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Motherhood is understood to be foundational to human relationships; the very ‘stuff’ of 
family law. However, rather than supported by the law, motherhood seems to exist in an 
uneasy tension with it. This thesis begins by exploring motherhood in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand, from both legal and historical perspectives. The welfare principle, devised 





century England, is examined as a legal transplant into New Zealand’s younger, more 
egalitarian and gender-equal society. The impact of the legislative introduction of gender 
neutrality into New Zealand parenting laws in 1980 (in a social context that valued gender 
equality) is considered. Competing feminist theories, seeking gender equality by either 
denying or embracing gender difference, provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
Feminism’s problem with essentialism, and the difficulties that arise when the law seeks 
gender equality by disregarding gender difference, are also explored.  
Particular attention is paid to how motherhood is understood and regarded within 
contemporary family law. With a focus on New Zealand family law, the impact of legal 
developments on motherhood are reviewed in relation to the specific issues of shared care 
parenting, relocation (at times regarded as an infringement upon shared care), gatekeeping, 
imprisonment and breastfeeding. It is clear that the voice and value of motherhood appears to 
have been diminished and compromised. The thesis concludes by considering whether a 
redemptive approach towards motherhood’s relationship with family law is possible. In 
particular, it examines whether the welfare and best interests principle enshrined in section 
4(1) of COCA would be better served by a repeal of section 4(3), a legislative provision 
which requires that in the application of the welfare and best interests principle, no 
recognition is to be given to a parent’s gender.  Such repeal may then arguably allow for an 
unrestrained consideration of the matrix of circumstances that determine the welfare and best 
interests of a child “in his or her particular circumstances” as required by section 4(2). This 
could thereby enable the law to legitimately accommodate the differences that both 
motherhood and fatherhood bring to parenting and, without compromising the value of 
fatherhood, enable a restoration to the law of the ability to consider, and dignify, the 
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This thesis explores the history, concept and understanding of motherhood and how it is 
currently regarded within contemporary family law, with a particular focus on New Zealand.  
Motherhood is significant because it is understood to be foundational to human relationships; 
the very ‘stuff’ of family law. However, rather than having its significance confirmed and 
supported by the law, it appears rather to exist in an uneasy tension with it. Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved provides, for example, a challenging literary critique of the law’s representations of 
motherhood,
1
 confronting the United States of America (US) legal system’s apparent 
inability, or unwillingness, to incorporate the voice of the mother into the construction of the 
law.
2
 Whether this is also true of family law in New Zealand therefore lies at the heart of the 
enquiry in this thesis.  
Firstly, however, what is ‘motherhood’ and what is its connection to the law? 
1.1 What does ‘motherhood’ mean?  
Motherhood is associated with women, a state of being and therefore a gendered concept. At 
the same time, in law it is associated with the function or role of caring for children and in 
this regard, gender may not be considered significant.  For example, the development of ‘the 
psychological parent’ by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit
3
 in the 1970s, and the scientific 
advances of the late 20
th
 century enabling in vitro birth technologies, created complexities 
that have challenged the significance to a child of a biological and / or gendered basis to the 
parenting relationship.  
Motherhood has been variously defined as ‘a female parent’,
4
 ‘maternal tenderness or 
affection’,
5
 ‘the qualities of a mother’,
6
 ‘the qualities characteristic of a mother’,
7
 and ‘the 
                                                          
1
 Toni Morrison Beloved (New York, Plume 1987). 
2
 Elizabeth Tobin “Imagining the Mother’s Text: Toni Morrison’s Beloved and Contemporary Law” 16 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 234 (1993); Andrea O’Reilly Toni Morrison and Motherhood: A Politics of the Heart  
(State University of New York Press, 2004). 
3
 J Goldstein,  A Freud &A Solnit Beyond the Best Interests of the Child  (New York: Free Press, 
1973). 
4
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary www.merriam-webster.com searched 26 April 2013. 
5
 Above note 1 
 2 
state of being a mother’.
8
 It is understood to be a gendered state of being vital to the origins 
and source of life itself, rooted in theology and anthropology.
9
 It is also considered to be a 
role,
10
 a socio-cultural product subject to historical fluctuations, but normatively defined.
11
  
Motherhood became what philosophers described as an “essentially contested concept”.
12
 
The feminist movement of the 1970s had difficulty in accommodating the reality of 
motherhood, identifying an unresolved issue as being the problem with maternal 
essentialism.
13
 Sanger describes how during this time motherhood, as a central but confusing 
icon within our social structures, became “at once dominating and dominated, much as 
mothers are both revered and regulated.”
14
 She further discusses how in legal scholarship the 
study of motherhood was avoided, perhaps being regarded as a suspicious subject choice. She 
also pointed to the difficulties of “theories of custody bec[oming] conceptually estranged 
from the business of mothering”.
15
 Accordingly, motherhood as the subject of law has not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6
 www.thefreedictionary.com searched 26 April 2013.  
7
 The Collins Concise Dictionary of the English Language 2
nd
 Ed (Collins, London and Glasgow, 1988) 
8
 Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Encyclopaedic Edition)(International Press, New 
York, 1977). 
9
Central to the Christian story is Mary, chosen by God to bear His son: “But the angel said to her, 'Do not be 
afraid, Mary, you have found favour with God. You will be with child and give birth to a son, and you are to 
give him the name Jesus. He will be great and will be called the Son of the Most High. The Lord God will give 
him the throne of his father David, and he will reign over the house of Jacob forever; his kingdom will never 
end”. (Luke 1: 30-33); Mary, mother of God, is honoured and deified worldwide by the Catholic Church’s 1.2 
billion members; a biblical theology of motherhood describes its significance to the central story, beginning 
with a statement that the seed of the woman will crush the serpent’s head (Gen 3:15), and ending with a 
depiction of a dragon trying to devour a woman and her male child (Rev 12:1–17). Julia Stonehouse Father’s 
Seed Mother’s Sorrow, e-book http://www.amazon.com/Fathers-Seed-Mothers-Sorrow-ebook/dp/B008I8ZZJC 
(2012) reviews anthropological reproduction theory and its impact on gender relations.  
10
 In Andrea Doucet’s book Do Men Mother? Fathering, Care and Domestic Responsibility (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006), her answer to the question “Do men mother?” was both yes and no. Yes, in 
the sense that men are capable of doing the work and assuming responsibility for the role and no in the sense 
that men live in some similar but also some different ways to women. In reviewing her work, Scott Neigh says 
that difference is not essential, but not trivial either and that it is not surprising there are gendered differences in 
parenting, as this is what gender is and how gendered relations presently work in the real world. 
11
 Helen Rhoades “The No-Contact mother; Reconstructions of motherhood in the era of the new Father” (2002) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 16: 71-94; Vanessa May “On Being a Good Mother: the 
Moral Presentation of Self in Written Life Stories” (2008) Sociology 42: 470-486; Carol Smart “Deconstructing 
Motherhood” in Good Enough Mothering: Feminist Perspectives on Lone Motherhood Elizabeth Silva (ed) 
(Routledge: London, 1996); Evelyn Nakarno Glenn “Social Constructions of Mothering: a Thematic Overview” 
in Mothering Ideology Experience and Agency E N Glenn, G Chang and L R Forcey (eds) (Routledge: NY 
1994) 1-29; Sharon Hays The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood  (Yale University Press, 1996); A C 
Henderson, F M Harmon and J Houser “A new state of surveillance: an application of Michael Foucault to 
modern motherhood” Surveillance and Society (2010) 7 231-247. 
12
 W. B. Gallie “Essentially Contested Concepts” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (56) (1) (1956) 167-
198. 
13
 See discussion in Carol Sanger “M is for Many Things” 1992 1 S Cal. Rev. Law & Women’s Studies 15-67.  
14
 Sanger, above note 13, at 17. 
15
 Sanger, above note 13, at 24; Sanger also considered at 27 that legal scholarship with respect to motherhood 
in the end developed in part because of the influence of other disciplines; for example, economics where women 
and children were found to be less well off after family breakdown, as discussed by Lenore J Weitzman in “The 
Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in 
 3 
been clear-cut. In some jurisdictions, such as in France, it is a gestational state, though not 
always biological, as a result of advances in human assisted reproduction and surrogacy.
16
 
This enables maternity to be more easily separated out from motherhood and able to be 
renounced beyond birth. In other jurisdictions, maternity is inextricably linked to the 
relationship between mother and child beyond birth.
17
 For example, in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and New Zealand, a woman who has given birth cannot refuse legal motherhood, 
oppose registration of her name on the birth certificate,
18




The purpose of the thesis is therefore to explore the different ways in which motherhood has 
been portrayed in law and social policy, and to propose a way forward to enable motherhood 
to play its role in family law.   
1.2 Research focus and its significance 
Throughout the broad sweep of history and related disciplines, including the law, can be 
found instruction with respect to the issue of motherhood. In one sense, it transcends culture; 
in another, it is a cultural construct. That is, it is a cultural imperative that has constructed 
women as natural caregivers.
20
 Motherhood is understood to be of profound significance to 
children, and it instinctively seems important. The implications of such understandings for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
America” (1985), the exploration of why women mother by Nancy Chodorow in The Reproduction of 
Mothering : Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978) and the issue of family justice by Susan Okin 
in Justice Gender and the Family (1989). 
16
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (NZ); Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008(UK). 
17
 Michael Freeman and Alice Margaria in “Who and What is a Mother? Maternity, Responsibility and Liberty” 
Theoretical Enquiries in Law, The Cegla Centre for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law, Tel Aviv University, 
Vol 13 No 1 Jan 2012 discuss the approaches of different legal systems to this question; for example, in France 
the institution of accouchement sous X provides women with the choice to give birth anonymously and not 
become legal mothers yet in the UK and New Zealand, giving birth implies motherhood and automatically 
carries with it attaching legal responsibilities; see also Michael Freeman Understanding Family Law (2007) 
164-66; see too Jonathan Herring with respect to the idea that welfare and best interests should be measured not 
atomistically but according to relationship with another, that is ‘relationship-based welfare’, and that ‘well-
being’ can only sensibly be defined by reference to the nexus of relationships in which humans exist, as 
discussed in Chapter Six. These are ideas which Herring suggests form no part of most lawyers’ understanding 
and application of the welfare principle. J J W Herring and Charles Foster, “Welfare means relationality, virtue 
and altruism” (2012) Legal Studies 480.  
18
 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 (UK); Sections 5 and 9 Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships 
Registration Act 1995 (NZ).  
19
 Sections 152 and 154 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) with respect to failing to provide the necessities of life and 
abandonment of a child under 6; see also Carol Sanger on the differences between abandonment and separation 
in “Mother from Child: Perspectives in Separation and Abandonment” in Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and 
the Legal Regulations of Motherhood Martha Fineman and Isabel Karpen (eds) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995). 
20
 Alison Diduck and Felicity Kaganas Family Law, Gender and the State (Hart Publishing, 2012) at 127. 
 4 
family law therefore warrant exploration. This includes the emergence of the welfare 
principle in late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century England, and its legal transplant from its 
jurisdiction of origin into that of New Zealand. The rise and fall of the ‘tender years doctrine’ 
in England and the ‘mother principle’ in New Zealand also warrant consideration in light of 
the current gender-neutral parenting provision contained in section 4(3) of the Care of 
Children Act 2004 (COCA).
21
  
The culture of rights that has developed with respect to separated fathers is also relevant. That 
is, an understanding of equality that provides that a father has an equal right with the mother 
to provide day-to-day care to his child when the mother and father no longer live together. As 
well, the interpretation placed on the mother’s voice, speaking on behalf of her child, is 
explored,
22
 and consideration given to whether motherhood has been compromised by these 
developments in the law.  
Clearly, a tension exists between motherhood and the law. This is linked to the recent 
emphasis in various jurisdictions (including New Zealand, Australia, and England and Wales) 
on the development of separated parenting shared care regimes.
23
 This is irrespective of the 
confirmation by New Zealand’s higher Courts of the ‘no a priori assumptions’ approach to 
determining a child’s welfare and best interests,
24
 and the effects of imposing a shared care 
regime where a conflicted post-separation co-parenting relationship exists.
25
  
The law in New Zealand requires a welfare and best interests assessment to be undertaken 
without any prior assumptions being made and without any relevant factors being given 
additional presumptive weight, when it seeks to determine a parenting outcome for a child.
26
 
However, while the New Zealand Court of Appeal in D v S
27
 specifically rejected the UK 
approach in Payne v Payne
28
 that the mother’s health and happiness in seeking to relocate as 
the primary caregiver should be given a greater weight than any other relevant factor, the 
New Zealand Family Court at the same time began informally moving in a direction that was 
                                                          
21
 Section 4(3) Care of Children Act 2004 says: “For the purposes of this section, and regardless of a child’s age, 
it must not be presumed that placing the child in the day-to-day care of a particular person will, because of that 
person’s sex, best serve the welfare and best interests of the child”. 
22
 ‘Shared care’ carries a variety of meanings and has developed in different ways in a number of western 
jurisdictions. This is discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
23
 See Chapter Seven. 
24
 See Chapter Seven. 
25
 See Chapter Seven. 
26
 Section 4 Care of Children Act 2004, as confirmed by D v S [2002] NZFLR 116 and Kacem v Bashir [2010] 
NZFLR 884 (SC). 
27
 D v S [2002] NZFLR 116 
28
 Payne v Payne [2001] 2 WLR 1826; [2002] EWCA Civ 166 
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effectively contrary to this appellate direction. 
29
 It began developing a two-pronged approach 
which arguably saw a mirror image of the Payne situation emerging in New Zealand, 
notwithstanding the ruling of the Court of Appeal in D v S.
30
 This was because the Family 
Court began to prefer shared care parenting over the one home primary carer model. It 
appeared to equate the desirable norm of the then section 5(b) of COCA,
31
 that of providing 
to a child a relationship with both parents, with the provision of a shared care arrangement. 
This also seemed to satisfy the outcome sought by the fathers’ rights groups, that the need to 
preserve and strengthen a child’s relationship with his/her father, and therefore being in a 
child’s welfare and best interests, should be provided by an equal time shared care 
arrangement.
32
 As a result, relocation (often by mothers seeking to return to the wider 
maternal family after separation) became increasingly difficult to achieve.
33
 Further, the 
existence of inter-parental conflict was no longer regarded as a barrier to separated shared 
care parenting, but rather something to be managed in its introduction and maintenance.
34
 
The provision of a relationship with both parents through shared care took an elevated and 
informally presumptive position in separated care considerations by the Family Court. As a 
corollary, the Family Court did not give a great deal of consideration to the voice of the 
mother expressing concerns, firstly, about the effect of the shared care arrangement on her 
child and, secondly, about her own ability to cope with a conflicted parenting arrangement 
that may have been exacerbated by the imposition of shared care. The mother was rather at 
risk of being regarded as alienating the child from the father, even in circumstances of 
                                                          
29
 This was detected by Priestley J in Downing v Stamford [2008] NZFLR 678 as the tension that had been 
developing between the High Court and the Family Court as to the correct emphasis required by the Care of 
Children Act 2004 of the factors relevant to a welfare and best interest enquiry with respect to relocation, 
continued to intensify. In addition, the Court of Appeal in D v S (No 1)[2002] NZFLR 116 expressly rejected the 
Payne v Payne approach, that is, that the emotional and psychological wellbeing of the primary carer should be 
accorded particular weight. Richardson J observed that “it is not a long step to the assumption that the happiness 
of the relocating parent will meet the best interests of the child’s welfare”. This view was reiterated post COCA 
by Winkelmann J in the appellate decision of LH v PH [2007] NZFLR 737. She noted that: “The Judge would 
have erred if he had addressed the application focusing on the issue of the mother’s emotional wellbeing as the 
primary or central issue for him”. The risk became, however, that the emotional health and happiness of the 
mother as a relevant factor in determining a child’s welfare and best interests, was given too little weight in a 
child’s welfare and best interest’s assessment. See also Chapter Eight. 
30
 D v S above note 27. 
31
 This section has since been revised, and is now incorporated in section 5(e) of the Care of Children Act 2004. 
See the Care of Children Amendment Act (No 2) 2013. 
32
 See Pauline Tapp and Nicola Taylor “Relocation: a Problem or a Dilemma?” (2008) 6NZFLJ 94. 
33
 Above note 32; see also Taylor, Gollop and Henaghan, above note 470; N J Taylor and M Freeman (2012) 
“The Gender Agenda and Relocation Disputes” International Family Law, June, 184-191.  
34





 The mother could also be regarded as ‘gatekeeping’ the father’s 
relationship with the child, or otherwise being obstructive if she resisted embracing equal 
time shared care.
36
 Conflicted and / or equivocal social science views, particularly between 
those of Joan Kelly and others who prioritised the development of shared care,
37
 and Judith 
Wallerstein and others who prioritised the protection of a child’s primary attachment,
38
 
compounded the difficulties. The 2003 decision of Baragwanath J in L v A
39
 promoted 
management of parental conflict to enable shared care to be imposed notwithstanding the 
existence of parental conflict, in preference to earlier judicial acknowledgements that such 
conflict mitigated against the practical viability and emotional safety of shared care for a 
child. This provided judicial appellate support for the Family Court moving in the direction 
of shared care despite misgivings being expressed, particularly by mothers, to the point where 
practitioners considered that it had become the informally preferred outcome in any contested 
separated parenting matter, including where parental conflict was evident; that is, an informal 
presumption in favour of shared care, by the elevation of the importance of the child’s 
relationship with the father pursuant to the then section 5(b) of COCA, had started to operate 
within the Family Court in New Zealand. Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Kacem v 
                                                          
35
 “The alienating mother” and this theory’s rise to prominence within family law is discussed by Christine 
Harrison “Implacably Hostile or Appropriately Protective? Women Managing Child Contact in the context of 
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 confirming again the no prior assumptions approach to a section 4 welfare and best 
interests enquiry, this decision is regarded as being in respect of relocation and therefore one 
step removed from a decision regarding separated care arrangements. However, confirmation 
by the Supreme Court of the paramountcy of the welfare and best interests test pursuant to 
section 4 of COCA, without any prior weighting of relevant principles pursuant to section 5 
of COCA, is as equally applicable to decisions with respect to post-separation parenting 
arrangements as it is to relocation.  
Accordingly, changes in New Zealand’s family law since the 1970s have meant that what 
may have been self-evident truths about motherhood expressed by the cases of the time,
41
 no 
longer had any place in modern family law. In addition, what was intended by the ‘no 
presumption’ rule with respect to parenting gender, originally devised in the UK to protect a 
mother and child from the power of possession and ownership by the father,
42
 has become a 
basis on which to build a separated parenting model based on equality irrespective of the 
reality that mothering and fathering is usually neither genderless nor gender neutral. The 
‘tender years doctrine’
43
 of the UK, and the ‘mother principle’
44
 and ‘same-sex’ rule in New 
Zealand were only rules of thumb and did not have the force of legal rules. However, whether 
this meant that they should be completely supplanted by a preference for gender-neutral 
shared care parenting needs consideration. There also appears to be little account in law given 
to differences between motherhood and fatherhood. How a child may respond to and need to 




A discussion of these developments in this thesis is framed by an examination of the 
theoretical frameworks of relevant aspects of feminism. Through three waves over the last 
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45
 See Chapter Seven. 
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150 years, feminism has sought gender equality in the law of western jurisdictions. In pursuit 
of such outcomes, one feminist theoretical framework sought to deny gender difference and 
its effects, particularly with respect to child bearing. At the same time, it has faced an 
insoluble problem with the concept of maternal essentialism, which supports the notion of a 
unique genetic, biological, emotional and gendered connection between a mother and child.
46
 
There are also other theoretical frameworks at play. One recognises gender difference is 
central to the pursuit of gender equality; another points to the gendered power structure which 
needs to be overcome if gender equality is to be achieved.
47
 These frameworks are all 
foundationally relevant to motherhood and how it has come to be regarded within 
contemporary family law, and are therefore deserving of further exploration.
48
 
This work would be incomplete without some reference to the effect of deeper themes within 
the law, and how these might influence the issue of motherhood and its relationship with 
family law.
49
 The Hart-Fuller debate is a good starting place. An exchange between Lon 
Fuller and H.L.A. Hart, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1958, on morality and law
50
  
marked the divide between legal positivism and natural law philosophy. Hart argued that 
morality and law were separate, while Fuller argued that morality was the source of the law’s 
binding power. Essentially, positivism provides a separation between the law as it is and the 
law as it should be, and legal rights and moral rights are not related. Hart believed the method 
of deciding cases through logic or deduction is not necessarily wrong, just as it is not 
necessarily right to decide cases according to social or moral aims. Legality was not 
determined by morality but by social practice, and interpretation of the words used in the 
legislation was key to judicial application of rules.  On the other hand, Fuller’s view was that 
law was not neutral, but embodied its own inner morality; therefore the creation of law could 
only be based on natural laws or common morals, or it could not be said to be law at all. That 
is, the law is seen as based on its purpose, not just on the meaning of the words, and that 
imbued in the law itself is the existence and content of morality. However, philosophical 
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debates, particularly legal philosophical debates, are not usually about just the one issue, and 
as Shapiro says, this continuing debate:
51
  
… concerns such disparate issues as the existence of judicial discretion, the role of 
policy in adjudication, the ontological foundations of rules, the possibility of 
descriptive jurisprudence, the function of the law, the objectivity of value, the 
vagueness of concepts, and the nature of legal interference. 
Shapiro notes that the debate has continued because it is centred around one of the most 
profound questions with respect to the philosophy of the law, that is, the relationship between 
law and morality.
52
 Accordingly, for the purposes of this thesis I discuss whether family law, 
and in particular section 4 of COCA with respect to the paramountcy of a child’s welfare and 
best interests, should be seen as imbued with, or informed by, natural law and morality in 
relation to motherhood (and also fatherhood), or whether it should be based in and interpreted 




There are other foundational values at play. Eekelaar argues that respect, while not easy to 
discern, is a pivotal value in the law governing personal or family relationships.
54
 He 
discusses Stephen Darwall’s two kinds of respect: ‘recognition respect’ giving appropriate 
recognition to people as people, and ‘appraisal respect’ as being not for everyone, but in 
circumstances of high regard or special excellence.
55
 Eekelaar also approves of the distinction 
drawn by Bird
56
 between respect for persons, and respecting difference between people. 
While this is in the context of cultural difference, I will discuss the need for family law to 
respect the differences between motherhood and fatherhood. Eekelaar points to Dworkin’s 
prescriptions of equality as not requiring concern and respect. Yet there is significance in 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ stating 
not that “everyone has the right to his private and family life” but rather that “everyone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life”. Eekelaar describes the insertion of the 
word “respect” as giving the statement an important character of timeless quality, having 
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value in and of itself,
57
 and arguably this includes a respect for motherhood as a component 
part of everyone’s “private and family life”.
58
  
Honneth, in his theory of recognition, discusses the three aspects of love, rights and 
solidarity.
59
 While beyond the scope of this thesis, the importance of, and respect for, 
motherhood’s contribution to a child’s development with respect to the corresponding 
component parts of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, should not be overlooked.  
In a similar way, Waldron stresses the importance of dignity, understood as a status defining 
a person’s relation to law and his or her capability of presenting and arguing a point of view, 
and responding to the law's demands.
60
 He defines status as ‘a legal condition characterised 
by distinctive rights, duties, liabilities, powers, and disabilities’ which ‘attaches to a person 
when their occupying a certain position is a matter of public concern’ and traces the term 
‘dignity’ from its Roman origins to its current use, marking a gradual equalisation of status 
between people.
61
 Accordingly, the responsibility accompanying the status of each of 
motherhood and fatherhood should therefore require each to protect the dignity of themselves 
and that of the other.  
Trust is a further significant and relevant value to any consideration of motherhood. 
Henaghan discusses this in relation to health care professionals
62
 and describes an erosion of 
trust as having the potential to dehumanise the unique relationship that has traditionally 
existed between healthcare professionals and their patients. I argue that care to protect against 
the erosion of trust, and the dehumanising by the law of the unique mother-child relationship, 
is therefore also a relevant matter.  
Accordingly, this thesis considers the need for the law to take care not to mechanise 
relationships that, at their very core, are founded in the intimacy of human relationships and 
based in the values of dignity, respect and trust. Herring’s theory of a relationship-based 
welfare principle
63
 is consistent with this aspiration and relevant to a consideration of 
motherhood and the mother-child relationship. He argues that “families, and society in 
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general, are based on mutual co-operation and support.”
64
 He also says that such relationships 
should be fair and just, and that placing unacceptable or unrealistic demands on a parent do 
not further a child’s welfare.
65
 
Drawing on an examination of history, philosophy, legislation and case law as it relates to 
motherhood in both the UK and New Zealand, I will illustrate how motherhood is now 
viewed in contemporary child care and parenting law in New Zealand. This includes a brief 
discussion of the Māori perspective, including the concept of whāngai, and an examination of 
legal trends with respect to the contexts of shared care parenting and relocation, and the 
issues of gatekeeping, imprisonment and breastfeeding. I discuss the implications and 
examine whether the law should continue to adopt its current gender neutral approach in 
determining a child’s welfare and best interests in matters of parenting, or whether the law 
should consider recovering its ability to recognise again the unique contribution to parenting 
made by motherhood.  
1.3 Personal background to this research  
I am a New Zealand family lawyer based in Tauranga. I attended the University of Otago’s 
Law School in the 1970s when women students were a minority and the classes were small. 
We were taught well, we were regarded as our male counterparts’ equal and our gender 
seemed largely irrelevant. Then, in the 1980s, I became a mother and was challenged by the 
transformative power of the experience. However, I had difficulty in integrating my deepest 
feelings of motherhood with what liberal feminism
66
 had sought to teach me, and which by 
then was also influencing family law. As a result, I determined to make my own way as a 
young professional married woman, still in the world of work, but at the same time 
prioritising what I sensed was my more important task, that of mothering my children. I 
began to see an emerging paradox between the application of New Zealand’s separated 
parenting legislation and what was happening on the ground. My lecturers’ legacy led me to 
wrestle with the practical realities of legal practice in the family law field, and its disconnect 
from real-life mothers and fathers faced with needing to make arrangements for the care of 
their children following the breakdown of their relationship. The 1999 W v C decision,
67
 close 
to home as it involved a local family and local family law practitioners, was a watershed. The 
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judicial influence of Judge Inglis QC out of that decision profoundly affected the 
introduction, direction and thrust of COCA in 2004.
68
 While Parliament had, in 2000, 
rejected Muriel Newman’s Shared Parenting Bill
69
 seeking to introduce equal shared care 
between parents as the default position upon separation, the new legislation subsequently 
pushed towards the normalisation of separated shared care parenting arrangements. Much of 
this was driven by the activism of fathers’ groups, who rebadged the equality sought by 
liberal feminism as a welfare and best interests issue with respect to the father-child 
relationship. That is, a child’s relationship with the father was the same, equal to and equally 
as important to the child as that with the mother and this was best recognised by an equal 
time shared care arrangement. Cultural feminism, pursuing equality between men and women 
through recognition of difference,
70
 gained little traction. As a result, the movement towards 
equal time shared day-to-day care began to develop as the preferred mechanism to provide to 
a child an equality of parenting relationships as being in their welfare and best interests. 
These arrangements did not assess the different contributions that a mother and father could 
each make to the parenting of their child;
71
 rather they appeared to work from a position of 
equality in function by each of them, able to be shared by a care arrangement between two 
homes with time being split between the mother and father as nearly equally as possible. 
However, the fathering, particularly of young children, appeared to require the ongoing 
support and input of the mother such that the majority of the care actually continued to be 
shouldered by her. This did not sit easily with the premise that parenting function was the 
same, it was to be split equally between mothers and fathers and gender was irrelevant. This 
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was not the reality in practice, nor was it consistent with the more traditional understanding 
that mothering and fathering contributed different functions to the upbringing of a child.
72
 
By the early 2000s, the law in New Zealand had been saying for a long time that no 
assessment of the welfare and best interests of a child could be determined by reference to the 
gender of the parent.
73
 The reasons for this are explored later in the thesis. It is noteworthy, 
though, that within the law there appears such a clear expression of gender neutrality in a 
field where, in reality, there may be a clear gender difference.  
In addition, as shared care parenting began to develop, the issue of relocation of children in 
New Zealand family law became highly contested,
74
 and diverged significantly from the 
position in England and Wales.
75
 This included circumstances where one parent, (usually the 
mother), was seeking to return with her children to the support and care of the wider maternal 
family, and even where she provided the majority of the day-to-day care. It also included 
both domestic and international relocations.
76
 This tension, between the law and its 
application by the Family Court, led me to complete a Masters in Law dissertation, exploring 
the trends that were developing in the area of child relocation.
77
 The subsequent Supreme 
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Court decision of Kacem v Bashir
78
 assisted in correcting the slow creep into the Family 
Court that had been identified as an informal and incorrect presumptive weighting in favour 
of an ongoing relationship with the non-relocating parent (usually the father), contrary to the 
correct non-presumptive welfare and best interests test intended by sections 4 and 5 of 
COCA. Nonetheless, motherhood and its importance to a child was no longer spoken of as 
present or self-evident as it had been in the past.
79
 Motherhood was no longer really spoken 
of at all. It had become genderless. This is in contrast to a recognition of the importance of 
fathers and fatherhood through the movement during the 2000s that had gained considerable 
momentum, not only in New Zealand but also in other western jurisdictions including 
Australia, the US, Canada and the UK. Much of the emphasis on fathers and fathering was 
sound,
80




1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is concerned with motherhood and its relationship with family law, and is divided 
into the following chapters:  
Chapter Two: The background and social context of motherhood is examined in this chapter. 
I traverse motherhood in the UK and New Zealand, from both historical and legal 
perspectives, and outline the historical development and significance of marriage as the 
context where motherhood was initially located. A mother’s place within and without this 
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institution, together with an understanding of the UK’s history of the absolute ownership and 
control of children by the father, is also explored.  
Chapter Three: In this chapter, the historical enquiry into motherhood continues. The 
response of the law to the inequity of the absolute ownership by the husband of his wife and 
children is explored through the development of its equitable parens patriae jurisdiction, the 
welfare principle, the ‘tender years doctrine’ in England and the development of the ‘mother 
principle’ in New Zealand, a jurisdiction that had adopted the common law tradition of the 
UK, and assumed many of the UK’s statutes as its own. The circumstances surrounding the 
emergence of the welfare principle in England and its original purpose, to protect the mother-
child relationship, are discussed. Motherhood is then explored through an historical tracing of 
the relevant statutory legal framework and associated case law between the UK and New 
Zealand. This includes recognition of the movement from mothering within marriage, to a 
more neutrally framed and individualised state of parenthood. Issues of morality, 
illegitimacy, gender and adoption as relevant to motherhood are also examined. 
Chapter Four: This chapter explores the state of contemporary motherhood and its 
relationship and recognition by current family law, statute, policy and context. Surrogacy and 
human assisted artificial reproduction are also discussed within the context of socially and 
legally constructed motherhood. Reference is then made to the current separated parenting 
environment from a descriptive, statistical and policy point of view. The thesis context also 
requires that family demographic trends be discussed. This is done by reference to reports by 
the Ministry of Social Development
82
 and the Population Studies Centre at Waikato 
University,
83
 as well as statistical information.
84
 
Chapter Five: The theoretical frameworks underpinning this thesis, with a particular focus 
on competing feminist theories, are next considered as foundational to understanding the 
gender-neutral developments found in New Zealand’s contemporary family law, and the 
impact of such developments upon motherhood. This chapter also highlights feminism’s 
problem with essentialism, and the difficulties that arise when the law seeks gender equality 
by disregarding gender difference.   
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Chapter Six: This chapter considers the law’s response to the unique role of motherhood 
through a discussion of the welfare principle as a legal transplant from the UK into New 
Zealand, an egalitarian social context very different to that of England. While not initially 
discernible, a divergence between jurisdictions became evident from the 1970s onwards, 
notwithstanding the transplanted welfare principle being apparently both identical and 
foundational to family law in both jurisdictions. Discussion of the welfare principle as it has 
developed in each jurisdiction then follows. Originally understood as based on the intimate 
relationship between mother and child, it arguably developed into a gender-neutral, rights-
based concept. This has led to tensions in the law as it seeks to engage in a gender-neutral 
way with issues that nonetheless remain gendered. Differences between masculine and 
feminine ways of moral reasoning, and Gilligan’s original notion of the ethic of care, as 
distinct from the ethic of justice, are explored. Herring’s ‘relationship-based’ view of the 
welfare principle is discussed and whether motherhood may have been compromised by the 
law by a loss of the Herring approach, is considered.  
Chapter Seven: Building upon the previous chapters, this chapter explores family law’s 
response to motherhood within the legal context of gender-neutral separated parenting, 
through the phenomenon and development of the concept of shared care separated parenting 
across a number of jurisdictions, including England, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
The effect of the imposition of shared care arrangements upon motherhood, in light of 
underlying feminist theories seeking equality between mothers and fathers, includes tracing 
the tension that has arisen in the social science field as the same issue has been grappled with 
in that arena. There, it was initially concerned with the impact upon very young children of 
the introduction of overnight care or contact arrangements that took a child away from their 
primary attachment figure, who is usually the mother. More recently, this has been modified 
to recognise that the issue is not so much overnight stays away from a primary attachment 
figure. Rather, the issue is the importance, firstly, of the constancy of emotional nurturance 
and attunement being readily available to a young child, which is usually provided by the 
mother and, secondly, the need for a low conflict or conflict-free co-parenting relationship 
being developed between separated parents.  
Chapter Eight: This chapter continues the exploration of motherhood and contemporary 
family law in New Zealand, this time through the lens of relocation. Family law disputes 
associated with this issue are regarded as some of the most controversial and difficult issues 
to be found within current parenting law. The situation has commonly involved a mother 
 17 
wishing to return home to the support of her family after the breakdown of the parenting 
relationship and, as the primary care-giver, seeking to take the children with her. At times, 
relocation was regarded as an infringement upon an existing shared care arrangement, or the 
implementation of such an arrangement, when tension between motherhood and the law 
increased. The different approaches to judicial relocation decision-making that emerged 
during the 2000s between the UK and New Zealand are examined, and linked to the 
fundamentally different bases upon which the welfare principle rests in each jurisdiction. The 
relevant case law in New Zealand is traced, through to the corrective provided by the 
Supreme Court in 2010 and subsequent legislative amendments in 2013 to the Care of 
Children Act 2004. The impact upon motherhood is reflected in the ebb and flow of 
relocation statistics during the 20 year period from the early 1990s to 2014.   
Chapter Nine: The developments outlined in the preceding Chapters Seven and Eight may 
have resulted in a diminished or negative view of motherhood by the law. This chapter 
considers these concerns by examination of a further aspect of motherhood and family law, 
that of the concept of ‘gatekeeping’. The possibility of a constructive understanding of 
motherhood to emerge out of a previously negatively-viewed paradigm of gatekeeping is also 
explored.  
Chapter Ten: In this chapter, three specific Family Court interventions are discussed, where 
the court seeks to a) impose and address the development of a child’s relationship with a 
father through directed contact with him in circumstances where the mother is the primary 
caregiver; b) the situation contains allegations of domestic violence and; c) the parenting 
relationship is conflicted. These examples highlight mothers’ responses through 
‘gateclosing’, and the law’s apparent increased disregard for the voice and views of 
motherhood in such circumstances. It is a low point for motherhood within contemporary 
family law, with the imposition by the Family Court of terms of imprisonment upon some 
mothers for disobeying court-directed contact orders with fathers. 
Chapter Eleven: This chapter explores motherhood’s relationship with family law through 
an exploration of breastfeeding, a matter uniquely associated with motherhood, and a matter 
relevant to human flourishing. It also has the capacity to create tension within the context of 
gender-neutral shared care separated parenting arrangements. A number of recent family law 
cases are examined, where differing judicial approaches to the issue can be discerned.   
 18 
Chapter Twelve: This final chapter discusses the themes and issues that have emerged in the 
earlier chapters, considers their implications, and draws conclusions to help point the way 
forward in legal policy and practice. It analyses contemporary family law’s gender-neutral 
approach to separated parenting, the loss of recognition of motherhood by the law as being of 
unique value to a child, and the appropriateness or otherwise of section 4(3) of COCA 
continuing to form a part of New Zealand’s separated parenting legislative regime. It then 
draws conclusions, and discusses the possibility of the law adopting a redemptive approach 
towards motherhood. In particular, it examines whether the welfare and best interests 
principle enshrined in section 4(1) of COCA would be better served by a repeal of section 
4(3), thereby allowing for an unrestrained consideration of the matrix of circumstances that 
determine the welfare and best interests of a child “in his or her particular circumstances.”
85
 
This could thus enable the law to legitimately consider the differences that both motherhood 
and fatherhood bring to parenting, and further enable a restoration to the law of the ability to 
consider the significance of the mother-child relationship as a discrete welfare and best 
interests factor. 
I now turn to Chapter Two, which traces the history and relationship between motherhood 
and marriage, socially and as reflected in the early common law, in both the UK and New 
Zealand. It identifies periods of prominence and protection of motherhood, on the one hand, 
and periods of anonymity and lack of recognition on the other. 
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Chapter Two 
The History of Motherhood I: Tracing the Development of Social and 
Public Policy 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the social history and development of public policy with respect to 
motherhood. The late Judge Inglis QC, one of New Zealand’s foremost family law jurists, 
said that the foundations of family law were based in marriage and parentage through 
marriage.
86
 It is accordingly difficult to historically trace the social and public policy 
framework with respect to motherhood without, at the same time, identifying the relevance 
and history of the institutions of marriage and divorce, and the issues of illegitimacy and 
adoption. It also follows that issues with respect to motherhood were addressed socially and 
by the law as being either within or outside of marriage, at least initially. This chapter 
therefore considers the context that marriage historically provided to the social, policy and 
legal development of the status of motherhood, culminating in an examination of the social 




 centuries when the value of motherhood appeared to be at its zenith. 
The development of the legal frameworks of both England and New Zealand with respect to 
marriage as a context for motherhood, the move towards ‘no fault’ divorce, and its impact 
upon motherhood are also explored. The chapter then examines, both socially and through the 
law, the effect of divorce upon motherhood, and motherhood outside the context of marriage, 
that is, illegitimacy and adoption. With respect to New Zealand, a brief discussion is included 
on whāngai
87
 and the Māori perspective. The chapter concludes by traversing the historical 
development of motherhood as a gendered role. Issues of gender inequality were quite 
apparent in England over this time, while in New Zealand, where social history was still in its 
infancy but appearing to be founded in a greater egalitarianism, equality appeared to be a key 
and central social driver. These issues foreshadow the tensions that were to arise with respect 
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to gender equality, both socially and within the law, to which motherhood (and fatherhood) 
remain central (even) today.  
2.1 Marriage as the social, legal and public policy context for motherhood 
Sir William Blackstone said, as early as 1765, that ‘the establishment of marriage in all 
civilised states is based upon this natural obligation of the father to provide for his 
children’.
88
 It was the marriage relationship between man and woman that was the context 
into which children were to be born, and therefore where motherhood was naturally to be 
found. However, it is not easy to identify the origins of marriage. Pollock and Maitland 
discuss some evidence of marriage from early Teutonic times and also from Hindu law which 
suggested ‘marriage by capture’;
89
 the marriage was valid if the woman consented. The 
alternative was marriage by sale of the mund or protectorship of the woman. This would 
contractually provide to her, in return, honour as her husband’s consort. The ancient Greeks 
appeared to regard the issue of marriage as being ‘a matter of paternal wishes and economic 
considerations’, and that Athenian women, defined by their childbearing function and 
motherhood role, were in need of protection.
90
 
In Anglo Saxon times (recorded from the reign of Aethelbert AD 570-616), legal structures 
were based on kinship and family groups.
91
 Historian Lawrence Stone, in reviewing patterns 
of English family structure, pointed to kinship as having originally been the main organising 
principle of society. This declined with the rise of the modern state, when some of the 
family’s economic and social functions were taken over by government.
92
 At the same time, 
the ancient roots of patriarchal power were strengthening within the family, informed by its 
pre-existing condition but also encouraged as a device to develop state and political control, 
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and nurtured by a widespread acceptance of Christian morality and teaching.
93
 Married 
women were regarded not as subservient, but as having independent status. Value was placed 
on their childbearing capacity and motherhood, and also on their economic contribution to the 
family unit and settlements were made to them on separation or upon becoming widowed.
94
 
However feudalism, based on a hierarchical system of land ownership, influenced the 
development of men’s power, emerging from land ownership, as being superior to the 
women’s position as reproducers of heirs, necessary to provide legitimacy and continuity to 
the land ownership system.
95
 Women were accordingly again seen as needing protection and 
‘coverture’ to enable them to fulfil this motherhood role. Blackstone described this in the 
following terms:
96 
… by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, 
and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-French a 
femme-covert; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her 
husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her 
coverture. Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend 
almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the 
marriage. I speak not at present of the rights of property, but of such as are merely 
personal. For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into 
covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to 
covenant with her, would be only to covenant with himself: and therefore it is also 
generally true, that all compacts made between husband and wife, when single, are 
voided by the intermarriage. 
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While motherhood was recognised and valued, the children who resulted from the marriage 
belonged to the husband and father, because the wife and mother had no separate legal 
identity. 
Marriage, to create the context for motherhood, was historically a simple customary process. 
Two forms of promise were possible; a promise in the present tense (sponsalia per verba 
praesenti) was a valid and indissoluble marriage from the time of promise, while a promise in 
the future tense (sponsalia per verba de futuro) prohibited marriage with anyone else, but 
was not a marriage as such. However, if sexual intercourse took place after such latter 
promise, the marriage became valid and indissoluble.
97
 Amongst the aristocracy, marriage 
was often arranged and designed to increase property and wealth; amongst the poorer classes, 
informal marriages were endorsed by customs such as hand-fasting and broomstick 
ceremonies.
98
 Marriage was accordingly a private contract between a man and a woman with 
little, if any, link to the law or to the church.
99
 It was not until the Middle Ages that marriage 
began to emerge as an institution of the Christian Church, with its prerequisites of consent 
and conjugality. In establishing its jurisdiction, the Church also developed the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity, the practice of calling for banns of marriage, and required that 
marriage be solemnised in a church and conducted by a priest.
100
  
To settle debts, William the Conqueror separated canon and common law, thereby 
strengthening the position of the church in Rome with respect to marriage being the domain 
of the church. The theory of unity between man and woman from Genesis
101
 was 
incorporated into the canons and ecclesiastical laws in England. This concept of oneness was 
recognised by Bracton in the 13
th
 century, Sir Edward Coke in the 17
th
 century and Sir 
William Blackstone, as above, in the 18
th
 century. Blackstone went on to say that “in the eyes 
of the law a husband and wife are one, and that one is the husband.”
102
 Thus, the English 
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ecclesiastical laws of marriage adopted and reinforced the ancient ideas of protection and 
ownership of husbands over their wives, and over the children born within this union. The 
Christian notion of marriage became foundational, central and pivotal to the ideas of equality 
and to gender roles, including motherhood. While these roles have become contested and 
politicised concepts in the centuries since, it is helpful to consider the development of the 
Christian foundation of marriage as a further important context for motherhood. 
2.2 Effect of the Christian view of marriage 
Christian teaching gave prominence to three purposes for the partnership of husband and wife 
in marriage: the procreation of children, the regulation of sexual activity and the mutuality in 
the giving and receiving of companionship, comfort and support.
103
 Wifely subjection and 
obedience was based in Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians,
104
 which reinforced the notions 
already held in scientific theory, that women were in many ways inferior to men. They were 
not as strong, less able to control their emotions and naturally unfitted for heavy work or 
public life. The husband also enjoyed legal supremacy over his wife, controlling her property. 
Husbands were, however, to honour their wives as the weaker vessels.
105
 Medieval 
theological scholars drew a distinction between the equality of the immortal soul irrespective 
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of sex, and earthly inequality. However, other writers such as Erasmus and Castiglione
106
 
suggested that women had equal intelligence and capacity for virtue, and women themselves 
began to write about their lack of educational opportunity.
107
 Mary Astell, an 18
th
 century 
conservative feminist, considered that the improvement of women was hampered by custom, 
poor education, and low and wrong aims including the attraction of men as an end in itself.
108
 
Yet, despite the call for better education for women, there was, at that time, no real extension 
proposed to the woman’s role. As Houlbrooke said: “While she sought to free women from 
the tyranny of fashion and custom, Astell insisted that the family was their proper sphere; 
they had no business with ‘the Pulpit, the Bar or St Stephen’s Chapel.’”
109
 Women’s capacity 
for virtue might be equal to men’s, but it was exercised in different areas, and in particular it 
was exercised in the area of motherhood. 
2.3 Gendered roles within marriage 
Christian marriage and social convention demanded that the wife address her husband with 




 century letters between husbands 
and wives as being marked on their face by compliance with such standards with respect to 
the salutations, but becoming increasing intimate and personal as female literacy grew. In 
conversation, particularly in lower social classes, a familiarity by wives towards their 
husbands was seen to develop, which raised the larger question of where the balance of 
power in families actually lay.
110
 Houlbrooke describes the identification by other writers of a 
woman commonly holding herself out as her husband’s equal notwithstanding the law and 
custom of the times, insisting on getting her own way and showing no more respect for her 
husband than she would for a servant.
111
 A woman’s will towards independence or mastery 
was also a common literary theme.
112
 
Despite this, married love was highly valued by the Christian church. St Thomas Aquinas in 
his Summa Theologica saw marriage as “a certain inseparable union of souls, by which 
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husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered.”
113
 The 
wedding ring symbolised love without end, and, while the duty of love was a mutual one, 
most Reformation writers regarded the greater responsibility for love resting on the 
husband.
114
 Husbands and wives were seen as different. God had given to the man “great wit, 
bigger strength, and more courage to compel the woman to obey by reason or force” and he 
had given to the woman “bewtie, faire countenaunce and sweete words to make the man obey 
her againe for loue.”
115
 The Church drew an uneasy distinction between sinful lust and 
conjugal love. This distinction was also found in secular romantic literature.
116
 Mutual 
married love existed in practice, as demonstrated by the intimate and shared nature of letters 
between husbands and wives that have survived from that era,
117
 marked by a shared 
enjoyment of sexual intimacy, high expectations of the relationship, close affection, 
loneliness without the other and a sense of humour. Married love became a highly valued 
ideal, demonstrated by the funeral inscriptions that began to develop upon the death of a 
spouse. The idea that marriage occupied a more central place in a woman’s life than that of 
the man, with her investing more into it, also became an accepted notion.
118
 Motherhood was 
seen not only as a natural consequence of this gendered marriage relationship, but also as 
central to its purpose. 
2.4 Marriage for the purpose of procreation 
It was the Christian church’s teaching that one of the major purposes of marriage was for the 
procreation of children. Socially, childlessness was regarded as a worse plight than having 
too many children, as the availability of child labour was important to the economies of many 
families. Parental affection was, in part, understood through possession, but however strong 
the paternal affection may have been, by the 16
th
 century maternal love was held to be 
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 A mother’s love for her child was described as “hardly contained within 
the bounds of reason”
120
 and what man “were able to endure that clamor, annoyance, and 
clutter which she goes through withoit complaint among poore nurslines, clothing, feeding, 
dressing and undressing, picking and clensing them; what is it save the instinct of love which 
enableth her hereto?”
121
 Mothers also played the greater part in a child’s early religious 
instruction and, by the end of the Reformation, this came to be regarded as her most 
important responsibility.
122
 The legacy of the Middle Ages with respect to the parent-child 
relationship was described by Houlbrooke in these terms:
123
 
Children were welcome gifts from God. Parental love was the most deeply rooted of 
all instincts, and showed itself especially in the mother’s tender loving care of the 
helpless baby. … There is much direct evidence of the reality of loving care in some 
families and of parental grief in face of the loss of children. Women of the upper 
classes did not generally suckle their own children … but this did not preclude care 
and solicitude in the choice and supervision of wet-nurses. … The quality of 
parenthood was not … determined by material circumstances alone. … The 
unquantifiable and still only partially understood elements of individual character 
were crucial in this period as they still are today. 
2.5 Civil and common law challenges to canon law with respect to marriage 
There were civil and common law challenges to canon law. During Henry VIII’s reign, the 
English Parliament passed the Marriage Act 1653 to address the uncertainty of a future 
promise to marry, on the basis that a promise to marry that was broken should not be a barrier 
to a later marriage, unless it had been followed by sexual intercourse. This was subsequently 
repealed by Edward VI, which resulted in promises to marry continuing as valid marriages, in 
addition to 17
th
 century attempts to record magistrate-sanctioned civil marriages. Therefore 
by the mid-18
th
 century, it had become difficult to identify a valid marriage. There were 
“three overlapping, occasionally hostile but generally exclusive jurisdictions – the Church, 
the State and customs enforced by the local community.”
124
 The increasing number of ‘Fleet 
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 and concerns by the church and the aristocracy about the lack of social 
control of the lower and working classes resulted in the passage of Lord Hardwicke’s 
Marriage Act in 1753, which then gave the established Church of England a virtual monopoly 
on marriage.
126
 There were detractors. The poet Percy Bysshe Shelley
127
 argued that 
religion’s emphasis on monogamy, with sexual relationships conducted only within marriage, 
was unnatural. Wheeler and Thompson considered marriage subordinated women, and 
believed gender equality was only possible through social groupings in which marriage had 
no place.
128
 There were subsequent reforms introduced by the Marriage Act 1823 to further 
regulate marriage and link it to the Births, Deaths and Marriage registration processes and 
consolidation of the Poor Laws.
129
 It was the Marriage Act 1836 which introduced civil 
ceremonies for marriage in addition to the church and emerged, as Cretney suggests, out of 
an analysis of the respective interests in marriage of each of the Church and State.
130
 The 
1836 Act remains the basis for modern laws of marriage and is reflected in New Zealand 
through the Marriage Act 1955, where every marriage ceremony held in a church or 
elsewhere, and conducted by a priest, celebrant or registrar, is a civil ceremony. This has now 
also been amended by the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 to 
introduce same-sex marriage.
131
 Thus, while marriage continues to exist, it can no longer be 
said that it is gendered, or the preferred social and legal context for motherhood.
132
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 S Cretney Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 9. 
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2.6 The rise of the nuclear family 
Stone describes how, between 1500 and 1750, the importance of the nuclear family and the 
centrality of motherhood within this structure increased as the political influence of 
surrounding kinship decreased.
133
 At the same time, the affective bonds of the family were 
seen to be strengthening, as its centrality as an economic unit declined. He sees these trends 
as reflective of three related issues of the time: the decline of kinship as the basis of societal 
organisation, the modern state rising and taking over some of the social and economic 
functions of family or kin, and the subordination of kin loyalty to the higher obligations of 
patriotism and allegiance to the sovereign. He also regarded the rise of Christian morality as 
influencing the role of the family towards that of a substitute parish.
134
 The power of the state 
was strengthened by the destruction of the political power of aristocratic kinship, while at the 
same time the state fostered the rise of patriarchy. This strengthened the power of the 
husband and the father within the family unit, seen by Reich as a situation where “in the 
figure of the father, the authoritarian state has its representative in every family, so that the 
family becomes the most important instrument of power”.
135
 The contemporaneous rise of the 
church’s sanctification of marriage and married love meant that the authority of a husband 
over his wife was strengthened with an increased readiness on the part of the wife to submit 
herself to such authority, including in her motherhood role, and this contributed to the rise of 
patriarchy. 
At first, as the kinship of the Middle Ages gave way to the nuclear family of the 17
th
 century, 
it became more patriarchal and authoritarian than ever before, with power flowing 
increasingly to the husband over his wife, and to the father over his children. Subsequently, 
influenced by a number of factors including the growth of affective bonds between husband, 
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wife and children and the influence of the Christian church, there continued a complex 
evolutionary process of the structure of marriage and family from this patriarchial 
authoritarianism towards what Stone describes as the more “companionate and egalitarian” 




 However, he then saw patriarchy returning after 1800. 
This had implications for the understanding of family gender roles, with the development of 
separate spheres of activity for men and women. Stone’s “companionate” marriage has been 
described by other writers not as a move away from patriarchy, but a ‘gentle tyranny’ in 
which male dominance was maintained, if somewhat more subtly.
137
 Shoemaker, for 
example, considers that recent research on family shies away from grand theories of change, 




2.7 The development of divorce  
Marriages did not always last and the context for motherhood was therefore not always 
secure. Stone records that at common law:
139
 
… a married woman was the nearest approximation in a free society to a slave. Her 
person, her property, both real and personal, her earnings, and her children all passed 
on marriage to the absolute control of her husband. The latter could use her sexually 
as he wished, and beat her (within reason) or confine her for disobedience to any 
orders. The children were entirely at the disposal of the father. 
Yet whether the marriage broke down through cruelty, domestic violence, adultery or simply 
through incompatibility, the parties faced a difficult situation as divorce, except by statute, 
was illegal in England until 1857. A formal divorce could be obtained by an Act of 
Parliament but it was rare and expensive, and only available on certain grounds. A husband 
could obtain a divorce against a wife on the basis of her adultery, but a wife could not 
achieve the same against her husband unless accompanied by bigamy, rape, incest or 
sodomy.
140
 It was also possible through the ecclesiastical courts to pursue a legal separation, 
mostly brought by husbands on the basis of the wife’s adultery. Private agreements were 
possible and often resulted in more favourable outcomes for the wife, as they could include 
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maintenance and the prospect of economic freedom. They were often utilised in 
circumstances where a husband wished to go and live with a new lover.
141
 However, where 
there were not the financial resources to make these kinds of arrangements, desertion became 
the increasingly common option of achieving divorce. This was often the result of economic 
stress but, whatever the reason, it was usually the man who left both the woman and their 
children. Motherhood therefore continued after marriage breakdown, but in challenging 
circumstances. However, a woman who deserted her husband was regarded as still legally 
married and, in these circumstances, had no right to any property nor to the custody of her 
children who belonged to the father. Common law divorces and remarriage became relatively 
common, marked by such rituals as returning the wedding ring or jumping backwards over a 
broom. However, with the passage of Hardwicke’s Marriage Act in 1753, these practices 
became more difficult as the detection of bigamy became easier.
142
 From about 1750 a more 
formalised, but still customary, practice developed called the wife-sale; a husband placed a 
halter around his wife’s neck and led her to the market where she was sold to the highest 
bidder. Women were treated as the property of their husband and the process lacked respect 
for the wife. However, these rituals did not occur without her consent, with a sale often 
having been pre-arranged with the wife’s lover and arrangements being made for her to 
continue in her motherhood role, suggesting that this form of divorce could sometimes work 
to her advantage.
143
 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 reformed the law on divorce in 
England.  The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts moved to the civil courts, with divorce 
becoming more widely available to those who could not afford to bring proceedings for 
annulment or to promote a private Bill. Subsequently, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 
promoted a more equitable treatment of divorce law, making it easier for women to seek 
divorce. It also widened the grounds for divorce from adultery alone, to include desertion and 
incurable and mental illness. This was consolidated by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
144
 
Throughout all these processes, marriage, and remarriage upon divorce, continued to be the 
preferred context for motherhood. 
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2.8 The development of New Zealand’s legislative regime with respect to marriage 
The New Zealand legislative regime initially followed that of England, although Inglis saw 
the divergence after 1840 eventually becoming so pronounced that any resemblance between 
the two became largely superficial.
145
 New Zealand was regarded as a pioneer in many family 
law areas, such as enfranchising women and with respect to the introduction of the Married 
Woman’s Property Act 1884, allowing women for the first time to hold property in their own 
right. With respect to divorce, the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1867 was almost 
identical to the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. It allowed divorce for the husband 
only on the grounds of the wife’s adultery; a wife’s ability to obtain a divorce from her 
husband through his adultery, as in England, had to be linked to other serious misconduct on 
his part such as cruelty, desertion, bigamy, rape or bestiality. Motherhood had some 
protection in these circumstances as the mother was not regarded as being at fault, contrary to 
her motherhood role being placed in jeopardy if she was regarded as guilty of moral failure. 
The development of New Zealand’s divorce laws continued to be based on fault. The Divorce 
Act 1898 allowed a wife to divorce solely on the basis of her husband’s adultery, together 
with a number of new grounds including desertion, habitual drunkenness, failure to maintain, 
non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or attempted murder of the 
wife (providing a minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment was imposed). The 
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1907 added two further grounds, being a conviction for 
the murder or attempted murder of a child and confinement as a lunatic for ten of the 
previous twelve years,
146
 (subsequently reduced to five out of the last seven years).
147
 Further 
amending legislation added more grounds, being three years separation by agreement and a 
sentence of seven years imprisonment or more for grievous bodily harm to wife or child.
148
 
The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1953 added seven years separation with no 
likelihood of reconciliation, and the murder of any person. The Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1963 consolidated all of the earlier legislation and remained the foundational legislation until 
the major reforms of the Family Proceedings Act 1980, when the Family Court was instituted 
and the ‘no fault’ policy and sole ground of divorce on the basis that the marriage had broken 
down irreconcilably
149
 were introduced. These reforms should have protected motherhood 
from the challenges of the previous fault-based regime, but the changes occurred at the time 
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of moves towards gender neutrality in New Zealand’s parenting laws, which arguably then 
became problematic for motherhood because of its gendered nature.
150
 
The Destitute Persons Act 1910 provided statutory relief for mothers with respect to issues of 
paternity, maintenance and a separation order where domestic violence was involved. In 
1939, these remedies became available to husbands through the Domestic Proceedings Act 
1939. This was again reformed and consolidated in the Domestic Proceedings Act 1968, 
which also introduced the non-molestation order.
151
  This was consolidated into the present 
Family Proceedings Act 1980. The Guardianship Act 1968 addressed issues of custody, 
access and guardianship, carrying forward the principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of 
the child from the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926, introduced into New Zealand from 
England.  The welfare principle itself, foundational to this legislation, had first emerged in 
English law in 1885 and was elevated there to the paramount principle in 1925. New Zealand 
followed suit by the introduction of the welfare principle in 1886, with its paramountcy being 
legislated in 1926. Gender neutrality in parenting entered New Zealand law as an amendment 
to the Guardianship Act 1968, introduced in 1980. The Care of Children Act 2004 replaced 
the Guardianship Act 1968 and, following amendment in 2013, remains in force today. 
2.9 The History of motherhood outside the institution of marriage ie illegitimacy 
Until the passage in the UK of the 1753 Marriage Act, which ended legal protection for a 
betrothed, sex had been playing an important part in negotiations leading to marriage. A 
promise to marry was understood to convert to a common law marriage if sexual intercourse 
took place. Pregnancy was still expected to lead to marriage even after this Act came into 
force, and by the early 19
th
 century it was estimated that about a third of brides were pregnant 
at the time of their marriage.
152
 Gillis says of the time that there had by then been no increase 
“in chargeable bastards [to the poor law], but a great increase of marriages to prevent it.”
153
 
However, Shoemaker reports that while illegitimacy declined in the early 17
th
 century and 
would decline again in the late 19
th
 century, from about 1650 to 1850 it increased from 1.5 
per cent to 5 per cent of all births. If the focus is only on first births, the illegitimacy rate was 
                                                          
150
 See Chapter Three with respect to the Guardianship Act 1968, its subsequent amendment in 1980 and the 
introduction of the Care of Children Act 2004, with its gender-neutral language with respect to parents and 
parenting, replacing any previous gendered references to mothers and fathers. 
151
 This was subsequently replaced by the Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
152
 Shoemaker, above note 142 at 98. 
153
 Gillis For Better For Worse, referring to “Report of His Majesty’s Commission to Inquire into the Poor 
Laws”, cited in Shoemaker, above note 142 at 98. 
 33 
even higher at about 16 per cent.
154
 This was not the type of motherhood intended by the 
Christian view of marriage. It resulted in shame and rejection for the mothers, and created 
difficulty for them in providing for their children.
155
 The first admission to the London 
Foundling Hospital was in 1741, and in the period 1756-60 when the admissions policy was 
at its most liberal, about half of all first births in London were delivered there.
156
 For most 
women, motherhood through an illegitimate birth was catastrophic, both socially and 
economically.  
New Zealand again led the common law world with respect to its legal response to 
illegitimate children, recognised in their ‘bastardy’ as being the children of no-one (nullius 
filius).
157
 In 1860, New Zealand took steps to create some recognition with the Half Caste 
Disability Removal Act which provided legitimacy if the child’s parents later married. The 
legitimacy of such children was not recognised in England until 1926. In New Zealand, there 
was further legitimising legislation in 1894, followed by the Legitimation Act 1939. Then, in 
1969, New Zealand’s Status of Children Act removed illegitimacy altogether from the law.
158
 
At the same time, marriage as a context for motherhood was becoming less important. 
Illegitimacy, with its associated social shame, was no longer recognised in the law and 
barriers to motherhood outside of marriage were being broken down. The Domestic Purposes 
Benefit was introduced to provide state financial support to unmarried mothers.
159
 
Motherhood was no longer limited, either socially or legally, to the context of marriage. 
                                                          
154
 Shoemaker, above note 142 at 99; see also P Laslett and K Oosterveen “Long Term Trends in Bastardy in 
England” Population Studies 27 (1973) 260.  
155
 That maternity might not automatically lead to responsibility for motherhood was not considered in England 
and other common law systems such as New Zealand. However, in France from the time of the French 
Revolution, a system of accouchement sous X developed and was subsequently adopted into the Civil Code in 
1941, which provided a clear distinction between maternity and the choice by a mother whether or not to accept 
responsibility for the child after birth. See Michael Freeman and Alice Margaria, above note 17 153; see also 
discussion in Chapter Five with respect to theories of motherhood. 
156
 Adrian Wilson “Illegitimacy and its Implications in mid-Eighteenth Century London: the evidence of the 
Foundling Hospital” Continuity and Change 4 (1989) at 136, cited in Shoemaker above note 142 at 99. 
157
 The term ‘bastard’ apparently derives from the French ‘bast’, meaning a ‘pack-saddle’ often used as a pillow 
by muleteers. A bastard was a pack-saddle child, born of a casual relationship on the road. See Anthony Dickey 
Family Law (Thomson Reuters, Australia, 6
th
 ed, 2013). Nullius filius is defined as “an illegitimate child: a 
bastard having no heritable rights in common law”; see Merriam-Webster dictionary www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/nullius%20filius, searched 5 August 2015. 
158
 Inglis, above note 68 at 21. 
159
 The passage of the Social Security Amendment Act, on 14 November 1973, introduced the Domestic 
Purposes Benefit to New Zealand's social welfare system. Paid out from 1 May 1974, the DPB was to be 
maintained at a level that would enable sole parents, usually mothers, to care for their children without needing 
to find paid employment. 
 34 
2.10 Adoption, whāngai and the Māori perspective in New Zealand  
Adoption as a response to the problem of illegitimacy, that is, birth and motherhood outside 
of marriage, was recognised early in New Zealand’s family law. The Adoption Act 1881 
again led the way in the Commonwealth, in enabling adoption of illegitimate children. This 
early legislation was followed by the Adoption Act 1955 which still remains in force today, 
although the subject of review and calls for reform.
160
 Adoption was also an early legal 




Whāngai, a longstanding practice of Māori customary adoption or gifting of a child, 
continued alongside these legal initiatives and is also now formally recognised within New 
Zealand’s family law.
162
 It has always maintained the central importance of kinship in 
placement arrangements for a child within whānau (based on a Māori and tribal world-view 
of the physical, emotional and spiritual dimensions of the extended family). It has also always 
recognised within this, the role of a female caregiver, be it an aunt or grandmother, in place 
of the natural mother rather than a gender neutral caregiver for the child.  
Makereti, in The Old Time Māori,
163
considered that Māori did not regard illegitimacy in the 
same way that Europeans did. It was not common but, if a birth occurred outside of marriage, 
the mother was not deserted by the father. The child would be brought up by the mother or by 
the father’s people, would be well looked after and would own shares in land and property 
along with the other children of the whānau.  It is Judge Somerville’s view that the Adoption 
                                                          
160
 Law Commission Report Adoption and its Alternatives (NZLC, 65) (Wellington, New Zealand, 2000); Care 
of Children Law Reform Bill Member's Bill 62—1, 2012 (not drawn out of the ballot). Adoption numbers in 
New Zealand increased from 1455 adoptions in 1955 to 3967 adoptions in 1971; thereafter the numbers began to 
decrease, with 1864 adoptions in 1981 continuing to steadily reduce with 259 adoptions in 2008.  
http://www.cyf.govt.nz/documents/about-us/adoption-data-1955-2011.pdf   searched 24 November 2015. These 
statistics do not identify children in state care, away from their natural mothers, but whose care arrangements do 
not proceed through formal adoption. However, they do correlate with the introduction of the Status of Children 
Act 1969 and the Domestic Purposes Benefit in 1974, providing to a single mother a social and financial ability 
to keep her child. 
161
 See Chapter Three with respect to the ‘psychological parent’, a term developed by the work of Joseph 
Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973), Before the Best 
Interests of the Child (1979), and In the Best Interests of the Child (1986). 
162
 See also Jacinta Ruru, (2013) “Kua Tutu Te Puehu, Kia Mau. Māori Aspirations and Family Law 
Policy” in M Henaghan and B Atkin (eds), Family Law Policy in New Zealand (4
th
 ed) (Wellington, 
LexisNexis) pp 57-97 for comment on the Māori perspective in family law policy in New Zealand. Note that 
extensive comment with respect to whāngai and the Māori perspective on motherhood generally, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
163
 Makereti The Old Time Māori (Gollancz,1938) at 117. 
 35 
Act 1955 fails to accommodate this practice of whāngai.
164
 Section 7 of the Adoption Act 
requires that the consent of the natural parent must be given prior to adoption; this does not 
include the wider whānau who are seen by Māori as requiring input into the decision making. 
The child belongs not to the individual parent, but to the wider descent group where kinship 
is central and important. Judge Somerville quotes from the affidavit of an unidentified Māori 
mother to further explain the concept:
165
  
My pregnancy was unplanned and unexpected. X and I discussed my pregnancy and 
she asked for my son. X wanted to have a child so I gifted my son to her. It was very 
difficult but I have not given him away. He is part of my immediate family and is 
never far from me. He now has two mothers and is bonded to X, myself, my Koro and 
Aunty… My son is in my sister’s primary care and he is bonded to her. My son has 
lots of people who love him and X is an awesome mother. My son is very lucky to 
have so many people who love him. 
To Māori, motherhood was a respected state whether inside or outside of marriage. It was 
also uniquely a female role, based in a recognition of gender difference between motherhood 
and fatherhood. 
Whether motherhood is more broadly accepted by the law as a uniquely female role or not, is 
relevant to issues of gender neutrality and gender equality, which can be traced through the 
law as it applies to motherhood.
166
 Recognition of motherhood as a gendered role within a 
broader social context, at the same time linked to the development of gender equality 
including within the context of motherhood, is now explored.  
2.11 Motherhood as a gendered role, yet an issue of gender equality 
Historical tensions have played out socially and legally with respect to the issue of gender 
equality between motherhood and fatherhood, and these tensions continue to exist today. 
Seeking gender equality between motherhood and fatherhood also contributed to the 
unresolved tension between motherhood and fatherhood being regarded either, firstly, as 
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equal in value but different in function, or secondly, as equal in value and the same in 
function.  John Locke, a 17
th
 century English philosopher, argued that motherhood was not an 
obstacle but the key to women’s equality.
167
 Locke, regarded as the father of classic 
liberalism and one of the most influential of the Enlightenment thinkers, was, as Waldron 
says, “at his most radical”
168
 in his aggressive arguments on behalf of mothers and 
motherhood. According to Waldron, Locke rejected the notion that motherhood was a 
debilitating state precluding women sharing equally in the rights granted to men. In contrast, 
says Waldron, Locke regarded motherhood not as an obstacle but as the key to equality.
169
 
According to Locke, it is the mother, not the father, to whom the foetus owes its soul. He 
credits the mother with “an equal share, if not the greater” for the child’s “Materials and 
Principles of its Constitution,”
170
 which Waldron describes as “emphatic egalitarianism or 
actual favouring of mothers.”
171
 Waldron also regarded Locke as expressing no concern 
about a child being left to the sole care and protection of its mother, nor any suggestion that 
an abandoned mother needed to go and find a male guardian for her children.
172
  
Shoemaker also confirmed that the division of role and function between motherhood and 





perhaps as a result of the growing ideology of separate spheres.
173
 Maternal care of children 
was seen as natural. Richard Allestree had written in 1673 that “a mother is a title of so much 
tenderness … that nature seems to have secured the love of mothers to their children.”
174
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While the responsibility for parenting was shared, a mother’s responsibility was at its greatest 
with babies and young children. It then began to decrease after the child reached about seven 
years of age, especially for a boy child. Childbirth was a woman’s domain, the lying-in 
period became extended and this was often followed by a “churching” ceremony. This was to 
purify new mothers from the taint of sex and childbirth and became popular notwithstanding 
its potential for embarrassment, because it “legitimated the wider ceremony of childbirth”
175
 
which mothers controlled.  Pollock records that mothers, in having assumed the primary care 
of babies and young children, wrote diaries during the 18
th
 century period noting that they 
“devoted every waking moment to the care of their offspring”.
176
  Fathers were seen to have a 
different role in taking an increasing interest as the child got older, playing with them, 
reading, going on walks and undertaking other recreational activities. They also took 
responsibility for the major decisions, enforced discipline and helped their children 
(especially their sons) to get established in a career. However, men saw their primary role as 
providing economic support for the family.
177
 There was some overlapping responsibility in 
the area of moral and religious instruction, and general schooling. Mothers provided most of 
the instruction for young children, and as children got older, fathers began playing a greater 
role. Stone records that the mother became the dominant figure in children’s lives in the 
period 1640 to 1800,
178
 and refers to Lady Sarah Lennox, writing in 1820, that as her children 
“rose out of infancy, [she] left them to their father’s management, and studied to become 
their friend, not the tutoress of [her] sons.”
179
 There was a steady increase in a mother’s 





 centuries there was a “progression to a model of full-time motherhood”
180
 as 
recognition of this primary and gendered role and responsibility. Tosh
181
 viewed early and 
mid-Victorian motherhood as having a greater moral importance than it had at any other time, 
as “all questions relating to the upbringing of children were increasingly resolved by the 
mother.”
182
 Shoemaker records that childrearing manuals of the 17
th
 through to the 19
th
 
centuries were aimed initially at both mothers and fathers, by the 18
th
 century at mothers only 
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“with some anxiety expressed about this” and by the 19
th
 century at mothers only, without 
such anxiety.
183
 Perry argues that women became defined by their maternal function, rather 
than their sexuality.
184
 Motherhood had become a serious duty and responsibility for women, 
with maternal qualities such as pity, tenderness and benevolence being highly valued and wet 
nursing declining as maternal breast-feeding increased.
185
 Tosh saw the mother’s 
responsibilities towards her children extending to their moral upbringing, which went so far 
as to include “the manliness of her son”.
186
 At the same time, men were seen to be 
withdrawing from child-raising. Leavy suggests that motherhood acquired increased 
importance at the expense of fatherhood.
187
 Tosh considered that the most common approach 
to fatherhood that developed through this period was the emotionally distant father who cared 
deeply about his children, but withheld his feelings for them, not because of the rise in the 
centrality of motherhood but because of a number of inter-related factors. These included the 
use of nurseries in middleclass homes, work away from home, the greater difficulty in 
securing employment for their sons, the need to demonstrate a hard-heartedness to equip 
them for the outside world, and the increased importance placed on the mothers’ accepted 
moral qualifications with respect to child-rearing.
188
 While it could be argued that this 
undermined the role of fathers, Shoemaker suggests that the evidence points to the contrary. 
He saw fathers continuing to participate in domestic decision-making and family intimacy, 
and that the best conclusion to be drawn from this time was that, while a gendered division of 
responsibilities for childcare may have been accentuated, it was the continuities of shared but 
different parental roles over a long period, rather than changes, that were the most striking.
189
 
The impact on children of the increasing value that was placed on motherhood during this 
period is difficult to measure. Boys and girls were treated differently and expectations as they 
each approached adulthood were also different, yet both spent significantly more time with 
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their mothers than their fathers during their formative years. Locke may not have been 






 century, the accepted social and policy context for motherhood was within the 
context of Christian marriage. However, marriages did not always last; motherhood was 
therefore not always secure, and outside the context of marriage, it was generally regarded as 
catastrophic for a woman. Men were regarded as superior, particularly in the UK’s patriarchal 
society, and husbands and fathers had supreme authority and ownership over their wives and 
mothers to their children. Kinship remained important, which was also the case in New 
Zealand, particularly with respect to whāngai, a Māori cultural practice which pre-dated, and 
continued after, European settlement. Gendered roles within family were recognised, 
motherhood having become a revered, full-time and serious duty and responsibility. 
The next chapter continues this historical survey of motherhood, this time tracing the 
emerging family law jurisdictions of both the UK and New Zealand, and case law 
developments from the late 18
th
 century to the present time as they relate to motherhood and 
the role of the mother.  
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Chapter Three 
The History of Motherhood II: Tracing Law and Society 
Introduction 
The origins and development of family law in the UK initially reflected respect for the role of 
motherhood, and protection of mothers and the mother-child relationship from the inequity of 
the absolute ownership by the husband of his wife and children. This approach was the basis 
of the emergence of the law’s equitable parens patriae jurisdiction, the welfare principle, the 
‘tender years doctrine’ in England and the development of the ‘mother principle’ in New 
Zealand, a jurisdiction that had adopted the common law tradition of the UK and which also 
assumed many of the UK’s statutes as its own. The law’s understanding of motherhood as a 
unique and gendered role also emerges from an historical tracing of the relevant statutory 
legal framework and associated case law between the UK and New Zealand from the late 




 centuries, to the 1970s. The subsequent movement from 
mothering within marriage, to a more neutrally framed and individualised state of 
parenthood, based in equality and gender neutrality, is then identified. As a consequence, 
regard for motherhood by the law appears to diminish. This occurs at a time that the law’s 
regard for the importance of fatherhood appears to increase. A discussion of these historical 
developments follows.  
3.1 Roman law 
Roman law provides the origins of both English and New Zealand family law. Pater familias 
was the highest ranking family status in Roman law, meaning “father of the family”. The 
Roman pater was the chief of his house, a concept distinct from that of the biological father 
who was called the genitor. The pater familias had patria potestas, the power of life and 
death, over his children, his wife and his slaves who were said to be sub manu, “under his 
hand”. His word was absolute and final. If a child was unwanted, the pater familias had the 
power to order the child be put to death by exposure. He had the power to sell his children 
into slavery, and to approve or reject marriages of his sons and daughters. The children could 
be other than biological offspring, such as brothers, nephews or adoptive sons and daughters. 
In Ancient Rome, the family household was an economical and juridical unit subordinated to 
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a single person, who held significant authority over all its members. The family was 
considered the original social unit, foundational to the clan, caste, or tribe. 
The pater familias was the only person endowed with legal capacity, or sui iuris. Women (in 
most, but not all, cases) had a capitis deminutio, meaning diminished capacity, that is, they 
could not enter valid contracts, could not possess personal property and did not have 
authority over their children. All assets, including contracts and children, belonged to the 
pater.  He owed duties towards the women, children and slaves within his household. Only a 
Roman citizen could enjoy the status of pater familias and there could only be one holder of 
the office within a household. Male adult sons remained under the authority of their pater 
while he still lived, and could not acquire the rights of a pater familias while he was still 
alive. Those who lived in their own households at the time of the pater’s death succeeded to 
the status of pater familias over their respective households (pater familias sui iuris), even if 
they were still barely more than children themselves.  
Women were always under the control of a pater familias, either their original pater, or the 
pater of their husband’s family once married. Over time, the absolute authority of the pater 
familias weakened, and rights that theoretically existed were no longer enforced or insisted 
upon. The power over life and death was abolished, the right of punishment was moderated, 
and the sale of children was limited. Nonetheless, Roman law had a significant influence 
upon the development of English common law which, in turn, was foundational to the 
development of New Zealand family law. 
3.2 The development of English family law  
The English parens patriae doctrine, having its roots in Roman law, developed in England 
through common law and equity. In feudal times, various obligations and powers, 
collectively referred to as the ‘royal prerogative’, were reserved to the king who exercised 
these functions in his role as father of the country. Blackstone noted that the English 
sovereign was “general guardian of all infants, lunatics, and idiots”.
191
  This was initially 
invoked by the King’s Bench in the 16
th
 century in cases of non compos mentis adults.  The 
doctrine dates from at least 1608, as recorded in Coke’s Report of Calvin's Case “that moral 
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law, honora patrem ... doubtless doth extend to him that is pater patriœ.”
192
 The parens 




 centuries, and 
has since evolved from one granting absolute rights to the sovereign to one associated with 
rights and obligations of the state and courts towards children and adults suffering from an 




 centuries in England, feudal law began to break down and 
the legal relationship of parents and children was no longer intertwined with land tenure. 
However, the father retained ownership and control of the children. He had custody of them, 
defeated only if the mother could establish that the father’s conduct would place their life, 
health or moral development in serious jeopardy. In the 1781 decision of Ex Parte Lytton,
193
 
the reach of the Court of Chancery was becoming evident. There, the father retained custody 
but Lord Mansfield required him, within a voluntary deed of separation, to provide access by 
the mother to her child. However, the 1804 decision of R v De Mandeville
194
 illustrates how 
pervasive and superior a father’s ownership rights were considered at that time to be, 
notwithstanding the significance of the mother. There, a breast-fed eight-month-old baby girl, 
whose mother had left the home with her because of her husband’s violence, was ordered to 
be returned by the mother to the father. Lord Ellenborough indicated that the Court would 
protect the child if injured “through want of nurture” or in any other respect. The limitation to 
the father’s rights was justified by the Court of Chancery as being in the interests of the child, 
that is, motherhood was understood as being of great importance to the child, and not because 
of any evident lack of equality between the parents. In the 1806 decision of Whitfield v 
Hale,
195
 the mother gained custody because of the father’s ill-treatment; however, in R v 
Greenhill,
196
 three young girls were ordered back to a father who had committed adultery and 
was paying no support to the mother. There, Lord Denman directed that the father would 
retain custody unless there was some evidence on his part of “the apprehension of cruelty, or 
contamination by some exhibition of gross profligacy”.
197
 The few exceptions to the father’s 
right to ownership and custody of the child, were based on the father’s conduct, not because 
of any legal recognition of the importance of the mother to the child. Examples can be found 
in the 1818 decision of R v Dobbyn,
198
  where a father lost custody because of his cruelty, and 
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in 1838, in Ex Parte Bailey,
199
 where the father’s conviction with respect to a felony caused 
the loss of custody to the mother. Thus, the absolute nature of the father’s rights under the 
common law could be ameliorated by equity.   
From the 17
th
 century, social changes and the consequential changing nature of the family 
affected how the mother-child relationship was viewed. This brought about a greater 
orientation towards the concept of childhood and the welfare principle. However, that the 
interests of the child required the mother-child relationship to be protected was far from 
established in law. The patriarchy of the common law in the 18
th
 century meant that women 
and children were denied legal status or competence. It was not until women’s struggle 
during the 19
th
 century for recognition of equal parental rights with respect to their children 
that two results emerged. One was the 1925 elevation of welfare principle to the central and 
paramount consideration in any custody dispute. The other was the creation of a neutral 
gender principle as between mothers and fathers in determining such disputes. That is, fathers 
should not be advantaged by their gender in determining issues of child custody ownership, 
as had previously been the absolute position in common law. The gender neutral principle did 
not have its origins in arguments that mothers should be advantaged by their gender in 
determining issues of custody. This was a position that was to emerge much later, in the late 
20
th
 century, argued largely by fathers, that mothers should not be advantaged by their 
gender, as they sought to neutralise the effects of the ‘tender years doctrine’ in England and 
‘the mother principle’ in New Zealand.
200
 In the beginning, the neutrality principle only 
operated if a custody matter was brought before the Court. Until then, the all-encompassing 
rights of the father at common law, regarded as sacred, remained as they were.  
Cretney traces the development, through the English common law, of the enduring legal 
principle that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration.
201
 He identifies the 
pressures and processes which led to change, examining the influence of officials in 
government and the Parliamentary draftsmen. He gives particular attention to the pressure for 
compromise. Maidment suggests that the legislative introduction of the welfare principle in 
England through the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925,
202
 against a background of complete 
authority, ownership and power by the common law belonging to the father (though 
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somewhat ameliorated by the Court of Chancery), was a political device which enabled 
patriarchy to continue. She saw that mothers, by such a provision, would then be enabled to 
obtain the care of their young children upon separation, as was understood to be a right and 
natural consequence of motherhood, without any further concessions having to be made by 
husbands and fathers or Parliament, with respect to equal rights for women within the home 
or generally.
203
 Power would not then need to be shared or equalised, and patriarchy could 
continue. This is consistent with the development of dominance feminist theory, that the 
important issue between men and women was the difference in power and its distribution, 
with the consequential powerlessness of motherhood within a patriarchal culture.
204
 
The statutory principle that a child’s welfare in custody disputes was the first and paramount 
consideration, which developed out of the principle in equity and the Court of Chancery, 
required the neutrality principle to be subordinated to it. Moreover, the legal position 
concerning parental rights, and therefore the legally superior father’s claim, influenced the 
judicial interpretation of the welfare principle. Paradoxically, the welfare principle was, in its 
earliest form, used to justify eroding the sacred rights of fathers over their children. 
Maidment also refers to the fact that the welfare principle did not emerge out of concern for 
children, but rather to assist mothers to be more equally recognised with fathers in custody 




3.3 The development of New Zealand’s legislative framework  
The late Judge Inglis QC outlined the nature and history of family law in New Zealand as 
having been derived from English ecclesiastical law and the principles developed by the 
English common law and the Court of Chancery, in his authoritative work New Zealand 




 New Zealand’s Custody of Infants Act 1839 legislated the 
position that already existed in England, that is, children belonged to their fathers and women 
and children had no rights in law.
207
 
Then New Zealand adopted and codified the provisions of England’s Guardianship of Infants 
Act 1886, through the provisions of the Infants Act 1908. This related to situations where the 
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father had died, and the mother was seeking guardianship which she did not otherwise have, 
in his place, either alone, or in conjunction with any testamentary guardian appointed by the 
father. The New Zealand Courts were greatly influenced by the value of precedent 
established by the English common law and equity cases of the time. However, they were 
also influenced in the exercise of their discretion by instinct and by natural law.
208
 
It was England’s Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 which introduced the two important 
ongoing strands referred to above, and which also further affected the development of New 
Zealand’s law. The first was the elevation of the welfare principle to a position of legislative 
centrality, taking it out of equity and its place of origin in the Courts of Chancery, to become 
a central statutory and legal principle. The second was to create neutrality between fathers 
and mothers in relation to custody arrangements between them for their children, seeking to 
acknowledge and address the history of women’s struggle for equal parental rights with 
respect to their children. While the neutrality principle was to be subordinate to the welfare 
principle, Maidment noted that the principle of neutrality only operated as an equitable 
principle when the matter was brought to court; otherwise, the rights of the father at common 
law remained intact. That is, he had absolute rights over his children. The 1925 legislation 
advanced matters for a mother by enabling her to have the right to apply for custody and/or 




New Zealand’s Guardianship of Infants Act 1926 adopted exactly the same legislative 
standard incorporated by England, after many years of struggle, into its Guardianship of 
Infants Act 1925. That is, pursuant to section 2: 
Where in any proceedings before the Supreme Court … the custody of an infant is in 
question the Court in deciding that question shall regard the welfare of that infant as 
the first and paramount consideration and shall not take into consideration whether 
from any other point of view the claim of the father, or any right at common law 
possessed by the father in respect of such custody … is superior to that of the mother, 
or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father. 
New Zealand, then, along with many other countries as a result of the Second World War, 
faced significant social upheaval and change. This was later to be reflected in the law. At the 
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 Conference comments about the role and value of motherhood were 
expressed in these protective terms:
211
 
Our birth rate has steadily fallen and if it continues, it does not matter if we win this 
war or not, and a crusade which must be launched today is to get the mother back into 
her rightful position as the most honoured person in the community 




If there be one mother in this country today who has to work in a factory to make ends 
meet financially or through any misguided estimate that a mother in overalls is doing 
more for the prosecution of the war effort than if she were at home it is high time that 
the state stopped placing a financial burden on motherhood and that the true 
significance of motherhood in the wellbeing of the nation is recognised. 
Walter Nash’s post-war reconstruction efforts reinforced a woman’s maternal and wifely role 
and motherhood was regarded as a fulltime occupation.
213
 The New Zealand post-war baby 
boom is regarded as one of the most significant in the western world,
214
 beginning at the end 
of the Second World War and continuing until the early 1960s. In 1948, 58.6 per cent of 
women were married by age 25; in 1958 this had increased to 70 per cent and the average age 
of a woman at her first birth dropped from nearly 26 years in 1948 to 24 years in 1958.
215
 
Gender relations contributed to this post-war context. Men and women as equals, yet 
different from each other, meant that marriage and motherhood were promoted as roles for 
women and held equal status to the roles of men.
216
 The concept of motherhood shifted, from 
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providing social identity in the early 20
th
 century, to one of service, influenced by the 
attachment theory work of John Bowlby.
217
 This value appears to have contributed to present 
day outcomes for mothers, that is, in their having assumed a greater share of child care and 




3.4 Motherhood reflected by the law  
I now trace case law and legislative developments in both the United Kingdom and in New 
Zealand over, approximately, the last 200 years, as they relate to motherhood and the role of 
the mother within the social context and emerging family law jurisprudence of both 
jurisdictions. Originally, the overwhelming power of patriarchy and the father dominated. In 
the late 19
th
 century, the courts began to address this and the centrality of the role of 
motherhood and the mother’s importance to her child began to be recognised in the law. This 
continued throughout the 20
th
 century until such noteworthy significance appears to fade into 
an unmentioned insignificance in contemporary family law decisions. This is in stark contrast 
to the earlier decisions, which openly speak of mothers and motherhood. It is also 
inconsistent with the statistical reality of a continuing division of role and function between 
genders with respect to work within the home, including child care, which continues to be 
carried out predominantly by mothers. This dissonance appears to have developed in New 
Zealand case law from about the 1980s onwards. 
3.5 Early English legislative and case law developments  
The principle of the welfare of the child assuming a predominant position in Victorian society 
was related to a number of wider considerations than the imbalance of power between 
separating mothers and fathers.
219
 Maidment refers to the 19
th
 century as having become the 





Maternity safety, physical care, hygiene and health issues, working conditions, poverty, 
education, moral and religious issues were all concerns that were considered. As a result, 
between 1780 and 1914 some ninety Acts relating to children’s issues were passed by the 
English legislature and described by Maidment as a “largely ad hoc and extremely complex 
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structure of legal protection which aimed to safeguard the interests of the young”.
220
 Concern 
for the emotional welfare of the child also began to develop. Rousseau’s innocence of the 
child
221
 was glorified by the poetry of Blake and Wordsworth,
222
 and Charles Dickens’ 
“Oliver Twist” provided a vehicle for consideration of the psychological childhood 
experience and its impact.
223
  Darwin’s theory of evolution pointed to the development of the 
child through nature, and the work of Freud initiated an interest in and study of the 
development of personality and sexuality through childhood experiences. Dr Ian Suttie 




The child’s basic need is for mother-love, his basic fear is loss of such love, and all 
his later social and cultural attitudes depend on the nature of this relationship. 
Further work with respect to maternal deprivation and the significance of the child’s primary 




The relationship between the welfare principle and the development of equal parental rights 
in the law is complex. The strength of the authority of the father, the power of the Courts and 
the injustices perpetuated on mothers (and their children) were real, and the Court of 
Chancery recognised from quite early times the deprivation suffered by mothers (and by 
implication, children) in the light of such inequities.
226
  In 1827 in Ball v Ball,
227
 the mother 
was unsuccessful through the Ecclesiastical Courts in gaining custody or access to her 14-
year-old daughter. The separation had arisen through her husband’s adultery, and her 
daughter had initially been living with her with occasional visits to her father. On one 
occasion her father did not return her and instead sent her away to school, with no reference 
or advice to the mother. The mother sought the assistance of the equitable jurisdiction. The 
question for the Court, advocated for the mother, was “whether a child of fourteen years is to 
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be deprived, by the brutal conduct of the father, of the company, advice and protection of a 
mother, against whom no imputation can be raised?”
228
 Vice Chancellor Hart confirmed the 
absolute authority of the father with which the Court could not interfere unless there was 
some conduct on his part to authorise it, which there was not. However, he also confirmed the 
prevailing view that separation of a mother and child was unconscionable. He said:
229
 
This Court has nothing to do with the fact of the father’s adultery unless the father 
brings the child into contact with the woman. … I do not know of any case similar to 
this, which would authorise any making of the order sought, in either alternative. If 
one could be found, I would almost gladly adopt it; for, in a moral point of view, I 
know of no act more harsh and cruel, than depriving the mother of proper intercourse 
with her child. 
In Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort,
230
 the father did lose custody because of his immoral and 
adulterous conduct, although it was still considered in the “interest and happiness” of the 
children to have their “filial affection and duty towards their father operate to the utmost.”
231
 
Nonetheless, the notion of the welfare of the child was used in the 19
th
 century to deny a 
mother a right to custody, and often access, because judges at the time continued to deem that 
the child’s welfare was best served by upholding the sacred rights of the father. It was 
therefore a concept initially used against mothers. Maidment suggests that the Guardianship 
of Infants Act 1925 was, in the end, a political device to deny equality of parental rights to 
women and that had it not been for the struggle by women for equality rights generally, the 
welfare principle may not have reached the statute books when it did.
232
 Thus the welfare 
principle, in itself an indeterminate test, was informed and shaped by the dominant political 
and social values of the time. The women’s movement, to force their recognition in relation 
to their children both within marriage and upon separation, was a key driver, at least as 
significant as any of the humanitarian and social recognitions of the day, of the need for child 
protection and associated reforms.
233
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3.6 The Court of the King’s Bench and the equitable Court of Chancery 
Before 1875, there were two court procedures available in England with respect to disputes 
over the custody of a child. One, through the Court of the King’s Bench, was utilised by the 
father by the seeking of a writ of habeas corpus for the return of the body of the child to the 
person who has the legal right, that is, the father, even if this was against the mother. The 
other was through the Court of Chancery which anyone could invoke on behalf of a child’s 
interest, including the mother, and was based on the Court’s ancient parens patriae 
jurisdiction.  
The Court of the King’s Bench would usually enforce the father’s right to custody 
irrespective of his behaviour or the child’s age. Over time and through the influence of 
societal and political influences, there was some softening of this absolute approach by 
allowing some access to the mother. It was only through the Court of Chancery that the 
father’s absolute right was ameliorated by an increasing recognition of the welfare of the 
child through its protective jurisdiction but, even then, it was difficult to point to conduct 
serious enough by the father to warrant intervention by the Court. Certainly, retention by the 
father of the child to the exclusion of the mother was not enough. 
Examples of judicial attitudes through the early English cases during this period can be seen 
in the following decisions. In Vikkareal v Mellish 
234
 the mother, Mrs Mellish, daughter of a 
Jewish father, had married Mr Vikkareal, also a Jew. They had two children aged nine and 
eight when their father died. The mother agreed to transfer her guardianship of the children to 
her father, then remarried without her father’s consent and became a Christian. The 
grandfather, as a consequence, refused contact by the mother with the children. The Court 
drew on natural law to confirm the right of the mother towards her child (although in this 
situation, it was not in competition with the father as he was deceased). The Court said:
235
 
It is with reluctance [I] am obliged to determine questions of this sort, in family 
disputes, and more disagreeable where they relate to religious matters; but when it 
becomes necessary [I] will do it. Here are two petitions, first by the mother and then 
by the children. As to the mother’s ... her claim is clear and a right in her. It has been 
truly said that the right of guardianship of the mother differs from that of the father; 
she cannot devise, as the father may ... The mother’s right abstracted from socage 
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(which is not here the case, there being no lands) arises from nature. She has a right to 
the custody of the persons, and care of the education; and this in all countries where 
the laws do not break in. The grandfather has no right to interpose, otherwise than as 
the mother being his daughter, owed a duty to him. 
Irrespective of this natural right, the mother’s position was not secure in law. Equity initially 
only provided relief to the mother where the father had died and had not appointed a 
testamentary guardian or there were issues with respect to land or property to be determined. 
Where there was a testamentary guardian, the common law provided no rights to the mother 
and equity did not intervene, as confirmed in Eyre v Shaftesbury.
236
 
As between the mother and the father, there was a clearly superior claim by the father. In R  v 
de Manneville,
237
 an English mother left her French husband alleging mistreatment, taking 




… by force and stratagem, to get into the house where she was, and had forcibly taken 
the child then at the breast, and carried it away almost naked in an open carriage in 
inclement weather; with a view, as the mother apprehended, of taking it out of the 
kingdom. 
Once the issue of non removal was addressed, Lord Ellenborough C J said that the burden of 
proof then lay on the mother to show why the father was not entitled to custody, he being the 
person entitled by law to the custody of his child. However, he also said that if the father 
should abuse his right to the detriment of the child, the Court would protect the child. 
Although custody remained with the father, Lord Chancellor Eldon had previously espoused 
the following three principles. The first concerned the welfare of the child: “It has been truly 
observed, that the court will do what is for the benefit of the infant, without regard to the 
prayer”; second, with respect to access, “I shall take care that the intercourse of both father 
and mother with the child, as far as it is consistent with its happiness, shall be unrestrained” 
and, third, he confirmed the applicable criteria for removing a child from the father’s custody: 
where he was abusive, not providing proper maintenance or by his character, insolvency, 
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imprisonment or religious concerns, or was considered unsuitable to retain custody despite 
his common law rights in this regard.
239
  
However, the bar for any intervention by the court against a father’s rights remained high, 
and motherhood continued to suffer accordingly.  
In Blake v Lord Wallscourt,
240
 the Court acknowledged evidence of abuse by the father and 
the probability of cruelty and mistreatment having been made out, but because it had 
stretched back over a number of years and no steps had been immediately taken by the 
mother, this mitigated against the Court’s interference. The Court said:
241
 
Grievances were alleged to have existed many years ago; and one circumstance in 
particular, was said to have taken place with respect to indecent conduct so far back as 
1839 … a transaction that transpired when they were seven years younger, and, when 
in fact, they might have been sleeping at the time. … It was true there was one act, 
which, even as explained by Lord Wallscourt, could hardly be said to be defensible, 
namely that which related to his interfering with his daughter’s ablutions … neither 
did the evidence go far enough to shew there had been any improper exposure … 
which related to His Lordship’s dress. … No one could be more delighted … with the 
society of Irishmen; but it was impossible not to see that, from their breeding rather 
than their birth, there were modes of viewing things, and there were actions tolerated 
amongst them which were quite abhorrent to the minds, and … the more geometrical 
view Englishmen took of such things. 
The judgment went on to describe the father’s conduct as assuming the character of barbarity, 
on the one hand, but with respect to educating his daughters to have been very properly 
attended to, as they were proficient in drawing and music, speaking French, German and 
Italian, and had been taught to read the Bible and, in particular, the New Testament in Greek. 
This, the Court regarded, was:
242
  
… one of the wisest and kindest things a father could do for his daughters, for it 
enabled them to read the sacred oracles of truth and judge for themselves. 
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The daughters’ application to be removed from their father’s care and their mother’s 
application to the Court of Chancery for custody of them once they had been so removed 
were declined on the basis that the Court of Chancery would not interfere on behalf of Irish 
parents normally resident in Ireland. The consideration of the Court was also that:
243
 
… unless the cruelty was proved to be excessive, [it] ought not to interfere; for it was 
clear that any such general intereference would be the means of entirely breaking up 
the privacy of families. … the common law of our country was only ancilliary to the 
law of God and nature in declaring that, during the state of infancy, the father should 
have the custody and guidance of [the children]. 
The principle was that the father’s rights could reluctantly be forfeited, but only if the welfare 
of the child required it, rather than provide recognition to any rights of the mother.
244
 
In R v Greenhill,
245
 the rules with respect to a writ of habeas corpus were discussed. The 
mother, Henrietta Greenhill, had left the marital home as a result of her husband’s continuing 
affair and returned home to her mother. Her brother said he subsequently went and spoke 
with the husband, who indicated he did not intend giving up his new relationship and was 
living with the woman in question. The brother uplifted the three young children of the 
marriage and took them to their mother. The father applied for a writ of habeas corpus and 
the mother was required to produce the children in answer to the writ. She then sought the 
assistance of the Court to have custody granted to her because of the father’s conduct and the 
risk this represented to the children. The Court considered that while she had not done 
anything wrong to render her an unfit or unworthy mother, and that the father would be able 
to have access if the children were in her care, there was nothing to suggest that the usual rule 
should be departed from, that is, that the father’s right over the children was paramount. The 
mother offered to relinquish custody and control if she was assured of permission to provide 
care to the children during their tender years. It was further argued on her behalf that the 
proceedings were not about whether the father’s rights over his children were paramount; that 
was accepted. Rather, the question was whether the rights of the mother were to be wholly 
disregarded such that she did not even have access to the children during what was known as 
their age of nurture, and, in addition, whether the children were to be deprived of maternal 
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care and protection in circumstances where the husband had made his house unfit for his 
wife’s residence. 
The Court discussed the common law habeas corpus rule: where, after a child has been 
produced in answer to the writ, they are too young to exercise the discretion to decide where 
they want to live, such discretion vests with the father. However, where the father exercises 
that discretion, not to enforce his own rights, but to take away those of the mother the Court 
considered that some restraint might need to be placed on the father in a manner consistent 
with the interests of the children themselves. The issue at this time, then, was whether the 
Court could exercise its own discretion or whether the rights of the father were so far 
paramount to those of the mother that she had no right to stand before the Court to make any 
claim. Reference was made to the anomaly that “a bastard child”
246
 within the age of nurture 
(that is, originally up to age seven, then extended to eleven and then further to age fourteen) 
was not to be separated from the mother, but that such ruling pursuant to the R v Mandeville 
decision
247
 did not extend to legitimate children where custody belonged to the father and not 
even access could be guaranteed by the Court to the mother. The mother having lost custody 
in these circumstances, then took the children out of the country so that the order that they be 
returned to the father could not be enforced. A number of actions against her followed, 
including attachment against her for contempt. The Court of Chancery was then asked by the 
wife to enforce a previously made support order against the husband in her favour.
248
 The 
Court was urged by the husband to withhold enforcement on the basis of the mother’s 
disobedience with respect to the King’s Bench orders, and the fact that she had gone abroad 
with the children to avoid enforcement. There was no precedent; the Court of Chancery 
determined that the custody matter belonged in another jurisdiction and should not affect its 
enforcement of the support issue that had arisen through the husband’s conduct, saying:
249
 
… in this case I am at a loss to know why I should, by starving an innocent wife, 
compel obedience to the order of other tribunals to render up to the guilty husband the 
offspring of that union, the obligations of which he has grossly violated. 
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Difficulties continued for motherhood. Despite the new divorce court under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857 being enabled to make custody orders on divorce “as it thinks fit”, it was 
still influenced by the Courts of the Kings Bench and Chancery, which were still basing 
decision-making on the absolute rights of the father. Motherhood remained compromised by 
the operation of a gendered law. In Clout v Clout and Hollebone,
250
 the father had petitioned 
for divorce based on the mother’s adultery, which was granted. The mother subsequently 
asked the Court to grant her access to the two children of the marriage, they remaining in the 
custody of the father. This was considered to be “an application of novel character which 
required some consideration”.
251
 However, the Court considered it was required to follow 
established precedent that where a mother had committed adultery, no custody or access 
order could be made in her favour, and her application was refused. Then in Codrington v 
Codrington,
252
 the Court discussed the nature of its discretion in refusing a mother’s 
application for access to her 11- and 12-year-old daughters pending the hearing of the father’s 
application for divorce against her based on her adultery, which she had denied. The father 
had arranged the removal of the children from their governess while out on a walk, with no 
communication to the mother of his intentions. The mother made arrangements through an 
intermediary to be able to correspond with them. Then the father subsequently removed them 
out of the country to Gibraltar. Because the mother had initially agreed after the children’s 
removal, to address contact through letters, the Court considered that what the mother was 
really now trying to do was have it order the father and children back from Gibraltar, which it 
was not prepared to do. The Court made clear when the mother appealed this decision, that 
she was incorrect in seeking to argue from a position of some vested right on her part, “the 
obvious intention of the Legislature [being] to gratify the natural affection of both parties for 
the children” through the exercise of a discretion on the part of the Court, and that “the right 
of the wife to access to her children has been argued to exist in a much stronger degree than it 
really does.”
253
 Notwithstanding, there was considerable sympathy for Mrs Greenhill’s 
position and embarrassment with respect to the state of the law, that it should be rendered so 
impotent in the face of such injustice against a mother.
254
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3.7 The reforms of Caroline Sheridan Norton  
During these years, the campaigning of the Honourable Caroline Norton,
255
 arising out of her 
own personal, unjust circumstances as a mother, had been influential in forcing legislative 
changes throughout the 19
th
 century, but most particularly with respect to the Custody of 
Infants Act 1839,
256
 the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 and the Married Women’s Property 
Act 1870. She argued that natural justice required a separate recognition in law of the natural 
love of the mother:
257
 
… that whereas hitherto the Courts have refused to consider the suffering and wrong 
done on very many instances to the mother, [and] some recognition and 
acknowledgement may now be made of the mother’s separate existence, and right to 
protection. 
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She also said that:
258
 
… doubtless the claim of the father is sacred and disputable, but when the mother’s 
claim clashes with it, surely something should be accorded to her. There are other 
laws beside those made by men – what says the holier law, the law of nature?  
Caroline Norton further argued that a mother:
259
 
… is under God responsible for the souls of the new generation confided to her care; 
and the woman who is mother to the children of a profligate and tyrannical husband is 
bound by her duty, even if she were not moved by the instinct of her own heart, to 
struggle against the seizure of her infants. 
However, change was slow to come politically in England, where the environment was 
complex and conflicted. In support of the Bill in the House of Commons debates, Mr T J 
Leader described the law as:
260
 
… sternly refus[ing] to listen to the pleadings of natural sympathies and affections, 
giv[ing] to the husband the charge and possession of the children, and den[ying] even 
the sight of them to the beloved and loving mother. … There are hundreds of women 
now suffering in silence, pining for the children whom a stern law has torn from them. 
The arguments against it were based on a prediction of an increase in conflict between 
husbands and wives, and an increase in separations. One argument suggested that access to a 
separated mother would be a bad thing for children as it would provide opportunity for their 
minds to be poisoned, one parent against the other.
261
 
When the Custody of Infants Bill finally passed in 1839, it granted a married mother upon 
separation or divorce, the right to apply to the Court of Chancery for custody of her children 
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up to the age of seven years (putting her on the same footing as a mother of an illegitimate 
child), and for access up to any age, unless she was guilty of adultery. 
Change was less slow through the Courts, particularly the Court of Chancery, where there 
was increasing sympathy and recognition of a mother’s position and role.  
In Barnes v Barnes and Beaumont,
262
 the father had petitioned for divorce based on the 
mother’s adultery. There were two children of the marriage aged three years and 18 months 
respectively. The father had removed the children to the care of a third party stranger. The 
wife denied the adultery and sought a custody order in her favour in respect of the children, 
pending determination of the divorce petition. She was described as depressed at being 
separated from her children. It was argued that an earlier decision of Cartlidge v Cartlidge,
263
 
where the child was living in the father’s house, the mother’s health was not described as 
suffering and custody remained with the father, should be distinguished. The Court agreed, 
saying: 
I think this application should be granted. … The children in this case are both of 
tender age; they are not living with their father, and it is clear that the mother’s health 
has suffered from being deprived of their society. 
Court of Chancery decisions reflected a recognition of motherhood’s plight, where the 
absolute right of the father at common law was understood but the Court, where appropriate, 
sought to ensure that such rights were limited when the father’s conduct warranted it and 




… guardianship for nurture continues until the age of fourteen, and that a child has no 
right before that age to exercise his own choice as to quitting or remaining in the 
custody of his father. 
In that situation, the father had left his wife, having formed an adulterous relationship with 
another woman with whom he was still living. He also had the custody of the parties’ 13-
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year-old son. The mother petitioned the Court of Chancery for a judicial separation and also 
for custody. Sir C Cresswell said further:
265
 
No imputation was cast on the wife, and it would be unjust if a husband, having 
deserted an unoffending woman, were allowed to deprive her of the custody of her 
child. Nor would it be proper to oblige her, if she wished to see the child, to resort to 
the husband’s home, where his mistress is residing, nor to place the boy where he 
would be liable to be contaminated by his father’s evil example. I shall therefore 
order, that the child be delivered up by the respondent [the father] to the petitioner 
[the mother], and that he remain with her until he shall attain the age when the law 
gives him a right to elect for himself with which of his parents he will remain; the 
mother to keep the father informed of where he resides, and the father to have access 
to him once a week for two hours, between the hours of ten and four.   
Likewise, in 1850 in Thomas v Roberts,
266
 the care of a three-year-old boy was confirmed 
with his mother through the protective jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. The petition was 
presented on behalf of the child, seeking guardianship and custody to be placed with his 
mother, and that the father be restrained from applying for a writ of habeas corpus. The 
detailed decision describes the father as having, in 1842, commenced ordination in the 
Church of England. He then, having seceded from the church, joined  a religious sect which 
professed a high spirituality, had abandoned the idea of prayer, had “set a high value on 
exercise of a cheerful and amusing kind”,
267
 and did not appear to be committed to any works 
of usefulness or charitable purpose. There, the father met and married the mother, a young 
woman who had been left a considerable inheritance by her late father. When she did not give 
this up to her husband and the community, as she was pressured to do, she was cast out 
despite being pregnant. The father remained with the community. The Court saw that the 
father had abandoned his wife and child and that there were sufficient equitable grounds in 
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… this confiding and unoffending woman was, without the slightest justification, 
apology or excuse, deserted and abandoned – wilfully, completely and finally 
deserted and abandoned – by her husband, in the state which has been mentioned. 




But God forbid that I should be accessory to condemning any child to such a state of 
probable debasement; as lief would I have on my conscience the consigning of this 
boy to a camp of gypsies. 
The Judge went on to say:
270
 
It appears to me that, consistently with the law of England as declared and enforced 
by the Court of Chancery. … I cannot decline interfering to avert from the country the 
infliction of such a citizen, and from the child such ruin temporally and such spiritual 
peril as his father’s threatened care must, I think, without a miracle, produce.  
As Maidment comments, however, it was only behaviour that was unacceptable to Victorian 
society that would lose a father custody of his children.
271
 
The English Judicature Act 1873 then gave concurrent jurisdiction to the Common Law 
Courts and the Courts of Equity with respect to the care and custody of children, and further, 
that in the case of any conflict the rules of equity were to prevail. However, the legal standard 
remained a difficult one for many mothers, notwithstanding the elevated recognition 
motherhood at the same time was receiving within the private spheres of Victorian life. This 
incongruent legal standard was discussed in Re Goldsworthy,
272
 where a father had sought 
through an application for a writ of habeas corpus to remove his child from the care of the 
maternal grandfather. The Court decided that this was a case of “a man habitually indulging 
in inebriety and in the use of violence and language of a character the most abominable that 
can be conceived” such that equitable principles ought to be invoked and his application 
declined. The Court commented upon the interference with a father’s natural rights to custody 
of his children as being a difficult and delicate one, and that mere habits of intemperance 
would not justify the interference of the Court. Rather, the father’s conduct must be such as to 
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render it not just merely better for the children, but essential for their safety or welfare, that 
the father’s acknowledged rights be interfered with. 
The Goldsworthy decision was sought to be relied on by the father in Condum v Vollum,
273
 in 
an attempt by him to control issues of his eight-year-old daughter’s religious education, he 
being a Roman Catholic and the mother being a Protestant. The mother and father had agreed 
to separate when their daughter was two years of age. The mother would have custody 
without interference by the father, though he would have access. The mother would not bring 
up the child in a manner at variance with the Roman Catholic faith and when the child was 
seven, they would review her care arrangements. The mother was now asking the Court for 
the right to provide education and religious instruction to the child. The father, who had not 
seen the child for three and a half years, and was living in another relationship, opposed the 
mother’s application on the basis that as the father he had the right to require the child to be 
brought up in the Roman Catholic faith. The Judge said:
274
 
The objection on the part of the father is not, in my opinion, a bona fide objection, but 
is merely made for the purpose of vexing and worrying Mrs Condon. … Looking at 
the facts of the case, and taking into account the circumstances that the mother is to 
have custody of the infant, and is willing to educate and maintain the infant, I do not 
think that it would be for the benefit of the infant to be brought up by its mother and 
yet to be, in its religious education, to be dissociated from its mother. Further, 
speaking as a man of the world, I am aware of the futility of attempting to make such 
an order, and also that if it were attempted to be carried out such an attempt would be 
injurious to the infant’s welfare in the proper and, indeed, in the highest sense of the 
term. 
Access to the father was also directed. This was to be a week in each school holidays and 
other opportunities when the child was home from school with her mother. Here, a natural 
and rightful influence of the mother upon the child was recognised. That was, however, the 
exception.  For example, in Re Besant,
275
 the Court removed an eight-year-old daughter from 
her mother and placed her in the care of her father, notwithstanding earlier agreements that 
the parents had made between them that the son would be cared for by the father and the 
daughter by the mother. The Court’s reasons related to the mother’s atheism, her refusal to 
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allow her daughter to receive religious instruction and her proactivity in publishing material 
designed to educate with respect to the issue of contraception, considered to be immoral and 




We have not in this case to consider any question as to the exercise of the power of 
the Court to deprive a father of the paternal power over his children which the law 
recognises as the essence of that family constitution which lies at the foundation of 
our social organisation. We have not to inquire … whether the things that are alleged 
as the grounds for removing the infant ward from the custody … of her mother, would 
or would not if alleged against the father, have afforded sufficient ground … for 
depriving him of his legal power and natural authority. Now there is nothing more 
clearly established as the settled rule of the Court than this: that it is the duty of the 
Court to take care that a fatherless ward is brought up in the religion of the father… It 
would be impossible for the Court to allow its ward, a Christian child, the child of a 
Christian father, baptized in the Christian Church, to remain under the guardianship 
and control of a person who professes and teaches and promulgates the religious, or 
anti-religious, opinions which the Appellant avows that she professes and intends to 
persevere in teaching and promulgating. … In the absence of the father (the father 
being assumed to be practically absent) the Court is the real guardian of the infant and 
must perform its duty to the ward accordingly, and, if necessary, wholly irrespective 
of the convictions or wishes of the mother and by separating the child from her. 
3.8 The strength of fatherhood’s sacred power  
The influence of the Christian church upon the procreation of children and their being 
brought up by the father, remained strong. What the Court would do if confronted by 
attitudes of atheism or obscenity in a father had already been considered in Shelley v 
Westbrooke.
277
 The father was the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley. Shelley deserted his wife and 
went to live with another woman. His wife, the mother of their two children, went to live with 
her father. The mother then died and the children remained in the care of their maternal 
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grandfather. The Court of Chancery had been petitioned by the children to restrain the natural 




… the father avowed himself an atheist, and that since his marriage he had written and 
published a work, in which he blasphemously derided the truth of the Christian 
revelation, and denied the existence of a God as creator of the universe; and that since 
the death of his wife he had demanded that the children should be delivered up to him 
… and educated as he thought proper. ... This is a case in which the father’s principles 
… cannot be misunderstood, in which his conduct, which I cannot but consider as 
highly immoral, has been established in proof … conduct nevertheless, which he 
represents to himself and others, not as conduct to be considered as immoral, but to be 
recommended and observed in practice, and as worthy of approbation. … I cannot 
therefore think that I should be justified in delivering over these children for their 
education exclusively, to what is called the care to which Mr S wishes it to be 
intrusted. 
The Court therefore made an order restraining the father from taking possession of the 
children at that time, but left open the possibility of a further order. This situation was 
regarded as having been quite exceptional in its interference with the rights of the father. 
The case of Swift v Swift
279
 was discussed by Lord Romilly M R in Hamilton v Hector,
280
 in 
the context of a father and mother having reached their own agreements as to the separated 
care of their children, but where the mother considered subsequent circumstances required 
the protection of the children from the cruelty of their father. The Judge said:
281
 
… if a husband, by deed or by an agreement … agreed to abandon all his parental 
duties, and transferred them to the wife to be performed by her, this Court would not 
specifically enforce a Contract of that description. Then on the other hand, a case 
afterwards came before me which was unquestionably a case likely to try the principle 
very strongly – the case of Swift v Swift, where the father had been guilty of moral 
turpitude towards his own child, a little girl of seven years old; and thereupon he 
consented to a deed by which the children were taken away from him and consigned 
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to the mother. He repented of that afterwards … and insisted that he should have 
possession of the children; upon which the mother instituted a suit for the purpose of 
restraining him from so doing. Thereupon I endeavoured to point out … that the 
foundation of the jurisdiction lay in determining what was for the good of society in 
general; that it was against public policy to allow a father, under ordinary 
circumstances, to abandon his duties as a parent. … But on the other hand, a different 
and a controlling equity arose where the father had shewn himself utterly incompetent 
to perform those duties, and where he had so ill-behaved himself that the interposition 
of this Court was necessary for the protection of his children. … It is a compliance 
with the rules of public policy that prevents this Court from taking away the rights of 
the father. It is also a compliance with the rules of public policy which in another case 
induces this Court to prevent a father from injuring his own children. 
The law therefore continued to uphold the rights of the father as against the mother, 
notwithstanding the age and needs of the child. It said that it regarded its task as ensuring that 
the father carried out his legal responsibilities, notwithstanding the compromise to 
motherhood that this entailed. This can be seen as an example of the application of the 
dominance feminist theory, that is, the powerlessness of motherhood within a legal system 




A further example of the effect of such patriarchal power reflected through the law is found 
in Agar-Ellis v Lascelles,
283
 where the four children of the marriage had already been made 
wards of the Court at the father’s request. The mother had, contrary to the express views of 
the father that the children were to be Protestant, raised the younger three children as Roman 
Catholics. When they, at ages nine, eleven and twelve respectively, refused to go with their 
father to a Protestant church, he took action resulting in the mother being restrained from 
taking the children to confession or to a Roman Catholic Church and leaving the father to do 
what he thought best for the temporal and spiritual welfare of the children. As a result, he 
took the children away from the mother and placed them in the care of a clergyman and 
others, allowing the mother to visit them once a month. He also required all correspondence 
between them to be supervised.   
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When the second daughter, Harriet, reached sixteen, she wrote to her father’s solicitors 
asking that she be able to spend the long holidays with her mother because her carer was 
going abroad and could not take her with her, and because her father, who had not in the last 
four years spent the holidays with her, would probably be placing her in the care of still more 
strangers. A petition was filed by Harriet and her mother asking that Harriet be able to spend 
the holidays with her mother, and that in the future her mother might have free access to her 
and they also be able to freely correspond with each other. The father strongly opposed such 
unrestricted communication between them on the basis that “for so long a period as two 
months would tend to create a great prejudice in the child’s mind against him, and might 
result in entirely alienating her affection from him.”
284
  
The petition failed on the ground that in the absence of any suggested fault on the part of the 
father, the Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the legal, and more powerful, right of 
the father to control the custody and education of his children and as to where they should 
reside. However, Harriet and her mother did not give up, and appealed this decision on the 
basis that a court should allow a child at 16 to be freed from restraint (being the usual 
outcome of a habeas corpus application) and that the child should then be able to exercise her 
own discretion as to custody and movement, rather than having her father’s discretion 
substituted for her, as is the law for a younger child. The father argued that if this course was 
adopted by the Court, it would “produce a revolution in the relations of father and child.”
285
 
He further argued that the Court only had three situations in which it could interfere with a 
father’s custody: first, where the father was guilty of gross moral turpitude towards his 
children; second, where the father has abdicated his parental responsibility and the Court will 
not allow him to interfere and resume it; and third where the Court holding wardship will not 
allow a father to remove the child from outside of its jurisdiction. He saw that none of these 
situations applied to enable the Court to interfere, but, if it did, he wanted to let the Court 
know that he would consider himself discharged from all moral and legal obligations to 
maintain his daughters.  
The mother’s counsel asked the Court to meet Harriet, a most forward thinking strategy, but 
the Judges declined. The mother’s counsel also indicated a willingness and ability on the part 
of the mother, in light of the father’s attitude, to maintain Harriet herself. The Court recorded 
its disappointment that the father had not been willing to accede to its suggestion, made 
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during the course of argument, that Harriet be allowed by him to visit with her mother for the 
holidays and thereafter, not unlimited access, but once a fortnight, and also that the 
correspondence between them not be the subject of supervision. However, because the father 
refused, and because it was not a habeas corpus application brought by him (being the thrust 
of the authorities cited by the wife’s counsel and which therefore had no application), the 
Court found itself required to act on the general rule that the father has the control over “the 
person, education and conduct”
286
 of the child until they are twenty one years of age and the 
Court could not intervene.  





Appeals have been made to the principles of the law which have been settled for 
centuries. Those principles have never been called into question. One of those 
principles (and it is the prominent one) is that this Court, whatever be its authority or 
jurisdiction, has no right to interfere with the sacred right of a father over his own 
children.  
He went on to say that “the rights of the father are sacred rights because his duties are sacred 
duties” before confirming that whatever view the Court took of this particular father’s 
responses, the Court could not interfere with the general trust “which the law reposes in the 
natural affection of a father”.
289
 The petition of Harriet and her mother therefore had to be 
dismissed. Cotton L J agreed, but expressed regret, saying:
290
 
I can hardly conceive circumstances where a daughter should not have the opportunity 
of visiting, under any restrictions which may be necessary, and of corresponding with, 
her mother. I should think that would, almost as an unexceptional rule, be of the 
greatest possible advantage to the infant. But the father takes a different view and the 
question is whether the Court ought to interfere with the discretion of the father and to 
say what it would think best for the infant. Here we are not in any way dealing with 
the jurisdiction of the Court under habeas corpus, we are considering the jurisdiction 
which the Court of Chancery has always exercised, delegated probably from the 
Crown as parens patriae. … The jurisdiction is not exercised unless the infant is 
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made what is called a ward of the Court. … Here in my opinion, the circumstances are 
not such as, having regard to the principles on which the Court has acted in exercising 
that jurisdiction, to justify the Court in interfering with the discretion of the father. I 
do not say the Court has no jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction to consider 
whether the father has acted in such a way as will justify the Court in interfering with 
his parental authority. … The father has not in my opinion forfeited his right to 
exercise his duties as a father, and we ought not to interfere. 
Bowen L J said essentially the same:
291
 
If we were not in a Court of Law, but in a court of critics  … we might be tempted to 
comment … upon the way in which …  the father has exercised his parental right. But 
… the Court must not be tempted to interfere with the natural order and course of 
family life, the very basis of which is the authority of the father. … As soon as it 
becomes obvious that the rights of the family are being abused to the detriment of the 
interests of the infant … that [the father] has perverted the ties nature for the purpose 
of injustice and cruelty. When that case arrives, the Court will not stay its hand; but 
… it is not mere disagreement with the view taken by the father of his rights … that 
can justify the Court in interfering. If that were not so we might be interfering all day 
and with every family. 
The prevailing power of the father, reflected through the law, is based in dominance feminist 
theory.
292
 Maidment suggests that it was the injustice of this decision that prompted women’s 
groups to seek legislative change to provide joint guardianship.
293
 
3.9 A gendered power imbalance   
The issue of the power imbalance that creates a powerlessness for motherhood was discussed 




It is quite true that things which have to be decided every day, and cannot adjust 
themselves gradually, or wait for a compromise, ought to depend on one will; one 
person must have their sole control. But it does not follow that this should always be 
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the same person. The natural arrangement is the division of powers between the two; 
each being absolute in the executive branch of their own department, and any change 
of system or principle requiring the consent of both. … The division of rights would 
naturally follow the division of duties and functions; and that is already made by 
consent, or at all events not by law, but by general custom; modified and modifiable 
at the pleasure of the persons concerned. 
The promoter of the 1886 Guardianship of Infants Bill, adopting this reasoning, said:
295
 
Some might hold it a graver objection to the Bill that where two people lived together, 
one must rule; that the father ought to be at the head and have control of his family, 
the wife yielding to him; and the usual illustration was given that if two people rode 
together one must ride behind. But this answer was that the old system of giving the 
husband supreme power over the child had not worked well in the past; and he 
believed that nothing could be more conducive to harmony than the husband and wife 
be placed in apposition of perfect equality before the law, the former recognising and 
respecting the rights of the latte. When women had had power over their children, 
they generally used that power well – as well, on the whole, as fathers did. So far 
from his proposal being likely to breed discord in families, he was sure it would 
improve the relations between husband and wife, by removing from him an engine of 
tyranny, and from her a motive for attaining her ends by indirect methods. … It must 
be remembered that the provisions of this measure would only be needed where the 
parties did not agree. Where they lived together and loved one another, all would go 




The great objection that he had to the Bill under consideration was that it would 
establish duality of control in the household – a thing to be avoided. … Duality of 
control and of leadership was often to be regretted in other matters, but it would be 
especially bad within the domestic circle.  
The final passage of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 backed away from joint 
guardianship, but embodied the “best interests” test as the “paramount” consideration. This 
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allowed a custody order to be made in favour of a mother on her application “having regard 
to the welfare of the infant” during the father’s lifetime, that is, it gave separated mothers the 
ability to apply for custody without altering the father’s absolute rights in the home while the 
marriage subsisted. It also gave mothers’ rights of guardianship on the death of the child’s 
father, either alone or jointly with a testamentary guardian the father might appoint. Finally, it 
provided a statutory mandate that ostensibly gave the Court a wide discretion of its own.  
Mothers and fathers were now both being recognised as having distinct, different and 
necessary functions, and the devaluation of the role of the mother was recognised. This 
comment was made within the House of Commons at the time:
297
 
Our country is to be congratulated on this achievement and on the liberality of our 
law, which discerned … that a child generally has two parents, and that one of them, 
though comparatively unimportant – even verging on the superfluous – might feel 
hurt if her existence and wishes were altogether ignored. … Yet even now their 
position is subordinate. The woman who bears, suffers, risks her life, rears, trains, 
watches – of whom indeed, public opinion demands these things … Father and 
mother are to share pleasantly between them the rights and duties of parenthood – the 
father having the rights, the mother the duties. 
While there was some difficulty in moving on from the common law position of the 
supremacy of the father’s rights, the divorce courts sought to adopt this new standard with its 
recognition of motherhood within the law. In Symington v Symington,
298
 a father who had 
committed adultery was allowed the custody of his three sons, away at school, while the 
mother regarded as the innocent party, was allowed custody of her daughters, being “the 
natural person to have their custody.” With respect to the father, Lord O’Hagan said:
299
 
The father’s right to the guardianship of his child is high and sacred. Our law holds it 
in much reverence, and it should not be taken from him without gross misconduct on 
his part and danger of injury to the health or morals of the children. Bad as the offence 
of adultery may be, there may be considerations of convenience and advantage to the 
children which, if injury to them be not likely to arise, should forbid their withdrawal 
from their father’s care. 
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However, in the decision of Handley v Handley,
300
 a mother who had committed adultery was 
denied custody or access on the basis that the child’s welfare required deference to be given 
to the father’s wishes about the matter. The father had for the first three and a half years after 
separation allowed access to the mother, but then stopped it when he remarried. The Court 
saw that “it is a great hardship for the mother suddenly to be deprived of all access to her 
children”
301
 but also that:
302
 
… here, the wife was divorced for adultery, and forthwith married again. The 
husband, while unmarried, allowed her access to the children, but on his marrying 
again, refused it. His marrying again made a great difference. He might well say, 
“This lady has broken up my first home, and if I do not take care she may break up 
my second home.” I think that his refusing access was reasonable, and that the order 
appealed from ought not to be disturbed. 
By 1893, the father’s wishes had been ameliorated even in the Common Law Courts, to the 
extent that they would stand only if there was no case for welfare interests becoming instead 
the dominant consideration. In addition, the concept of a child’s ‘ties of affection’ was 
introduced.  In Re McGrath,
303
 another decision about religious education, the dispute was 
between and around the appointment by a widowed Protestant mother of a testamentary 
guardian, and the trustees of the late Roman Catholic father’s estate. The Court said:
304
 
The dominant matter for consideration of the Court is the welfare of the child. But the 
welfare of the child is not to be measured by money only, nor by physical comfort 
only. The word welfare must be taken in its widest sense. The moral and religious 
welfare of the child must be considered as well as its physical well-being. Nor can the 
ties of affection be disregarded. 
Notwithstanding these inroads, judicial responses and the exercise of judicial discretion 
pursuant to the new legislation with respect to mothers’ claims and what was intended by the 
welfare of the child, continued to be guided by the two principles of the supremacy of the 
father’s rights and the mother’s matrimonial guilt. In Re G,
305
 a mother lost custody of her 
two children to her husband’s trustees on the basis that the trust fund required that it be 
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applied to the bringing up of the children. Because she was living in an adulterous 
relationship, this was regarded as an immoral home for the children, and accordingly a breach 
of trust. Kekewich J said:
306
 
 I am not sitting as a court of morals … but I distinctly hold that a woman thus living 
in adultery cannot be treated as properly bringing up her children, however much she 
may do in the way of making them a comfortable home and giving them a proper 
education. 
3.10 First wave feminism seeking equality for mothers with fathers 
The social and political context in England around the turn of the 20
th
 century was dominated 
by the Pankhursts, and the establishment in 1903 of the Women’s Social and Political Union 
was aimed at achieving women’s suffrage, and other similarly focused women’s rights 
movements. The continuing inequality between men and women with respect to the existing 
divorce laws was highlighted in Dodd v Dodd.
307
 The wife had left her husband because of 
his adultery, but because she could not also establish his desertion (he wanting her to 
continue to live with him), she was unable to obtain a divorce unlike the position of the 
husband had circumstances been reversed. Sir Gorell Barnes heard the matter and went on to 
deliver the Gorell Report in 1909 in response to the 1909 Royal Commission set up to 
examine Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. As a result, he recommended that the sole ground 
of divorce become adultery, equally for either the husband or the wife, contrary to previous 
policy based on an understanding that a wife’s adultery was more serious than a husband’s 
because, as a mother, she could “palm spurious offspring upon the husband”
 308
 which the 
husband’s adultery could not do.  
At the same time, there was some movement towards recognising that a mother should not 
for all time be disqualified from access to her children by her adultery. A father had never 
been so disqualified, provided he was circumspect in not allowing the children to come into 
contact with the woman and thereby suffer a moral taint.  In Mozley Stark v Mozley Stark and 
Hitchins,
309
 the Court recognised the social forces at work in the drive towards the 
emancipation of women and equality of parenting rights for mothers before the Guardianship 
of Infants Act 1925 was finally passed. In that case, the Court recognised the reality of a 
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sixteen-year-old daughter who strongly wanted to live with her adulterous mother and new 
husband, and not her father. The Court therefore considered the easier course was to 
discharge the custody order in favour of the father, and leave the parties to fall back on their 
common law rights. If the daughter left her father’s house, she being over the age of 
discretion, the father would not be able to force her return through an application for habeas 
corpus. The Court went further, by saying:
310
 
We only desire to add that the matrimonial offence which justified the divorce ought 
not to be regarded for all time and under all circumstances as sufficient to disentitle the 
mother to access to her daughter, or even to custody of her daughter, assuming her to be 
under sixteen. The Court ought not to lay down a hard and fast rule on this subject. … 
And it is always to be borne in mind that the benefit and interest of the infant is the 
paramount consideration, and not the punishment of the guilty spouse. 
The problem of the immoral mother, her continued importance to the child and the 
significance of the status quo with respect to care arrangements were all discussed in the 
1924 decision of B v B,
311
 which cited with approval the Stark decision. On appeal, the 
decision of the lower Court judge, exercising his discretion and refusing all access to a 
mother in respect of her eleven year old daughter, was reversed and access was allowed. The 
appellate Court said the following:
312
 
… we are dealing with a delicate child of eleven years of age, an only girl, who 
obviously is very closely attached to the mother, and who, owing to the circumstances 
of the matrimonial home, has necessarily been throughout the whole of her childhood 
under the substantial and sole charge and nurture of the mother. Under those 
circumstances, it would be a very strange and unusual combination of circumstances 
that would make it to the interest of the child to be deprived at that age of all 
association with the mother. It means a cutting away from the child all the most tender 
associations that she has ever had in her life… to my mind the love and affection of a 
mother outweigh many foolish or indiscreet acts on the part of the parent in question. 
…  The result of this seems to me to be that it is our duty in the interests of the child 
to allow her from time to time, as I would prefer to put it, to have access to the 
mother, rather than to deal with it in the other way. 
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In tracing the early English decisions it is of note that it was not until 1948, notwithstanding 
the introduction of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, that an adulterous mother was not 
considered unfit to have the custody of her child “on the ground that a bad wife did not 
necessarily make a bad mother.”
313
 In Allen v Allen,
314
 after a divorce was granted to the 
husband based on the wife’s adultery, the father sought and was granted custody of their 
eight-year-old daughter who had always been in the care of her mother. The basis of the 
decision was that the child’s moral welfare was the paramount consideration, notwithstanding 
the evidence that the child’s health may suffer if separated from her mother. It was 
considered that the mother had committed adultery once, and she may do so again. The 
mother appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the lower Court had not applied the correct 
test, that both the moral and physical welfare of the child was of paramount importance, and 
the appeal was allowed. The Court said:
315
  
The welfare of the child, both moral and physical, was the paramount consideration. It 
was impossible to say, because a woman had once committed adultery she was not a 
fit person, vis-à-vis one who had not, to look after a child. There was no suggestion 
that the mother was promiscuous, or a bad mother, or a bad housekeeper, or anything 
which made it undesirable for her to look after the child. All the evidence in the case 
is strongly in favour of leaving the child with her, and the appeal must be allowed. 
The value of motherhood accordingly continued to be recognised, notwithstanding issues of 
morality and gender inequality. 
3.11 The compromise: the welfare principle  
There was continuing Parliamentary opposition in England to the introduction of the 1925 
Guardianship of Infants Act. It remained unwilling to cede, within the home, the superior 
rights of the husband and father to a position of equality between husband and wife. A 
compromise position emerged: full equality for women was not necessary to protect the child 
because the welfare of the child generally required the care of the mother. Thus, there was a 
subtle change in emphasis from women’s equality rights to the welfare of the child as the 
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In all cases the Courts have always leant in favour of giving the mother the custody 
and the care of children of tender age. I cannot recall, for my part, a single case in 
which violence has been done to those sentiments, which accord both with our 
feelings and our wishes.  
The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, said:
317
 
The status of women has very much changed in the last twenty five years. Recently it 
has been so changed that the woman almost has the same status as the man. She has 
not altogether the same status, because it is necessary to preserve the position of the 
family as a unit, and if you have a unit, there must be a head to that unit. 
When the family unit broke down, however, Viscount Haldane went on to say:
318
 
When you come to the interest of the child it is recognised as most important that the 
mother should be able to intervene and take care of the child with a power of doing 
good and preventing evil equal to that possessed by the father. 
Thus, section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 was expressed in the following 
terms: 
Where in any proceeding before any court … the custody or upbringing of an infant 
… is in question, the Court, in deciding that question, shall regard the welfare of the 
infant as the first and paramount consideration, and shall not take into consideration 
whether from any other point of view the claim of the father, or any right at common 
law possessed by the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or 
application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to 
that of the father. 
This legal principle was then transplanted into New Zealand’s family law jurisprudence. 
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3.12 The welfare principle in New Zealand  
New Zealand by now had moved ahead, from its greater egalitarian position, to address issues 
of women’s equality with an equanimity not seen in England. It accordingly led the way in 
many areas of reform relating to women, families and motherhood.
319
 The paramountcy of 
the welfare principle was adopted into New Zealand law in the same form as that just passed 
in England, through the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926. It was hailed as a landmark in both 
England and New Zealand and remains foundational to child custody laws in both countries, 
even today. However, the disingenuity behind its legislative introduction in England, based in 
unresolved cultural and rights tensions as they related to women, may be relevant to the 
ongoing struggle to determine what the principle actually means as between mothers and 
fathers. The introduction of gender neutrality through the welfare principle, informed by 
social practice, was a device designed to protect the mother-child relationship without the 
legislature needing to further address the general lack of gender equality in the law. The issue 
of gender neutrality was subsequently, approximately a century later, then used in relation to 
the gender neutral meaning of the welfare principle to dismantle the protection of the mother-
child relationship, the very purpose for which the welfare principle had in the first place been 
introduced. The law therefore, arguably again, avoided the need to address gender equality 
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with respect to motherhood, based in its previously recognised difference from fatherhood.  
The failure of the law in this regard also then, arguably, enabled current developments with 





 Century English case law 
The facts of the 1931 decision of Re Carroll
321
 suggest that a pattern of disingenuity may 
have continued.  The Divisional Court had refused an appeal against a chambers decision to 
refuse an application for habeas corpus by a mother to have her child delivered up to her. The 
mother further appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appellant, Miss Carroll, was a domestic 
servant. She already had one illegitimate child Patrick, when she had another baby, a girl 
named Joan. Both children were baptised as Roman Catholics. The mother and her children 
were in a working house run by a Roman Catholic order. The mother was unable to leave 
with the children because she had no means to care for them, and she was unable to leave 
herself unless she could make suitable arrangements for the care of the children. When Joan 
was nine months old, she sought the assistance of an organisation which arranged adoptions. 
She completed the forms, including a question as to whether Joan had been baptised. She 
answered this in the affirmative. A Protestant couple was found and Joan was placed with 
them. The mother was advised that Joan would be brought up according to the Protestant 
faith. She did not demur, and signed the consents. Several weeks later, the Father of the 
Roman Catholic workhouse where the mother was still living, wrote to the adoption 
organisation advising that Joan had been baptised as a Roman Catholic and therefore needed 
to be brought up according to her faith. He said that the mother had acted without his 
knowledge and that in her anxiety had forgotten this important point, which she now wanted 
to rectify. The mother then wrote to the adoption organisation, which appeared in the view of 
Greer L J, the dissenting appellate Judge, “not to have been composed by herself, in which 
she said that she now wanted her child back so that she could arrange for it to be brought up 
in its own religion.”
322
 The Father also wrote, in terms based not so much on the wishes of 
the mother, but on what he considered were the rights of the child.  The organisation advised 
that the couple who had the care of Joan did not wish to give her up, as they were now 
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attached to her and she to them. Then, there was a subsequent letter from the mother to the 
adoption organisation, in which she said:
323
 
… [I] have been thinking it would be best to keep Joan where she is and would be 
very grateful to you if you could fix my boy Patrick, who is five years old, into one of 
your homes, or if inconvenient to do that, could you get him adopted. Should be out 
of here months ago but owing to my boy Pat I am unable to go. 
The organisation advised that they were pleased that she considered Joan’s care settled, but 
felt unable to assist with Patrick owing to the position of the Father of the Roman Catholic 
workhouse. The mother replied that the Father was not going to help with Patrick unless she 
got Joan back, and added:
324
  
… so we have come up with the conclusion that it would be best to give up writing to 
Father Craven altogether. They have turned very disgusted towards me. 
Subsequently, Father Craven wrote to the organisation advising that he had been to see the 
mother, had ascertained “her real sentiments” in the matter and that what had happened was 
that she had offered the child in a fit of pique because they would not immediately relieve her 




I find that I cannot be entirely separated from my daughter, as would be the case if the 
arrangements made with the defendant society were to continue. I have therefore 
applied to the Incorporated Society of the Crusade of Rescue and Homes for Destitute 
Catholic Children to take care of the child for me, and if they take the child I shall be 
given every opportunity of seeing her from time to time. Further, if the child is left in 
the custody of the persons with whom she now is, I find that she will be brought up in 
a faith other than that which I myself profess. The child was baptized as a Roman 
Catholic, and it is my earnest desire that she should be brought up as a Roman 
Catholic. 
Greer L J saw that “this case was not really the application of the mother at all, but the 
application of the Incorporated Society of the Crusade of Rescue and Homes for Destitute 
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 and wished to confirm the lower court’s refusal of her application for 
habeas corpus that the child be delivered up to the mother. However the majority of the 
appellate judges took a different view. Scutton L J, in determining that a habeas corpus 
should issue, considered that the mother:
327
 
… when left to herself and pressed by the inability to get work due to the 
encumbrance of her two children she is chiefly anxious to hand over their custody to 
anyone who will maintain them regardless of religion, but that when the spiritual 
advisors of her religion point out to her that her duty is to bring up her children in the 
religion she professes, she recognises that duty and is prepared to act on it, and does 
so … that the mother has a legal right to require that the child be brought up in her 
religion … and the Court will … be undertaking a dangerous and impossible task if I 
substitutes its own wishes and responsibility for the wishes and responsibility of the 
parent in the matter of religion. 
Slesser L J, in agreeing with him, held the view that:
328
 
Certainly, [the mother] appears to be illiterate and many of the letters undoubtedly are 
phrased in language which suggests another hand and another mind; but taking into 
account all these elements … I think it would be unfair to Father Craven … to assume 
that [he has] put forward her desires when they are not really her own. I prefer to 
believe her sworn testimony rather than to draw inferences on very inadequate data to 
her detriment and the detriment of those who are supporting her by affidavit.  
Slesser L J went on to consider the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 and the legislative 
introduction of the paramountcy of a child’s welfare, which had influenced the lower Court’s 
decision. However, he saw that:
329
  
… between the mother and father [to decide] which religious education should be 
given. ... [t]his statute … has confined itself to questions as between the rights of 
mothers and fathers … problems which cannot arise in the case of an illegitimate 
child.   
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He further went on to say that a mother of such a child has a right to its possession, and while 
not a legal guardian as an illegitimate child is filius nullius, the child of no one, her claim 
upon the child has always been recognised in equity. She has, by law, obligations imposed on 
her in respect of the child, a contract between her and another person for the transfer to that 
person of her rights and obligations is invalid and so far as religious education is concerned, 
the Court is required to give “the gravest considerations to the wishes of the parents – in the 
case of an illegitimate child, of the mother”,
 330
 that the child was under two years of age so 
its wishes could not be obtained, and that the appeal should therefore allowed. 
In re Collins,
331
 a baby boy, Patrick, born in 1943, had been baptised as a Roman Catholic. 
His father was Roman Catholic and his mother was Protestant, and at the time they married in 
1942, his mother signed a declaration that any children of the marriage would be brought up 
as Roman Catholics. Patrick’s father was killed in action in 1943 and his mother died in 
1947. Before she died, she expressed the wish that Patrick be raised as a Protestant. For two 
and half years before the application brought by the paternal grandparents that custody be 
granted to them, to enable them to raise him as a Roman Catholic in accordance with the 
wishes of his father, Patrick had been living with his maternal grandparents. The argument 
was that the father’s common law rights to dictate the religious education of the child should 
continue to prevail, even in death. This right had previously been absolutely enforced by the 
Court of Chancery, even though it was described in an earlier Chancery decision in 
Hawksworth v Hawksworth 
332
 as: 
… creat[ing] a barrier between the widowed mother and her only child; to annul the 
mother’s influence over her daughter on the most important of all subjects, with the 
almost inevitable effect of weakening it on all others; to introduce a disturbing 
element into a union which ought to be as close, as warm, and as absolute as any 
known to man; and lastly, to inflict severe pain on both mother and child. But it is 
clear that no argument which would recognise any right in the widowed mother to 
bring up her child in a religion different from the father’s can be allowed to weigh 
with me at all. 
The Court saw that this rule had persisted until 1925, when the paramountcy of a child’s 
welfare was introduced. It was then argued the legislation only applied as between a mother’s 
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and father’s rights, and as they were both dead, the common law position should prevail. The 
Court disagreed and extended the application of the welfare rule to situations where the 
parents were alive or dead. The child was left with the maternal grandparents where he was 
already settled, even though this would mean that he would be brought up as a Protestant.  
In Re A,
333
 the Court of Appeal considered competing claims between a putative father and an 
adoption application by the child’s adoptive parents with whom the unmarried mother had 
placed the child. It held that the paramount (but not exclusive) consideration was the welfare 
of the child, and that the mother’s wishes regarding the person who should bring up the child 
were not entitled in law to prevail merely because they were her wishes. The Court found that 
it was the duty of the judge to exercise his discretion by considering the alternatives 
presented to him by the mother and the father, and to come to a conclusion as to which was 
the better place in the interests of the child. 
The idea of divided custody began to arise through the English decisions from about the 
1930s, that is, legal custody to the father and care and control to the mother.  It was seen as 
recognising the reality, and difference, of the mother’s child rearing role and enabled the 
paramountcy of the child’s welfare to be addressed. At the same time, it ensured that the 
father retained his right of control over decision making with respect to the upbringing of the 
child.
334
 This can be seen as an example in the law of not only the dominance feminist theory 
where patriarchal power is maintained, but also perhaps as an early application of cultural 
feminist theory, that is, there is an equality in value but difference in role and function 
between mothers and fathers.
335
 For example, in Re W,
336




So far as I am aware … it is most unusual to deprive the mother of a very young child 
of, at least, the care and control of the child. Only in cases of extreme necessity, 
having regard to the paramount consideration, that is to say, the child’s welfare, 
would a child so young … be taken away from his mother. … On the other hand, it is 
… in the interests of [the infant] that his father should have a practical and effective 
interest in, and so far as possible, be able to plan ahead and provide for his child’s 
further education. … For this purpose, [the father] requires at least some promises of 
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certainty that he can prepare for such education in a reasonable hope of his desires 
being effective, and … to have the chance… of proving… that his proposals are in the 
best interest of his son.  
I therefore order that the custody of [the infant] be granted to the father, but that [the 
infant] shall not be removed from the care and control of … his mother, save as is 
provided for in his access … that [the father] shall be entitled to the possession of his 
son from eleven in the morning until six in the evening on one day in each week, and 
for the period of a fortnight during the school holidays in the summer of each year.
338
 
The mother appealed the decision and was successful in obtaining custody. The appellate 
Court saw the father as having had exclusive custody at common law and that this meant 
‘safe-keeping’, as well as an inseparable element with respect to the right to determine 
matters of education, religion and other matters, and that the notion of divided custody  was 
unknown to the common law. However, it saw a child’s wardship through the Court of 
Chancery being a division of custody, and with respect to directions under the divorce 
legislation, Denning L J had already in Wakeham v Wakeham
339
 given ‘legal custody’ to one 
parent and ‘care and control’ to the other. This was to get around the adulterous wife who had 
not previously been allowed access at common law, and the paramount consideration of the 
welfare of the child. This was recognised as only one consideration, the father’s rights as an 
innocent party also being entitled to consideration. Accordingly, custody was given to the 
father, “although for practical reasons, and solely for practical reasons, the mother may have 
the care and control.”
340
 The appellate Judge said there was no jurisdiction upon which such 
split orders could be made, preferring instead that the matter be addressed as to:
341
 
(i) The fact that the mother had the custody would not prevent the father from 
making plans for the infant’s education. 
(ii) Any order relating to an infant is in its nature being subject to review, and where 
the custody of an infant is given to one parent it is always open to the other parent 
to make a further application to the Court. 
                                                          
338
 In New Zealand, the term custody under the Guardianship Act 1968 (now day-to-day care under the Care of 
Children Act 2004) denotes the day to day care of the child; guardianship is the term used under both Acts to 
describe the authority of a parent to control the major decisions with respect to a child’s upbringing, including 
education. 
339
 Wakeham v Wakeham [1954] 1 WLR 366 at 369. 
340
 Wakeham v Wakeham, above note 339 at 369 per Denning L J. 
341
 Re W above note 336 at 564. 
 82 
(iii) The ability for either parent to apply to the Court of Chancery by way of wardship 
proceedings, and that probably being the right course in a case of any complexity. 
(iv) A  recognition that if one parent has legal custody and the other care and control, 
and they are unable to agree, a further application by one or other to the Court is 
probably inevitable in any case. 
The law’s approach to divided custody may have been a precursor to the shared day-to-day 
care parenting arrangements that have now developed. Divided custody was founded on a 
continuing reality and recognition of a father’s superior rights and, therefore, upon 
dominance feminist theory.
342
 Shared care parenting regimes appear to be the result of 
political pressure applied by fathers’ groups.
343
  A new default legal position and a proposed 
amendment to New Zealand’s legislative regime to provide for equal time shared day-to-day 
care was rejected in 2000.
344
 The paramountcy of the welfare of the child was confirmed as 
the continuing and applicable legal standard for a child’s care arrangements. 




3.14 Motherhood and adoption 
The intensity of a mother’s feelings towards her child can be seen in adoption cases where the 
mother has not been able to finally commit to the fiction which requires that she give her 
child up, absolutely and completely, and she then seeks to withdraw her consent. In Re C,
346
 a 
1964 English adoption case, the mothers’ feelings towards her child were written into the 
judgment directly from her affidavit:
347
 
My failure to make up my mind was because I could not bring myself to put pen to 
paper because of my strong desires for her and my decision as to what was best for 
her. I was aware of the risk of attachment between the child and the adopters and they 
and her. I have read [the doctor’s] report … He says - to summarise – there is a very 
real danger in a move now, taking into account the time she has been with the 
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adopters. This came as a slight shock to me. I knew that she would be terribly upset, 
but I was slightly surprised that so much was written on the psychological effect upon 
her. I was surprised that the report seemed to harp so much on the psychological 
effect on the child. This is what I had realised I would have to cope with if she 
returned to me. I think that I will succeed in coping with her troubles. I acknowledge 
the possibility that she will be very turbulent and the effect this will have on her – 
tantrums, tempers, perhaps bed-wetting. I think that, if she feels strong love from me, 
she will grow out of the terrible depressions she will suffer at first. I think maybe in 
her subconscious mind she will feel love and security in me. 
The issues of the child’s attachment to the adoptive parents, and the doctor’s report of the 
dire consequences if the child was removed from this care to be returned to the natural 
mother, were determinative. The Court considered the natural mother was unreasonable in 
withholding her consent to the adoption proceeding. Her consent was therefore dispensed 
with. She appealed, again seeking the restoration of the care of her child back to herself. Her 
appeal also failed, the Court deciding that in their view, “[the mother] show[ed] a self-




In another English adoption decision from 1966, the quality and character of not just the 
natural mother, but also the proposed substitute mother (being the wife of the natural father 
who sought to care for his baby son himself, rather than have him retained by the adoptive 
parents) were central to the decision of the Court. In changing his mind during the course of 
the concurrent adoption and custody proceedings, and granting custody to the 49-year-old 
Protestant father despite the baby having been with the proposed adoptive Roman Catholic 
parents with the consent of the 24-year-old mother since he was seven weeks old, the judge 
indicated how favourably impressed he was by the father’s wife. Her quality as a mother, 
combined with the “instinctual bond” that should develop with the child’s father, changed the 
judge’s mind. He said:
349
 
I will just refer to one or two short passages of my notes of the wife’s evidence in the 
hope that something of her quality will come through in the written word. .. She said 
that she always wanted a boy and that the father wanted a boy too, and that after it had 
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been found that she could not have any more children, she and the father … talked 
about adopting a child. …She said that her husband told her of the affair and that he 
wished to marry the mother. She said “I loved him;  I thought there was no sense in 
three people being miserable about it”… [on] the day of the decree nisi, she met him 
because he always took her two daughters to the pictures on that day of the week. She 
said she was very upset. They had a number of discussions about it and about making 
a fresh start. … The baby was discussed before the decree nisi was rescinded. It was 
one of the basic things that she should look after the baby. She was asked in cross 
examination why she was willing to look after the child and she said: “really, because, 
first, he” (that is, her husband) “does love me and we are very happy together, and, 
secondly, he did such a lot for me and my two daughters … and this is one of the 
ways I can repay him. She was asked: “Is it your position this: that you are in love 
with your husband and you are grateful to your husband,” and her answer was, “Yes, I 
am.” Question: “And that is why you are willing to look after this child that was part 
of his betrayal to you?” and she said yes, she was. This woman is of a kind which 
fortunately is not very rare in this country. She is not given to ideas or ideology; she is 
not irreligious though not a church-goer; she is thoroughly practical, with her feet 
firmly on the ground. She is a woman of principle, truthful, honest, forthright, sincere, 
kind, loyal and decent through and through. She impressed me most favourably ... I 
am confident she would make a good and completely devoted mother to the child, and 
that to bring him up would be to her a work of love. 
3.15 Motherhood, morality and the law 
By 1969, an understanding of a child’s need for its mother was regularly referred to, 
notwithstanding the adultery of the mother. In Re F,
350
 the father obtained an interim custody 
order through wardship. The mother had left their home, although unable to take their young 
daughter with her, to live with an Air Force colleague of her husband and became pregnant to 
him. The husband wanted to reconcile, but this was refused by the wife. The father then sent 
the child to his parents. The mother subsequently uplifted her and took her to her mother’s, 
where she also remained. The wardship order was made and the child had to be returned to 
the father. Meanwhile, the father had entered a new relationship and was living with the 
young woman, close by to his parents. A further child was also expected of this union. 
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Accordingly, both the mother and the father had re-partnered and were creating new families. 
The Court decided that while there was little between the parties in terms of moral guilt, it 
was still the mother, not the father, who had broken up the home. It saw both parents 
continuing to have significant input, and also discussed the mother-substitute and father-
substitute roles of the new partners together with the considerations required to give effect to 
the principle that the welfare of the child was the paramount. It also confirmed that the 
welfare principle was not exclusive, and, while giving it special weight, the Court should also 
weigh all relevant circumstances. It said:
351
 
First, as regards the home, the mother has a small advantage. Second, as to the parent 
substitute, again the mother has a small advantage. Third, as to the upheaval to the 
ward, the father has a small advantage. Fourth, as to a young child’s need for its 
parents, the mother has a substantial advantage. Fifth, as to justice between the 
parents in the responsibility for the breakup of the marriage, the father has a 
substantial advantage. …  Of these five … all except the fifth relate to the welfare of 
the child. 
He came to the conclusion that the mother’s failings as a wife had not made her so bad a 
mother as to displace the greater need young children had for the mother, rather than the 
father, and custody by “a small margin”
 352
 was granted to the mother. Thus, by the late 
1960s, the issue for the judges was still reconciling two competing principles: that of 
punishing a guilty party, with the understanding that as a general rule it was better for little 
girls to be cared for by their mothers. 
However, by 1970 this had been displaced by decisions that there was no principle that a boy 
over seven should be with his father, just as there was no principle that a young girl should be 
with her mother. The Court of Appeal in Re C (A) (An Infant),
353
 in a dispute over an eight-
year-old boy between the father, and the paternal grandmother and aunt (the boy being left 
with his father), said:
354
 
I do not agree at all with expressions of opinion which have fallen … from judges that 
a boy should, as a matter of “principle” be with his father – just as much as I disagree 
with the other “principle”, which has altogether been abandoned, that a girl under 
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three should, as a matter of principle, be with her mother. Other things being equal, 
these things may be so, but there is no principle involved in either. They are merely 
considerations which may weigh with the judge, where the scales are nicely balanced. 
1970 was an important year in tracing the English case-law. The House of Lords decision in J 
v C
355
 established that the welfare principle is one that is deliberately indeterminate, as beliefs 
about what is best for a child change with time, cultural norms and social and parenting 
practices. Further, what was understood as a child’s welfare, whether intuitive or informed by 
sociology or psychology
356
 was to be incorporated into the concept itself.
357
 Thus, much of 




… the words’… shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount 
consideration’ … in their ordinary significance … must mean more than that the 
child’s welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to the matter 
in question. I think they promote a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, 
relationships, claims and wishes of the parents, risks, choices and other circumstances 
are taken into account and weighted, the course to be followed will be that which is 
most in the interests of the child’s welfare as that term has now to be understood. That 
is the first consideration because it is of first importance and the paramount 
consideration because it rules on or determines the course to be followed. 
This view means that a child’s welfare is the sole, not first, consideration. All other 
considerations must be subordinated to it. This has resulted in elevation of the welfare 
principle as the only consideration. It has also led to the principle having had removed from it 
all previous social understandings, and has therefore made it vulnerable to being politically 
                                                          
355
 J v C [1970] AC 668. 
356
 The rise of the discipline of psychology and its influence on the law with respect to motherhood and 
parenting, is significant. See the foundational work of Bowlby and others with respect to attachment; also 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit with respect to the development of the psychological parent, above note 161 and 
Chapter Seven with respect to these influences on the development of separated parenting. 
357
 Maidment, above note 201. 
358
 J v C, above note 355 at 686 per Lord McDermott. The New Zealand Family Court continues to cite J v C 
with approval and in particular, the “checklist” of factors that should be considered in determining a child’s 




 In addition, judicial discretion and how it is informed and exercised, has become 
a significant part of the decision making process. 
While the status quo approach emerged from the J v C decision,
360
 and, as a result most 
mothers continued to obtain custody because they were doing most of the caring at the time 
of the breakdown of the parenting relationship, it also created a vulnerability for motherhood 
that was already becoming evident in New Zealand from the drive for equal parenting rights 
through gender neutrality. The status quo principle, while generally protective of 
motherhood, was further undermined by the cases where a child was ‘taken’ by one parent 
and a new status quo established by the time the matter came to hearing. This meant that 
some judges were reluctant to give effect to the status quo principle and “the old fallacy that 
possession was nine tenths of the law”.
361
 The case law suggests they preferred instead, in 
these situations, to follow their instincts.  
3.16 The development of the gender neutral psychological parent 
The 1970s was also the period when the psychological parent was in its ascendancy, through 
the work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, and there was a great deal of weighing and 




The obligations of one parent towards the other parent also began to emerge during the 
1970s. Respect for the other parent was referred to as a need for the child to have recognised 
the significance of a relationship with the other parent. In B v B,
363




… one parent who takes that attitude [one parent believing it is in the interests of the 
child that there is no contact with the other parent]is undertaking a tremendous 
responsibility and discharging it thoroughly badly. Again speaking generally, it is the 
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duty of parents, whatever their personal differences may be, to seek to inculcate in the 
child a proper attitude of respect for the other parent. 
In Re D,
365
 the reality of “a temporary drifting apart and a withdrawal by the husband father, 
when the marriage is breaking up, and especially when he has another woman to keep” was 
discussed as not being abrogation, by the father, of his duties. A father caring about his child 
and missing him but not wanting to upset him or the mother by pushing the access was 
another situation discussed in Re B,
366
 and the cutting off of a natural father’s relationship 
through step-parent adoption was disapproved of:
367
 
It is quite wrong to use the adoption law to extinguish the relationship between the 
protesting father and the child, unless there is some really serious factor which 
justifies the use of the statutory guillotine. The Courts should not encourage the idea 
that after divorce the children of the family can be reshuffled and dealt out like a pack 
of cards on a second rubber of bridge. 
It was still expected that mothers would have the care of the children after separation. 
Therefore, any challenge to this was usually based on the unfitness of the mother. The risk 
was that there was not a corresponding assessment of the father’s parenting fitness, as the 
alternative. Even so, it was still recognised, with respect to young girls, that the father may 
not be as suitable as the mother. In M v M,
368
 Stamp L J said:
369
 
However good a sort of man he may be, he cannot perform the functions which a 
mother performs by nature in relation to a little girl [of four and a half years]. 
Accordingly, a foundation in cultural feminist theory was evident.
370
 However, by the late 
1970s, this situation was described as one of a negative bias in favour of mothers by the 
appellate Court. Families Need Fathers were, in 1974 in the UK, beginning to frame their 
issue on the basis of bias in the Court in favour of mothers (and therefore against fathers), 
saying that nine out of ten custody cases were decided in favour of mothers. Maidment points 
to this statistic being correct, but that within this 90 per cent, over 90 per cent were in 
uncontested or consent matters, usually confirming the status quo which was also often with 
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Accordingly, it was not a maternal preference, but the dominance of the status 
quo principle which was actually at play. Eekelaar said, in 1977, that:
372
 
Our study confirms that the major factor taken into account by the courts in deciding 
where a child is to live is the avoidance of disruption of the child’s present residence. 
We could find no significant relationship between the outcome of the residence issue 
and factors such as the age of the children, the sex of the custodian or the separation 
of the siblings … occasional instances of ‘favouritism’ for the wife may still be found, 
but they are quite uncharacteristic of the general practice. 
That the two considerations probably coincided did not need to have attention drawn to it, 
and therefore the significance of the mother to the child did not need to be separately 
identified. Given the increasing demands by fathers, it was politically expedient that this 
should be the case. Bias against the mother was seen in some instances. A child’s wishes 
began to be independently obtained through social workers’ reports, although the nature of 
their independence came under scrutiny. Mothers came to be regarded with greater suspicion. 
In Cadman v Cadman,
373
 a constellation of these issues was discussed. The lower Court judge 
had formed an adverse view of the mother arising out of her early action in having the father 
“ousted” from the home. In addition, the father was unhappy with the social workers’ reports 
proposing custody of their seven-year-old daughter should continue to be with the mother. He 
therefore obtained the approval of the Court, without any reference to the mother, to obtain 
through his counsel another ‘independent’ and court-sanctioned report which provided a 
more suitable conclusion to him, contrary to the ones already provided. This was on the basis 
that these earlier reports were biased against him. The appellate Court said it would have 
been difficult to find any reports which contained less bias. After extensive interviews over a 
long period of time, the mother had been reported as coping well with the child despite the 
extreme difficulties she had been in with respect to accommodation, now resolved by the 
provision of a council house. The appellate Court considered that the mother might have been 
forgiven in thinking that the turn of events in the lower Court provided a slanted set of 
instructions against her, that the order for another report was made in a form to which she had 
little option but to submit, and that her position was “wholly prejudiced”. The appellate Court 
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described the lower Court’s judgment as not only appearing wrong in process and substance, 
but also one where an opinion about the mother was expressed in the judgment in such 
unusually explicit language that one could not help but wonder “whether [the judge’s] mind 
to some extent has been affected.” 
3.17 Motherhood and poverty 
The issue of poverty of the mother also began to arise during this period.
374
  Occupation of 
the home was often contested. In the 1974 decision of Allen v Allen,
375
 where the father had 
for some years been living in the home with two of the three children, and the mother 
supporting herself and the third child in a rental flat, the lower Court judge said:
376
 
I really think this family should be back together as far as possible, and I think the 
mother should have the care and control of these children until they are grown up, or 
at least until they are aged 16 … She ought to go back and live in the house with them 
and make a matrimonial home for them. 
The father appealed. However, the decision was confirmed. 
In Dennett v Dennett,
377
 the husband put pressure on the wife to agree to his payments of four 
pounds per week for maintenance of their child to continue at that figure without it ever being 
able to be increased, and in return the husband would not defend the wife’s divorce suit 
against him. The Court considered this agreement to be so against public policy that it also 
refused granting the decree nisi to the wife (reversed on appeal as to the granting of the 
decree nisi). However, it spoke of a certain reality faced by mothers in respect of their 
financial, housing and property settlement situations after marriage break down, which 
difficulties that persist today.
378
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Split custody orders continued to develop, despite the appellate Courts signalling the 
undesirability of allowing one parent to dominate a custody situation. The appellate decision 
in Dipper v Dipper
379
 was described by Maidment as confused.
380
  However, the Court did 
say, in allowing an appeal by the mother against a lower Court decision providing the father 




… these split custody are not really desirable. … care has to be taken not to affront 
the parent carrying the burden day to day of looking after the child by giving custody 
to the absent parent.  
The answer in that case was to provide the mother and father with joint custody, and 
therefore joint control over the major decisions, seeking the assistance of the Court if they 
could not agree. The mother was granted day to day care and control.  
It is hard to resist the conclusion that a form of patriarchy was still evident in the English 
cases in the latter part of the 20
th
 century, and at the time that the fathers’ movement (and 
their claims to the contrary) began to gain ascendancy and political influence. 
Notwithstanding, the position and role of motherhood was still recognised in the UK, 
founded in either dominance feminist theory or cultural feminist theory.
382
 This was in 
contrast to the position in New Zealand where, by this time, the role of motherhood was no 




Motherhood’s increasing, then decreasing, legal recognition is now traced through New 
Zealand’s case law. 
3.18 20
th
 Century New Zealand case law    
The New Zealand Courts were greatly influenced by the value of precedent established by the 
English common law and equity cases of the time. However, they were also influenced in the 
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exercise of their discretion by instinct, by natural law and by the egalitarian social context 
that had been foundational to the development of New Zealand society. 





After 1882 the legislation in England and New Zealand on the subject of the custody 
of infants was the same. … Our legislation, therefore, has followed close on the 
English legislation, and is now the same in every respect as the English legislation. 
Williams J further confirmed that under The Infants Act 1908, where a father asks for a 
habeas corpus to take a child out of the custody of the mother, the Court can give effect to the 
provisions of the legislation even though the mother may not have petitioned. The Court was 
required under this legislation to have regard first, to the welfare of the infant, secondly to the 
conduct of the parents and, thirdly, “to the wishes as well of the mother as of the father.”  
This was contrary to the old English common law position, as modified by equity and the 
legislature that the Court was first to have regard to the paternal right, secondly to the marital 
duty and, thirdly, to the interests of the children. Thus, the approach of the early judges in the 
New Zealand Courts appeared to recognise the greater historical vulnerability of the mother. 
It also appeared more cognisant of the differences between mothering and fathering to a 
child, despite the wholesale adoption of English law which had been constructed around 
patriarchy. In Re Thomson,
386
 Williams J discussed the need for English common law as 
described in R v de Manneville,
387
 to have been ameliorated through equity with respect to the 
domination of the rights of the father against the mother. He saw this as having commenced 
in 1839 with Talfourds Act, replaced by the Custody of Infants Act 1873, which extended the 
age up to which control of a child could be given to a mother from seven to sixteen years. He 
confirmed the New Zealand legislation as having adopted the English position, describing the 
English Acts of 1839, 1873 and 1886 as a series of modifications, in favour of the mother, of 
the absolute common law rights of the father with respect to the guardianship and custody of 
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Nobody can read the various sections in the [Guardianship of Infants Act 1886] 
without seeing that it is essentially a mother’s Act. It has very greatly extended the 
rights of mothers. I do not say that it has as much, if at all, diminished the rights of 
fathers except as regards mothers.  
Williams J was clear that the rights of the father were not to override the wishes of the 
mother, and that the rights of the father were no longer paramount. In that case, the husband 
left the wife; the wife had asked if he was going to give her anything to keep the children. 
Because he said ‘no’, she then said that he had better take the children with him, which he 
did. The wife was also pregnant. She had the baby and there was no response from the 
husband to this advice, to her requests for information about the children or in providing 
support for the new child. The father had placed the children with the paternal grandmother in 
Milton and when the mother attempted to see them she was refused access to the house. The 
husband’s behaviour was described as “callous and hard-hearted”; the wife’s, on the other 
hand, as “genuinely anxious about her children.” She then “took the extreme step of taking 
them away surreptitiously from their grandmother’s custody” and while the judge considered 
what she really should have done was to apply to the Court under the Infants Act 1908, he 
saw that “it is difficult to blame a mother from doing anything right or wrong to recover her 
children.”
390
 The mother subsequently took up a housekeeping position in Napier, taking the 
children with her, they being two boys aged six and four years together with the baby. 
Williams J approved of the remarks made by Sir J Romilly M R in the English decision of Re 
Austin,
391
 where he said:
392
  
No thing and no person and no combination of them can, in my opinion, with regard 
to a child of tender years supply the place of the mother, and the welfare of the child 
is so intimately connected with its being under the care of the mother that no extent of 
kindness on the part of any other person can supply that place. 
He commented that the paternal grandmother at 65 years old, however well meaning, could 
not take the place of a mother to the children. There was nothing to suggest that the wife 
would not treat the children as a mother should, and therefore, looking at the welfare of the 
children and the conduct of the parents, Williams J considered he should then prefer the 
wishes of the mother to those of the father with respect to custody. With respect to the issue 
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of religious education, however, he saw that it remained beyond question that the law 
provided to the father the right to have his children brought up in the religion that he 
professes, “however languid and lukewarm that profession may be”
393
 and even when the 
father is dead. He referred to the English decision of in Re Besant
394
 as his authority. He saw 
this as a secondary issue to that of custody, and noted the difference between a father wanting 
to take the children off his wife and seeking custody to have that want satisfied using his right 
to control their religious education to do so, and a father who wanted his children in his care 
to enable them to be raised according to his religion. The mother was granted custody, the 
children were to be raised as Presbyterians (according to the father’s wishes), and the father 
was granted access once a month. 
An emergence of the ‘same-sex’ rule began, that is, that young children should be with their 
mothers but, as they grow older, girls do best with their mothers while boys should be cared 
for by their fathers. For example, in Morton v Morton,
395
 a Dunedin Supreme Court decision 
from 1911, the wife sought the custody of the three children of the marriage, a boy aged ten 
and two girls aged seven and six years. The marriage had been dissolved on the wife’s 
petition as a result of the husband’s adultery. The children had remained in the care of the 
father at separation by the agreement of them both, and he was described as fond of them and 
they of him. He was also seen as having done his best to bring them up properly and the wife, 
while innocent and with “no suggestion of immoral tendencies or that she is given to drink”, 
was suggested to be “given to gadding about and to neglecting her household duties.”  
Williams J said that in deciding the question of the custody of the children:
396
 
… where the mother is innocent of any matrimonial offence, it is obvious that she is 
the natural person to take charge of her female children, unless it is shown 
conclusively that she is for other reasons unfit to take charge of them. That has not 
been shown here. 
However, he saw the situation for the boy as different, for much the same reasons; that is, just 
as growing girls want a woman to look after them, growing boys are better in the charge of a 
man. 
                                                          
393
 Re Thomsen above note 384 at 425. 
394
 In Re Besant, above note 275. 
395
 Morton v Morton (1911) 31 NZLR 77. 
396
 Morton v Morton, above note 395. 
 95 
The judge went on to suggest that the father’s immorality did not appear to be continuing, nor 
that his previous fault would affect the morals of his son. He then cited the 1875 English 
decision of Symington v Symington
397
 in support and as providing him with authority for the 
decision he was about to make. However, Symington v Symington was also regarded as the 
high point in the recognition of the “high and sacred”, (and exclusive), guardianship rights of 
the English father. While it was similarly a decision that provided for the ongoing care of a 
son by an adulterous father, with care of the daughters by the innocent mother, the basis of 
the decision may have had more to do with the competing superior and natural right of the 
father than with the more intuitively, natural law-based theory of Williams J. Thus, while the 
children were separated between their parents according to the gender of both parent and 
child, provision was at the same time made for there to be “the fullest provision for access”
398
 
for both parents.  
The same principle, that is “as growing girls want a woman to look after them so growing 
boys are better in the charge of a man”, was also applied by Stringer J in the 1921 decision of 
Meurant v Meurant.
399
 Accordingly, there was a continuing recognition into the 20
th
 century 
of the value of gendered parenting roles for mother and fathers.  
3.19 New Zealand Courts’ interpretation of the paramountcy of the welfare principle  
The legislative introduction into New Zealand in 1926 of the paramountcy of a child’s 
welfare, did not alter the Court’s previously held views as to what that might mean. For the 
New Zealand courts, this appeared to be rooted more strongly in natural law and therefore 
less influenced by the strongly held superior (and absolute) right of the father over the child 
that existed in England. In the 1928 Wellington Supreme Court decision of Parsons v 
Parsons,
400
 the wife had separated from her husband and had sought orders appointing her 
guardian and granting her custody of their three-year-old son. The husband also wanted 
custody. There was no proof of immorality by the wife but there were suggestions which had 
culminated, after the proceedings had been commenced, with the wife discovering that she 
suffered from a venereal disease. The Court pointed to the legislation that it was required to 
apply, that is, section 2 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926. It regarded this as meaning 
that it was directed, in determining the welfare of the child as the first and paramount 
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consideration, not to take into consideration a husband’s superior right to custody at common 
law or any right of the mother against the father, other than from the point of view of the 
welfare of the infant. The decision required to be made was what to find the best solution 
with respect to the question of custody, in the interests of the welfare of the child.  
The decision was that that it would be better that the husband have custody of the child.
401
 
In the 1930 Supreme Court Nelson decision of In Re Winter,
402
 a father, living with his 
mother, was refused an application for a writ of habeas corpus against the mother, living with 
her mother, in respect of their 18-month-old daughter who was in the mother’s care. Kennedy 
J referred to section 2 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926 as the relevant statutory 
authority. He referred with approval to Parsons v Parsons,
403
 decided under this legislation, 
and, also with reference to In Re Thomsen,
404
 decided under the earlier legislation but still 
addressing itself to a consideration as to what was in the best interests of the child. He 
concurred with Williams J with respect to Sir J Romilly’s observations in Re Austin
405
 and 
extended the quote by adding, also with approval, “It is the notorious observation of mankind 
that the loss of a mother is irreparable to her children and particularly so in the young.” He 
went on to confirm that:
406
 
A child of such tender age as the child claimed, essentially requires a mother’s care 
and so far as upon the existing evidence one can see into the future it will be better for 
her to be surrounded in her upbringing, when she has left her very tender years, with 
her mother’s love and care. … the grandmother’s care … is not better for the child 
than the care of its own mother which will be available, so far as may be seen, for as 
long as the child may need it. 
In 1940, the Supreme Court in Wellington in Re H,
407
 also confirmed the general view that it 
was preferable in all ordinary circumstances that a male child should be brought up by, and 
have the care and guidance of, the father. However, Smith J, in the circumstances of this 
particular case, saw that it was better that the mother have custody of both children, boys 
aged 13 and 3 years. An additional reason for this was that the elder boy, regarded as capable 
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of making a choice, indicated a clear preference for living with his mother when interviewed 
by the judge. The father had obtained a writ of habeas corpus and as a result, the question of 
custody needed to be determined.  
The mother had left the father in Kaikohe and gone to her parents in Wellington with the 
children, ostensibly for the school holidays. In reality, she was leaving him. They had been 
married for 14 years and there had been previous significant financial difficulty resulting in 
periods of separation while the husband worked in the South Island. He had also been 
imprisoned for criminal activity. The wife stood beside him and her parents had supported 
him with funding to establish a piggery in Northland. There were further difficulties and the 
wife spent periods back with her parents with the children “heartbroken, depressed and 
discouraged.”
408
 She became ill, she was not sympathetically treated by her husband and the 
doctor ordered her to go to her parents as part of her recovery. She took the younger of their 
two boys with her. During her absence, the husband made considerable efforts to put the 
place to rights, erecting fencing so that the pigs could no longer wander freely between the 
farm and the home. When the wife came home, things were considerably better but the 
financial pressures continued. The wife’s father suggested the family relocate to Wellington 
to be closer to them and to enable better schooling for their eldest son. The wife’s mother had 
guaranteed the business overdraft, it was not being addressed and matters continued to 
decline. The husband became depressed, uncommunicative and was subject in the home to 
“moods of ill-will”.
409
 He was also inattentive to the difficulties the business was in and bills 
were mounting and remaining unpaid. The wife could take no more and returned to the 
support of her parents taking the children with her.  
Smith J concluded that, notwithstanding the desirability of male children being under the care 
and guidance of their fathers, there was no rule which superseded the rule that the Court will 
regard the welfare of the child as paramount. He referred to the process of habeas corpus and 
that the liberty accorded to the 13-year-old by the writ being granted then meant that if he 
was capable of exercising his own discretion, full effect should be given to that. The judge 
talked to the boy, who thought he was getting on better at his school in Wellington,  that he 
wanted to be an engineer, and if his parents were going to live apart he would prefer to live 
with his mother. The judge considered him to be articulate and intelligent and accordingly 
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followed the English decision of R v Greenhill,
410
 that if a youth of this age expressed a 
preference, the Court should have clear reasons for disregarding his wishes. The judge 
considered that the mother, on the facts, was entitled to the custody of the three-year-old boy 
(although it is not clear how he reconciled that conclusion with his position in Parsons v 
Parsons
411
) and that it would also be preferable for both children to be brought up together.  
By the mid-20
th
 century, there was still an acceptance of the different roles of motherhood 
and fatherhood in New Zealand, with motherhood continuing to be recognised and valued in 
the law. For example, in Norton v Norton
412
 in the Supreme Court at Hamilton, Adams J 
referred to the need for children of tender years to be with their mother and said that:
413
  
… There is scarcely need to quote authority for the proposition that, other things 
being equal, children of tender years should be in their mother’s care; … or for the 
proposition that a mother’s care is to be preferred to that of a father, in the case of 
girls, even after they have ceased to be of tender years. … These considerations 
would, on this view of the law, be clearly decisive. But, even if one assumes that the 
Court may have regard in the wider sense to the rival claims of parents I think the 
same conclusion must be reached. … the only proper course is to grant the custody to 
the mother. ... The matter can of course be reviewed if her position becomes such that 
she cannot properly fulfil the duties of a mother. I am not proceeding on the 
assumption that she will not undertake work outside the home. 
This decision also demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the wife as to the reasons for the 
breakdown of the marriage. On the face of it, she had left her husband. He had obtained 
against her a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and she had failed to comply. This put 
her in the wrong, and the husband was able to obtain a divorce. Adams J said:
414
 
The law does not permit a wife to leave her husband except on weighty grounds. She 
is to bear much before she may justify departure. In this case, the wife failed to attain 
the required standard of patience and forbearance, and left the husband for reasons 
which might not have influenced a less sensitive person. But it was, in my view, the 
husband who subjected her to the strain which was too great for her susceptibilities, 
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and was at least guilty of a lack of sympathy and consideration which ought to have 
been extended to the wife. … 
Conduct was also discussed in Miller v Low,
415
 a 1951 decision considered by the Full Bench 
of the Court of Appeal. It allowed an appeal by the mother against the lower court decision of 
Gresson J who had granted the father custody of his 10-year-old twin daughters in 
circumstances where it was clear that the conduct of the wife, in marrying her former 
companion in adultery, had influenced the outcome. This was contrary to section 6 of the 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1926 where conduct was only relevant if it affected the welfare 
of the children, and was at odds with the uninterrupted care the mother had provided to the 
children throughout their lives. 
Criticism was levelled at the mother’s original adultery, her continuing association, and then 
at the mother’s new husband as a ship deserter and aged 24 years, when the mother was 32. 
However, the Court of Appeal was clear. The decision of Gresson J was wrong and the 
appeal was allowed. The Court drew a distinction between what a mother is understood to 
provide to her children, and what this particular mother was or could provide weighed against 
this father’s proposed care arrangements.  It made strong comments in this regard:
416
 
There is one matter not referred to … in the [lower court] judgment, but which we 
regard … as crucial – that is to say, the importance to these girls of their mother’s 
affection and care compared with the affection and care which may be expected to be 
given by … any … stranger, however kindly, bearing in mind in particular that the 
mother’s relation to these children is founded on the natural tie between mother and 
children, has subsisted throughout the children’s lives, and may fairly be regarded as a 





It seems to us that it is a matter of great importance in [the interests of the children] 
that they should continue to have their mother’s care and attention, and, from the 
point of view of their interests, the mere fact that the mother has married her former 
companion in adultery does not outweigh this consideration. Unless and until the 
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contrary appears, it is right to assume that her new ménage will be, not loose and 
immoral, but conducted with normal propriety; and, although it has originated in 
wrong, it should not be inferred that its wrongful origin will so cloud the home as to 
affect these children unduly. Without minimizing the mother’s guilt, it may be said 
with justice that nothing else of substantial importance has been said against her as a 
mother … The father may be equally good as a father, but, with liberal access, such as 
he certainly ought to have, he can still play a father’s part towards these girls, and is 
not likely to be supplanted in their affections. 
And finally, there was a strong general comment and recognition given to the value of 
mothering generally: 
We are much influenced by the view that the care and affection of a mother are of 
great importance in the case of adolescent girls. There is, or ought to be, an intimacy 
between a mother and her daughters of that age which is profoundly important for the 
daughters, and which operates in spheres to which a father’s influence cannot easily 
penetrate. The relationship springs normally from the intimate relations of early 
childhood, and rests largely on the daily ministrations of the years that have passed. In 
this case, the mother and daughters have stood in that relationship to each other for a 
decade – the formative first decade of the children’s lives – and it would, in our 
opinion, require strong grounds to justify the Court in saying that the bond must be 
broken and the children henceforth committed to the care, perhaps only temporary, of 
some woman who is not their mother. 
However, while the 1961 decision of Palmer v Palmer
418
 continued to confirm the 
importance of the ‘mother principle’,
419
 it was also careful to confirm that the general 
desirability of a young child being in its mother’s care was not to be regarded as having an 
inflexible application, much less application as a rule of law.
420
 The ultimate decision in that 
case rested on the fact that the child, not quite two, had already been out of his mother’s care 
since he was three months old and, as a boy, would probably require his father’s care when 
he was older in any event. Therefore, given the significance of the status quo principle, 
custody was confirmed in favour of the father to avoid any further shifts in care. However, 
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the dissenting judgment of Gresson P, supporting the lower court judge that the child should 
be returned to his mother, contrary to the Magistrate who thought he should remain with his 
father, was very strongly in favour of a continuing recognition of the “overwhelming 
importance” to a young child of care by his mother. Gresson P said: 
… the advantage to a child under three years of age of the care and attention of his 
own mother is so considerable as to outweigh such other disadvantages as may be 
incidental to the transfer of the child  from his father’s (or grandfather’s) custody to 
that of his mother. One does not need the testimony of psychiatrists to know that a 
young child is happier and better with its own natural mother of 24 or thereabouts 
than with its grandmother of 54. … But for the fact that the father has had the custody 
for upwards of two years … the granting of custody of so young a child to its mother, 
would in the absence of any disqualifying circumstance, be a matter of course. … 
Even if a transference of custody to the father might hereafter – in some five or six 
years time – become desirable, I do not think that possibility … would warrant 
denying the child for the next five years the care and companionship of its own 
mother.  
Gresson P also discussed the need for such frequent access with his mother if he was to stay 
in the custody of his father:
421
 
So that an intimate relationship between mother and child could develop – as it should 
… would mean that the boy spent approximately half his time with his mother, for 
anything less would surely be unfair to both the child and his mother. … [then] … the 
child will become perplexed as to why…he must leave his mother and go and stay 




In the result, the child has been deprived for two years of the care of its mother. I 
regard it as a grave injustice to continue that deprivation because possibly … in about 
five years time it may be desirable to give custody to the father. That does not seem to 
me to provide an adequate ground for denying the child for the next five years 
benefits which it is said are incalculable. 
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North P, in allowing the father’s appeal to retain custody, said: 
While … I do not wish for one moment to be thought to pass over too lightly what has 
been described as “the mother principle” I attach a great deal more importance … to 
the desirability of maintaining continuity in custody. 
Cleary J, also allowing the appeal because the child was already in the father’s custody, 
however said: 
I am prepared to accept the principle, as a general but by no means invariable rule, 
that young children, including young male children, are better in the care of their 
mother, and I accept also that good and sound reason affecting the welfare of the 
infant should be shown before the principle is departed from. …  
These New Zealand decisions also took the position in Australia into account. The 1950 
decision of the High Court of Australia in Lovell v Lovell
423
 was frequently cited. There, a 
wife had left her husband taking their three-year-old daughter with her. The husband took the 
child off her and the wife sought the assistance of the Supreme Court of Victoria. It decided 
that the child was at least as well off with the arrangements that the father could make for the 
child’s care, as could the mother (who was also working). She successfully appealed to the 
Full Supreme Court. The husband then took the matter to the High Court of Australia where 
the majority confirmed the judgment of the primary judge in initially refusing the wife’s 
application. The Court discussed ‘the mother principle’,
424
 and while it confirmed its 
significance to the welfare of the child, it also said it was not a rule of law. It confirmed that 
parents were to be on an equal footing and that the welfare of an infant could not be allowed 
to “elbow out” all other considerations. Latham C J said: 
425
 
… the welfare of the infant cannot properly be allowed to “elbow out” all other 
considerations … The Full Court has based its judgment not only on the proposition 
that the consideration of the welfare of the child should elbow out other 
considerations, but also on the proposition that a mother has a superior right to the 
custody of an infant of tender years … and that right can only be displaced by the 
very strongest evidence. … The provision means that the parents are to be on an equal 
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footing as to rights and claims. Neither is to be regarded as superior to the other. … 
These propositions involve no challenge to the common sense of the proposition that 
as a general rule small children will be better looked after by their mother than by 
their father, particularly in the case of female children,. But there is no rule of law to 
that effect. 
Webb J delivered a dissenting judgment, saying:
426
 
… ordinarily the paramount interests of a girl of three require it to be with its mother. 
To give the child’s custody to the appellant simply to console him or to avoid adding 
to the hardships he has already suffered would be to subordinate the child’s interests 
to his. 
By 1971, the Guardianship Act 1968 had been in force in New Zealand for three years. It 
provided for equal and shared guardianship between mothers and fathers when married, and 
for the mother as sole guardian when unmarried and not living together at the time of the 
birth of the child.
427
 It also provided pursuant to section 23 that: 
(1) In any proceedings where any matter relating to the custody or guardianship of 
or access to a child, or the administration of any property belonging to or held 
in trust for a child, or the application of the income thereof, is in question, the 
Court shall regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount 
consideration. The Court shall have regard to the conduct of any parent to the 
extent only that such conduct is relevant to the welfare of the child. 
(2) In any proceedings under subsection (1) of this section the Court shall 
ascertain the wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and shall, 
subject to subsection (9) of section 19 of this Act, take account of them to such 
extent as the Court thinks fit, having regard to the age and maturity of the 
child. 
Even then, the Court of Appeal was still saying, in D v R 
428
 per North P that:
429
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There is no doubt at all that the mother principle is a very vital one. … but … it is not 
a right in law – the law has never recognised the “mother principle” as having the 
status of a rule of law. It is a factor of importance which varies from case to case. 
However, Turner J added: 
I think … it is impossible to contend that, when other things are equal, the welfare of 
the children is better served by placing them with a mother who has broken up the 
family home to live in adultery for her own selfish purposes. 
Hence, the idea of the “bad” mother began to emerge, despite the clear legislative directive 
contained in section 23(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968, and despite a continuation of the 
long held view that, generally and all other things being equal, young children did best if in 
the care of their mothers. 
The 1977 decision of White J in R v R and V
430
 also expressed the tension the Court saw 
between the “mother principle” as being a “very vital one” as described by North P in D v 
R,
431
 and the issue of a “bad” mother usually associated with her repudiating the marriage 
relationship for an alternative which the Court regarded as relevant conduct pursuant to 
section 23 (1) of the Guardianship Act. In that case, the solution was found by White J in 
recognising that: 
… these children require the attention and care that a mother can give them. In my 
view, therefore, … the proper course is to grant custody to the [mother] but at the 
same time making it clear that I consider this order may be an interim one. 
From the late 1970s, a change of judicial approach can be detected. This was against a 
background of the ‘tender years doctrine’ having developed in England, which protected 
motherhood. At the same time the ‘mother principle’ in New Zealand had been similarly 
protective of motherhood. This had been despite the legal transplant of the welfare principle 
from the English jurisdiction and social context, to the jurisdiction and social context in New 
Zealand, the divergent effects of which were yet to be seen.  
The following section explores the ‘tender years doctrine’ and the ‘mother principle’ and 
considers the effects of the legal transplant, that is, a borrowing of law from another legal 
system. Several cases are discussed that were influential in developing a jurisprudence in 
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New Zealand that was based on equality through the gender neutrality of parenting as the 
dominant value. This is contrasted with the value of fairness to mothers in England, which 
had shaped the jurisprudence there. As a corollary, motherhood in New Zealand was arguably 
being diminished, no longer assuming a position in law as uniquely valuable to a child, and as 
distinct from fatherhood. 
3.20 The rise and fall of the ‘tender years doctrine’ (UK) and the ‘mother principle’ 
(NZ) 
The advantages of young children being with their mothers were first reported in the 
American Courts in 1840.
432




The wisdom of the rule, again, was suggested by the law of nature. Ordinarily, the 
infant is under the complete control of the mother. Usually, she discharges her duty of 
nurture and education far more effectively than does the father. ‘All things being 
equal,’ then, ‘the mother is the most proper person to be entrusted with the custody of 
a child of … tender age.’ It was said that nature implanted in the woman a 
domesticity, an affection and a love for helpless infancy which no man could likely 
possess ‘in an equal degree’. 
In England, this became known as ‘the tender years doctrine’ where it was used, in the 19
th
 
century, to introduce greater equality for mothers within the patriarchal social system.
434
 The 
doctrine recognised an accepted reality: that mothers were understood as being the parent by 
nature better equipped to care for their young child, and this also extended to young male 
children. However, Parliament was not prepared to grant equality to women because of it. 
Talfourd’s Act of 1839 had finally allowed an innocent mother (that is, not adulterous or 
immoral) to be granted custody of her child up to the age of seven years contrary to a father’s 
right in law to absolute possession and control of the child. The age of seven was extended to 
eleven years by the Guardianship of Infants Act 1873. The inherent capacity of a mother was 
being recognised even if not articulated. The works of attachment theorists such as John 
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Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (with respect to maternal sensitivity to infant signals)
435
 in the 
first half of the 20
th
 century further strengthened the position of the ‘tender years doctrine’ in 
England and the ‘mother principle’ as it was referred to in New Zealand. However, the law in 
both jurisdictions was careful to ensure that the notion did not displace the paramountcy of 
the welfare principle first legislatively found in England in section 1 of The Guardianship of 
Infants Act 1925, later consolidated in section 1 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. The 
welfare paramountcy principle applied to any proceedings in relation to the care of children, 
the Court being expressly instructed to disregard, whether from any other point of view, that 
the claim of the father was superior to that of the mother, or vice versa. It was carried through 
to section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 and the reference to the claims of either the father or 
the mother being superior was then dropped. Baroness Hale in Re J (a child) (FC)
436
 
considered this was because “the proposition was too obvious to require repetition.”  
In New Zealand, the welfare paramountcy principle was adopted from England in identical 
form by section 2 of The Guardianship of Infants Act 1926.
437
 Section 3 was added, 
confirming that a mother had the same rights as those possessed by a father to make any 
application to the Court. This was followed by the Guardianship Act 1968 which enshrined 
the paramountcy of the welfare principle in section 23(1) as follows:
438
  
(1) In any proceedings where any matter relating to the custody or guardianship of or 
access to a child, or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for 
a child, or the application of the income thereof, is in question, the Court shall regard 
the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration. The Court shall have 
regard to the conduct of any parent to the extent only that such conduct is relevant to 
the welfare of the child. 
Then, by the Guardianship Amendment Act 1980, section 23(1A) was added:  
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(1A) For the purposes of this section, and regardless of the age of a child, there shall 
be no presumption that the placing of a child in the custody of a particular person will, 
because of the sex of that person, best serve the welfare of the child. 
This was carried forward into the then section 4(4) of the Care of Children Act 2004: 
4(4) For the purposes of this section, and regardless of a child’s age, it must not be 
presumed that placing the child in the day-to-day care of a particular person will, 
because of that person’s sex, best serve the welfare and best interests of the child 
This subsequently became s4(3) of the Care of Children Act 2004, by amendments 
introduced on 1 April 2014.The provision now reads: 
4(3) It must not be presumed that the welfare and best interests of a child (of any age) 
require the child to be placed in the day-to-day care of a particular person because of 
that person's gender. 
These movements were a subtle but significant departure from the origins of the English 
legislation, which had been addressing gender neutrally solely to ensure that the rights of 
separated mothers, and therefore the welfare of the child, were not lost within the existing 
patriarchy. Rather than seeking to have legislatively recognised that a child’s welfare would 
not be served by placing a child according to the sex of the parent, as New Zealand has now 
done, the English law had been at pains to ensure that the sex of the parent as a child welfare 
issue, was, in fact, recognised.  
Nonetheless, the notion that a young child is inherently better off in the care of its mother, 
accepted as a given, began to create tensions in the law. In England, the application of the 
tender years doctrine had grown throughout the 20
th
 century. By the 1950s, it was firmly 
entrenched. Roxburgh J said in Re S (an Infant):
 439
 
The prima facie rule (which is now quite clearly settled) is that, other things being 
equal, children of this tender age should be with their mother, and where the court 
gives the custody of the child of this tender age to the father it is incumbent upon it to 
make sure that there really are sufficient reasons to exclude the prima facie rule.
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Then, in 1960, while the English Court Appeal confirmed “that there was no rule that 
children of a tender age should remain with their mother,”
440
 each of the hearing Judges went 
on to qualify their remarks. Lord Evershed M R added: “it is, of course, true to say that as a 
matter of human sense a young child is better off with its mother and needs a mother’s 
care.”
441
 Harman L J added: “so long as a child is young enough to need the day to day care 
of its mother, it is better to leave the child with her unless she is an entirely unsuitable person. 
But that does not mean that one starts with the mother being ‘one up’; the court must look at 
the facts of each case.”
442
 Donovan L J stated: “Prima facie a child of this age ought to 
remain with its mother and strong grounds are required to justify taking it away. I agree that 




Throughout the 1970s the tension continued, that is, a clear statement by the Courts that there 
was no rule of law or presumption to the effect that a child of tender years should be cared for 
by his or her mother, followed by such clarifying comments as, nonetheless being, “very 
remarkable indeed … that there is no reference to the desirability, other things being equal, of 
small children being with their mother.”
444
 Further judicial comments, recognising the unique 
and special nature of motherhood and its value to a young child, continued to be made. 
Ormrod L J said, in Re K (Minors) (Children: Care and Control):
 445
 
Taking all the facts of this case as they stand, with the exception of [the fact that the 
father is an Anglican minister], I cannot imagine any court deciding to give children 
of this age, namely 5 ½ and 2 ½, to the father, when the mother, a perfectly competent 
mother, is able to offer them, physically speaking, a perfectly satisfactory home. I 
cannot believe that the fact that the father is a minister of religion can have so 
dramatic an effect on the decision of the court as to reverse what would have been the 
inevitable answer in any other case.
 
 
In 1983, Cumming-Bruce L J said that if the position were “nicely balanced, then probably it 
is right for a child of tender years to be brought up by his or her natural mother.”
446
 George 
describes the place of the ‘tender years doctrine’ by this time as having been reduced to that 
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It used to be thought many years ago that young children should be with mother, that 
girls approaching puberty should be with mother and that boys over a certain age 




Her Ladyship appreciated that, in reality, it is mothers still doing most of the caring of young 
children and this created a consideration, not a presumption. What was more relevant was not 
the inherent importance to a child of being cared for by its mother, but the factor of the 
continuity of the care arrangements (which therefore often preferred the mother).
449




In cases where the child has remained throughout with the mother and is young, 
particularly when a baby or toddler, the unbroken relationship of the mother and child 
is one which it would be very difficult to displace, unless the mother was unsuitable to 
care for the child. But where the mother and child have been separated, and the 
mother seeks the return of the child, other considerations apply, and there is no 
starting point that the mother should be preferred to the father and only displaced by a 
preponderance of evidence to the contrary. 
In Re S (A Minor),
451
 Lord Donaldson M R described this change of legal approach as being a 
reflection of  “a change in the social order, in the organisation of society, whereby it is much 
more common for fathers to look after young children than it used to be in bygone days.” Yet 
at the same time in Re W (A Minor) (Residence Order), the Court said “there is a rebuttable 
presumption of fact that the best interests of a baby are served by being with its mother, and I 
stress the word ‘baby’.”
452
 Thus England appeared to move away from the tender years 
doctrine; the Courts did not accept that the welfare principle should have imbued within it a 
recognition of the separate roles of the mother and the father towards the child, which by 
their nature stand apart from each other. It prefers instead to equate the preponderance of 
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early child care still being carried out by mothers as creating a continuity of care principle 
which may therefore have the Courts confirming that a child should remain in the care of its 
mother. That is, it is no longer the role of motherhood that is being given recognition as it 
once was, particularly for a young child. It is the desirability of continuity of care that is 
important. That the carer may be the mother is no longer relevant. In the 2006 House of 
Lords decision in  Re G (Residence: Same Sex Parents),
453
 Baroness Hale of Richmond did 
point out that only a woman can combine genetic, gestational and social parenting, but the 
thrust of the decision was to confirm that unless there are strong reasons to make a change, a 
child’s existing care arrangements should normally be maintained. Thus, the significance of 
the existing carer being the mother was not relevant in making a welfare assessment for the 
child; rather it was that she had cared for the child for the previous four years, with continuity 
of care being the important factor.
 
Smith subsequently expressed concern that the tender 
years doctrine not re-emerge, and describes this decision “as an attempt to cling to the old 
safety net of biology”
454
 in preferring the biological mother in a custody dispute between two 
mothers, one biological and the other her separated partner.
455
 
In New Zealand, prior to the 1970s, there had been some equally compelling judicial 
commentary about motherhood’s importance to children, even if not a ‘legal’ principle. In the 
1961 decision of Palmer v Palmer, Gresson P in his dissenting judgment referred to the 
‘mother principle’ as being of “overwhelming importance”
456
 and also noted the evidence of 
one medical professional as saying “that the cardinal principle is that a baby belongs to its 
own mother, that biologically the mother’s role was tremendous, there being some bond 
between the natural mother and the natural child which was hard to define.”
457
 Another 
medical professional in the case was also recorded as advising that “the mother in the first 
three years was a more important figure than the father and that many authorities gave it as 
much older than that and up to at least seven years.”
458
 Gresson P also referred to a third 
medical professional, giving evidence on behalf of the father, as saying “that for a much 
longer period than three years a mother was still imparting to her baby benefits which were 
                                                          
453
 Re G (Children)(Residence: Same Sex parents)[2006] 2 FLR 629 at 631 (HL); [2006] UKHL 43. 
454
 L Smith “Re G (Children) (Residence: Same Sex partner) [2006] UKHL 43(case note) (2007) 29 Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law, cited in Robert H George, above note 433 at 7. 
455
 Smith, above note 454. George also considers that the case placed emphasis on the continuity of care 
principle than the gender of the parents.  
456
 Palmer v Palmer, above note 418 at 709. 
457
 Palmer v Palmer, above note 418 at 709. 
458




 Finally, Gresson P stated that the suggestion that the paternal grandmother 
could be regarded as a mother-substitute was “mere sophistry.”
460
  However, by 1971 the 
courts had rejected the ‘mother principle’ as a presumption or a rule of law, but confirmed 
that it nonetheless remained vitally important.
461
 Inglis J, however, was subsequently 





This chapter has traversed the history of motherhood and the law between the UK and New 
Zealand. Though women in England made inroads with respect to the issue of gender 
inequality throughout the 1800s, particularly with respect to improved working conditions 
and through the suffragette movement, the relationship between mothers and their children 
was not recognised by the law, which continued to reflect the ownership and power of the 
father. The development by the state of its parens patriae equitable, or fairness, jurisdiction, 
and recognition of an increasing need to protect the mother-child relationship upon separation 
of the parents, was reflected in a focus in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries upon the 
development of the welfare principle as a mechanism to protect the mother-child relationship, 
without politically needing to recognise gender equality. The continuing demand for gender 
equality in the UK resulted in elevation of the welfare principle to its paramount status by the 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, adopted into the more egalitarian New Zealand society by 
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926 (NZ). The development of New Zealand’s 
Guardianship Act 1968 and the ‘death’ of the ‘mother principle’ in 1980, pursuant to section 
23(1A) of the Guardianship Amendment Act, occurred at a time when there was also a 
contemporaneous decline of the ‘tender years’ doctrine in the United Kingdom. Recognition 
and protection of the unique role of motherhood within the parenting laws of both England 
and New Zealand was also waning against a background drive for gender equality through 
the feminism of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, essentially based in removing gender 
differences from the law.
463
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At the same time, a divergence between England and New Zealand began in about 1970 with 
respect to the understanding and application of the welfare principle. The principle had 
developed in England based in a context of patriarchal fairness. In New Zealand, the welfare 
principle was adopted into the law of an egalitarian society where equality (meaning same, 
there being no legally recognised gender difference) was the prevailing value. Goldstein, 
Freud and Solnit’s ‘psychological parent’ became main-stream during this period, and the 
value of the natural mother and the significance of Bowlby’s work in recognizing the 
importance of the natural mother-child attachment, was further diminished.  
Against this background, the next chapter turns to consider motherhood within modern 






The History of Motherhood III: Contemporary Law, Policy and Social 
Context 
Introduction 
Having laid an historical foundation for motherhood with respect to evolving social 
developments and the emergence of the law’s treatment of motherhood, this chapter 
considers contemporary motherhood’s relationship with current law, and discusses New 
Zealand’s present legislative family law framework as it pertains to motherhood.
464
 This is 
based in the paramountcy of the welfare principle, transplanted from England, but is gender 
neutral in its language such that motherhood is no longer recognised as a role distinct from 
fatherhood, and unique to a child. It also identifies, statistically, the reality of our social 
context with respect to the continuing division of role and function between mothers and 
fathers. Mothers continue to undertake a greater share of homemaking and parenting work, 
which is arguably incongruent with New Zealand’s current gender neutral parenting laws.  
4.1 The Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA) 
COCA replaced the Guardianship Act 1968 from 1 July 2005 and is now the central piece of 
legislation providing the legal framework for the guardianship and parenting of children in 
New Zealand. It does not refer to either mothers or fathers by gender; rather it is gender 
neutral in language and refers only to parents. Pursuant to section 4(1) it requires that the 
welfare and best interests of the child be the first and paramount consideration, requiring 
consideration for a particular child in that child’s particular circumstances. Section 4(3) 
requires that, regardless of a child’s age, it must not be presumed that by placing a child in 
the day-to-day care of a particular person, will because of that person’s sex, best serve the 
welfare and best interests of the child. Decisions must be made by the court and implemented 
within a time frame appropriate to a child’s sense of time, informed by the principles set out 
in section 5, and, pursuant to sections 6 and 7, the court must also ensure a child is given 
                                                          
464
 The UK’s family law legislative framework with respect to care arrangements for children between mothers 
and fathers is found in the Children Act 1989, as amended by the Children Act 2004, and the more recent 
Children and Their Families Act 2014 introduced at the time of the establishment of a single Family Court. For 
the purposes of this section, the focus is on New Zealand’s current legislative regime. No further comparison 
with the UK legislation is therefore intended. 
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reasonable opportunities to express his or her views and to take any views expressed into 
account.   
The Act does not refer to marriage or to any other relationship context within which 
parenting prior to separation might have been conducted; no prior relationship is required to 
have existed. However, the biological parentage of the mother and father does provide the 
starting point for the legal authority bestowed with respect to both guardianship and parenting 
orders pursuant to sections 17 and 48 respectively.  
Section 15(a) defines the role of guardian as involving “all duties, powers, rights and 
responsibilities that a parent of the child has in relation to the upbringing of the child.” 
Section 16(1) refers to the exercise of guardianship as including “determining for or with the 
child, or helping the child determine, questions about important matters affecting the child.” 
Important matters are defined in section 16(2) as including “changes to the child’s residence 
(including, without limitation, changes of that kind arising by travel by the child) that may 
affect the child’s relationship with his or her parents and guardians.” A child’s father and 
mother are usually joint guardians, and joint guardians must consult and secure joint 
agreement with respect to guardianship decisions wherever practicable. Where there is a 
dispute between guardians, this is resolved by an application to the Family Court pursuant to 
section 46R for guardianship directions. A parenting order pursuant to section 48 does not 
provide the right to shift a child as an incident of day-to-day care. This was removed from the 
Care of Children Bill before it was enacted. However, a parenting order can have conditions 
attaching to it as to where a child is to live when the order is made. It is also possible to apply 
for the variation of a parenting order with respect to where the child will live, if a parent’s 
location is to change. 
Relevant to an assessment of a child’s welfare and best interests and not previously included 
in the Guardianship Act 1968, are the section 5 principles, amended by the Care of Children 
Amendment (No 2) Act 2013 (which came into force on 1 April 2014).
465
 These principles 
                                                          
465
 Section 5 Principles relation to child’s welfare and best interests 
The principles relating to a child's welfare and best interests are that— 
(a) a child's safety must be protected and, in particular, a child must be protected from all forms of 
violence (as defined in section 3(2) to (5) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995) from all persons, including 
members of the child's family, family group, whānau, hapū, and iwi: 
(b) a child's care, development, and upbringing should be primarily the responsibility of his or her parents 
and guardians: 
(c) a child's care, development, and upbringing should be facilitated by ongoing consultation and co-
operation between his or her parents, guardians, and any other person having a role in his or her care under 
a parenting or guardianship order: 
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are not exhaustive and the court may take other relevant factors into account. They refer to 
the parents having primary responsibility for their child’s care, that there should be continuity 
in the care arrangements, the child should continue to have a relationship with both parents, 
and the child’s relationship with “family group, whānau, hapū, or iwi” (understood to mean 
and include the extended family, the descent group, and the tribe) should be preserved and 
strengthened. A child’s identity is important.  Consultation and cooperation is encouraged 
but, above all, a child must be kept safe (including from psychological harm). The language 
of the legislation is neutrally written. There is no distinction between mother and father. The 
role of the mother and father as distinct from each other, is deliberately omitted from the 
legislation. This is consistent with liberal feminist theory. That is, mothers and fathers should 
be treated equally and any significant natural difference through gender is not generally be 
regarded as relevant. This is not consistent with cultural feminist theory, which pursues 
gender equality through recognition of such difference.
466
 That is because there is no 
presumption in law providing for a recognition of the differences between motherhood and 
fatherhood in the weighing and balancing of the matrix of circumstances which make up a 
welfare and best interests assessment pursuant to section 4 of the Act. By virtue of the 
specific direction contained in section 4(3), there can be no presumption that a child’s welfare 
and best interests require that the child be placed in the day-today care of a particular person 
because of that person’s gender.
467
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(d) a child should have continuity in his or her care, development, and upbringing: 
(e) a child should continue to have a relationship with both of his or her parents, and that a child's 
relationship with his or her family group, whānau, hapū, or iwi should be preserved and strengthened: 
(f) a child's identity (including, without limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious denomination and 
practice) should be preserved and strengthened. 
466
 See Chapter Five  
467
 Section 4 Child's welfare and best interests to be paramount 
(1) The welfare and best interests of a child in his or her particular circumstances must be the first and 
paramount consideration— 
(a) in the administration and application of this Act, for example, in proceedings under this Act; and 
(b) in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care for, or 
contact with, a child. 
(2) Any person considering the welfare and best interests of a child in his or her particular 
circumstances— 
(a) must take into account— 
(i) the principle that decisions affecting the child should be made and implemented within a time 
frame that is appropriate to the child's sense of time; and 
(ii) the principles in section 5; and 
(b) may take into account the conduct of the person who is seeking to have a role in the upbringing of the 
child to the extent that that conduct is relevant to the child's welfare and best interests. 
(3) It must not be presumed that the welfare and best interests of a child (of any age) require the child to 
be placed in the day-to-day care of a particular person because of that person's gender. 
(4) This section does not— 
(a) limit section 6 or 83, or subpart 4 of Part 2; or 
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A discussion of other New Zealand legislation relevant to the regard the law has for 
motherhood follows. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (Hague Convention), originally developed to address the issue of abduction of 
children, usually by fathers out of the care of mothers, is first considered, and then legislation 
focusing on the responsibility of the state to address care and protection concerns for a child 
where motherhood may have become compromised.  
4.2 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
1980 
The Hague Convention forms part of New Zealand’s statutory framework relevant to 
motherhood, shared care, and international relocation.
468
 Difficulties have arisen in recent 
years over the changed emphasis of the Convention. It was originally devised as a mechanism 
to ensure the return of children to their home jurisdiction when they had been abducted 
overseas by a non-primary care-giving parent (and more commonly the father against the 
mother). In recent years, it has become the instrument of choice to prevent a pre-emptive 
relocation by a primary care-giving parent, (more commonly the mother against the father). 
The tensions created by this, and by a mechanism not designed to address welfare issues but 
to apply the law as to the prevailing jurisdiction with few exceptions, has had a significant 
impact upon motherhood within a separated parenting environment. This is particularly in 
situations where a mother may be seeking to return, after relationship breakdown, to the 
support of her own family.
469
 It is also related to the difficulties some mothers have 
experienced when seeking the permission of the Court to relocate with their children, after 
separation, back home to family support.
470
 
4.3 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 
The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (CYPFA) provides a statutory 
framework for the state protection of children and also touches on mothering. Under CYPFA, 
the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development may apply, pursuant to section 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(b) prevent any person from taking into account other matters relevant to the child's welfare and best 
interests. 
468
 Incorporated into our domestic jurisdiction through sections 92-124 of the Care of Children Act 2004 
469
 See examples in http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2229386/Jennifer-Jones-Tears-tug-love-mother-
went-run-children-loses-battle-them.html (accessed 18 November 2012) and http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-
08-07/high-court-custody/4182818 (accessed 18 November 2012). 
470
 See Dr Nicola Taylor, Megan Gollop and Professor Mark Henaghan “Relocation Following Separation: The 
Welfare and Best Interests of the Child” Research Report, June 2010, Centre for Research on Children and 
Families and Faculty of Law, University of Otago, Dunedin. 
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78, for an interim custody order in respect of a child pending determination of care and 
protection proceedings. As a result of a successful application pursuant to section 14 that a 
child is in need of care and protection through any of the stipulated grounds, a custody order 
in favour of the Chief Executive, pursuant to section 101, will usually result. This may be 
accompanied by an additional guardianship order pursuant to section 110. Any rights that the 
mother (or father) may have had in law are suspended as a result of such state intervention. 
Strong efforts are made through the use of the Family Group Conference to have family and 
whānau take responsibility for, and make decisions about, their own children. The value of 
whānau, or kinship, is a central and respected part of the decision making process. However, 
there is a different emphasis on the value of a child maintaining a relationship with both 
parents under this legislation as compared to COCA. If a child is not to be returned to the 
day-to-day care of one or both parents but is to achieve permanency in another placement 
through state intervention, the same effort is not made by the Chief Executive to maintain a 
relationship with a non-care-giving natural parent as is considered desirable by the Family 
Court with respect to orders under COCA. A permanent care-giver under the CYPFA may 
subsequently be encouraged to obtain COCA orders for additional guardianship and 
parenting pursuant to sections 44 and 48. The Chief Executive then withdraws the CYPFA 
orders. The care-giver is then confronted by a different philosophical legislative approach. 
Under COCA, they are statutorily required to consult with the other guardians pursuant to 
section 16(5) and can no longer simply relocate with the child as a function of their day-to-
day life, or make any other parenting decisions which go beyond the normal incidence of 
day-to-day care.  
In 2005, former Principal Family Court Judge Peter Boshier discussed the interface between 
these two pieces of legislation, saying: 
471
  
Children are primarily dependent on their families, so to truly uphold the principle 
that the welfare of the child is paramount, one must also look to the welfare of the 
child’s family, as the two are inextricably linked. To eliminate these considerations 
from the welfare assessment under one Act while they remain as a fundamental 
concept under another would seem to cause irreconcilable ambiguity as to what the 
Court – and society – consider as having a crucial impact on the welfare of children 
                                                          
471
 Peter Boshier, Principal Family Court Judge of New Zealand “Relocation cases: an international view from 
the Bench” (2005) 5 NZFLJ 77 at 81. 
 118 
These competing legislative positions remain outstanding, as do their differing impacts upon 
motherhood in its relationship with the law. 
4.4 The Māori perspective  
COCA provides, in a manner not available under its predecessor, the Guardianship Act 1968, 
for the desirability of taking into account wherever possible a child’s cultural identity and for 
the strengthening of its relationship with whānau.
472
 Yet COCA is ideologically inconsistent 
with CYPFA, despite both professing to have the best interests of the child as their guiding 
and paramount principle. Atkin
473
 has described the interface between COCA and CYPFA as 
a lack of harmony in family law in New Zealand.  He points to the ideological inconsistency 
between COCA, which he describes as “monocultural and Euro-centric in focus”, and 
CYPFA, which focuses, not on the primacy of the parent–child relationship but on the child’s 
relationship with whānau or kin. COCA does not elevate the biological parent above the 
social parent, nor the mother above the father, when determining care arrangements. This is 
apart from the gateway by which an application might be brought (leave being required 
pursuant to section 47(1)(d) and (e)). CYPFA, on the other hand, is founded on the principle 
that there must be, firstly, an exploration of whether the child can be returned to its own 
whānau, hapū or iwi before alternative placements are explored.
474
 Atkin cites Hall and 
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 Care of Children Act 2004, sections 4 and 5, particularly 5(b) and 5 (f). 
473





 Section 13 of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 provides: 
Principles 
Subject to sections 5 and 6, any court which, or person who, exercises any powers conferred by or under this 
Part or Part 3 or Part 3A or sections 341 to 350 shall be guided by the following principles: 
(a) the principle that children and young persons must be protected from harm, their rights upheld, and their 
welfare promoted: 
(b) the principle that the primary role in caring for and protecting a child or young person lies with the child's or 
young person's family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group, and that accordingly— 
(i) a child's or young person's family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group should be supported, assisted, and 
protected as much as possible; and 
(ii) intervention into family life should be the minimum necessary to ensure a child's or young person's safety 
and protection: 
(c) the principle that it is desirable that a child or young person live in association with his or her family, 
whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group, and that his or her education, training, or employment be allowed to 
continue without interruption or disturbance: 
(d) where a child or young person is considered to be in need of care or protection, the principle that, wherever 
practicable, the necessary assistance and support should be provided to enable the child or young person to be 
cared for and protected within his or her own family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group: 
(e) the principle that a child or young person should be removed from his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and 
family group only if there is a serious risk of harm to the child or young person: 
(f) where a child or young person is removed from his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group, the 
principles that,— 
(i) wherever practicable, the child or young person should be returned to, and protected from harm within, that 
family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group; and 
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Metge, who describe the approach contained in the CYPFA as reflecting the Māori aspiration 
of the family ideal.
475
 However, neither piece of legislation enables the role of each of 
motherhood and fatherhood to be independently valued, arguably leading to an erosion of the 
unique value of motherhood in the drive for gender equality through the gender neutrality of 
the law in both statutes. 
Section 5(e) of COCA now provides that “a child should continue to have a relationship with 
both of his or her parents and that the child’s relationship with his or her family, family 
group, whānau, hapū or iwi should be preserved and strengthened.” Prior to the 2013 
amendment, section 5(b) provided not only that “the child’s relationship with his or her 
family … should be stable and ongoing” but also that “in particular, the child should have 
continuing relationships with both of his or her parents.” This had enabled the Family Court 
to focus on and elevate the child’s relationship with the non-care-giving or non-relocating 
parent (usually the father) to a degree of exclusivity not found nor intended by CYPFA. 
While the Māori perspective favoured maintaining links with both parents and whānau, this 
did not mean sharing day-to-day care and a tension in the law was therefore created. The 
elevated emphasis on the relationship with both parents through COCA, without the same 
emphasis being given to the importance of wider whānau, was inconsistent with the whānau-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(ii) where the child or young person cannot immediately be returned to, and protected from harm within, his or 
her family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group, until the child or young person can be so returned and 
protected he or she should, wherever practicable, live in an appropriate family-like setting— 
(A) that, where appropriate, is in the same locality as that in which the child or young person was living; and 
(B) in which the child's or young person's links with his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group are 
maintained and strengthened; and 
(iii) where the child or young person cannot be returned to, and protected from harm within, his or her family, 
whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group, the child or young person should live in a new family group, or (in the 
case of a young person) in an appropriate family-like setting, in which he or she can develop a sense of 
belonging, and in which his or her sense of continuity and his or her personal and cultural identity are 
maintained: 
(g) where a child or young person cannot remain with, or be returned to, his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi, 
and family group, the principle that, in determining the person in whose care the child or young person should 
be placed, priority should, where practicable, be given to a person -  
(i) who is a member of the child's or young person's hapū or iwi (with preference being given to hapū members), 
or, if that is not possible, who has the same tribal, racial, ethnic, or cultural background as the child or young 
person; and 
(ii) who lives in the same locality as the child or young person: 
(h) where a child or young person cannot remain with, or be returned to, his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi, 
and family group, the principle that the child or young person should be given an opportunity to develop a 
significant psychological attachment to the person in whose care the child or young person is placed: 
(i) where a child is considered to be in need of care or protection on the ground specified in section 14(1)(e), the 
principle set out in section 208(g). 
475
 Atkin, above note at 452. Note also the meaning of “whānau, hapū or iwi” as commencing with iwi (tribes) 
that form the structure of Māori society. Within each iwi are many hapū (clans or descent groups), each of 
which is made up of one or more whānau (extended families). See http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/tribal-
organisation searched 14 December 2015. 
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based Māori perspective. Relocation of a mother back to her whānau, but away from the 
father, or placement of the child with an aunt or grandmother as is quite usual under Māori 
customary whāngai practices, created further tension from a Māori perspective if contested 
parenting arrangements were subsequently addressed under COCA. The 2013 amendments to 
section 5 of COCA have ameliorated this to some extent, but the whāngai or kinship 
approach, with its continued recognition of gendered parenting roles, remains in 
uncomfortable tension with COCA’s current emphasis on gender neutrality and its favouring 
of shared day-to-day care of children between two parenting homes.
476
 
4.5 Separating maternity from motherhood, human assisted reproduction and 
surrogacy 
The concept of motherhood presents other modern challenges for the law. No longer is a 
child’s gestation an automatic and intimate consequence of its mother’s biology. Today, 
assisted human reproduction and surrogacy are well established processes available through 
assisted reproductive technology. Human assisted reproduction means an egg may be donated 
by one woman, and be fertilised and implanted in the uterus of another woman who will then 
gestate, carry the child to term and give birth. Both women could be called the biological 




Advances are also being made with respect to three-parent babies, that is, children who will 
have three genetic parents.
478
 The legal relationship between mother and child in most 
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 However, see PED v MHB & DWT FAM 2009-079-000089 Oral judgment of Judge S J Coyle dated 19 April 
2011; see also T vT [2007] NZFLR 307 per Judge T H Druce at para [23] “In considering TW’s welfare, I note 
the principle that the child’s parents and guardians should be encouraged to agree to their own arrangements for 
the child’s care, development and upbringing: see s 5(a), and ss 39 and 40 of the Act. The whāngai agreement 
should be respected by this court (subject to the paramountcy of TW’s welfare and best interests). Further, it is 
appropriate to have regard for the customary practice of whāngai, given the obligation on the Court to consider 
all factors relevant to a child’s welfare.” 
477
 Note that in other countries, for example in India, it is the commissioning parents who assume legal 
responsibility for the child, not the surrogate. Assisted reproductive technologies such as donor insemination 
have been practised in New Zealand since the 1950s, and invitro fertilisation began in the mid-1980s. There are 
presently seven infertility clinics located in the main centres and funded both publicly and privately. New 
Zealand’s artificial reproductive technologies (ART) are highly regulated with respect to practical application, 
unlike some other countries such as the US and India. This is through legislation and through the establishment 
of committees such as the Ethics Committee on Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ECART), and the 
Advisory Committee on Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ACART). The child born to a woman as a result 
of these technologies is regarded as her biological child, irrespective of it being a different woman who may 
have provided the genetic material. This issue does not arise with respect to fatherhood. The man who provided 
the genetic material is regarded as the biological father. 
478
 This process involves taking the nucleus of one egg and inserting it into the cytoplasm of another egg which 
has had its nucleus removed, but still contains mitochondrial DNA. The hybrid egg is then fertilised with sperm. 
The purpose is to remove a nucleus from a cell with defective mitochondria and place it in a donor cell with 
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western cultures tends to reflect the traditional link between the child and the woman who has 
carried and borne that child. This gives rise to the associated responsibilities of motherhood, 
as Herring says, and a cultural assumption that it is ‘natural’ for mothers to care for children, 
which is not necessarily expected of fathers.
479
 However, this can now include circumstances 
where an egg may be donated by one woman and implanted in the womb of another woman 
not genetically related to the child, who then gestates and gives birth to that child. Both 
women can be regarded as the biological mother, with the law needing to consider whether 
the rights and responsibilities of motherhood should lie with the genetically related mother, or 
the carrying mother.
480
  While, at present, it is the carrying mother who is recognised in 
Western law as the mother, the issue of who the law should recognise needs further 
consideration in light of ongoing technological advances.
481
 At present, there is a general lack 
of congruence around these issues. For example, the genetic relationship between a father and 
child is usually the basis for the creation of a legal relationship.
482
 In the case of the mother-
child relationship, it is the fact giving birth that makes a woman legally a mother. That is 
even where the child is immediately placed for adoption, or is born to a surrogate to whom 
the child is not genetically related. Diduck and Kaganas suggest the law may wish to consider 
whether there should be formal recognition in the care arrangements of both the genetic 
mother and the gestational mother.
483
 This would create some symmetry between the present 
priority accorded to the gestational mother supported by the emotional bonding which 
anthropologists and psychologists suggest takes place in the womb,
484
 and the priority usually 
accorded to the genetic father.  
In New Zealand, surrogacy arrangements as a consequence of human assisted reproduction 
are addressed by the Status of Children Act 1969 (SCA). An agreement that the child, once 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
healthy mitochondria, which, after fertilisation will contain a nucleus with genetic material from only the two 
parents. 
479
 Alison Diduck and Felicity Kaganas Family Law, Gender and the State above note 20 at 125; see also 
Jonathan Herring Family Law 6
th
 Edition, (Pearsons, 2013) at 367. 
480
 Diduck and Kaganas, above note 20. 
481
 Michael Freeman and Alice Margaria above note 17 at 169; see also Alison Diduck “If Only We Can Find 
the Appropriate Terms to Use the Issue will be Solved: Law, Identity and Parenthood” 19 Child & Family Law 
Quarterly  458 (2007). 
482
 Note however that pursuant to Sections 18 and 21 of New Zealand’s Status of Children Act 1969, the man 
donating genetic material through AHR (assisted human reproduction) procedures is deemed not to be the father 
if he is not the mother’s partner; it is the mother’s partner, providing the partner consents, who becomes the 
child’s legal father even though there is no genetic connection.   
483
 Diduck and Kaganas, above note 20 at 128. 
484
 Anthropologist Robin Fox recorded in 1992 that “The emotional bonding of the mother and child starts 
before birth. This bonding will eventually become essential to the heathy emotional development of the child as 
the mother’s milk (in pre-formula days)is essential to its physical development. The evolutionary function of the 
preparturition bonding is presumably to prevent the mother from rejecting the infant at birth …” Diduck and 
Kaganas, above note 20 at 127. 
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born, will become the child of the commissioning couple by adoption, or guardianship and 
parenting orders, is enforceable (although such enforceability is always subject to the 
overriding principle of the welfare of the child).
485
 Otherwise in New Zealand, as in the UK, 
commercial surrogacy arrangements are not legally enforceable.
486
 A surrogate mother 
maintains legal rights to the child, even if they are genetically unrelated, and the surrogate 
mother remains the legal mother of the child unless an adoption order is made. The partner of 
a surrogate mother will also be a legal parent. In addition, it is illegal to pay more than to 
cover expenses with respect to a surrogacy arrangement.
487
 These issues are addressed in 
New Zealand pursuant to the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (HART). 
In England and Wales, these issues are addressed by the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, 
and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. In both jurisdictions, respect 
continues to be accorded to the unbroken link between maternity and the responsibility of 
motherhood arising out of the child being born to the gestational woman.
488
 This approach 
has been consistently found throughout common law based jurisdictions. Because 
reproductive technologies arguably denigrate motherhood by minimising the value of 
gestation, prioritising in law the parental rights of the gestational mother goes some way to 
countering this trend.
489
 However, this is not necessarily the case in legal systems based on 
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 Section 4(1) of the Care of Children Act 2004. 
486
 By way of contrast, in the Ukraine and Georgia for example, a donor or a surrogate mother has no parenting 
rights over the child born; the child born is legally the child of the prospective parents. In addition, in some US 
states such as California, commercial surrogacy is legal, with such contracts being enforceable.  In New Jersey 
however in the 1986 case of Baby M, the surrogate mother refused to give custody to the couple with whom she 
had made a surrogacy agreement. The Courts of New Jersey found that she was the child's legal mother and 
declared contracts for surrogate motherhood illegal and invalid. The court then found it in the best interests of 
the child to grant custody to her biological father and his wife, rather than to the surrogate mother, who was 
granted access. 
487
 This is consistent with section 21 of the Adoption Act 1955, which prohibits payment for an adoption other 
than reimbursement of hospital and medical expenses of the mother. Note however that the courts have been 
lenient with respect to breaches of the payment issue. See Re P (Adoption) [1990] NZFLR 385 
488
 Women being treated as mothers throughout pregnancy was implied in in Re G (Residence: Same Sex 
Parents), where Butler-Sloss L J pointed out that only a woman can combine genetic, gestational and social 
parenting. Note, however, the pressure being placed on the law in this regard by the UK decision of Z (A Child: 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: parental order) [2015] EWFC 73 (7 September 2015) where section 
54(1) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 provides that a parental order can be made in certain 
circumstances upon the application of two persons. Z, the biological son of a British single father, was 
conceived through a US surrogacy arrangement. An order had already been made in the US that the British 
father was legally the child’s only parent, in line with what everyone intended. The father brought his son home 
to the UK, and has cared for him in the UK ever since. However, because UK law treats the US surrogate (who 
has no biological connection with the child and never intended to be his parent) as the boy’s legal mother, she, 
rather than the father, has sole decision-making rights. The father therefore sought a parental order from the UK 
High Court to confirm his sole parentage and to give his son a UK birth certificate. Despite the agreement of all 
parties, the court said that the law was clear – two applicants were required in a surrogate situation, which only 
Parliament could change. 
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 Jennifer S Hendriks “Essentially a Mother” William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law Vol 13, Issue 2 
2007 429-469 at 429 
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civil law, where a sharp contrast between maternity and motherhood is evident and supported 
by the law. Abortion on demand also provides a woman with a right to fully renounce 
maternity as well as motherhood.
490
 A gestational mother at the time of birth can already 
renounce her motherhood in such jurisdictions as France, Italy and Luxembourg and, if she 
makes that choice, she has no further motherhood responsibilities. Freeman and Margaria
491
 
examine the body of opinion, led by Katharine O’Donovan,
492
 that considers that the way 
forward lies in a gestational mother being legally allowed to deny post-birth motherhood in 
those jurisdictions where this is presently seen as abandoning a child and therefore illegal.  
O’Donovan contrasts the response of both England and New Zealand to the issue of baby 
abandonment as one of denial with that of France as creating a legal right of anonymous 
maternity, and Germany as accepting of it as a pragmatic necessity.
493
 However, Freeman and 
Margaria see England’s position as one where the fact of giving birth simply implies 
motherhood and, as in New Zealand, there is no such thing as anonymous birth. That means 
motherhood continues to be recognised. Lord Simon of Glaaisdale said that: “[m]otherhood, 
although also a legal relationship, is based on a fact, being proved demonstrably by 
parturition.”
494
 New Zealand’s legal framework is the same as that in England. The law does 
not allow a woman to give up the responsibilities of motherhood upon the birth of her child, 
except by legal processes such as adoption. If a mother seeks to otherwise abandon her baby, 
while it is on the one hand a criminal offence, on the other hand she is generally regarded as 
needing special assistance to be helped to come to terms with her motherhood and to afford 
protection to the child. O’Donovan considers this view reflects the popular belief that blood 
ties and biological mother love are natural and best for a child.
495
 However, in France since 
the time of the French Revolution, women have had a choice whether to accept legal 
motherhood upon the birth of their child, with a legal distinction being drawn between 
maternity and motherhood. If they choose anonymity upon birth, this is regarded as a right 
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protected by the French Civil Code, known as “accouchement sous X”, the birth giver being 
recorded as X on the birth certificate.
496
  
O’Donovan discusses the English approach as resonating with mothers “being persons who 
give life to their children,”
497
 in contrast to the autonomy and freedom underlying the French 
system. She points to the English understanding of a mother as emphasising biology and 
kinship, while other cultures give greater emphasis to parenthood as a social, biological and 
legal construct.
498
 She also observes that Bonnet, in describing the majority of French X 
women as not wanting to reveal their identities nor seeing themselves as mothers, as also 
acting as autonomous agents with rights while at the same time surrendering their children as 
“gesture[s] of love.”
499
 Yet the 1999 study of the X women by Lefaucheur suggested that 
hardship and a lack of resources constrained their capacity to freely make a choice, and they 
sought anonymity because of their lack of autonomy.
500
 However, the inconsistencies 
highlighted by the various approaches of civil legal systems, as outlined by O’Donovan, do 
not appear to adequately address the issues of biology, kinship and the relational aspects of 
the mother-child relationship which is understood to commence in utero. A simple separation 
of maternity and motherhood is also a complex issue as a result of modern technologies, and 
is therefore increasingly legally fraught.
501
 In addition, the approach of the civil legal systems 
leads to contradictions and tensions between a mother’s right to abandon her child, and a 
child’s right to know his or her identity as required by Article 8 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC).  
Movement of common law systems towards recognition of the legal rights of two mothers, 
one contributing genetics and the other gestation as proposed by Diduck and Kaganas with 
respect to post-birth care arrangements,
502
 would be an appropriate next step by recognising 
and dignifying the biological contributions of each towards the life of the child.
503
 At present, 
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while the common law position demands more of gestational mothers, greater protection 
should continue to be provided in respect of their interests. A lack of congruence can, 
however, be identified between common law and civil jurisdictions with respect to the 
separation of maternity and motherhood, and the consequential definition and legal 
responsibilities of motherhood.  
Attempts to address the ethical problems arising from the process of human assisted 
reproduction, where motherhood in the context of donor sperm, donor eggs, conception 
occurring outside a human body, frozen embryos and implantation of fully developed 
embryos into the bodies of non-donor women are all new issues that the law needs to grapple 
with and regulate.
504
 These issues have been given further complexity by technology where 
the genetic material from two mothers can be combined to create one egg and ultimately one 
child,
505
 and, more recently, by innovative technology that appears to have the potential to 
develop a human egg from the skin cells of two men (with the implication that a mother may 
no longer be required in the creation of a child).
506
 There is also a lack of harmony, in 
common law systems at least, between genetic and gestational mothers such that further 
careful consideration by the law is required with respect to these new and emerging issues for 
motherhood. 
4.6 Current social and statistical trends  
In 2011, “The Changing Face of Motherhood” report
507
 was commissioned in the UK to 
assess how the motherhood role had changed since the 1950s. It found that 34 per cent of 
mothers today believe they have less time for themselves than their mothers did, with the 
majority of them attributing this to going out to work. The key findings included that, 
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notwithstanding the demands of working outside the home, 20 per cent of mothers spend 
more than four hours a day of active time with their children, that 47 per cent rely for their 
greatest support upon their own mothers, with 20 per cent considering that the single most 
important thing that would improve their quality of life as a mother is living closer to their 
own mother (that is, the maternal grandmother) and that mothers are twice as involved with 
child care as fathers.
508
 
The Australian Institute of Family Studies has undertaken research to measure the value of 
unpaid household, caring and voluntary work. It found that the value of unpaid work is at its 
greatest among women aged 25 - 44 (where mothering and child care boosts the value of 
unpaid work to $45,617 per annum), and that the value of these contributions decreases 
slowly after age 45 years. Older men (over 45 years) contribute more through their unpaid 




Intact families also provide useful information as to how mothers and fathers each spend 
different time with their children. Craig
510
 uses data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Time Use Survey to give a more complete picture of gender differences in the quantity and 
nature of child care in Australia, including when women are also in full-time work. She finds 
that despite widespread approval of the concept of shared care parenting, it is not occurring in 
real terms. She reports that the experience of parenting as a mother is not the same as 
parenting as a father, even where mothers and fathers both work full-time and they live 
together. Mothering involves “more double activity, more physical labour, a more rigid 
timetable, and more overall responsibility than fathering,” an outcome not explained by any 
time limitations for fathers, and she concludes that “social and employment policy makers 
cannot assume that masculinisation of women’s work patterns is concomitant with a 
masculinisation of their care responsibilities.”
511
 
In New Zealand, the National Council of Women’s November 2015 White Paper records that 
“women spend twice as much time as men in unpaid work – raising children, running the 
                                                          
508
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home and supporting elderly and unwell relatives.”
512
 The Government’s Time Use Survey of 
2009/10 also confirms this.
513
 It points to men and women spending similar amounts of time 
on productive activities (about 6.75 hours a day). However, men were paid for most of their 
time (63 per cent) while women were unpaid for most of their time (65 per cent), recording 
that these statistics had changed very little since 1998/99. Productive activities include labour 
force activities, household work, child and family care, purchasing goods and services, and 
community services. Further key findings were:
514
 
 There were significant differences in the kinds of work men and women did, with 
women spending significantly more time than men on unpaid work;  
 On average women spent 4.3 hours per day on unpaid work and 2.9 hours on paid 
work (compared with 4.8 hours and 2.2 hours, respectively, in 1998/99); 
 Men spent 2.5 hours on unpaid work and 4.7 hours on paid work (compared with 2.8 
hours and 4.2 hours respectively in 1998/99); 
 Women who were employed part-time, were unemployed, or not in the labour force, 
spent more time working than men in these groups; 
 Men spent considerably less time than women on unpaid work if they were employed 
either full-time or part-time.  Women who were employed full-time spent on average 
one hour more on unpaid work than men each day; 
 Women employed part-time spent almost the same amount of time on unpaid work as 
women who were not in the labour force at just over 5 hours per day.  The amount of 
time women spent on unpaid work reduced only when women were employed full-
time. 
These findings and realities are inconsistent with the development by the law of shared care 
parenting. The implied premise upon which the introduction of shared care is based (and 
particularly equal time shared care) is the equality of rights and responsibilities of parenthood 
by both mothers and fathers. Shared care parenting and its impact upon motherhood is 
discussed further in Chapter Seven, but its development suggests that the law may have failed 
to recognise and respect the reality of motherhood and mother work undertaken in society. 
New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice statistics for the period 2006 to 2010 with respect to 
access to the Family Court, indicate that during this period, after COCA came into force, 
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there were 27,500 applications for parenting orders made. Of these, 53 per cent of the 
applicants were mothers, 29 per cent were fathers and 18 per cent were by other parties.
515
 
Thus, many more mothers applied for parenting orders than fathers. Of the mother applicants, 
day-to-day care was granted to 82 per cent of them, 60 per cent of these by consent, 31 per 
cent after a formal proof hearing (indicating that the father did not participate) and 9 per cent 
following a defended hearing. Of the remaining 18 per cent, day-to-day care was granted to 
the father in 5 per cent of the cases, and to the mother and father in some sort of shared care 
arrangement in 10 per cent of the cases. Day-to-day care was awarded to other family 
members or caregivers in the remaining 3 per cent of cases.
516
  
Former Principal Family Court Judge Boshier recorded in 2011 that of the 29 per cent of 
parenting applications brought by fathers in the preceding 4 year period, 30 per cent granted 
day-to-day care to the father, the mother sole care in 45 per cent of the cases, and shared care 
in 21 per cent of cases finalised.
517
 These statistics have been further refined with reference to 
those applications which proceeded to a defended hearing. Where the mother was the 
applicant and the matter proceeded to a defended hearing, a day-to-day care order in her 
favour as the primary care giver was made in 77 per cent of the applications heard. Where the 
father was the applicant and the matter went to a defended hearing, he was awarded day-to-
day care as the primary caregiver in 34 per cent of the applications heard. There are no 
statistics available on the care arrangements in place prior to a defended hearing and what 
percentage reflects a continuation of the status quo.
518
 Judge Boshier also considered the 
challenge by fathers to the question of gender bias in the Family Court and while in 2008 he 
is recorded as encouraging the move to shared care parenting orders if that was what the non-
caregiving parent (usually the father) was seeking, by 2012 he also records that “the scathing 
criticisms from men’s groups that the Family Court is gender biased have largely dried up.” 
519
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Comparing 2013 and 2014, including the period since the 2014 reforms of the New Zealand 
family law system, the Ministry of Justice identified, in December 2014, that there had been a 
15 per cent decrease in the COCA type case.
520
  
It therefore appears that within recent Family Court statistics at least, mothers appear over the 
10 year period 2000 to 2010 to have provided more of the post-separation care than fathers. 
These statistics, however, do not necessarily reflect a difference in division of role and 
function between parents in intact families, nor what separated parenting arrangements are 
being implemented without reference to the Family Court. This is also all against a 
background of increasing numbers of women participating in the labour force. Statistics New 
Zealand confirm that in the ten year period from 1986 to 1996, the labour force participation 
rate of women continued to increase; in 1986, mothers of 53.7 per cent of children in two 
parent families were in paid work and in 1996 this had increased to 61.3 per cent.
521
 In 
Statistics New Zealand’s 2015 report “Mothers in the New Zealand Work Force”, over the 
last 20 years the labour force participation rate of women is recorded as having increased 
from 54.5 percent (June 1994 year) to 63.3 percent (June 2014 year). Over the same period, 
men’s participation rate was largely unchanged, but remained higher than women’s. While 
much of this growth in women’s participation was in the older age groups, significant 
increases were also recorded for those aged 25–49 years, recognised as the prime child-
bearing and rearing ages.
522
 The number of children a woman may have is at the same time 
declining, as is the total number of children being born (in actual numbers and as a proportion 
of the population). In 1880, the average number of children born to a woman was six; this 
dropped in 1930 to three.
523
 The fertility rate in June 2007 was just at replacement level, 
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This chapter identifies New Zealand’s diverging position as continuing, through the 
developments leading up to COCA and the ongoing inclusion of section 4(3), to require 
gender neutrality to apply in parenting decisions. The foundation had been laid in part by the 
Hansard debates from the 1970s and 1980s to eradicate the ‘mother principle’, the fathers’ 
rights movement from the 1980s through to the 2000s demanding equal (meaning same) 
parenting recognition as mothers had previously been accorded, and Judge Inglis’ watershed 
decision in W v C.
525
 The divergent positions between England and New Zealand became 
evident from the 1970s, and, as will be further discussed, reached a high point with respect to 
child relocation, as identified by George.
526
  
Changing demographics over the last 150 years, including women entering the work force 
and a rise of cohabitation as opposed to marriage, suggest a trending towards greater gender 
equality. However, women have also been identified as, notwithstanding, continuing to 
undertake the majority of work in the home, including caring for children. There accordingly 
appears to be an unaddressed incongruence between the reality of the statistics of the 
disproportionate gendered care taking place in the home, and the gender neutral basis 
required by COCA, upon which child care decisions are made after separation of the parents. 
Contemporary family law must also now grapple with new issues relevant to motherhood, 
including an increasing recognition of a separation of maternity and motherhood through 
human assisted reproduction and surrogacy. These emerging issues are challenges for the 
law, and motherhood’s future relationship with it.  
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In addition, the reality of motherhood identified in this chapter foreshadows some of the 
difficulties that arise within the context of the development of separated shared care 
parenting, where parenting care time is sought to be divided on the basis of gender-neutrality 




The next chapter examines relevant theoretical foundations, as they relate to motherhood and 
the development of family law in New Zealand. In particular, the impact of the quest for 
gender equality through the second wave feminism between the 1960s and the 1980s is 
explored. This movement helped to foundationally secure the direction for contemporary 




                                                          
527





A theory is a set of interrelated concepts that describe, explain and predict how society and its 
parts are related to each other.
528
 There are a number of theories, particularly in the social 
science field, that have relevance and application to the issue of motherhood and family 
law.
529
 The most significant for the purpose of this thesis is the development of the feminist 
theories of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. They are important because they seek the ultimate 
goal of gender equality, yet they hold to paradoxically different approaches to achieve this. 
These different positions have directly impacted upon the approach family law has taken 
since that time to the issue of parenting gender and to motherhood. On the one hand, to 
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achieve gender equality feminist theory required any natural difference between men and 
women to be denied while, on the other hand, it demanded recognition of the reality of 
gender differences as the only way such equality could be achieved. These competing and 
apparently conflicting theoretical frameworks and their impact upon motherhood and family 
law will be discussed further within this chapter. Gender theory will be explored, and whether 
a theory of motherhood has developed will also be considered. The chapter will conclude 
with  a discussion of the theoretical framework of essentialism, and the possibility that 
second wave feminism’s problem with essentialism might be overcome through recovery of 
the unique experience of motherhood as understood by third wave feminism. 
5.1 Feminism and feminist theory as they relate to motherhood and family law 
Feminism and feminist theory (including feminist legal theory)
530
 focuses on the significance 
of gender and inequality, and can be found across many disciplines. Also known as the 
women's liberation movement, it refers loosely to campaigns for reforms on issues such as 
reproductive rights, domestic violence, maternity leave, equal pay, women's suffrage, sexual 
harassment, and sexual violence based in challenging gender inequality. It emerged in the 
western world in the late 19th century and has gone through three waves. First-wave 
feminism of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries focused on women’s suffrage and political 
equality, and upon women’s special rights to custody of their children. The development of 
the welfare principle emerged from this agitation.
531
 The second-wave feminism of the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s sought to address social and cultural inequalities, and women’s autonomy. 
In particular, it critiqued the influence of state systems, especially the law, on motherhood as 
a practice and a status. It identified that the prevailing view of motherhood inhibited women’s 
financial self-sufficiency, career progression and independence from men. The third-wave 
feminism
532
 of the last twenty years, in intergenerational tension with second wave feminism, 
has become more personalised with storytelling focusing on a woman’s journey towards 
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motherhood as a new rite of passage, while also seeking to address the economic inequalities 
arising from this. Crawford suggests that third wave feminists appear to keep critical theory 
at a distance.
533
 She sees this combined with the content of third wave narratives about 
fertility and motherhood, as contributing to a mythology about motherhood which the second 
wave feminists had sought to dismantle. She further criticises third wave feminism for failing 
to grapple with gender equality or “law writ large.”
534
 She accordingly advocates for a 
joining of third wave feminism with the law to develop an equality jurisprudence that, on the 
one hand, can acknowledge the uniqueness of a woman’s reproductive capacity while, on the 
other, can neutralise the role this capacity has contributed to a woman’s legal oppression. The 
feminist perspective is about the personal as well as the political and, as Diduck and 
O’Donovan point out, feminist theory is therefore also about “the possibility of the 
transformation or reconstruction of both.”
535
 This may be relevant to motherhood, as a 
statement aspirational of its future relationship to family law. 
Thus, from the 18
th
 century, feminists have contested the idea that gender differences are 
innate and that these differences could be seen in different intellectual, emotional and moral 
capacities.
536
 There have been a number of streams of thought which have created apparent 
inconsistencies. What is clear, however, is that gender relations involve ideas of both 
inequality and difference which have been held in uneasy tension in different ways at 
different times. 
Feminist scholars across all periods have identified the institution of motherhood as a social 
construction, yet also an ideology as a natural consequence of the biological differences 
between men and women. Adrienne Rich,
537
 in 1976, deconstructed the notion of the 
maternal instinct and this was followed in 1995 by Fineman, who described motherhood as a 
“colonised concept, something physically occupied and experienced by women, but defined 
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controlled, and given legal content by patriarchal ideology.”
538
 O’Donovan and Marshall 




Ideological frameworks have shifted over time and have become complicated as equality 
became the central and driving norm, with fathers expected to participate to a greater extent 
in their children’s lives and mothers expected to take up a greater share of employment 
outside the home. Boyd points to “the rise in gender symmetry in relation to legal 
parenthood” as being in contrast to the disproportionate responsibility for child care and 
“mother work” that continued and has been rendered invisible because of the legal trends 
promoting fathering.
540
 Boyd further describes the significance of ideology in discussing 
mothers being constructed as the “favoured darlings of the law”
541
 where motherhood is 
measured according to the ideology of a middle-class stay-at-home, heterosexual mother. The 
law then reinforces this by measuring the child’s best interests against the mother’s degree of 
conformity to such an ideological norm. Yet, as Boyd points out, there has been a dilemma in 
feminist theory. In seeking to emphasise a child’s best interests, instead of the value of 
maternal care, there have been negative consequences for mothers through family law 
embracing gender neutrality and the principle of ‘no fault’ in relationship break down. The 
language of maternal care was discredited, mothers lost their voices in the debate over 
separated parenting care arrangements, and the rise of fathers’ rights advocacy became 
embedded in the formal equality approach to parenting.
542
 Fineman describes this as “the 
neutered mother”
543
 and argues this shift reinforced patriarchal norms as fathers’ rights 
groups in the 1970s absorbed and redeployed for themselves the feminists’ arguments against 
gender-specific parenting law. In her view, gender neutrality should have made feminists 
wary of pursuing formal equality. Feminist legal theory is not gender neutral and therefore 
cannot seek equality in a formal, legal and gender neutral sense if it is to address the needs of 
mothers. She sees instead that feminist legal theory should be founded on the gendered 
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experiences of women’s lives to show that the concept of difference is necessary to remedy 
the harm to women (and mothers). A contested definition of ‘mother’ in law would, in that 
way, challenge equality as one of patriarchy’s core concepts.
544
 Uviller, too, recognised as 
early as 1978 that the move towards sharing equal custody rights with fathers based on 
gender neutrality could result in unintended consequences against mothers. “[U]nder the 
guise of sex-neutrality, women who want their children may be at a distinct disadvantage in 




Feminist theory, being about biology and gender equality, has therefore been significantly 
and paradoxically influential in family law challenges to motherhood. In 1974, Finer and 
McGregor wrote that all major developments in family law from the mid-19
th
 century 
onwards had been directed to “equality in the law for women [and] equality within the law 
for people of small means.”
546
 Subsequently, however, equality became a disputed theoretical 
concept.
547
 As discussed, formal equality, or sameness of treatment, and the goal of first and 
some second wave feminists then shifted focus to recognise that sameness of treatment 
actually failed to recognise the reality of differences and also the norm of dominance, which 
may require differences in treatment to compensate for the disadvantages these dynamics 
created.  
Second wave feminism can therefore be described as having developed three broad 
theoretical approaches to the issue of gender and inequality: liberal feminist theory, cultural 
feminist theory and dominance feminist theory.
548
 In general terms, liberal feminist theory 
emphasises equality of treatment while cultural and dominance theories focus on equality of 
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 These theories are important contributors to how motherhood has been regarded by 
the law. 
5.2 Liberal feminist theory 
Liberal feminist theory was understood to deny any significant natural difference between 
men and women, requiring that both be treated equally with respect to norms, rules and the 
law. It advocated the abolition of gender-based law. This had a profound effect on 
motherhood within family law, as the natural corollary was that any maternal preference in 
custody disputes was seen to discriminate on the basis of sex by treating individuals 
differently depending on whether they were men or women. This theory regarded law that 
treated men and women differently on the basis of their sex as contributing to, and 
reinforcing, sex stereotypes and roles.
550
 Any difference between men and women should not 
be legally relevant. Women are workers just like men and, on this basis, women’s rights 
could then be expanded. The purpose of the feminist liberal theory was to show that 
distinctions based on gender, denying women the same opportunity as men, were unlawful.
551
 
A major limitation with this theory, or sameness doctrine as it has been called, is that it did 
not recognise that neutral laws in a gendered world do not operate neutrally. The reality of 
the differences between men and women both biologically and in gender expectation did not 
disappear because legal language was written neutrally. This was exacerbated by legal 
language being regarded as a “male language because it is principally informed by men’s 
experiences and because it derives from the powerful social situation of men, relative to 
women.”
552
 Legal reasoning was seen to reflect the same male bias, and for women to seek 
equality they needed to work with, and measure up, against male norms and interpretations, 
including that of neutrality, embedded in the law. That is, women were thought to need to 
conform to the legal reasoning, views and perspectives about equality and neutrality based in 
a patriarchal framework and reflecting only one sex’s universalised experience. Sunstein saw 
that the sameness and difference approaches were inadequate as they used men as the 
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baseline from which to measure difference.
553
 Finley regarded the language of neutrality 
itself as being one of the devices that was silencing women in relation to the law, failing to 
take into account women’s unequal starting point and not serving those who had not 
participated in the original creation of the law.
554
 Thus, the paradoxical difficulty with respect 
to motherhood within family law was identified but was not able to be addressed by liberal 
feminist theory. Advocating gender-neutral language and laws could, in fact, become a 
harmful tool in silencing mothers within family law by diminishing and inhibiting an 
exploration of the ways of thinking and reasoning values, structures and roles that may be 
uniquely gender based. Such gender based contributions could have provided for greater 
recognition and possibilities for not only mothers and fathers, but also for children in the 
present development of separated parenting laws. These second wave feminism difficulties 
were one of the foundational reasons for the different, and seemingly conflicting, theoretical 
approaches that subsequently developed within feminism, and for what became referred to as 
“the problem of essentialism.”
555
 
5.3 Cultural feminist theory 
Cultural feminist theory, on the other hand, pursued equality through recognition of the 
difference between men and women (and was therefore able to distinguish motherhood and 
fatherhood). It considered that feminist legal theory could not be gender-neutral. It also 
considered that equality could not be its central goal in the traditional formal sense because 
gender, and therefore difference, was central to society. It promotes a feminist theory centred 
around women because it promotes women’s experience, but stands in tension with liberal 
feminist theory, as it sees that equality between men and women can only be achieved by 
recognising the biological, social and cultural differences between men and women and by 




Carol Gilligan is regarded as one of the original proponents of cultural feminist theory
557
 and 
is referred to by Herring as “the grandmother of care ethics.”
558
 She argued that given the 
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differences in women’s conceptions of self and morality, women bring a different point of 
view and priorities to the ordering of human experience and existence.
559
 They therefore 
speak in a “different voice.”
560
 She regarded the female voice as one of caring and valuing of 
relationships, while the male focused more on autonomy and on the separation of self from 
others. Women were stereotypically portrayed as nurturers and defined by the relationship 




However, in attempting to assign to women the characteristics of nurturing, care and 
selflessness, it created a risk that such a definition could not support women who worked 
outside the home. They would be seen as modelling the male stereotype, and would therefore 
be unsuitable as mothers as they did not possess the typical nurturing characteristics of a 
woman as defined by cultural feminist theory. Liberal feminist theory suggested that such 
women-identified values were created in response to the patriarchy, saying “[w]e value 
caring because that is what our oppressors have caused us to value (because we define 
ourselves in relation to our oppressors we aren’t really engaging in self-definition).”
562
 The 
major limitation of the difference approach characterised by cultural feminist theory was 
considered to be its lack of recognition for the pre-existing discrimination upon which the law 
was already founded. For both liberal and cultural feminist theories, man was the norm by 
which equality for women was measured, and this was going to continue to present problems 
for the autonomy of motherhood within family law.  
5.4 Dominance feminist theory 
During this same period of second wave feminism, Catherine MacKinnon proposed the 
dominance theory as an alternative to the above two theories.
563
 She saw the important issue 
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between men and women as being a difference in power and its distribution. This was based 
in Rich’s work with respect to the experience and institution of motherhood, where she saw 
that we needed and were yet to “fully to understand the power and powerlessness embodied 
in motherhood in a patriarchal culture.”
564
 The dominance theory therefore was about the 
social and legal subordination of women to men. Sunstein described it in these terms: “[T]he 
problem is not that those similarly situated have been treated differently; it is instead that one 
group has dominated the other.”
565
 And while ‘the difference approach’ of cultural feminist 
theory embraced a need for women’s relational connectedness, ‘the dominance approach’ 
saw women needing to be freed from practices that fostered subordination to men. 
MacKinnon saw that the impossibility of a woman’s, and therefore mother’s, point of view 
was being constantly reinforced by the state, reflecting as it did the rule of law from a male 
perspective and then “eras[ing] what it has done in the name of neutrality.”
566
  
MacKinnon did not regard the law as neutral but as reinforcing, even in the name of 
neutrality, the legitimacy of the male point of view as the standard upon which the law was 
based, saying that “[t]he state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the 
way men see and treat women.”
567
 She argued that the state adopted the position of male 
power with respect to the relationship between law and society, criticising both the difference 
and sameness theories for distinguishing or aligning themselves with a male model. That is, 
under the sameness standard, women are measured according to their correspondence to man, 
and under the difference standard, women are measured according to their lack of 
correspondence to man.
568
 She considered that gender neutrality, as liberal feminist theory’s 
answer, was simply a male standard and that special protection, cultural feminist theory’s 
answer, was simply a female standard. She warned, however, that maleness was nonetheless 
the reference point for both theories. She went further, in arguing that by liberal feminist 
theory demanding equality through sameness, women were achieving exactly the opposite 
result, saying somewhat prophetically with respect to the development of separated shared 
care parenting yet to come, that “the sameness standard has mostly got for men the benefit of 
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those few things women have historically had.”
569
 She also said that the argument was for a 
sameness standard that ignored the reality of women’s lives.
570
 She noted that formal 
equality, being the goal of liberal feminist theory, may look gender neutral but in application 
only entitled women to the rules and practices worked out by men for men. MacKinnon also 
outlined the problems inherent in the gender difference central to cultural feminist theory. By 
using men as the baseline upon which to measure difference, a false universalisation was 
created which risked being detrimental to women, when the opposite had been intended. 
Thus, she saw that viewing gender only as a matter of sameness or difference masked the 
reality of gender as a system of social hierarchy, a political system of male dominance and 
female subordination and one which sexualised power for men and powerlessness for 
women. James, in traversing gender-relations in Australia, points to evidence of this within 
family law, concluding that “more than other areas of family law, child custody was about 
power.”
571
   
5.5 Impact on the development of family law and motherhood 
The feminist theories described have had a major impact upon motherhood within the law, 
and arguably created an inconsistent, flawed and as yet unresolved foundation for the 
development of family law and the models of separated shared care parenting that were to 
follow. Mandating equality between mothers and fathers in family law was noted by one 
1985 commentator in respect of the US position, in the following terms:
572
  
Women’s … needs in this society may continue to be undervalued and ignored unless 
the equality rhetoric now associated with the relationship between the sexes is 
challenged as inappropriate for resolving situations where they stand in inherently 
unequal positions. 
Removing any reference in the legislation to a gender classification in the area of child 
custody and the care arrangements for children upon parental separation, has arguably 
worked to the detriment of the people such attempts at formal equality in the law were 
designed to protect. This is because motherhood and fatherhood are the obvious gender 
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references that have been abolished. Women may have accordingly been more readily 
deprived of custody of their children, causing motherhood and its unique value to a child to 
be undermined. MacKinnon’s dominance theory would, on the other hand, support legislation 
that retained a gender classification within separated parenting law, providing such legislation 
does not contribute to a woman’s position being subordinate to that of the man. 
The gender-neutrality of section 4(3) of New Zealand’s COCA is consistent with the formal 
equality requirements of liberal feminist theory, seen to enhance equality for women. 
Retention of the so-called mother-principle would be regarded as incompatible with this and 
as reinforcing the stereotype of women as maternal and based in the home, rather than 
enabling women to equally be able to pursue their careers the same as men. The welfare and 
best interests principle of section 4(4) of COCA, found in many other Western jurisdictions 
as well, is also consistent with liberal feminist theory as it is couched in gender-neutral 
language, the implication being men and women will be treated the same. Therefore, 
legislation that does not state a preference for mothers also refrains from promoting gender 
stereotypes, a further goal of liberal feminist theory.  Promotion of sameness by this theory 
would also be seen to be advanced, on the basis that the best way to avoid sex-based 
discrimination is to remove sex-based classifications. However, the theory does not provide 
any practical means to create an equality standard with respect to separated parenting 
between mother and fathers, nor to recognise actual outcomes notwithstanding eliminating 
gender references in the law with respect to the traditional gender-based roles of motherhood 
and fatherhood. Schwarz describes the outcome of the application of liberal feminist theory to 
separated parenting laws as elevating form over substance, with the goal of equality in this 
area being thwarted by the theory’s disregard of the actual results.
573
 
Cultural feminist theory, on the other hand, would suggest the opposite with respect to 
legislation about separated parenting. This theory would hold that the gender-neutral 
parenting provisions contained in sections 4(3) and 4(4) of COCA cannot achieve equality 
because gender plays an important role in society, and an even more important role in the 
parenting of children. Therefore, the law should reflect the differences between motherhood 
and fatherhood, and be willing to continue to support, at least in a general way, such rules of 
thumb as the mother principle, and the same-sex rule.
574
 The ‘difference approach’ of cultural 
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feminist theory takes gender into account. Without this recognition, women’s inferior 
position in society cannot be rectified. This theory would support whatever differential or 
special treatment of motherhood was required through the law to remedy the inequality. This 
was met, at least in part, by the apparently gender-neutral preference for the status quo 
principle,
575
 and more latterly pursuant to the principle of the desirability of the continuity of 
care arrangements pursuant to section 5(d) of COCA. This was because it was usually 
mothers who were undertaking the care, with the desirability of that being able to continue 
without any reference to gender. However, cultural feminist theory would prefer that the 
legislation contained gender-specific language rather than having to indirectly support 
gender-specific motherhood through gender-neutral means.   
Dominance feminist theory would find the present gender-neutral provisions in sections 4(3) 
and 4(4) of COCA unacceptable. This theory considers that as there was no gender equality 
to start with, mothers would be subjected to a continuing power imbalance through the 
application of gender-neutrality within such a gender specific area, and would allow for the 
likelihood of a continuing patriarchy through the exercise of the discretion of the judge. The 
major difficulty with this theory is that care arrangements for children upon separation of 
their parents should not have the imbalance of power between the parents as the primary 
concern. The welfare and best interests of the child should retain its paramountcy status. 
It is thus evident that none of these three second wave feminist theories appropriately remove 
the gender inequalities that have existed around the nature, role and function of motherhood. 
Gender-neutral laws are important in drawing attention to the need for equality, but not at the 
expense of protecting the gender-specific when this is required, and not if they represent a 
desire to eliminate discrimination but fail to achieve that goal. Worse, if they become a 
mechanism of discrimination against the very people they were designed to protect. 
Motherhood may be an example of such vulnerability and, according to cultural feminist 
theory, may represent the need to consider gender-specific protection of motherhood in the 
law, to address the power imbalance and achieve equality. 
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5.6 The language of gender-neutrality and formal equality within family law 
The language of gender-neutrality and formal equality also became important in family law 
in both the UK and New Zealand,
576
 where it was seen as the standard for treating mothers 
and fathers fairly and equally in custody disputes. It arose out of the first wave feminist 





 century British society.
577
 This resulted in gender-neutrality being 
introduced into the legislation through the paramountcy of the welfare principle in the UK in 
1925 and shortly thereafter into New Zealand through its adoption of the same legislation in 
1926.
578
 Diduck points to this formal equality between parents falling out of favour by about 
the mid-20
th
 century, with the reality of gendered roles in child care during the cohabitation 
of parents being given legal recognition in parenting arrangements upon separation.
579
 The 
feminist focus then shifted to ensuring that women and children were not financially 
disadvantaged on separation. It has subsequently been fathers who have reinstigated claims 
for formal gender equality between separated parents. Germaine Greer pointed out in 1999 
that “fake equality had led women into a double jeopardy.”
580
 However, feminist theory 
regards the formal equality for mothers in the 19
th
 century (based in fairness to the reality of 
the mother-child relationship and in response to the dominance of the ownership by the father 
and lack of similar authority by the mother in the law) as being a different claim, and having 
different effects to the 21st century claims of formal equality by fathers. As  Boyd says “the 
apparently benign construction of mothers and fathers as formally equal draws on a bio-
genetic model of parenthood that erases the deeply political and ideological nature of the 
legal ordering of parent-child, and parent-parent relationships.”
581
 She considers that despite 
the insights of feminist legal theory, its approach to motherhood has not had a marked impact 
on legal policy and indeed, in many jurisdictions, shared parenting based on gender 
symmetry between mothers and fathers has become the dominant normative framework. She 
suggests that this may have occurred as a result of the arguments being complex and 
misunderstood as reinforcing gendered roles within the family, on the one hand, and 
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reflecting a backlash to social and legal approaches that appear to favour mothers, on the 
other.  
Smart, too, argues that the current and new narrative of fatherhood has repositioned the father 
in post-separation parenting and has had important implications for motherhood.
582
 She 
describes the introduction by fathers of the ethic of justice within ethic of care claims, and 
refers to “the silence surrounding motherhood in the current discursive struggle and the rise 
of narratives of fatherhood (particularly in the form of justice and rights)”.
583
 She concludes 
that no longer can Gilligan’s ethic of care be seen as a feminist corrective to the influence of 
the ethic of justice, because “the selfless pursuit of care and caring has become a 
governmental expectation within family policy.”
584
 Feminists’ ethic of care was not intended 
to become mainstream political policy, but was rather intended to reintroduce existing values 
as they related to motherhood into the public arena, where they appeared to have been 
ignored or denigrated. This came on top of the earlier struggle between the concept of the 
welfare of the child, challenging as it did former doctrines of rights, ownership and 
entitlement in family matters. Smart saw the inclusion of the dimension of care to welfare and 
rights as creating  “a three-cornered debate ongoing between ‘rights talk’, ‘welfare talk’ and 
‘care talk’” such that there has been created a subtle interplay and shift in the balance and 
influence of these claims. She argues that if fathers made their claims solely according to 
‘rights talk’, they would make little headway. However, by basing their rights claim on ‘care 
talk’,  together with fathers in any event being redefined as central to children’s welfare, the 
position of fatherhood has been in the ascendancy.
585
 The consequence of this may have been 
that motherhood has been excluded from the debate and diminished as a result. Smart 
suggests that the rise of the fathers’ movements based on an ethic of rights within an ethic of 
care, may be masking some hostile and patriarchal attitudes towards women and children, or 
may be seeking to express a desire to return to the  past when women were dependant and 
powerless. However, a third possibility is that fathers may be seeking to express a change in 
how they wish to relate to their children, signalling a shift in fatherhood which does not 
require motherhood to be denigrated.
586
 Such an approach would be complementary to the 
possibility referred to by Diduck and O’Donovan of the transformation or reconstruction of 
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the feminist theory to enable it to acknowledge the uniqueness of motherhood, while not 
accepting its contribution to a woman’s legal oppression.
587
 
These narratives appear to be based on an assumption that the Family Court has favoured 
mothers over fathers. This injustice is then regarded as self-evident because, statistically, 
children were more likely to live after separation with their mothers than their fathers. Then, 
in the face of the ‘truth’ of this ‘injustice’, it was difficult to respond in a manner which did 
not appear to be denying fathers their rights or saying that fathers should not care for their 
children. Mothers therefore became defined as objects or barriers to justice for fathers and 
also to the welfare of their children, if they failed to recognise the importance of the care that 
should be provided by fathers.
588
 Discussions around the significance of the primary carer or 
other parenting frameworks which do not suggest equality have, as Smart says, “become 
virtually unspeakable, and certainly suspect within family law discourses.”
589
 Care talk by 
mothers was regarded as of little value because mothers have a duty to care, and so they were 
not making a special claim, in contrast to the significance of fathers’ rights, care and welfare 
talk. That meant that motherhood had no legitimacy in the debate, despite the fact that they 
were usually still the primary carers of children. This also meant that motherhood has been 
effectively silenced in policy and law reform discussions. Further, as Smart points out, 
“responsible caring” (incorporating the care, rights and welfare talk of fathers) may now 
require that a mother be corrected to ensure that she provide contact with fathers within her 
ethical care obligations and what is now considered as the unfairness of her privileged 
position.
590
 Therefore, the extension of the scope of fatherhood began to redefine motherhood 
within the law. Mothers who appear to resist father involvement are now castigated.
591
 
However, care must be taken not to frame these developments solely as fathers needing to 
achieve justice for themselves and their children on the basis of the (alleged) anti-father bias 
present in the Family Court, or that their claims are politically motivated strategies designed 
solely to defeat motherhood.
592
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The legal fragmentation of parenthood has also been subject to challenge by feminist 
theorists.
593
 The complaint was, as Diduck observed, initially quoting Mykitiuk:
594
  
Whereas paternity is a construction allowing fatherhood to be established in a variety 
of ways - including choice – maternity is a unitary construction where women can be 
deprived of the status if both biological and social roles are not fulfilled. The 
naturalisation of maternity by law has precluded legal thinking about the distribution 
of maternity in a manner similar to determinations about paternity.  
O’Donovan and Marshall
595
 reflect upon even feminists’ apparent inability to separate 
motherhood from maternity; it seems that men have a choice about parenthood that women 
do not have.  
Collier and Sheldon
596
 suggest that the law is beginning to find different places for men to 
fulfil various aspects of fatherhood, coming as it does from a position where paternity does 
not necessarily lead to fatherhood and does not carry with it a legal responsibility to care for, 
or even acknowledge, a child (apart from the legal responsibility to pay child support where a 
biological father has been legally identified or has signed the birth registration of the child); 
motherhood, on the other hand, is not so easily fragmented into its social, psychological and 
biological components, despite motherhood and maternity becoming increasingly detachable 
from each other. The connection between a child and the woman who carried the child and 




Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) have also been debated within feminist theory. In 
the 1970s, such feminists as Adrienne Rich
598
 and Shulasmith Firestone
599
 regarded 
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motherhood as a patriarchal institution.  They considered motherhood as a means to maintain 
the subordination and oppression of women, and they therefore saw ART as having the 
potential to free women from this, as they could be relieved from the physical burden and 
inequality of childbearing. On the other hand, post structural feminists such as Sarah Franklin 
and Jane Sawicki, saw that women’s procreative bodies could become objects of capitalist 
and patriarchal forces and, with reference to Foucault’s notion of power,
600
 regarded women 
subjected to ART as always powerless and always unable to practise acts of control or 
resistance.
601
 However, it appears these feminist theories did not gain the traction expected. 
ART came to be regarded as a saving means to achieve motherhood, portrayed as essential to 
being a woman.
602
 This could be regarded as consistent with third wave feminism.
603
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5.7 Gender theory 
All feminist theories, including feminist legal theory, centre around gender theory, that is, the 
many aspects of what it means to be male and female and to live gendered lives in society.
604
 
Alsop, Fitzsimons and Lennon discuss the different approaches to gender theory, explaining 
and evaluating the naturalist, psychoanalytic, materialist and post-structuralist theories, and 
acknowledging the tensions and often opposing differences of thought between them.
605
 
Haraway describes gender as “a concept developed to contest the naturalisation of sexual 





Feminist theory and practice around gender seek to explain and change historical 
systems of sexual difference, whereby “men” and “women” are socially constituted 
and positioned in relations of hierarchy and antagonism. 
Simone de Beauvoir’s 1949 writings that “one is not born a woman” triggered the second 
wave feminist theories outlined above, seeking to address in some way the issue of biological 
or natural differences between men and women. This issue of gender difference was engaged 
with in a variety of ways, some denying its existence, some minimising the importance of 
difference, and others seeking to eliminate it. The arguments fall into two main camps, that 
is, gender difference is either socially constructed or biologically determined.
608
 The 
implication of either argument is that gender difference reduces down to a natural, existing 
essence, biologically and psychologically. The ascendancy of the different views at different 
times of how to view and address gender difference has had significant ramifications for 
motherhood within family law. 
5.8 Has a theory of motherhood been developed? 
In 2007, O’Reilly described research on motherhood as having exponentially increased since 
the seminal work by Rich in 1976, who said at that time: “[w]e know more about the air we 
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breathe, the seas we travel, than about the nature and meaning of motherhood.”
609
 Since then, 
there has been so much written on motherhood that O’Reilly sought to develop a text based 
on maternal theory. She saw the theory of motherhood as having developed into three 




For example, Rich distinguishes between motherhood and mothering, between experience 
and institution, and points to the line between the two as varying according to culture. 
Motherhood as experience was seen as intensely personal, Rich knowing only that “I had 
lived through something which was considered central to the lives of women, fulfilling even 
in its sorrows, a key to the meaning of life.”
611
 In a chapter she entitles ‘The “Sacred 
Calling”’, she also touches on these foundational theological and ontological questions by 
quoting writings from the American Tract Society in the 1830s:
612
 
Mothers have as powerful an influence over the welfare of the future generations, as 
all other earthly causes combined … When our land is filled with pious and patriotic 
mothers, then will it be filled with virtuous and patriotic men. The world’s redeeming 
influence, under the blessing of the Holy Spirit, must come from the mother’s lips. 
She who was first in the transgression, must yet be the principal earthly instrument in 
the restoration. It is maternal influence, after all, which must be the great agent in the 
hands of God, in bringing back our guilty race to duty and happiness. 
These larger themes are also explored by Ortner, who asks whether female is to male as 
nature is to culture.
613
 Other theories of motherhood brought together under O’Reilly’s broad 
headings include Nancy Chodorow’s “reproduction of mothering”,
614
 where the development 
of mother-son and mother-daughter relationships are examined in light of Freud’s work. 
Chodorow is also concerned that if women are seen primarily as mothers, then any liberation 
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of women will be experienced as traumatic by society. She therefore sees movements towards 
male responsibility for childcare and females seeking economic and emotional freedom as 
new models for family that are potentially more life-giving for both parents and children than 
the gender struggles that have previously defined male-female and parent-child relationships. 
Ann Crittenden discusses why motherhood, as the most important job in the world, is the 
least valued,
615
 and Daphne de Marneffe points to the problem of society’s obscuring of 
maternal desire, saying “it is almost as if women’s desire for sex and their desire to mother 
have switched places in terms of taboo.”
616
 Sara Ruddick’s “maternal thinking” was 
concerned with providing an alternative framework to the devalued reproductive labour 
found in Simone de Beauvoir’s work.
617
 Ruddick, by way of contrast, describes motherhood 
as a discipline, and focuses on the distinctive thinking a mother develops, “the judgments she 
makes, the metaphysical attitudes she assumes, the values she affirms” in the day-to-day 
work of raising a child.
618
 
5.9 The discipline and value of maternal practice and thinking within maternal 
theory 
Maternal theory would hold that it is out of mothering practice and experience that gender 
differences emerge. Sara Ruddick argues that:
619
 
… maternal practice begins with a response to the reality of a biological child in a 
particular social world. To be a ‘mother’ is to take upon oneself the responsibility of 
child care, making its work a regular and substantial part of one’s working life. 
It is this practice which gives rise to maternal thinking, with Ruddick’s definition of a mother 
being in relation to both a mother’s commitment to meeting the demands made by her 
children and the social world which has constructed ‘maternal work’. She suggests that there 
are three demands made of mothers, firstly, being preservation provided through protective 
care, secondly, being emotional and intellectual growth provided through nurturance, and 
thirdly, being provision of socialisation according to the norms and values of a particular 
group through a mother’s social responsibility. While maternal work involves other demands, 
it is Ruddick’s view that these three demands are what essentially constitute maternal 
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practice, a practice required by all cultures where children are seen as requiring protection, 
nurturance and training. While maternal commitment is voluntary, and while there are 
cultural variances, it is the demands themselves that require mothers to reflect on their 
responses. Ruddick sees this act of reflection as generating maternal thinking.  Ruddick, 
herself a wife and mother, became disillusioned with the kind of reason articulated by 
Descartes as providing the foundation for the correct way to think, such thinking involving 
self-control, objectivity, rationality, individualism and detachment. In her work Maternal 
Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace,
620
 she saw this kind of reason not only as embodied in 
men and lacking in women, but also used to justify domination, violence, oppression and 
privilege. For Ruddick, it implied a lack of recognition for the values embodied in loyalty and 
affection found in women; therefore, the human good in reason must lie elsewhere and 
needed to be differently understood. She saw reason as defined, rather, as “learning, 
experimenting, imagining, discovering, designing, inventiveness, steady judgment, self-
reflectiveness, clear speech and attentive listening”,
621
 and maternal thinking as “the 
intellectual capacities she [a mother] develops, the judgments she makes, the metaphysical 
attitudes she assumes, and the values she affirms”
622
 in response to a child’s demands to have 
its needs met. Ruddick therefore promotes a maternal theory that would re-evaluate women’s 
difference for the benefit of society, holding that there are distinctive maternal practices that 
emerge in response to a child’s needs, and that these practices are informed by a distinctive 
kind of maternal thinking. While she does not restrict these maternal practices solely to 
women, neither does she seek to neutralise their feminine nature. She sees recognition of 
maternal practice and thinking as providing a platform for values not generally promoted by 
men, and which can contribute to peace. At the same time, she recognises the essential 
demands that children make on mothering and maternal thinking as operating within 
conflicting tensions generated by the mothering experience, with mothers often having to 
struggle to think and act maternally. These views are consistent with research around 
maternal gatewaying and the tensions that this exposes.
623
 
For Ruddick, the first demand that a mother responds to from her child is the demand for 
protection with preservative love. She says:
624
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… in protecting her child, a mother is besieged by feeling, her own and her children’s. 
She is dependent on these feelings to interpret the world. The world that mothers and 
children see and name, separately and together, is constructed by feeling. 




… feelings demand reflection, which is in turn tested by action, which is in turn tested 
by the feelings it provokes.  
Ruddick argues that mothers develop a cognitive style called ‘scrutinising’, where they are 
looking for dangers before they appear.
626
 She sees this attribute coupled with humility, 
enabling mothers to think in a particular way that does not dominate yet does not relinquish 
control. Thus, successful mothering means ensuring the safety of the child whose will cannot 
be controlled. At the same time, this does not mean falling into passivity by relying on the 
judgment and advice of experts. In doing so, maternal thinking is relinquishing control to 
such experts. This has relevance with respect to separated parenting and particularly with 
respect to the development of shared care parenting. Maternal thinking and practice, borne 
out of preservative love, may have rejected separated shared care for a young child. Within 
the current gender-neutral family law environment, supported by various (and at times 
conflicted) social science thought, it is arguable that such protective thinking was at risk of 
being re-interpreted as obstruction or over-protection on the mother’s part.
627
  
Other maternal practices that mothers develop in response to the needs of their child are 
described by Ruddick as including “cheerfulness,” understood as the preservation of control 
in an uncontrollable world, as well as being a guard against a mother’s own impatience, 
anxiety, fatigue and self-preoccupation. In describing this as an attribute of motherhood, 
Ruddick points to the struggle that maternal work represents.
628
  
She also describes mothers as developing a particular conception of “nature,” an attitude that 
does not try and protect her child against nature, but rather one where she comes to 
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understand and appreciate the “workings of nature within herself and those she loves … like 
the Ghandian non-violent activist.”
629
 
“Holding” is another characteristic of maternal protectiveness described by Ruddick.
630
 
Through this attribute, mothers seek to minimise risk and reconcile differences through 
maintaining harmony and material resources to meet a child’s need for preservation. While a 
human good, she also sees its capacity to degenerate into “holding too closely, too timidly, 
too materially”,
631
 as well as “holding” together relationships for their children which might 
be harmful to them. 
Ruddick describes these attitudes and virtues of preservative love as being not only found in 
powerless people, but as also being utilised by the powerful in acts of oppression against the 
powerless. This view is consistent with the third strand of second wave feminism, that is, the 
dominance theory described above. There is work to be done for maternal practices around 
preservative love for it to become an instrument of political peace, but in Ruddick’s view 
such maternal care has the potential to keep not only a child and home safe, but also a 
neighbourhood, a community and a nation. That is, such maternal practice borne of 
preservative love is of value not only to a child but also to the health of a society as a whole. 
The corollary is that such qualities should be preserved and strengthened, rather than 
neutralised, minimised or ignored. 
Ruddick sees the second maternal practice of “nurturance” as a maternal response to a child’s 
demand that its growth be fostered. That is, mothers have the ability to recognise that 
children need nurturing, to understand the changing nature of a child and to be capable of and 
wanting to meet this demand, despite varying social circumstances. This maternal attitude 
makes specific assumptions that children are naturally healthy and good, that they require 
fostering in an age-appropriate style and in a way that understands the need to grow and 
change. To assist her in this task, Ruddick argues that the mother conceptualises the mind as 
inseparable from feelings in the child, such that their thoughts and perceptions of the world 
are understood through their fears and desires. Women are understood to have a cognitive 
style of thinking that is more concrete than men’s, arising out of the maternal practice of 
fostering growth in a child, as the mother seeks to understand the child’s mind. Ruddick 
further postulates that because mothers want to understand, they make themselves 
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trustworthy listeners and important instruments of confidence-building in a child. Then, 
through storytelling with other mothers, a broader common understanding through these 
shared experiences is able to develop. Ruddick describes the virtues that develop out of this 
maternal practice as “realism, compassion and delight.”
632
  
The third demand described by Ruddick that a child makes of its mother is for social 
acceptability, which is responded to through the maternal practice of “training.” While there 
may be cultural and individual differences, Ruddick sees this as a universal need, the 
maternal work focusing on developing the child’s moral conscience. There is an awareness of 
the contradictory nature of the maternal power, about knowing what to insist upon and what 
to ignore, but central to this training is about protecting and developing a child’s conscience, 
and building trust and trustworthiness. Ruddick adds “attentive love” as part of “training”. 
She draws upon the work of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch where attentive love is 
understood as “really looking”, combining an act of knowing with an act of love.
633
 It is 
understood as similar to empathy and allows difference to safely and trustingly emerge in a 
child.  
In summary, Ruddick argues that women’s engagement in maternal practice leads to maternal 
thinking, a distinct kind of reasoning different from that of men and an asset not only to 
children but also to society as a whole; something to be valued and protected, rather than 
devalued and neutralised in the drive for gender equality.  
Thus, for feminist theorists such as Ruddick,
634
 it is the practice of mothering in caring, 
nurturing and protecting that gives rise to motherhood’s distinctive nature, her cognitive 
capacities, attitudes and values. These mothering practices were seen to be demanded by 
children according to the child’s basic needs. Therefore, rather than mothering being a source 
of oppression, this sexual division of labour (where women respond to the child through 
mothering) should be seen as valuable, and celebrated by society as a whole. These theorists 
argue that if there is a problem, it lies with a masculine culture which prioritises different 
values such as instrumentalism and rationality, and devalues feminine virtues, values and 
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consciousness which emerge through motherhood. This represented a shift away from second 
wave liberal feminism, which sought to erase difference between men and women, and 
therefore between mothers and fathers, in the name of equality. Instead, it emphasises a 
conceptual shift, viewing gender difference as a source of enrichment for society as a whole, 
rather than a tool of oppression against women. Through motherhood, women develop the 
psychological qualities related to nurturing, cooperation and community that are considered 
to be valuable qualities. No longer was a woman’s body regarded as oppressive or a 
constraint;
635
 female physiology in itself also came to be regarded as a source of strength.
636
 
Rich distinguished between the experience of motherhood and the institution of motherhood, 
the latter being linked to patriarchy.
637
 Thus, in identifying and validating the biological and 
psychological differences between men and women that emerged through mothering, these 
theorists argued that uniquely female virtues and experience, though very different, should be 
recognised equally with the already valued male traits of competitiveness, aggression and 
domination. Indeed, some theorists contended that the value of these feminine traits was 
superior to the values of the traditional male institutions,
638
 and that this maternal essence 
was essential and needed to be protected for the wellbeing of society as a whole. Young 
describes gynocentric feminism
639
 as defining “women’s oppression as the devaluation and 




Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable critique of theories which celebrate women’s 
differences from men, and which focus on women’s experience and activities as explanations 
for gender difference. Such criticisms see mothering as a social construction (and therefore 
theoretically available to men), and difference from fathering based in gender as having been 
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 Lawler argues that by asserting that children have needs, and mothering is about 
responding to those needs, this ignores the fact that needs are a social construction, and 
requires children’s needs to be fixed and knowable. Thus, her criticism of Ruddick is that her 
ideas of maternal thinking are based on a “universal category of maternal work which exists 
in relation to a fixed and universal set of children’s ‘needs’.”
642
 However, for Ruddick, 
mothering experience is seen to exist prior to its social construction. She also sees most 
mothers as women, and says that:
643
 
… although maternal work can, in principal, be performed by any responsible adult, 
throughout the world women not only have borne but have also disproportionately 
cared for children. Since most of the people who have taken up the work of mothering 
have had female bodies, mothers, taken as a class, have experienced the 
vulnerabilities and exploitation as well as the pleasures of being female in the ways of 
their culture. Although some individual mothers may be men, the practices and 
cultural representations of mothering are strongly affected by, and often taken to 
epitomize, prevailing norms of femininity. 
Accordingly, as most maternal work is carried out by women, it is this experience which 
renders the work gendered and equates women with maternity. In this way, Ruddick 
essentialises mothering, as the word “maternal” is associated with women, and opposite to 
“paternal.” The difficulty remained however, that:
644
 
… the biggest problem with all these accounts of gender is that they credit the 
differences they find to universal features of male and female development rather than 
to the economic and social positions men and women hold, or to the actual power 
differences between individual men and women.  
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5.10 The problem of essentialism  
In the wake of the influence of feminism and the development of feminist theories during the 
1970s and 1980s, which regarded gender essentialism as something of a problem, there are 
nonetheless signs that the notion of ‘essential’ gender differences may now be undergoing 
something of a revival. This can be seen in such disciplines as genetics, evolutionary 
psychology and neurology.
645
 In popular culture, self-help manuals seeking to explain the 
differences between men’s and women’s behaviours, have become bestsellers.
646
 A closer 
examination of the theory of essentialism and the idea of the maternal essence and 
motherhood being different from fatherhood, follows.
647
 
Essentialism is a longstanding theoretical framework that holds to the view that objects 
possess certain essential properties that distinguish one from another. Speake
648
 defines it as:  
A metaphysical view dating back to Aristotle … It maintains that some objects – no 
matter how described – have essences; that is, they have, essentially or necessarily, 
certain properties, without which they could not exist or be the things they are … 
there is also a related essentialist view, presented originally by Locke, that objects 
must have a ‘real’ – though as yet unknown – ‘essence’, which (causally) explains 
their more readily observable properties (or ‘nominal essence’). 
Fuss examines whether essentialism has received “a bad rap.”
649
  She says that “few other 
words in the vocabulary of contemporary critical theory are so persistently maligned, so little 
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interrogated and so persistently summoned as a term of infallible critique” and comments on 
the “the sheer rhetorical power of essentialism as a term of disapprobation and 
disparagement.”
650
 She sees the essentialist/non-essentialist (or constructionist - the position 
that differences are constructed, not innate -) debate as marking an impasse in feminist theory 
on the one hand, while on the other signifying “the very condition and possibility of our 
theorising.”
651
 Fuss describes essentialism and constructionism as being at their most 
polarised around the issue of the relationship between the social and the natural. Essentialism 
points to the natural as being the raw material. Therefore, that is the determinative starting 
point to the practices and laws of social order, which come after. In the example of man and 
woman, the natural sex difference between the two can therefore be seen as being repressed, 
(or elevated), by social practices and the law, with motherhood and fatherhood being overlaid 
onto the natural. On the other hand, constructionism sees the natural as itself being a 
construction and a result of social practices and the law. This difference in position can be 
summed up by Ernest Jones who asks “Is a woman ultimately born or made?”
652
 For an anti-
essentialist like Simone de Beauvoir, a woman is made not born.
653
 For Jones, a woman is 
born, not made. 
Fuss seeks to utilise John Locke’s distinctions, that is, between real and nominal essences. 
Real essence is Aristotelian and refers to the irreducible, the unchanging thing. Nominal 
essence refers to a linguistic convenience, a classification. Real essence is empirically 
observable. Nominal essence is ascribed by language.
654
 Fuss saw these distinctions as not 
only describing in a general way the difference between essentialism (real essence) and 
constructionism (nominal essence) but also in seeking to break the tension between the two 
apparently apposite positions. Fuss suggests that both essentialism and constructivism share 
the classification of “essence”,
655
 concluding that social constructionism cannot escape the 
pull of essentialism. In effect, constructionism operates merely as a more sophisticated form 
of essentialism and that the bar between the two is “by no means unassailable.”
656
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Marshall refers to three types of essentialism within feminist theory. Biological essentialism 
is found in the works of Firestone, Rich and others, then philosophical essentialism as found 
in Simone de Beauvoir’s and others. Thirdly, in the work of Nancy Chadorow and others, is a 
cultural essentialism identified by the emergence in early human development of the 
essentially different male and female natures reflected in different emerging practices, 
including mothering practices.
657
 In common to all, however, is a connection between the 
female body and reproduction of humankind, and that the gender difference between men and 
women is found in what is known as the maternal essence. The maternal essence is 
understood to comprise a biological essence of reproductive functioning, a psychological 
essence of emotional drivers and cognitive abilities, and the social essence of mothering. On 
their own, each component cannot explain the maternal essence. For example, women 
assuming primary responsibility for mothering within families is as much a factor of external 
social conditions as it is a factor of their biological ability to bear a child. Crowley and 
Himmelweit
658
 suggest that feminism, in its theorising about motherhood either as an 
institution that creates obstacles and limitations for women’s self-realisation or as a positive 
experience that is a resource and strength for women, creates an insoluble tension. In 
addition, empirical studies and reviews of motherhood in attempting to analyse different 
conceptions and theories of motherhood have added to this tension.
659
 However, they do 
identify how social, economic, cultural, historical and political factors have influenced 
mothering and, more particularly, how different definitions and theories of motherhood are 
located according to different historical periods. Snitow
660
 refers to the writings about 
motherhood in the 1960s and 1970s as questioning motherhood as a destiny, and framing it as 
oppressive and a constraint to gender equality. The ideas of Simone de Beauvoir and 
Shulasmith Firestone resonate during this period. Then, in the late 1970s, feminists began 
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exploring women’s actual experience of motherhood, Chodorow referring to women as 
having a different voice. In the 1980s, such writers as Sara Ruddick reaffirmed and celebrated 
motherhood and explored mothers’ work and feelings about their children. Since then, the 
third wave of feminism has emphasised the unique experience of motherhood. 
Summary 
Thinking about the essential differences between men and women, mothering and fathering, 
and their relationship to each other needs to continue. As Alice Jardine puts it, “think about it 
[difference] we must, because if we don’t, it will continue to think us, as it has since Genesis 
at the very least.”
661
 A discussion of feminism’s approaches to gender, motherhood and the 
maternal essence (as opposed to the paternal), while only able to offer a partial understanding 
of the complexities of human behaviour and experience, has drawn attention not only to the 
significance of motherhood as an individual gendered experience, but also as significant 
within the broader historical and contemporary social contexts, institutions and the law. 
However, further examination of maternal theory is beyond the scope of this thesis, save to 
say that the diversity of thinking found within its framework is vast, and contributes to an 
understanding of the foundational layers of complexity, lack of voice, power struggle and 
paradox found with respect to motherhood and family law. It is self-evident that the issue 
cannot be addressed, indeed may be further complicated, by legislatively requiring the Family 
Court to ignore any gender difference between mothering and fathering in determining what 
the welfare and best interests of a child might require.
662
  
Whether the law in New Zealand should consider again the welfare principle as a 
relationship-based, rather than a more neutrally rights-based, paradigm, and thereby be able 
to consider the differences found in parenting gender through recognition of each of the 
equally valuable mother-child and father-child relationships, is explored in the following 
chapter. The unease evident in the law with respect to these issues is also examined.  
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Chapter Six 
The Law’s Response to Motherhood: The Welfare Principle 
Introduction  
The principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child is an example of a legal 
transplant from the UK to New Zealand. Chen-Wishart
663
 says that the resulting outcome can 
occupy any point along a spectrum from faithful replication of the legal principle to outright 
rejection. Her study asks why the Singaporean Courts have applied the doctrine of undue 
influence in family guarantee cases to such divergent effect when they profess to apply the 
same law.
664
 Similarly, the question can be asked as to why the New Zealand Family Court 
has applied the principle of the welfare of the child to such a different effect to that in the UK 
when it professes the same common law heritage. Chen-Wishart says the answer lies in a 
careful examination of the nature of the transplanted law within each of the originating and 
recipient societies. It is an important question, given the scale of legal transplant in colonial 
history, and raising as it does the bigger jurisprudential and philosophical questions about 
whether law changes society or whether law is changed by society? 
6.1 The divergent effect of a legal transplant  
The UK’s Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 was legally transplanted into New Zealand law 
through the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926 (NZ). As previously discussed, it brought with 
it the elevation of the welfare principle to a position of legislative centrality, and created 
neutrality between fathers and mothers in relation to custody arrangements for their children, 
based in recognition of the importance of relationship, namely that of mother and child.
665
 
The English political and societal context from which this principle originated was not 
gender-neutral. It was still a society dominated by patriarchal power and the superior rights of 
fathers. This was very different to the New Zealand context, an egalitarian colonial society 
founded on gender equality, into which the principle was received. The gender-neutrality of 
the welfare principle in England was based in a need to develop for mothers a fairer rendering 
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of the legal advantage held by fathers through ‘ownership’ of their children, thereby 
protecting the mother-child relationship. It was not based in the gender equality found in New 
Zealand society into which the principle was transplanted. In New Zealand, the notion of 
gender equality was already established. Therefore, the gender-neutrality of the welfare 
principle that had been developed in England for the purpose of protection of the mother-
child relationship, (and so that gender equality did not have to be more broadly addressed), 
transplanted comfortably onto a foundation of gender equality not found in England.  
At first, the significance of this difference was not apparent, and the approach of the early 
New Zealand judges was to draw heavily on English case law precedent. In reviewing the 
case law discussed in Chapter Three, it also appears that they were more cognisant of the 
natural differences between mothering and fathering. For example, in Re Thomson,
666
 
Williams J described the mother “as genuinely anxious about her children.”
667
 In 1911, in 
Morton v Morton,
668
 the same judge said: 
… One must look not only at the state of things existing at present, but at the future. 
The two girls have ceased to be little children, and are growing up into womanhood. 
A man cannot look after them properly. It is right that there should be some woman to 
whom they can talk, and in whom they can confide, and who will advise and direct 
them. 
However, he saw the boy’s situation differently: 
As to the boy, it is different. His father is very much attached to him, and he to his 
father. As growing girls want a woman to look after them, so growing boys are better 
in charge of a man. 
The ‘same-sex rule’ became known as ‘the mother principle’ and ‘the father principle’. That 
is, beyond tender years a girl was better off with her mother and a boy with his father. In 
1928 in Parsons v Parsons,
669
 with respect to a three-year-old boy, Smith J said: 
A woman may be a great deal to a child in its earliest years, but a male child has very 
many difficult years in front of it, and in all ordinary circumstances … it is very 
desirable that a male child should have the care and guidance of its father … and [if] 
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the parties remarried, then … it would be preferable that this boy should be brought 
up by his own father and a second wife, with rights of access to the natural mother, 
rather than by the mother with a second husband with rights of access to the father. 
In 1930, in the Supreme Court, (the then equivalent of New Zealand’s current High Court), in 
re Winter,
670
 with respect to an eighteen-month-old girl, Kennedy J said: 
It is the notorious observation of mankind that the loss of a mother is irreparable to 
her children and particularly so in the young. … a child of such tender age … 
essentially requires a mother’s care … and it will be better for her to be surrounded in 




In 1940 in Re H,
672
 involving two boys aged thirteen and three, the Supreme Court confirmed 
the general view that a male child beyond tender years be brought up by his father, but 
confirmed there was “no rule which can supersede the rule that the Court will regard the 
welfare of the infant as paramount.” By 1951, motherhood’s unique value was cemented in 
the law, as seen in the example of Norton v Norton,
673
 where the Supreme Court said: 
There is scarcely need to quote authority for the proposition that, other things being 
equal, children of tender years should be in their mother’s care; … or for the 
proposition that a mother’s care is to be preferred to that of a father in the case of 
girls, even after they have ceased to be of tender years.   
Also in 1951, with respect to ten-year-old twin girls, was the previously discussed appellate 
decision of Miller v Low,
674
 considered by the Full Bench of the Court of Appeal. It 
overturned the decision of Gresson J in the lower Court, making strong comments about the 
unique and significant role of motherhood and, in particular, the relationship between 
mothers and daughters. 
The effect of the more gender-neutral decision in 1950 of Lovell v Lovell
675
 has also been 
previously discussed,
676
 and by 1961 in New Zealand, as evidenced in the decision of Palmer 
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 the courts had become careful to confirm that ‘the mother principle’ should not 
have inflexible application, much less application as a rule of law.  
Nonetheless, a high point of recognition and respect in New Zealand law for motherhood 
continued through the 1964 decision of Mitchell v Mitchell.
678
 The divergent effect of the 
transplant of the welfare principle was not yet evident, North P saying: 
It has long been recognised that a child of tender years should not be separated from 
its mother unless in the interests of the child such a course is clearly and unmistakably 
necessary. It has never been doubted that there is wisdom in the observation of Sir 
John Romilly MR, in Austin v Austin,
679
 that: 
‘… no person, and no combination of them, can…with regard to a child of 
tender years, supply the place of a mother, and the welfare of the child is so 
intimately connected with its being under the care of the mother, that no extent 
of kindness on the part of any other person can supply that place.’ 
The Guardianship Act 1968 went on to provide for equal and shared guardianship between 
mothers and fathers when married, and for the mother as sole guardian when unmarried and 
not living with the father at the time of the birth of the child.
680
 There was no prohibition 
against considering the sex of the parent in making a welfare assessment, the welfare of the 
child being confirmed as the paramount consideration pursuant to section 23 of the Act. 
In 1971, in D v R,
681
 North P continued to confirm the mother principle as “vitally 
important”
682
 and acknowledgment of the importance of the mother’s role was also found in 
Woodhouse J’s dissenting judgment in the 1978 appellate decision of G v G,
683
 where he 
reviewed the significance of the mother principle to a best interests assessment through the 
case law over the years. He said: 
There can be no doubt that the Courts have consistently accepted as a matter of 
common sense (not as a matter of law) that in general young children (and girls of any 
age) should be in the custody of their mother.  … The principle has not got the status 
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of a rule of law but, as a factor based on long experience … it cannot now be in issue 
that it is something that must be given careful and deliberate attention by any Court 
before a decision is made that young children, particularly girls, should go to their 
father. … It is the very kind of case where the Court should pay heed to the principle, 
as a starting point at least.  
However, in the late 1970s in New Zealand, just as in the UK, there was political activism by 
fathers’ groups. This meant that the ‘mother principle’, rather than having a secure place as a 
relevant consideration in a best interests enquiry, was now being reframed as gender bias 
against fathers and should have no place in the law at all.  
The second reading of the Guardianship Amendment Bill (No 2) was introduced on 27 
November 1980 by the Hon J K McLay, Minister of Justice, in the following terms: 
There are those who believe that fathers do not gain custody of their children more 
often because the judiciary discriminates in favour of mothers. If any lingering trace 
of the so-called mother principle does in fact survive, it will be eradicated by the 
proposed new subsection (1A) of section 23, inserted by clause 8 of the Bill. 
This introduced s23(1A) of the Guardianship Act 1968, which was carried forward in New 
Zealand’s family law legislation into s4(4) of COCA. This became the present s4(3) of  
COCA by amendments, which came into force on 1 April 2014.
684
 
What has been observable in the case law since the original legislative inclusion of the 
current s4(3) of COCA is that there has been a declining reference to motherhood in New 
Zealand, to the point where motherhood now appears to receive no legal reference at all. This 
is notwithstanding the reality of parenting gender differences continuing to exist and mothers 
continuing to do more of the caring.
685
 The development of the welfare principle in England 
had occurred because it was fair to both mother and child that the law should provide this 
protection, and a gender-neutral principle was introduced so that fathers were no longer 
advantaged by their absolute position in common law. However, the welfare principle as a 
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legal transplant into New Zealand has had a divergent effect, influenced as it was by the 
egalitarian nature of New Zealand society where gender equality, not patriarchy, prevailed. 
That meant that equality, not fairness to mother and child, was the key factor. Further, this 
foundation was a principle of gender equality or sameness, which is not the same thing, 
though compatible with gender-neutrality (which was part of the English transplant).  In 
England too, additional weight was given to the custodial mother’s health and happiness as a 
factor in a welfare assessment.
686
 In New Zealand, the custodial mother’s health and 
happiness has not been accorded much, if any, weight in a welfare assessment, even if this 
was a relevant issue. Weight instead began to be given, wherever possible, to developing or 
maintaining a care relationship with the other parent (usually the father).
687
 
This movement culminated in a series of decisions of Judge Inglis QC in W v C,
688
 followed 
by the D v S series of decisions (including two Court of Appeal judgments), and the decision 
of Baragwanath J in L v A.
689
 These were all influential in the trend towards gender-neutral 




In England, however, while there was also increasing agitation by fathers’ action groups, the 
role and place of motherhood continued to be recognised. The effect in New Zealand of 
liberal feminist theory was also becoming evident, that is, in seeking gender equality, gender 
difference needed to be denied or eradicated. In the UK, cultural feminist theory appeared to 
have greater application. It appeared to recognise to a greater extent than New Zealand, a 
continuing gender difference within the pursuit for gender equality. This has contributed to  
different outcomes for motherhood within each of the UK and New Zealand jurisdictions, and 
is discussed further with respect to the example of relocation, and how it is addressed by the 
law within each of these jurisdictions.
691
 The divergence between New Zealand and England 
with respect to the meaning and application of the welfare principle was accordingly 
becoming increasingy pronounced, despite the principle having been legally transplanted in 
its entirety from England to New Zealand, and despite the law apparently intending the same 
thing. 
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6.2 The welfare principle as a relationship-based concept 
Herring argues that a contemporary application of the welfare principle, rather than the child 
being viewed atomistically, should be considered in a way which takes account of the rights 
of others and their relationship to the child. This would include consideration of the mother’s 
relationship with her child, and he calls this “relationship-based welfare.”
692
 This is  
consistent with the origins of the principle, that is, based in a recognition of the significance 
of the mother-child relationship. The application by the New Zealand courts of the principle 
pursuant to section 4(1) of COCA
693
 could be seen at times to reflect an understanding of a 
relationship-based approach. For example, in Auckland District Health Board v Z, a 2007 
High Court decision concerning the religious beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses around blood 
transfusion, Baragwanath J said:
694
 
Certainly the power of a parent as guardian includes decision-making in relation to 
the child's medical treatment. But the statute emphasises that the welfare and best 
interests of the child are the sole focus of the consideration by the Court which may 
override parental rights. That does not mean however that the parents' interests and 
wishes are of other than very great importance. There is a presumption that they will 
receive effect and to the extent that they do not receive complete effect they will be 
recognised as far as is possible compatibly with the predominant interests of the child. 
That is because a child is not to be considered as a microcosm insulated from her 
parents but as far as practicable as part of the family of which she and they are the 
components. 
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However, other decisions reflect an approach where the child is indeed atomised through a 
different understanding and application of the paramountcy principle. For example, in the 
2010 Family Court decision of JMC v AJHB,
695
 Judge Coyle said: 
To put it bluntly, it is his [the two-year-old child’s] best interests and welfare I need to 
consider, and not those of Ms H-B or Mr C. 
This latter approach is described by Herring as an interpretation by the Court that means, in 
effect, that the child’s welfare is the sole consideration, regardless of the impact such an order 
will have on the interests of the child’s parents or any of their children in the family, or the 
wider community. This narrow and strict statutory interpretation appears to require the Court 
to make an order that could cause harm to others while perhaps only slightly improving the 
welfare of the child.
696
 He argues that there should be no difficulty in interpreting the welfare 
principle based on an approach that recognises that children are raised in relationships. He 
goes further and says a child’s welfare also means supporting the caregiver, and that the 
Court “can legitimately make an order which benefits a parent, but not a child, if that can be 
regarded as appropriate in the context of their past and ongoing relationship.”
697
 This includes 




A truly child-centred perspective would also expose the fallacy that children can 
thrive while their care givers struggle, or that the caregiver’s needs can be severed 
from the child’s, which has led to the attitude that violence, hostility, and neglect 
toward the care giver are somehow irrelevant in the best interests calculus. 
Welfare and best interests requiring a relational, rather than a rights-based, approach was 
borne out of a rejection of autonomy
 
and individualism. As Becker says:
699
 
Patriarchy values power, control, autonomy, independence, toughness, 
invulnerability, strength, aggressiveness, rationality, detachment (being 
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non-emotional), and other traditionally masculine attributes that have proven effective 
in the battle against other men. 
Herring points to the relational approach as rejecting these values. Rather, people are 
understood as relational, connected and interdependent.
700
 They are also worthy of dignity, 
respect and trust.
701
 Thus, the value of the intimacy of the mother-child relationship should 
not be allowed by the law, through application of the welfare and best interests principle, to 
be diminished or put at risk by an approach based in seeking to protect the rights or interests 
of just one party. This is because, as Herring says:
702
  
… people do not understand their personal lives as involving clashes of individual 
rights or interests, but rather as a working through of relationships. The muddled give 
and take of everyday caring life, where sacrifices are made and benefits gained 
without them being totted up on some giant familial star chart, chimes more with 
everyday life than the image of independent interests and rights. 
Notwithstanding, this approach appears to contrast with that of Eekelaar.
703
 He sought a 
welfare decision making structure that would allow children to make decisions for themselves 
(unless to do so would infringe upon their development) and to:
704
 
… bring children to the threshold of adulthood with the maximum opportunities to 
form and pursue life goals which reflect as closely as possible as autonomous choice. 
However, as Herring says, while autonomy itself may be good, what really needs to be 
exercised is good autonomy. Further, this represents only one of a number of values we may 
consider our children should have in determining what their welfare and best interests might 
look like. Other values might include such things as the ability to form and maintain 
relationships, to be kind, to have a sense of obligation, to be altruistic and to have a sense of 
respect for others.  
The significance of identity is also important. Provision to a child of his or her identity is one 
of the desirable welfare and best interests norms found in section 5(f) of New Zealand’s 
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 Yet character and identity is formed and anchored by our relationships with others, 
and the nature of the self can only be properly understood in terms of relationships. The 
mother-child relationship must be regarded of particular importance, given its foundational 
primacy. Frazer and Lacey go on to say that:
706
  
… the notion of the relational self, in contrast to both atomistic and intersubjective 
selves, nicely captures our empirical and logical interdependence and the centrality to 
our identity of our relations with others … whilst retaining an idea of human 
uniqueness and discreteness as central to our sense of selves. 
Therefore, to interpret section 4(1) of COCA in an atomistic way with respect to the child is 
contrary to these tenets, and diminishes the unique value of motherhood. Herring challenges 
the law to see as a central part of its mission the task of it instilling values, citizenship and a 
sense of responsibility in children. He sees there as being nothing in the welfare and best 
interest principle that would stop a court from doing that and indeed he suggests, to the 
opposite, it requires it.
707
 That suggests that separated parenting arrangements should be 
viewed through the lens of relationship and not through the lens of rights. For young children, 
this may require according a greater recognition and protection of the mother-child 
relationship, which has arguably been compromised by the fathers’ drive for equal parenting 
rights.
708
 The identity of each of the mother and of the father are important, not only as to 
their different biology, but also in their different roles and relationships with the child.
709
 
There also remains an important distinction between the ethic of care and the ethic of 
justice.
710
 Held describes the difference in the following terms: 
711
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… An ethic of justice focuses on questions of fairness, equality, individual rights, 
abstract principles, and the consistent application of them. An ethic of care focuses on 
attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to need, narrative nuance, and cultivating caring 
relations. Whereas an ethic of justice seeks a fair solution between competing 
individual interests and rights, an ethic of care sees the interest of carers and cared-for 
as importantly intertwined rather than as simply competing.  … 
There can be care without justice. There has historically been little justice in the 
family, but care and life have gone on without it. There can be no justice without care, 
however, for without care no child would survive… 
Gilligan’s original thesis, published in her 1982 work,
712
 is that there are masculine and 
feminine ways of moral reasoning, which supports the uniqueness of each of motherhood and 
fatherhood. The differences and tensions around this were debated during the 1980s and 
1990s. Smart acknowledged all the valid criticisms of Gilligan’s work, but nonetheless she 
confirms its continuing, evident reality in everyday life. She describes Gilligan as having 
triggered a revitalisation of feminist moral philosophy.  Smart argued that while she did not 
consider there was either a feminine or female way of reasoning, our cultural constructions 
had lead men and women to experience different conditions of existence. This resulted in 
differences of form and articulation of their consciousness in different ways, as well as 
prioritising different issues.
713
  She describes this as close to Tronto’s formulation of different 
modes of moral reasoning, with that articulated by women as derived from a position of 
subordination (and which would be similarly found in other areas of subordination such as 
class, race, religion, disability and the like).
714
 Indeed, while Smart did not set out to prove 
the value of this dualist typology in understanding social and gender issues, she nonetheless 
found that during her research this was confirmed. She describes hearing, broadly, mothers 
talking in the framework of an ethic of care and fathers speaking in terms of an ethic of 
justice. She reported that mothers wished to retain connectedness, expressed worries and hurt, 
their desires to keep their children in contact with their fathers and their views about what 
was damaging to their children. Fathers talked about their anger with the law for failing to 
respect their rights, their need to fight the system and generally framing their views in terms 
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of objective fairness, equality, due process and rights.
715
 Smart counselled caution in seeking 
to operate in terms of Gilligan’s simple binary model, as fathers also talked about caring and 
mothers also talked about rights. This is where she found Tronto’s work useful. Her ethic of 
care identified two modes of caring, one ‘caring about’ and the other ‘caring for’. In orthodox 
moral theory, while caring is a recognised moral position, some forms of caring are excluded 
from this recognition because they are seen as instinctual behaviour and not an ethical act in 
the sense of choice or action. Thus, when mothers ‘care for’ their child, it is assumed this is 
instinctive behaviour and therefore not an ethical act. By contrast, fathers who ‘care about’ 
are regarded as good moral actors and deserving of recognition. This has played out in the 
Family Courts in New Zealand, Australia and England and Wales in the last forty to fifty 
years such that, arguably, the role of the mother became devalued in the ‘trumping’ of rights 
and the ‘caring about’ by the father. The voice of the mother may therefore have been 
diminished as a result.  
6.3 The problem with rights-based approaches to the welfare principle 
A recognition of rights should ensure that every person has their fundamental interests treated 
fairly. Michael Freeman says, in writing about children’s rights:
716
 
… To accord rights is to respect dignity; to deny rights is to cast doubt on humanity 
and on integrity. Rights affirm the Kantian principle that we are ends in ourselves and 
not means to others’ ends. It is therefore important that, as Ronald Dworkin so 
eloquently reminded us, we see rights as ‘trumps’. They cannot be knocked off their 
pedestal because it would be better for others, or even society as a whole, were these 
rights not to exist. Of course for the powerful – and for children, adults are always 
powerful – rights are an inconvenience. The powerful would find it easier if those 
below them lacked rights. 
Feminist commentators have argued that a rights based approach to welfare means that 
because rights are of the most benefit to those who have the power to assert them, they can in 
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practice work against the interests of women and children, and therefore the mother-child 
relationship. This is consistent with dominant feminist theory.
717
 As Lacey says:
718
 
… Rights may operate, in Dworkin’s memorable phrase, as trumps: but trumps are of 
little use if there are many trumps in the pack. And this multiplicity of rights brings 
with it a reliance on a coercive framework of enforcement which, as Carol Smart has 
argued, inevitably depends on violence of legal power: rights are a creature of the 
state and hence a function of existing configurations of power. This means, it is 
argued, that they are of limited use to the politically marginalised or for the 
construction of claims oppositional to prevailing power relations. 
These arguments are relevant in assisting to discern why the voice of motherhood may have 
become muted within contemporary New Zealand Family Court considerations, particularly 
with respect to decisions with respect to father contact, shared care and relocation. Herring 
sees that claims of rights talk promote an individualistic conception of people. He describes 
the central rights of autonomy and privacy as “designed to preserve the rugged individual, 
free from the ties that bind.”
719
 As the image that is being promoted by rights, it is the 
opposite to that of a relational person. Yet he considers that inherent in the welfare principle 
is the intimate relationship, based in the relational person. Central to this must be the mother-
child relationship. Yet it appears to be at risk by the law’s application of the welfare 
principle. This is because of the tension between rights and relationship with respect to the 
application of the welfare principle. The irony is that the development of the welfare 
principle in the first place was as a measure to protect the mother-child relationship.
720
 
Herring further describes how rights work against a relational perspective.
721
 He sees firstly 
that a rights focus tends to operate at a particular point in time, whereas a decision that 
interferes with an individual right and may therefore appear unjustified, may appear more 
justified if considered within the context of a wholistic relationship. Secondly, he describes 
how a rights-based approach in identifying each party’s rights and points of view tends to 
assume that each interest can be isolated, whereas a relational perspective would see each 
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party’s rights and interests as intermingled. He sees the individualised focus of rights as 
causing the failure of a rights-based approach to appreciate the systemic disadvantages 
caused to groups and collective interests.
722
 This would include the rights, interests and value 
of mothers generally, as opposed to “this particular mother”,
723
 and may explain why fathers’ 
rights understood as a collective interest were rebadged as a child’s welfare and best interests 
issue to gain traction by fathers’ interest groups.
724
 Herring challenges the assumption that the 
rights and individual interests of each party can be isolated. He suggests that a relational 
perspective means that each person’s rights and interests are intermingled and it is over-
simplistic to suggest otherwise.
725
 Thirdly, he sees that ‘rights talk’ means that “real 
experiences” are converted into “empty abstractions.”
726
 Carol Smart describes this process in 
the following way: 
… the rights approach takes and translates personal and private matters into legal 
language. In so doing, it reformulates them into issues relevant to law rather than to 
the lives of ordinary people. 
Jennifer Nedelsky also confirms the difficulty for mothers being created by the law:
727
 
… the selves to be protected by rights are seen as essentially separate and not 
creatures whose interests, needs and capacities are mutually constitutive. Thus, for 
example, one of the reasons women have always fit so poorly into the framework of 
liberal theory is that it becomes obviously awkward to think of women’s relation to 
their children as essentially one of competing interests to be mediated by rights. 
Tapp and Taylor suggest that the application of the welfare principle within New Zealand’s 
relocation context should be in a manner consistent with Herring’s relational perspective.
728
 
They suggest shifting the focus to one where information and resources are being 
constructively provided to the parents, re-empowering them to make parenting decisions that 
recognise all the factors involved, both short- and long-term. The adult interests would also 
be openly acknowledged, with a transparent balancing of all the relevant issues. This is a 
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move away from the Court making “sub silencio decisions by ‘re-badging’ adult interests as 
an interest related to the child’s welfare.”
729
  It is also a move away from the Court treating 
the child as an isolated, rights-bearing individual rather than a relational member of a family 
household. 
 
The final concern expressed by Herring about a rights-based approach to welfare is that it 
downplays responsibility, failing to place value on issues such as altruism, commitment and 
obligation.
730
 The essence of motherhood is that it is a relational obligation, which, by its 
nature, compels sacrifice and a foregoing of rights. While rights can impose an obligation to 
respect the rights of others, it does not capture the nature of the rights found within the sort of 
caring relationship described here. They are rights that are “other-focused,”
731
 where 
obligation, commitment and love are at play. An application of a rights-based perspective to 
the welfare principle should not take advantage of a mother’s propensity to sacrifice and 
forego her individual rights. Arguably, it should be protective of her capacity to do so. 
The problems with a rights-based approach to the welfare principle, and the risks that this 
presents to the diminishment and compromise of motherhood as an outcome, have been 
described. However, rights may still have a place within a relational conception of the 
welfare principle. For example, they might be used as effective protection from abuse within 
the parenting relationship. They could also be the framework for safe relationships to 
develop. Minnow and Shanley suggest that a relational concept of rights could embrace the 
person as both individual and as situated within a context of relationships of care, attachment 
and interdependency. The family would also be understood as determined by the individuals 
it comprises, but also as a unit that exists according to social, historical and political 
contexts.
732
 The child could then be understood as not only an individual with rights, but also 
as dependant on the love and care of others including that bestowed by the mother, as well as 
the father. 
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Family law cases often involve clashes between the competing rights of children and adults. 
For example, in relocation cases the right of the mother to have the freedom of movement to 
return home to the emotional care and support of her family, or to take up an employment 
opportunity elsewhere to better her career and income prospects, may compete with a shared 
care arrangement with the father already in place.
733
 The European Court of Human Rights 
and the Courts of England and Wales are developing jurisprudence around this issue in both 
family and medical law cases. Choudry and Fenwick suggest ‘paramount’ could be 
interpreted as ‘primary’
734
 and that it is time to accept the adoption of a new model of judicial 
reasoning in the context of disputes over children, that of the ‘parallel analysis’ or ‘ultimate 
balancing act’. Herring and Taylor suggest a principled balancing of rights could be achieved 
by focusing on the values that underlie each right. If cases involve people in intimate caring 
relationships and those relationships are regarded as the key value, then it can be argued “that 
the value of relational promotion should be one of the central values.”
735
 This would 
introduce a relational perspective into a rights-based approach as central to determining 
situations where rights of participating individuals clash. An application of this to the mother-
child relationship (and the father-child relationship) within a welfare and best interests 
assessment should therefore require focus on the offerings of each to a child, such that 
differences as well as similarities within an ‘equality of value’ rather than an ‘equality as 
same’ equation is considered. A recognition of the father-child relationship should therefore 
not have to cause a compromise to the mother-child relationship.  
6.4 Rethinking contemporary understandings of the welfare principle  
Herring supports the notion of vulnerability as the start point for a different approach to an 
understanding and application of the welfare principle.
736
 This is also discussed by 
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 It would start with an acknowledgement of the vulnerability of 
everyone involved,
739
 and because all personal and social lives are thus marked and shaped 
by vulnerability, “a vulnerability analysis must have both individual and institutional 
components.”
740
 Dodds suggests that:
741
 
It may be easier to recognise the social value of provision of care if it is viewed as 
something on which we all have been dependent at different points in our lives, rather 
than altruistic behaviour extended to those who lack ‘full personhood’. 
This reintroduction of relational values into the welfare principle could thereby restrain the 
notion that the principle is now based in “an individualistic conception of personhood”
742
 
with people, including children, being separate and independent from each other.  
6.5 New Zealand’s expansion of the welfare principle to include best interests  
With the passage of COCA, New Zealand expanded the welfare principle to additionally 
include a child’s best interests.
743
 The terms do not mean the same thing, as discussed by 
Judge O’Dwyer, who said:
744
 
The addition of the term ‘best interests’ in s4 of COCA underlines that a decision 
must focus not only on the immediate day to day welfare of a child such as care and 
nurture, but also the long term interests of ideally maintaining relationships with both 
parents. It had become common under the Guardianship Act for ‘best interests’ to be 
considered alongside ‘welfare’ although that Act only used the term ‘welfare’. The 
inclusion of ‘best interests’ in the new legislation highlights the importance of the 
Court looking at the longer term developmental, educational, cultural and familial 
needs of a child. 
                                                          
737
 Martha Albertson Fineman and Anna Grear (eds) Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for 
Law and Politics (Ashgate, 2014); see also Martha Albertson Fineman The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family 
and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge, 1995). 
738
 Susan Dodds, Catriona Mackenzie and Wendy Rogers (eds) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and 
Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
739
 P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, and B. Wisner  At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and 
Disasters (Abingdon, UK: Routledge); see also Herring, above note 700 at 52 and his discussion of the care and 
needs of vulnerable adults and those who lack capacity within medical law. 
740
 Fineman, above note 737. 
741
 Dodds, above note 738 at 507. 
742
 Herring above note 700 at 53. 
743
 S4(1) Care of Children Act 2004. 
744
 C v W [Custody] [2005] NZFLR 953 at [24]. 
 179 
The inclusion of ‘best interests’ alongside ‘welfare’ was intended to make application of the 
paramountcy of the welfare principle more extensive.
745
  However, such inclusion did little to 
address the law’s shift towards a rights-based, gender-neutral approach to its application of 
such principle. It also did little to address gendered parenting responses to the perceived care 
needs of a child.  
Summary 
The law’s emphasis on autonomy and rights appears to devalue the care which is central to 
human thriving. This care particularly includes that of a mother towards her child. Thus, 
consideration of a move by the law towards recognising again the relational values that 
underpin the welfare principle, even within a rights-based approach to welfare, may be a 
worthy goal and redemptive of the unique place of motherhood within family law. 
Without this recognition, motherhood within contemporary family law has been, arguably, 
further compromised by being framed as negatively ‘gatekeeping’ the development of a 
father’s relationship with the child, an issue that is discussed further.
746
 The theoretical 
foundations considered earlier
747
 also provide, in part, an explanatory basis for the challenges 
to motherhood with respect to the rise of contemporary shared care separated parenting, 
which is explored in the following chapter.   
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Chapter Seven 
Shared Care Parenting 
Introduction 
The development of gender-neutral post-separation shared care parenting arrangements 
(‘shared care’) within the Family Court in New Zealand, and in other jurisdictions, has 
increased in legal application in recent years. Also known as ‘shared-time parenting’, ‘joint 
physical custody’ or ‘dual residence’, it describes a new family form following separation or 
divorce (in New Zealand, known as dissolution of marriage) where children spend 30 to 65 
per cent of their time with each parent.
748
 Shared care has, however, created tension with the 
expectations and experiences of mothers, who may disagree that such an arrangement is in 
the best interests of their young children. This is because shared care may not reflect the 
reality of the gendered nature of caring for children, that is, the differences between 
mothering and fathering, nor the work being undertaken by mothers within the home carried 
out on a disproportionately greater basis than by fathers.
749
 Boyd discusses shared care as 
constraining maternal autonomy, yet the value of the caregiving that mothers provide is to 
enable children to become autonomous persons, something that she sees as a deep irony and 
compromising of motherhood.
750
 The way fathers care about their children was also 
identified by Smart as distinguishable from the way mothers care for their children.
751
 The 
new moral imperative seems to require mothers to maintain the presence of the father in the 
lives of their children and to ensure that their children receive quality fathering, in addition to 
caring for, protecting and putting their children’s needs first. Decisions by mothers to re-
partner or move away, that is, to relocate, thereby creating a tension with sharing the child’s 
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 See Chapter Four. 
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Best Interests Principle” in D Chunn and D Lacombe (eds) Law as a Gendering Practice (Toronto: Oxford 
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Carol Smart “Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: The Case of Family Law” above note 713. 
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care with their natural father, are then construed as morally questionable.
752
 This chapter thus 
examines the rise of the phenomenon of shared care within contemporary family law. Its 
politicisation, the challenges faced by the social sciences in researching shared care, and the 
implications for motherhood and the law are also discussed.  
7.1 The development of shared care in contemporary family law 
The potential for problems in founding separated parenting arrangements upon gender- 
neutrality was identified in the 1990s in England by Carol Smart.
753
 In 1995, she published 
her findings that fathers tended to speak of caring about their children, that is, feelings of 
care. Mothers, on the other hand, emphasised caring for their children, that is, the everyday 
physical and emotional input associated with care. Smart noted that these separate foci each 
received a different reception: “the caring about” of fathers was lauded by the courts while 
mothers who focused on “the caring for” were “ignored or denigrated.”
754
 The work and 
sacrifice of mothers was “seen as being as normal as breathing and thus as worthy of as much 
acknowledgment as such taken for granted activities usually generate. But when fathers 
articulated their care about their children … their utterances seemed to reverberate around the 
courts with a deafening significance.”
755
 On the other hand, the significance of fathers’ 
relationships with, and care of, their children is an increasingly relevant and important issue. 
The tension between motherhood and fatherhood in relationship with each other within the 
separated parenting arena has therefore intensified, as the boundaries and roles between them 
have been challenged and shifted. 
Doucet, in Do Men Mother?,
756
 discusses where gender similarities are in evidence, where 
gender differences ignite and where gender is muted in the parenting context. She suggests 
the problem may be in the question itself, and writes that “women are judged when they care 
too little. Men are judged when they care too much.”
757
 She links this to the moral 
responsibility of motherhood identified by Martha McMahon, who said:
758
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 Carol Smart “Losing the Case for Another Voice: The Case of Family Law” above note 713. 
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 Smart, above note 713, at 177. 
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 Smart, above note 713, at 173. 
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 Andrea Doucet, above note 10. 
757
 Andrea Doucet “Between Two F- words: Fathering and Feminism” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-
doucet/feminism-fathering_b_840421.html  searched 13 June 2013; see also Andrea Doucet Do Men Mother? 
above note 10, where at 210, she discusses the concept of borderwork between mothering and fathering such 
that fathers taking on the day-to-day care of children are reconfiguring fathering and masculinity. While further 
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What I didn’t know, and still find difficult to put into words, is how becoming a 
mother can provide some women with symbolic and relational opportunities for 
human experiences, that, when experienced by men have been called heroic: that is, 
transformative of self and potentially redemptive.  
 
Either way, there was potential for difficulty in developing legally-oriented regimes of care 
by separated parents based on gender-neutrality where the focus was on equality of treatment 
of mothers and fathers. 
The expansion of shared care did not sufficiently take into account the impact on young 
children of living in two homes rather than being based in one,
759
 nor the impact of 
conflicting feminist theories upon which such developments were founded. There is much 
literature on the resilience of children,
760
 but each child is different
761
 and it is understood that 
young children, in particular, need the opportunity to develop at least one secure attachment 
very early if there are to be positive long-term outcomes for them as socially functioning 
adults.
762
 There were no clear guidelines about when, from a developmental point of view, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, ‘mothering’, the work of motherhood, could arguably have 
meaning ascribed to it as the simple provision of love and comforting nurture, something a father or any 
combination of parenting figures could therefore provide (for example, the ‘mothering’ provided by a sibling or 
two gay men towards the children they may be raising together). Nonetheless, ‘mothering’ as well as 
‘motherhood’ retains the sense of being essentially female, just as ‘fathering’ as well as ‘fatherhood’ retains the 
sense of being essentially male.  
758
 Martha McMahon Engendering Motherhood: Identity and Self Transformation in Women’s Lives (New York 
Press, 1995) at 265.  Doucet, above note 10, identifies in McMahon’s work the argument that motherhood can 
be seen in terms of moral transformation and reform. This is a redemptive view of the role and value of 
motherhood in relation to children, fathering and indeed the whole of society, which is discussed further in the 
conclusions contained in Chapter Twelve. 
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Jennifer McIntosh says that attachment in the first two years of life is different to the third and fourth years and 
to stress the attachment in the first two years has a more far reaching negative impact, but children remain 
sensitive to attachment distress throughout childhood. She points to overnight caregiving as not essential for 
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attachment formation with an infant. See Jennifer McIntosh “Guest Editor’s Introduction to Special Issue on 
Attachment Theory, Separation and Divorce: Forging coherent understandings for Family Law” et al in July 
2011 edition of the Family Court Review, other contributors including Main, Hesse, Isaacs, Marvin, Waters, 
Sroufe, Schore and Seigel, Lieberman and Zeanah, George and Solomon, Bretherton, Crowell, Seligman. 
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such an arrangement should desirably start and where the bar lay with respect to “low level 
conflict”
763
 to enable shared care to be mandated in the first place. The social sciences were 
conflicted, the issue of overnights for young children away from their primary attachment 
figure having been hotly contested among developmental psychologists and the international 
family justice sector for the last decade.
764
 Had Bowlby’s theory about the need for a baby to 
develop a strong single attachment from birth, generally with the mother, to enable further 
healthy attachments to develop been debunked, or did it still have currency?
765
 Did Michael 
Lamb’s view that children form multiple attachments from the outset, that is, with both 
parents at the same time
766
 carry more weight, the corollary being that the development of the 
two home shared care model should not be compromised by disaffected mothers?
767
 Why did 
Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly ultimately hold apparently incompatible views when their 
original and important work had been undertaken jointly?
768
 Would it have assisted if there 
had been a greater awareness and understanding of the different underlying feminist theories 
that were at play: one seeking equality of treatment requiring a denial of gender difference, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Michael Lamb counterclaimed that infants form attachments to fathers and mothers at the same time, rather than 
sequentially and challenged the methodologies employed in the FCR July 2011 issue, highlighting how hotly 
contested is the issue within social science circles. Michael Lamb “A Wasted Opportunity to Engage With the 
Literature on the Implications of Attachment Research for Family Court Professionals” Family Court Review 
vol 50 July 2012 481-485. With respect to the impact upon the issue of shared care Liz Trinder points to its 
introduction largely having run ahead of empirical research and while clear messages are emerging from current 
research largely reaffirming older studies, challenges remain. Liz Trinder “Shared residence: A review of recent 
research evidence” Child and Family Law Quarterly (2010) vol 22 no 4 475-498.   
763
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notwithstanding continuing and unresolved conflict between the parents, described as “continuing conflict, a 
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overnight per week. See Liz Trinder above note 762. 
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the other seeking equality of outcome through recognition of difference, and both based in a 
power imbalance? 
7.1.1 The Demographic Data 
Shared care has, nonetheless, increased in popularity in recent years in a number of 
jurisdictions. In 2009, shared care was estimated in the UK to represent 12 per cent of 
separated care arrangements with about 3 per cent of parents saying they share care 
equally,
769
 and in Australia at that time, this was understood to be 16 per cent.
770
  Wisconsin, 
US, increased from 2 per cent in 1981 to 32 per cent in 2001.
771
 Sweden, in 2009, reported 
shared care (defined there as a 50:50 division of time) as being 28 per cent of care 
arrangements, while Norway reported an increase from 4 per cent in 1996 to 10 per cent in 
2004.
772
  Smyth, McIntosh, Emery and Higgs Haworth point to shared care being 
approximately 20 per cent in the US (the estimate now being as high as 45 per cent in some 
states), with estimates ranging between 11 per cent and 22 per cent in Australia, Canada, 




Taylor and Freeman note the research limitations with respect to shared care including the 
use of small samples, the difficulty in statistically identifying mutually agreed shared care 
arrangements, (that is, without Family Court intervention), and variations both within and 
between jurisdictions as to what actually constitutes shared care.
774
  Nonetheless, they 
confirm its increasing use and implementation in recent years.
775
 Accordingly, the clean 
break principle that dominated family law policy appears to be a thing of the past.
776
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7.1.2 Measuring the effectiveness of shared care 
Trinder, in reviewing the research available until 2010, reports the position in England with 
respect to the development of shared care as being similar to that in Australia, that is, shared 
care can be positive where parents are able to cooperate and arrangements are centred around 
children’s needs. However, in the higher conflict cases, typically the result of litigation, 
shared care may be associated with negative outcomes for children, and also for mothers. The 
statistical evidence available from Australia suggested that, at 34 per cent, shared care orders 
being made by the Family Court was two or three times higher than that type of care 
arrangement found in the wider community.
777
 Trinder’s caution, echoed by Taylor in New 
Zealand,
778
 is that litigated cases resulting in shared care have run ahead of empirical research 
as to the advantages and disadvantages for children, the reforms having been introduced in 
response to pressure from fathers’ groups. Trinder also notes that fathers with shared care are 
consistently more positive about the care arrangements, even in high conflict situations, than 
fathers with primary care or with mothers in either care arrangement. Further, that where 
there was little or no conflict, mothers were also positive about either primary or shared care, 
but where conflict existed 57 per cent of mothers in shared care arrangements were reported 
as not being satisfied with it.  
The work in Australia by McIntosh and others,
779
 with respect to the impact on children 
under four years of age of spending nights away from their primary carer, tended to confirm 
the validity of the concerns expressed by mothers.
780
 A four year longitudinal study by 
McIntosh et al. explores the different pathways into shared care. The cooperative group, more 
likely to have higher education and income and more involved fathers prior to separation, 
sustained positive relationships and continued to share care over time. The rigid care group 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
property settlement: exploring the connections” Australian Journal of Family Law (2010) 24(2) at 214-41; see 
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continued with a shared care pattern of a fixed division of time with minimal flexibility, and 
was characterised by repeat litigation and conflict, mothers feeling threatened, lower levels of 
cooperation, and low regard by fathers for mothers’ parenting skills. The “formerly shared 
care” group was characterised by dissatisfaction by both parents and children, was often the 
outcome of a mediation where no shared care had previously been in place and resulted in a 
reversion to primary care, usually by the mother.
781
 The study also examined the effects of 
shared care on under-two-year-olds and on under-four-year-olds, concluding that in infants 
under two, overnight care with the non-resident parent (usually the father) once or more a 
week was associated with high irritability and more vigilant efforts by the infant to watch and 
stay near the resident parent (usually the mother). In children aged two to three, shared care at 
five or more nights per fortnight was associated with lower levels of persistence, that is, 
playing continuously, staying with tasks, practicing new skills, coping with interruption, and 
greater levels of more problematic behaviour such as crying or hanging on to the caregiving 
parent, high anxiety, being frequently upset, eating disturbances and aggressive behaviour. 
The conclusions were that rigid, conflicted parenting arrangements, often imposed by court 
order, appeared to be associated with higher depressive and anxiety symptoms in children. 
Rather than the focus being simply on the provision of a shared care relationship as being in 
their best interests, for young children at least, their needs were found to be best met by two 
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 endorsed the McIntosh
784
 findings that two-to-three-year-old 
children with conflicted parents do less well when each parent has the care of the child for at 
least five nights a fortnight. They also confirmed that what is now known about young 
children’s attachments and sense of time means that a primary residence with one parent, 
regular contact with the other parent and limited periods of separation from both parents may 
be better for young children and especially those under four years of age.  
The development of shared care in Australia since its 2006 legislative reforms has been 
thoroughly reviewed by a number of researchers and legal commentators including Kaspiew, 
Gray and others,
785
 McIntosh, Smyth and others,
786
 Cashmore, Parkinson and others
787
 and 
Fehlberg, Smyth and others.
788
 Taylor and Freeman
789
 have also reviewed the available 
research across jurisdictions, and counsel caution when a decision is contemplated to split a 
child’s time approximately equally. They consider that such a decision needs to be carefully 
made and skilfully implemented to ensure it does not disregard the child’s need for secure 
attachments, nor creates psychological strain on the child. Otherwise, it may be a decision 
that best suits the rights of one or both parents, rather than the child. 
7.1.3 The place of the social sciences in Family Court decision-making  
In making decisions about the day-to-day care of children after a parental separation, 
including shared care, the Courts in a number of jurisdictions had begun increasingly to turn 
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for assistance to the social sciences. This added another layer of complexity to an already 
fraught area. As a result, the role of the social sciences in Family Court decision making 
processes also came under scrutiny.
790
 Rathus points to the ambiguous relationship between 
family law decision making and social science research in contemporary Australian family 
law, from a position of acknowledgement in 1976 to a high point over the next few years 
after the introduction of the 2006 Australian reforms. The 2007 decision of Murphy v 
Murphy
791
 is one example. There, the judge referred to over thirty books, scholarly articles 
and conference papers about shared care, parenting plans and the use of social science 
research in the Family Court.  Concerns began to arise about the liberal use of social science 
literature by judges. This was particularly because it is such a contested field, and evolves 
over time (as does the law). The issue was addressed head-on by Australia’s Full Court in 
2012 in the decision of McGregor v McGregor,
792
 with a rejection of such wholesale judicial 
use of social science material in a judge’s decision making. The lower court judge had made 
extensive use of social science material with respect to alienation, also a deeply contested and 
arguably gendered area of research.
793
 In relying on one particular view, the lower court was 
found to have failed to admit such social science evidence properly, such that there was an 
inability to “challenge the expertise of the authors … or to call other evidence from experts 
who might have a different view.”
794
 The Honourable Diana Bryant AO, the Chief Justice of 
the Family Court of Australia commented later in 2012 that “social science research has 
proved a seductive force in family-law decision-making”, and spoke of the “exquisite 
dilemma” of judges regarding the use of “extrinsic materials.”
795
 These comments and the 
issues raised by Rathus have relevance to the New Zealand context where contested social 
science material has also been regularly used within Family Court hearings, such material 
appearing to be selectively utilised to bolster the position of one parent ahead of the other. 
Baragwanath J’s decision in L v A is one example.
796
 Within the judgment can be found 
acceptance of one expert’s view which prioritised the developing week-about shared care 
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arrangement by seeking to manage the conflict between the parents, ahead of the views of 
another expert who was not willing to confirm the appropriateness of developing or 
continuing shared care where conflict was present in the parenting relationship.
797
 At the 
same time, Joan Kelly’s work gained traction within the New Zealand Family Court. It 
became known as the 2:2:5:5 “Joan Kelly model” of equal time shared care, its application 
being seen as an appropriate mechanism to meet the informal presumptive weighting of 
section 5(b), as it then was, of COCA that had developed.
798
 This provision provided that “the 
child’s relationships with his or her family, family group, whānau, hapū or iwi should be 
stable and ongoing” but it also provided in parentheses that “(in particular the child should 
have continuing relationships with both of his or her parents).” The principle, pointing to the 
desirability of a child having ongoing relationships with both of his or her parents, resulted in 
an increased emphasis on sharing day-to-day care of the child as the preferred mechanism to 
achieve that, usually meaning greater care by the father by reducing the care provided by the 
mother. The “Joan Kelly model,” based on promoting equality between mothers and fathers 
through an equal division of care time, was seen as providing the means to practically 
implement and provide for such legal desirability within the care arrangements.   
7.1.4 The social sciences debate  
The Australian movement was not without its detractors. The significance of attachment 
theory within separated parenting considerations and a lack of consensus by social scientists 
as to its meaning and application was reaffirmed by a special issue of the Family Court 
Review published in July 2011.
799
 Jennifer McIntosh was the guest editor. She recorded that 
all contributors agreed on the essential role of a primary attachment figure in the first year or 
two of a child’s life, and affirmed Bowlby’s sentiment that “what is sociologically popular 
and what is developmentally necessary are at loggerheads.”
800
 She pointed to agreement 
being clear, firstly, as to the need for the care arrangements for infants to support the growth 
and consolidation of the primary attachment while allowing for a growing attachment with 
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 Jennifer McIntosh “Guest Editor’s Introduction to Special Issue on Attachment theory, Separation, and 
Divorce: Forging Coherent Understandings for Family Law”, above note 780 at 422. 
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the second parent and, secondly, as to the term “primary” parent not denoting a better parent 
but primary in the sense of the fundamental aspects of attachment development. She also 
highlighted neurologists’ research as confirming that attachment drives a child’s brain’s 
developing capacity to know, express and self-regulate their emotional world, and that such 
right brain circuitry development takes place in a critical period of formation during a child’s 
first two years of life. In the third and fourth years she says they understand a child’s full 
cognitive system as starting to mature. Her conclusions, then, were that to stress a child’s 
attachment system in the first two years has a greater negative consequence than in the third 
and fourth years.
801
 Waters, another commentator in this edition, pointed to attachment as 
continuing throughout childhood, and that “Bowlby … suggested it wrapped up very early – 
we now know differently.”
802
 He further saw that within the separated parenting context 
“focusing on time only, you could never guarantee the best attachment experience for a 
child.”
803
 The commentators in this issue challenged many of the paradigms around which 
separated shared care parenting had developed and, in particular, the benefits of frequent 
contact to the development and maintenance of the second attachment relationship for an 
infant or very young child. They also saw such benefits being outweighed by such stressors 
as frequent or long-distance travel to achieve such contact, and conflict between the parents. 
In addition young children are not seen as equipped to be developmentally able to adapt to 
frequent shifts in care and location, such that they may become disoriented. Seigel saw such 
extreme solutions to these difficulties, such as month-about shared care, as leaving a child in 
a perpetual state of loss and such arrangements needing to be discouraged.
804
 McIntosh also 
described a concurrence of expert views within the publication to the effect that overnight 
care was not essential to a child’s ability to form a healthy attachment to the second parent 
(usually the father) and indeed, that repeated overnight stays away from the primary caregiver 
(usually the mother) in the first year or two of life may disrupt the formation of a secure 
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attachment with both parents.
805
 With respect to the gender of the parent, McIntosh describes 
the point being consistently made that while an infant does not have a gender bias with 
respect to attachment formation, there is a bias “for responsive, attuned, predictable, warm 
care within one consistent caregiving relationship, and then, subsequently with others.”
806
 
This was linked to motherhood by the evidence of neuroscience. Schore suggests that 
“dominant mother-care of infants is not just sociologically informed: in normal development, 
the female brain is specifically equipped for the largely nonverbal, affiliative, nurturant 
aspects of attachment formation with an infant.”
807
  
The special issue confirmed that attachment theory and research remain applicable to family 
law and separated parenting considerations, but saw difficulties with the language of 
attachment. The authors proposed that, instead of the word becoming shorthand for the 
relational support of a complex range of developments in a child, family law professionals 
should instead be clear about what they are referring to when using the word “attachment” 
within the adversarial context of the Family Courtroom.
808
 Questions were then raised as to 
whether the separated parenting arrangements being developed through shared care were 
promoting or interfering with a child’s optimum psychological and emotional development, 
with a recommendation that reconsideration and use of attachment theory could provide an 
appropriate and robust developmental framework for the problematic decision making that 
marks this area of family law.
809
 
There was a sharp response by two US commentators, Michael Lamb and Pamela Ludolph. 
In separate articles published in the July 2012 edition of the Family Court Review, each 
sought to diminish the impact of revisiting attachment theory in the terms presented by the 
earlier edition. Michael Lamb described it as “a wasted opportunity to engage with the 
literature on the implications of attachment research for Family Court professionals.”
810
 He 
considered the edition had presented a narrow and incomplete view of attachment theory, and 










and Jennifer McIntosh “If I Could Tell 
the Judge Something About Attachment : Perspectives on Attachment Theory in the Family Law Courtroom” 
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saw it as a platform for opinion rather than critical examination of the existing literature. This 
included his own work around multiple attachments, that is, that infants form attachments to 
fathers and mothers at the same time, rather than sequentially.
811
 He further considered 
Bowlby’s “monotrophy”, that is, that infants form an initial or primary attachment to the 
mother or mother-figure, before forming subsequent attachments with others, as being 
without supporting empirical evidence and out-dated.
812
  
Ludolph acknowledged that the “central idea of attachment theory, that early sensitive care is 
of great importance to children” was well supported and of interest for its implications for 
children upon divorce.
813
 She then said she had little to say about the papers contained within 
the edition, apart from commenting that “while the summary states briefly that the primary 
caregiver need not be the mother, the interviewees tended to talk about mothers as the 
primary caregivers and the fathers as the visiting parents.”
814
 Her focus was on the 
methodology and format of the publication, and she concluded that the tone of the publication 
suggested a certainty that, in her view, the literature did not warrant, and “safer by far, and 
truer to the state of the literature, is a caveat that individual children require individual 
decision making, whether by their parents or by the courts.”
815
  
McIntosh was provided with a right of reply.
816
 She reiterated that the special edition had 
focused on attachment as understood in the Bowlby tradition, and drew a distinction between 
the specific mechanisms of attachment-based interaction and the broader concept of 
attachment referring generally to parent-child relationships. She pointed again to the need for 
clarity around what professionals were now meaning when they used the term attachment 
within separated parenting considerations. She also highlighted the problem of polarisation 
that was evident around the issue, identifying an attempt through the responses to frame the 
edition’s work with respect to attachment theory as portraying “anti-father sentiments.”
817
 
McIntosh also pointed to claims by Lamb that the 2010 study by McIntosh, Smyth, Wells and 
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 was conducted with a small sample of parents “who had resorted to litigation”, as 
being inaccurate. She described general population data as having been used, one study 
comprising 5000 infants and the other 5000 young children between four and five years of 
age. In addition, she corrected Lamb’s suggestion that the data was from “the uncorroborated 
reports of parents (mothers) who opposed overnight arrangements”.
819
 Rather, she indicated 
that the data was from multiple informants wherever possible.  
This social science polarisation was followed by the 2014 publication by Richard Warshak of 
a “consensus report”, which pointed to the value of shared overnight care between separated 
parents of infant and young children as protective of the father-child relationship, and that 
depriving young children of overnights with their fathers could compromise the quality of the 
developing father-child relationship.
820
 Warshak says that the research does not support an 
assumption that “parents of infants and toddlers can be rank ordered as primary or secondary 




The intensity of the debate was also evident in the 2011 edition of the Australian Journal of 
Family Law, which contained articles by Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore on the one 
hand, and Jennifer McIntosh, Bruce Smyth and colleagues on the other, about the findings 
and meaning of the Australian research with respect to shared care separated parenting and 
the care of infants and young children.
822
 The tensions also spilled over into mainstream 
media, particularly in Australia, essentially seeking to reject the caution espoused by 
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McIntosh with respect to the introduction of overnight care of infants away from a primary 
carer (such overnights usually with the father away from the mother).
823
 
In summary, over this period, the conflict between social science views was pronounced.  
The work of Jennifer McIntosh and others in Australia appeared to identify differences 
between parenting gender, while continuing to support the equality of value of each parent 
developing a relationship with the child within a separated parenting regime. However, 
McIntosh’s work with respect to protecting the primary attachment (usually the mother) for 
under-four-year-olds and challenging an automatic introduction of overnight care with the 
other parent based in the shared care model, was not well received. By the time of the Family 
Court Review’s July 2011 Special Issue on attachment, Lamb in response was pointing to the 
Hippocratic dictum “do no harm” and criticised the use of “simplistic” rules of thumb “that 
ignore both the complexity of specific family circumstances and the nature of children’s 
relationships to both of their parents, as well as the large and growing body of literature on 
attachment”.
824
 His view was that while they may once have been helpful, they now “should 
be consigned to the past.”
825
  
In response to this continuing struggle between the professionals with respect to the validity 
of attachment theory, its application to the development of separated shared care parenting 
and McIntosh and others’ work suggesting that caution was needed in the introduction of 
shared care for under-four-year-olds,
826
 the AFCC convened a 32 member think tank in 2013 
for the express purpose of seeking consensus on the direction of public policy with respect to 
shared parenting, given the conflict that had emerged amongst the professionals. While it 
resulted in the Family Court Review publishing a further special issue in April 2014 on 
closing the gap with respect to the research, policy, and practice with respect to shared 
parenting,
827
 it did not achieve the consensus it had been seeking. The outcome was rather 
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described as a shift from Fisher and Ury’s seminal negotiation text “Getting to Yes,”
828
 to 
Mayer’s more recent work entitled “Staying With Conflict.”
829
 It did enable some consensus 
to be reached within the social sciences field with respect to its contested views around 
separated shared care parenting. However, the consensus points did not identify and address 
the broader tensions with respect to gender equality and difference, an issue that is directly 
relevant to motherhood; rather they focused on the narrower issue of the impact of conflict 
and domestic violence upon the viability of shared care within the law.
830
 
7.1.5 The Current Position 
More recently, Smyth, McIntosh, Emery and Higgs Haworth evaluated the available 
international research evidence with respect to shared care.
831
 They describe their 
methodology as searching for and assessing English language articles published from 2000 
through 2014 that included children in shared-time arrangements and presented data on child 
outcomes, with 17 empirical studies during this period being identified for inclusion in their 
research. They concluded that the international research literature on post-separation shared-
time arrangements is presently “a conceptual and methodological quagmire.”
832
 Nonetheless, 
they point to some key trends, distilled into five key domains which deserve consideration in 
assessing the viability and safety of a shared care arrangement. While they understand that 
shared care may be seen as the ‘Rolls Royce’ of separated parenting, appearing fair and 
simple, they also consider it is not typical of broader separated parenting arrangements. They 
also point to the potential for such an arrangement to undermine a child’s need for stability, 
and prolong or intensify a child’s exposure to conflict, neglect, violence and abuse.
833
 They 
confirm that the research identified that separated mothers with shared care arrangements 
provided the least favourable assessment of their child’s well-being.
834
 Emery describes 
shared care as the “best and worst” post-separation parenting arrangement, depending on how 
parents get along, resources available to the family, and how responsive the arrangements are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Research, Policy, Practice, and Shared Parenting” April 2014, Family Court Review with respect to the 
endeavours made to achieve consensus. 
828
 Roger Fisher and William Ury Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In” (Penguin Books, 
1983). 
829
 Bernard Mayer Staying With Conflict (Jossey-Bass, 2009); see discussion in Peter Salem and Arnold T. 
Shienvold “Closing the gap Without Getting to Yes: Staying With the Shared Parenting Debate” April 2014 
Family Court Review 145-151. 
830
 See discussion by Peter Jaffe “A Presumption Against Shared Parenting for Family Court Litigants” April 
2014 Family Court Review 187-192. 
831
 Smyth, McIntosh, Emery, and Higgs Haworth, above note 748. 
832
 Smyth et al., above note 748 at 13. 
833
 Smyth et al., above note 748.   
834
 Smyth et al., above note 748. 
 196 
to a child’s temperament and developmental needs.
835
 Smyth et al. identify five factors as 
emerging from the research, and central to the considerations to be undertaken in measuring 
the risks and benefits of a shared care arrangement for a particular child. These are:
836
 
 Safety and security in the caregiving environment (including emotional wellbeing, 
protection from family violence and  protracted parental conflict, and protection from 
being drawn into hostile levels of anger, contempt and dysfunctional communication); 
 Parenting quality and parent-child relationship (seen as key to a child’s safety and 
security); 
 Child-specific factors (with consideration of the age and stage of development as well as 
the gender of the child, and noting the special risks for infancy (understood to be 0-3 
years inclusive) in the context of a shared care arrangement); 
 The nature and exercise of the parenting arrangements (addressing such issues as the 
structure, predictability and flexibility of the arrangement, management of changeovers, 
and access to the absent parent); and 
 Practical issues (including financial resourcing, geographic proximity, work requirements 
and support of new partners). 
An important issue that has emerged from this review is the recognition that it is likely that 
the quality of a child’s relationship with each parent is more important than the significance 
of the quantity of time expended in it. This provides for a move away from assessing the 
value of each of motherhood and fatherhood to a child by calculating the time spent with the 
child, as the predominant relationship-valuing mechanism. It is arguable, then, that 
motherhood is no longer under such pressure to surrender part of what she may consider her 
role to be, through a requirement to implement a post-separation, time-calculated shared care 
parenting arrangement which she may not agree with, or to accept a minimisation of the 
reality of the unique differences between motherhood and fatherhood through the 
introduction of shared care as a demonstration of fatherhood’s equality with motherhood. 
Equality, trust and respect between mothers and fathers, and a good quality relationship of 
each with their child remain desirable goals. There does appear some recognition that these 
can be achieved through more nuanced measures additional to, and perhaps separate from, 
shared care. A deeper understanding of gatekeeping is one example, and is discussed in 
Chapter Nine. It offers the possibility of restoration to motherhood of her unique contribution 
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to not only the child but also to fatherhood, particularly within separated parenting 
arrangements.  
7.2 The development of shared care in New Zealand 
The ‘shared care’ story in New Zealand has its roots in earlier legislative amendments. 
Through the insertion of section 23(1A) into the Guardianship Act 1968,
837
 which came into 
the legislation through the Guardianship Amendment Act 1980,
838
 a foundation was laid for 
enforced gender-neutrality with respect to separated parenting arrangements, focusing on 
equality of treatment rather than equality of outcome. Such a foundation, whether intentional 
at the time or not, shaped the developments that were to occur over the next thirty years and 
had a significant effect upon diminishing the voice and status of the mother.  This was 
because during the 1970s there emerged considerable political activism by fathers’ groups, 
which continued on throughout the 1980s, 1990s and into the 2000s, and which built on the 
liberal feminist foundation demanding equality of treatment of mothers and fathers.
839
 As a 
result the ‘mother principle’, rather than having a continuing place in a welfare and best 
interests enquiry as a relevant factor for a child, was vulnerable to being reframed as a gender 
bias against fathers and responsible for a perceived inequality of treatment between them, 
which needed to be addressed. The ‘mother principle’, in recognising differences between 
mothers and fathers, was therefore discounted as a factor of value that should be taken into 
account in a welfare enquiry.  
The introduction of specific gender-neutrality into the law paved the way for the development 
of shared care as the preferred separated parenting model within an egalitarian society which 
prided itself on having led the Western world in its early acceptance of gender equality, 
where gender differences were neutralised.
840
 What was not immediately evident, were the 
several competing priorities, and challenges, which would emerge: that of the desirability of 
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both parents’ being involved in a child’s care (including when the parents were separated), 
that of a young child’s need for stability, and whether the best of each of motherhood and 




The potentially negative consequences for mothers and children of the inclusion of gender-




… for a joint custody arrangement to work, it would appear that the parents need to 
have a good cooperative relationship … while joint custody was a suitable and 
beneficial custody arrangement under the right circumstances, an unwilling parent 
should not be forced or pressured into accepting a joint custody arrangement … 
According to New Zealand judges who were surveyed for this research programme, 
the indicators for making a joint custody order in a disputed case were good 
communication or cooperation between the parents. 
At the same time, in 1995, Butterworths, one of the leading family law texts, said:
843
 
Shared custody proceedings will usually be the result of agreements rather than court 
proceedings but sometimes the courts find it appropriate to make orders for genuine 
joint custody. The fact that the parents do not get on well at all is no bar to the Court 
ordering genuine shared custody.  
The mother, as whistleblower with respect to the shortcomings for children of shared care 
within New Zealand’s Family Court system, was explored in a small research study carried 
out by Tolmie, Elizabeth and Gavey in 2009.
844
 They concluded that there is a discrepancy 
between what was being professionally advised to mothers within the New Zealand Family 
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Court system with respect to the promotion of shared care, and what research was saying 
about parenting arrangements that best serve children post-separation.
845
 They found that 
most of the mothers interviewed believed that contact with the father was in their child’s best 
interests, but that when “the conflicting gendered moral accountabilities of contemporary 
motherhood are overlooked”, mothers can then be defined as hostile and alienating.
846
 They 
also suggested that family law practice would lead to better outcomes for children when 
professionals listen to the history of, and reasons for, the mother’s position.
847
 Legal 
commentators and research evidence, in suggesting that it is likely that the quality of the 
child’s relationship with the other parent is more important than the significance of the 
quantity of time expended in it,
848
 also suggests an incongruence with the professional advice 
being given and the Family Court decisions being made.  
Boshier and Spelman record that between 2006 and 2010, mothers were the applicant in 53 
per cent of cases, fathers in 29 per cent and another party in the remaining 18 per cent. Of the 
82 per cent of applications for a parenting order filed by the mother that were finalised, 10 
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Marriage and the Family  61 (1999) at 557; see also the M F Whiteside and B J Becker “Parental factors and the 
Young Child’s post – divorce adjustment: a meta analysis with implications for parenting arrangements” (2000) 
Journal of Family Psychology 14 at 5-26; see also R Bauserman “Child Adjustment in joint- custody versus 
sole-custody arrangements : a meta-anaytic review” Journal of Family Psychology 16 91-102 which, as raised 
by Fehlberg et al, in suggesting that children in shared time arrangements are better off than those in sole 
custody, does not distinguish between consensual and court imposed shared care.   
 200 
per cent resulted in shared care orders; and of the 29 per cent finalised applications for a 
parenting order filed by the father, the father was granted sole day-to-day care in 30 per cent 
of cases, the mother sole care in 45per cent and in 21 per cent of cases, there was a shared 
arrangement.
849
 It is not known what numbers of private arrangements are being made in 
anticipation of what an imposed order might reflect, that is, bargaining in the shadow of the 
law,
850
 or the effect of increasing numbers of mothers being employed fulltime along with the 
fathers, upon shared care orders being made by consent. These issues are also placed within a 
context and history of conflicting social science views about what is best for a child, 
particularly a young child, with respect to post-separation parenting.
851
 In New Zealand, the 
importance of preserving and strengthening the existing primary caregiver’s relationship with 
the child, usually the mother-child relationship, no longer appeared to be as important in post-
separation care arrangements
852
 because increasing recognition was given to preserving and 
strengthening a child’s relationship with the non-caregiving parent, that is, the father-child 
relationship. The Family Court became proactive in promoting new care arrangements to 
address this, introducing the two-home shared care model into situations where that had not 
been the status quo. These challenges to motherhood were also noted by Taylor, Gollop and 
Henaghan, who said in the conclusions to their June 2010 Research Report with respect to 
their significant relocation study that:
853
 
… some relocations have been denied to allow a previously relatively uninvolved 
parent to maintain or build a relationship with their child, or a child’s care has been 
reversed from their relocating primary carer to the other parent in face of serious 
obstacles to its success.  
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There have also been challenges to motherhood through the perception, originally encouraged 
by fathers’ action groups, that the Family Court was biased against fathers and that it was 
“pro-feminist and anti-male.”
854
 However, the experiences of the 21 New Zealand mothers 
interviewed in relation to Family Court processes revealed their sense of powerlessness, of 
their feelings their views were not listened to or respected, and of being bullied into 
arrangements they did not consider were best for their children, despite supporting father 
contact.
855
 This resulting tension between motherhood and the law also became evident with 
respect to the issues of relocation and gatekeeping, discussed in  Chapters Eight and Nine.  
7.2.1 Family law decisions influential in the development of shared care 
Several leading family law cases have significantly influenced the development of shared 
care based on the gender-neutrality embodied in New Zealand law. The decisions point to a 
diminished recognition given to motherhood, its difference from fatherhood and its value to a 
child. This position has opened the way for the activism of the fathers’ groups to seek shared 
care parenting reform, requiring mothers and fathers to be treated equally and the same, and 
with the increasing preference for the development of the two-home shared care model, to 
enable such equality of treatment to occur. These developments run counter to the pursuit of 
equality through the recognition of difference between mothers and fathers and increased the 
tension in the relationship between motherhood and contemporary family law. 
A discussion of the decisions contained in the cases of W v C and L v A follows.
856
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7.2.2 W v C
857
 
The first significant series of decisions that had a profound effect on the development of 
shared day-to-day care arrangements were those of Judge Inglis’ QC in W v C.
858
  
C and W were married in 1993 and their son J was born in November 1995, in England. They 
separated in March 1996, reconciled briefly and separated again. C applied for joint custody, 
ultimately seeking equal time shared care. W cross-applied for a custody order. The matter 
first came before the Family Court in October 1999,
859
 by which time C, apparently on his 
election, was not exercising contact with J apparently because W did not accept the principle 
of equal sharing.  
The Judge considered that a joint custody order works well “only where there is a significant 
amount of respect between each parent for each other’s parenting and cooperation between 
parents”.
860
 Nonetheless, he made a joint custody order, C’s care times being two hours twice 
a week, with W having the care for the balance of the time. A review was directed, to 
increase C’s care time if all was going well.  
A second hearing took place in June 2000 before Judge Inglis QC, and it is this judgment 
which is generally referred to as the W v C decision.
861
 Judge Inglis viewed his decision as 
the Family Court “at least partially”
862
 confronting, and addressing, the concerns “of a then 
vocal group of disaffected fathers”
863
 who considered that the Family Court acted with a 
gender bias against fathers, that is, that it operated in a manner that was contrary to children’s 
best interests.  
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The Judge’s central thesis was about gender-neutralisation between mothers and fathers:
864
  
… that when parents separate consideration of the welfare and interests of 
their child should always start from two propositions. First, that the child is 
entitled to retain the advantage of being nurtured by both parents. Secondly, 
that neither parent has a greater right than the other to nurture the child.  
The Judge confirmed that the law provided that both parents have equal guardianship rights 
which included, pursuant to the definition of guardianship provided by section 3 of the 
Guardianship Act 1968, custody and the right of control over the upbringing of a child, as 
well as all rights, powers, and duties in respect of the upbringing of a child irrespective of 
gender. He also accepted the then Principal Family Court Judge Mahony’s view of the 
application and overarching nature of section 23 of the Guardianship Act, that:
865
 
It is not defined in the statute because case by case the elements of welfare to 
be taken into account will vary … the Court must look at the circumstances of 
‘this child with this father, this mother … and these particular surrounding 
circumstances. The result necessarily has to be personalised to meet the 
welfare of each particular child. 
Judge Inglis then further considered that:
866
 
The presumption of gender equity in s 23(1A) was introduced in 1980 to 
correct a developing assumption that girls were best in the custody of their 
mother while boys beyond infancy were best in the custody of their father, but 
of course it has a wider effect than that. 
He discussed how parents after separation might carry out, in practice, their joint and equal 
responsibilities of guardianship. He considered the spectrum of variables, from two parents 
both able and willing to exercise their guardianship functions and responsibilities on a joint 
basis of equality, to two parents where one was unable or unwilling to exercise any of his 
guardianship functions or obligations. In respect of the former, he saw the issue as being how 
to divide a child’s time between them based on such considerations as the child’s routines 
and stage of maturity, and parental employment responsibilities. With respect to the latter, he 
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 Above note 67 at 460. 
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 Above note 67 at 463. 
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accepted the remaining parent, by default, was required to assume sole responsibility for 
these functions and obligations. Then he considered it would be acceptable for custody to 
vest in the available parent, with the child having contact with the other parent in an 
appropriate way.
867
 The Judge further discussed other variables between those extremes, 
which included the need to protect a child from a parent’s unsafe behaviour. However, he did 
not refer to any parenting variables arising through gender difference and the desirability of 




The starting point must be whether there is any valid reason relevant to the 
welfare of the child why the respondent’s legal right - identical to the legal 
right of the applicant - to exercise guardianship responsibilities and 
obligations jointly and equally with the applicant should be restricted.  
The start point, founded in the equality view of liberal feminist theory, was one of gender 
sameness of a mother and father from a guardianship and parenting point of view.
869
 The 
cultural and dominance feminist theories based in the irrefutable natural differences between 
mothers and fathers, irrespective of their equality in value, was not addressed. 
Counsel for the mother referred to judicial criticism, in the Haslett v Thornton decision, of 
any approach that involved “calculations as to exact times the child spend with each parent 
with a view to achieving parity or equality.”
870
 The Full Court of the High Court in that 
decision also said that while it is the right of the child to have healthy, beneficial contact with 
each parent, “what is necessary for the child’s welfare cannot be measured in arithmetical or 
mathematical terms.”
871
 In other words, there appeared to be an attempt by the Court to 
recognise gender difference by articulating an approach founded on equality of outcome, 
rather than equality of treatment. 
Judge Inglis prefaced his final comments by saying that his judgment should not “be seen as 
an attempt to stand the law of custody and access on its head,”
872
 before concluding that:
873
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I do not accept on the whole of the evidence that the ultimate goal of shared 
and equal guardianship in its broad sense (not necessarily any rigid 50:50 
sharing of J’s time) would be contrary to J’s welfare provided the parents 
control their behaviour as responsible parents and do not involve J in any of 
their adult differences. … For the reasons expressed there must be now a firm 
and managed progression towards a situation in which J comes to appreciate 
that the responsibility for his parenting and welfare is shared equally between 
his mother and his father.  
The Judge varied the joint custody order made to provide for an increasing care time by the 
father of J, such that by the end of four months from the hearing, it was to be every weekend 
from 6pm Friday until 6pm Sunday. Then, by the time J started school at age five years, the 
parents were expected to have commenced making their own arrangements about J’s shared 
care, including, by way of an example given by the Judge, an additional overnight stay with 
the father during the week. It was anticipated that the father’s weekend contact would also 
then increase to a Friday afternoon pickup after school until Monday morning, when he 
would be returned to school. Finally, the Judge said that J’s transitions between the two 
homes were not to be represented to him as something which the Court had imposed upon his 




While the arrangements imposed on the parents by these orders broke down, the decision 
significantly influenced the subsequent development of shared care and legislative reform 
through COCA, and, while recognising and supporting the value of fatherhood, 
overshadowed, and arguably diminished, motherhood during this time. 
7.2.3 L v A 
875
  
The 2003 decision of L v A  by Baragwanath J
876
 contributed to the securing of shared care in 
New Zealand, by reducing the weight to be given to the effect on a child of continuing 
conflict between the parents, in preference to elevating the importance of continuing a day-
to-day shared care regime. Management of parental conflict, rather than its avoidance, 
enabled a shared care regime to be developed notwithstanding. In the decision, Baragwanath 
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J upheld the introduction of a week-about shared care arrangement. At the time of the 
hearing, such an arrangement had been in place for 16 weeks, notwithstanding continuing 
and unresolved conflict between the parents. The conflict was described as “continuing 
conflict, a low level of communication and a low level of ability to communicate with the 
other partner”,
877
 the Judge stating:
878
  
I have declined to accept the argument of law that continuing low level 
conflict is itself a barrier to such an order as that made by the Judge. 
Consequently, the health and happiness of a parent, usually the mother, in the face of 
continued parental conflict, may then have been accorded less weight and respect than was 
desirable in a welfare and best interests assessment.
879
 
The contribution of the social sciences to the development of shared care within New 
Zealand family law, led by the views of Kelly and Emery,
880
 was also influential.
881
 This 
created tension with the law’s earlier protection of the primary attachment (usually the 
mother).
882
 The decreasing importance of the issue of conflict, as opposed to the increasing 




New reports of joint custody, rather than sole custody … suggest a protective 
effect for some children. … Studies indicate that those parents who continue 
in high conflict range from 8-12 per cent (Hetherington, 1999), 2-3 years after 
divorce. The relatively small group of chronically contentious and litigating 
parents are more likely to be emotionally disturbed, character-disordered men 
and women, still intent on vengeance and/or controlling their former spouses 
and their parenting (Johnston and Campbell, 1988; Johnston and Roseby, 
1997). … Where one or both parents continue to lash out at transitions 
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between households, mediation experience indicates that children can be 
protected from this exposure through access arrangements that incorporate 
transfers at neutral points, such as school, day care or after school activities. 
… Although there are distinct advantages of cooperative co-parenting for 
children, children thrive as well in parallel parenting relationships when 
parents are providing nurturing care and appropriate discipline in each of their 
households (Hetherington, 1999; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Maccoby & 
Mnookin, 1992; Whiteside & Becker, 2000). 
An alternative social science view
884




Shared parenting, its benefits notwithstanding, should not be seen as the 
panacea for all separating families and certainly not as a means of resolving 
highly conflictual custody situations. … Where shared parenting is seen either 
as a means of controlling the other parent or where there has persisted a high 
level of inter-personal hostility, distrust, and lack of respect between parents, 
then the experience is more likely to be difficult for all family members to 
manage [and] … is significantly more difficult, and at times impossible, to 
achieve. 
The recent assessment of the research evidence with respect to the risks and benefits 
of shared care, undertaken by Smyth et al.,
886
 suggest that, notwithstanding the 
acknowledged importance of the availability of relationship with both parents to a 
child within a separated parenting arrangement, the imposition of the Baragwanath J. 
approach may have diminished the value and respect accorded to mothers in New 
Zealand, caught in court-imposed shared care regimes where hostility, conflict and 
mistrust were evident. Linking the quality of a parent-child relationship with time 
expended as the primary mechanism to achieve this, thereby encouraging the 
imposition by the law of a shared care arrangement and challenging motherhood in 
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the process, does not appear to have the same currency it once did. This, in turn, may 
reduce some of the challenges experienced by motherhood as a result of these earlier 
developments.  
7.2.4 Comparing legal developments between New Zealand and the UK 
The proactivity by New Zealand’s Family Court to promote and introduce shared care 
appears to be contrary to the position in the UK during the same period, as recorded in the 
2006 House of Lords decision In Re G (Residence: Same Sex Parents).
887
 There, the thrust of 
the decision was to confirm that unless there were strong reasons to make a change, a child’s 
existing care arrangements should normally be maintained. Thus, the key determinant was 
that the mother had cared for the child for the previous four years - continuity of care being 
the critical factor - and that this should continue as being best for the child. 
Gilmore identifies from English case law the main principles that have since emerged for 
shared residence orders in that jurisdiction,
888
 and Harris and George also point to the 
legislative emphasis in the UK’s Children Act 1989 on parental responsibility rather than 
equality of care time between the parents. They consider that its dilution in recent years, 
nonetheless, has created an apparent shift away in case law from the original principles 
underpinning the Act, such that it risks re-creating problems similar to those the Act was 
designed to remedy.
889
 For example, in Re K (Shared Residence Order),
890
 Wall L J said that 
a shared residence order emphasises the fact that both parents are equal in the eyes of the law, 
and in Re W (Shared Residence Order),
891
 Wilson L J said that “a shared order would be 
psychologically beneficial to the parents in emphasising the equality of their responsibilities 
towards [the child]”.
892
 The position in the UK therefore appeared to move closer to the New 
Zealand position.  
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7.2.5   Governmental response to political pressure 
In 2000, the New Zealand Government released a discussion paper “Responsibilities for 
Children: Especially When Parents Part – The Laws About Custody Guardianship and 
Access.” Its associated commentary suggested that the Guardianship Act 1968 needed to 
keep pace with New Zealand’s changing society and to be more consistent with other 
legislation. A significant number of submissions were received.
893
 Those of the professionals 
were similar. That is, the approach of the Court system should stay the same, that the best 
interests of the child were best addressed by legal representation, and that guidelines were not 
regarded as helpful to particularised situations.  
Individual views were significantly more gender based. One stream emphasised the safety 
and security of children, and of mothers who had been subjected to domestic violence. Other 
views were based on the promotion of parenting equality, and sought a fundamental move 
away from custody and access arrangements towards a shared parenting model, giving 
fathers a greater role in the day-to-day upbringing of the child. 
This created a tension between parenting arrangements as they had been before separation, 
and of the status quo continuing into post-separation care arrangements (particularly where 
the mother had been the primary carer of the children) as introduced by the UK decision of J 
v C,
894
 and the development of a new shared care regime as a result of the separation. The 
strength of the uptake of this new regime lay in the legislative mandate of section 23(1A) of 
the Guardianship Act 1968, based in a denial of parental gender difference while at the same 
time supporting parental gender equality. 
7.2.6   New Zealand’s attempt to legislate for shared care parenting 
Also in 2000, a private member’s Shared Parenting Bill was drawn out of the ballot. 
Attributed to Dr Muriel Newman, of the minority Act Party, it proposed a rebuttable 
presumption of shared (50:50) custody for the children of separated parents and described 
separated shared care parenting as having “been highly successful in other western countries 
over the past two decades.”
895
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The Government, in response, said:
896
 
The Government does not consider that the one size fits all solution promoted 
by Ms Newman through this Bill is appropriate. In attempting to legislate 
preferred or favoured custody arrangements the Bill places the rights of 
parents above those of children and as such it is inconsistent with other family 
law statutes 
The issue became a political one, and men’s action groups adopted and advocated the liberal 
feminists’ arguments that required the law, in pursuing gender equality, to deny any 
significant natural difference between mothers and fathers.
897
 The Bill was, however, 
unsuccessful in obtaining the cross-party support necessary for it to be further advanced. 
7.2.7   The Care of Children Bill 2003 
Then, in 2003, the Government’s Care of Children Bill was introduced and the following 
year, the Law Commission issued its discussion paper looking at new issues in parenthood.
898
 
In the background discussion, it said:
899
  
Obviously, a child cannot live in two places at once. The Court will often 
make a sole custody order in favour of one or other parent. The courts have 
been more inclined recently to make a divided custody order (sometimes 
known as shared custody or joint custody).
900
 Divided custody orders stipulate 
that one parent shall have custody of a child for certain days of the week and 
the other parent for the remaining days. The courts have tended to move away 
from the traditional custody/access dichotomy. In the words of Baragwanath J: 
To assume that the paradigm of a unified marriage in a single 
home means that the child of separated parents must live 
primarily with one parent or another unless the relationship is 
harmonious overlooks the possibility that in some cases it may 
be in the child’s best interests to have two homes – not one.
901
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The Law Commission referred to the UK decision of Gillick
902
 and the New Zealand decision 
of D v S 
903
 as reminders that rights conferred on parents must be exercised for the benefit of 
the child, and that guardianship, in giving a guardian rights, does not confer rights against the 
child but against others. From the outset, the potential for a power struggle with respect to 
shared care was evident, notwithstanding the Court of Appeal in D v S 
904
 making it clear that 
the law required that the best interests of the child was to be arrived at by the weighing and 
balancing of the relevant factors without any a priori assumptions.  
The Care of Children Act did not, in its final form, create a presumption in favour of shared 
custody as Dr Newman’s Shared Parenting Bill had sought to do. This was a position that had 
been unequivocally rejected by Parliament. At the same time, as noted by Atkin, the Bill did 
not contain a primary caregiver principle either, the position “advanced by the former 
Commissioner for Children, which would have seen custody presumptively going to the party 
who has played the greater role in the past in caring for the child.”
905
 This party was usually 
the mother.
906
 In a briefing paper, the Ministry of Justice noted:
907
 
The Bill does not … create a presumption of shared parenting, and nor does 
it create a right to contact. Instead, the Bill focuses on encouraging co-
operative parenting by focusing on the ongoing role both parents should 
have in a child’s upbringing. Any presumption on the form the arrangements 
should take would be inconsistent with the principle of taking into account 
the individual circumstances of each child to ensure that the care 
arrangements are in the welfare and best interests of that child. 
Subsequently, the section 5 principles were incorporated into the Act, intended to be non-
exhaustive, and designed to give some context to the welfare and best interests assessment.
908
  
At the time, the then Principal Family Court Judge Boshier said:
909
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There is no indication in this report that the principles are intended as 
anything more than a guide, and nothing to suggest a presumption of shared 
parenting should be adopted. 
However, he also pointed to the Australian position with respect to its Reform Act,
910
 with an 
expectation of the likelihood of a similar change of approach occurring in New Zealand. This 
was anticipated to occur by a change in the standards and attitudes of judges, lawyers, parents 
and the community generally, based in a gender-neutral approach to separated parenting, and 




7.2.8 Tensions between politics, policy and legislation   
While Judge Boshier indicated the “the onset of a third approach, where enabling the child to 
have a relationship with both parents is to be accorded greater weight over any other 
consideration”,
912
 it appeared that gender politics were driving COCA reforms.
913
 The 
inclusion in the law of section 23(1A) of the Guardianship Act 1968 (to become section 4(4), 
and later section 4(3), of COCA), served to strengthen the fathers’ groups position. This 
provided that gender should be neutralised, and men and women should be treated equally 
and the same. This logically led to the argument that there should be no reason why the care 
of the children upon separation should not be undertaken by shared care, and preferably equal 
time shared care. The gender of the parent was not relevant to these considerations. 
However, while New Zealand’s Parliamentary processes resisted the introduction of either 
shared parenting, or of primary care-giving by one parent as the norm, pointing instead to the 
continuing paramountcy of the welfare and best interests principle as the test to be applied in 
each individual situation, it is arguable that after the introduction of COCA, the Family Court 
subsequently moved towards shared care as if it was legislatively mandated.
 914
 This was 
notwithstanding the restraint counselled by Priestley J in the High Court, in Brown v Argyll. 
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In that decision, one of the first appellate relocation decisions after the passage of the new 
Act, the judge said, firmly, that there had been no change post-COCA to the pre-COCA 
approach, requiring a no a priori assumptions approach to an assessment of a child’s welfare 
and best interests, as established by the Court of Appeal in the earlier relocation decision of 
D v S.
915
 He went further, suggesting that any change to this approach was “untenable.”
916
 
The tensions and difficulties for judges in interpreting and applying the law, but not making 
it, are very real in family law in both first instance and appellate jurisdictions. This is because 
they must work in a discretionary area of the law, influenced by subtle shifts in societal 
attitudes, expectations and change. In Australia, for example, Justice Alwynne Rowlands 
AO, in response to encouragement given to the Court to normalise shared care parenting 
within judge-made law,
917
 referred again to his views in the Australian decision of B v B
918
 
with respect to the elevation of shared parenting, where he said:
919
 
It is not for the Court to experiment with emerging ideas espoused by exciting 
thinkers which may or may not stand the test of time. The function of the 
Court is not to lead society upon new adventures for its own good but to apply 
values which have broad acceptance. 
However, while patterns of family life, the demands of employment, expectations of society 
and legislation have developed to the extent that there appears to no longer be any effective 
legal difference between mothering and fathering, there still remain inherent natural 
differences with respect to essentialism and the maternal essence.
920
 McClain describes the 
movement in the law as “establish[ing] sexual equality as an important public value and 
constitutional principle, and signals a shift from marriage as a hierarchal relationship, 
premised on gender complementarity, to one of mutual self-government, premised on gender 
equality.”
921
 Neutralising gender within parenting law and the consequence of a recognition 
of equality of men and women as though they are the same, does not address the issue for 
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mothers or children. If there are differences in the role and function of mothers and fathers 
that are important to a child at various stages of the child’s development, such differences are 
not presently able to be explicitly acknowledged by the law.
922
 As a consequence, there have 
been ebbs and flows in these tensions, such that the voice of the mother in speaking out of 
gender difference, may not have been understood or well received.  
7.3  Shared care and legislative reform 
New Zealand, as discussed, ultimately rejected legislative reform as a mechanism to 
introduce shared care into the law. Other jurisdictions were also having to address the issue. 
In November 2012, the UK Government released its responses paper,
923
 and recommended 
legislative reform with respect to the introduction of shared care parenting. Subsequently, its 
Children and Families Act 2014 was passed. It introduced wide ranging family justice 
reforms including the establishment of a single Family Court, improving the process for 
children in state care and adoption, introducing mediation as a cornerstone for addressing 
private parenting disputes, and creating a new emphasis on the concept of parental 
involvement, seeking to shift the focus towards involvement by both parents in separated 
parenting arrangements.
924
 However, it did not, in the end, further legislate for the concept of 
separated shared care parenting. In considering the present position in the UK, Fehlberg, 
Smyth, McLean and Roberts identified the unhelpfulness of the mixed messages generated in 
Australia by the 2006 legislative changes being grafted onto an existing “best interests” 
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framework, suggesting dangers in even subtle legislative encouragement towards shared care. 
They distilled their key findings down to these three main points: 
1. Other things matter more than time (and without specifically noting this, the 
implication appears to include the importance of the difference between motherhood 
and fatherhood); 
2. Positive outcomes for children in shared care are more to do with the sort of families 
who choose this arrangement (that is, parents who are not in conflict and who respect 
the different contribution that each of the mother and father provide); and 
3. Shared care is workable for some families but risky for others. 
In discouraging legislative reform with respect to shared care across jurisdictions, Smyth et 
al. described the situation as being better focused on:
925
 
More clearly and consistently toward encouraging both parents to be actively 
involved in their children’s lives post-separation, including maximising [parent-child] 
contact, rather than specifically toward legislating for shared time. 
Such approach leaves open to both motherhood and fatherhood the opportunity to work 
together in the future by embracing the differences arising through gender, as well as the 
similarities derived through their roles as parents.  
Summary 
The development of shared care as a model of separated parenting has presented challenges 
for motherhood. While positive when parents can cooperate and the arrangements are centred 
around the needs of the children, it has, in other circumstances, been associated with negative 
outcomes for mothers and children. The law in New Zealand, in its approach to the 
implementation of shared care separated parenting arrangements without being able to take 
into account the gender of the parent, has at times been something of a blunt instrument as 
mothers  have sought to navigate the issues that have arisen in relation to such arrangements. 
Problems first arose because, as Smart identified, mothers tend to focus on caring for their 
children, while fathers tend to care about them. The former was expected; the latter was 
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regarded as heroic. The law, in focussing on issues of rights and gender equality (according 
to liberal feminist theory, meaning same with a denial of gender difference), did not tend to 
recognise the differences between mothering and fathering. This led to escalating conflict 
when mothers, generally understood to be more emotionally attuned to their children, began 
to protest that such court-imposed care arrangements were not working, particularly for their 
young children. The voice of the mother was not understood nor respected during this time, 
framed instead as being obstructive to fathers’ rights to share the care of their children, 
preferably equally, with the mothers. Social sciences, too, contributed to the conflict with  
competing theories, particularly with respect to the issue of the importance of the primary 
attachment (usually the mother) versus the importance of the development of 
contemporaneous multiple attachments (which included the father). Political, economic and 
policy considerations were also influential. These included such issues as parents more 
commonly both engaging in the workforce, with an expectation that fathers would then 
assume a greater responsibility for domestic and childcare duties, such that the division of 
role and function between mothers and fathers was reduced. The fathers’ rights movements 
were, at the same time, pressing for the legislative introduction of separated shared care 
parenting. More recently, through the research of Smyth and others,
926
 more refined 
understandings are emerging that point to others things in the parenting relationship mattering 
more than time (that is, there may be differences between mothers and fathers that should be 
recognised), and that shared care is workable for some families but risky for others.  
There have been shifts over time in thinking about mothers within the family law context, and 
the development of shared care has demonstrated this. A refocusing on the welfare and best 
interests of the child as being the paramount consideration in law, rather than legislating for 
shared care, does provide an opportunity for motherhood to reconfigure her role and 
relationship with fatherhood without the unique aspects of both attributable to gender having 
to be necessarily surrendered, notwithstanding the continued existence of s4(3) of COCA.  
An understanding of the positive contribution a mother can make to the development of a 
father’s relationship with their child through facilitative gatekeeping, including within a 
shared care context, is explored in a subsequent chapter. However, other challenges have 
emerged for motherhood as shared care continued to develop. When a mother seeks to keep 
her child safe by engaging in protective, inhibitory gatekeeping, perhaps arising out of issues 
of domestic violence or conflict in the parenting relationship, but is then misunderstood as 
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being obstructive, is one example. Another challenge relates to the issue of relocation, which 







Parenting disputes associated with the issue of relocation are regarded as some of the most 
difficult cases within contemporary family law. Mothers are usually the applicants as they 
seek to relocate and take the children with them.
927
 As shared care became more common, 
relocation posed a challenge to such post-separation arrangements. At times, it was regarded 
as an infringement upon either an existing shared care arrangement or the development of 
such an arrangement in the future. These tensions are reflected in the relocation statistics 
gathered during the 20 year period from the early 1990s to 2014.
928
 At first, a mother’s health 
and happiness was recognised and given weight within the matrix of welfare and best interest 
factors. The New Zealand position was initially similar to that in the UK, and relocation was 
more readily granted. Then, through a growing understanding and emphasis upon the value to 
a child of a relationship with both parents, relocation in New Zealand became more difficult 
to obtain and the consequential challenge to motherhood increased. New Zealand’s position 
thereby diverged from that in the UK, which continued to place an increased weight on the 
mother’s desire to relocate with less weight on a child’s continuing relationship with the 
father. This difference in judicial approach between New Zealand and the UK as to the 
meaning and application of the welfare and best interests principle within the relocation 
context, has in recent years been ameliorated by a change in emphasis in both jurisdictions. In 
New Zealand, this has meant a restatement of the no a priori approach to all relevant welfare 
and best interest factors as required by the law, while the UK began to place greater weight 
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on the child’s relationship with the father such that relocation, if sought by a mother, was no 
longer readily and automatically granted. The impact upon motherhood of these shifts in 
approach by the law are traced in this chapter. 
8.1 Relocation within New Zealand family law 
No legislative definition for relocation exists within New Zealand’s family law. Relocation 
disputes are, however, defined by Taylor et al. as arising:
929
 
… when, following parental separation or divorce, a primary caregiver wants to move 
with the children a significant distance away from their present locality, thereby 
disrupting the children’s contact with their non-resident parent. They involve two 
competing claims set within the context of determining the child’s welfare and best 
interests – the primary caregiver’s desire to relocate nationally or internationally with 
the children versus the non-resident (or shared care) parent’s desire to maintain 
contact with the child in their present locality. 
Relocation disputes are accordingly considered in contemporary family law as some of the 
most controversial and difficult issues to be found in modern family law “and have been 
described as being ‘some of the knottiest and most disturbing problems that our Courts are 
called upon to resolve’”.
930
 
A relocation is understood to mean a shift by one parent, seeking to also relocate their child. 
It is a guardianship decision requiring the consent of both guardians, failing which a decision 
of the Court based on the welfare and best interests of the child may be sought. This is 
because, pursuant to section 16(2)(b) of COCA, such a shift involves “changes to the child’s 
place of residence (including, without limitation, changes of that kind arising from travel by 
the child) that may affect the child’s relationship with his or her parents and guardians”. 
Location may also be a condition of a parenting order pursuant to section 48 of COCA, with a 
variation to such a parenting order sought if such location is sought to be changed. It includes 
consideration of a request by one parent to shift either to another country and therefore from 
one jurisdiction to another, or to shift domestically within New Zealand. 
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8.2 Comparing legal approaches between New Zealand and the UK 
The opposing legal positions taken between New Zealand and England/Wales with respect to 
relocation outcomes are discussed by George.
 931
 In 2009, using the same set of facts with 
practitioners across both jurisdictions where a similar welfare principle applies, he explored 
whether or not they would be likely to allow or refuse the proposed relocation. 
George’s results were startling, as Figure 1 highlights.
932
 In England, the practitioners would 
more readily allow relocation, while the New Zealand practitioners would not. 




The welfare principle, as a legal transplant into New Zealand, has had a divergent effect for 
motherhood, where it was influenced by the egalitarian nature of New Zealand society where 
gender equality prevailed. This is in contrast to England’s patriarchy and its offering of 
gender fairness with respect to the mother-child relationship.
933
 That meant that, in New 
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Zealand, equality between mothers and fathers was the key factor after transplant of a 
principle from England that had been based in fairness to mother and child. Further, New 
Zealand’s foundation was based on a principle of gender equality, which is not the same thing 
as, though compatible with, gender neutrality (being a part of the English transplant).  In 
England too, additional weight was given to the custodial mother’s health and happiness as a 
factor in a welfare assessment.
934
 In New Zealand, the risk has been that the custodial 
mother’s health and happiness was not accorded much, if any, weight in a welfare and best 
interests assessment, even if this factor was relevant and central. Weight was, instead, 
preferentially given to maintaining or developing a shared care relationship with the other 
parent (who was usually the father).
935
 This created challenges for motherhood with respect 
to the curtailment of her freedom of movement, her inability to automatically return to the 
support and geography of her own family, and an acceptance of financial restraints (and 
perhaps poverty) through an inability to pursue post-separation study, career development 
and employment opportunities if these required her to relocate. 
The divergence between jurisdictions was highlighted in New Zealand through the 2002 
Court of Appeal decision in D v S,
936
 by its rejection of the UK decision in Payne v Payne.
937
 
D v S confirmed that the law requires no preferential weight to be given to any of the relevant 
factors, nor to the gender of the parent, in a welfare and best interests assessment. 
Nonetheless, the judgment refers to the qualities that fatherhood, as opposed to motherhood, 
brings to parenting (together with comment on the mothering qualities of this particular 
mother), providing clear judicial recognition of differences in parenting gender that may be 
relevant to an assessment of the welfare and best interests of a child, notwithstanding the 
import of the legislation. The essential features of the decision are discussed below.   
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8.3 D v S 
938
  
The D v S series of decisions
939
 first came before the Family Court a few months after W v 
C
940




 decision had 
just issued out of the English Court of Appeal. While a relocation decision, it also had 
implications for the development of shared care, and for motherhood. 
The mother was on a working holiday in New Zealand in 1986, when she met the father, D. 
He was a New Zealander, and the mother, S, was an Irish Catholic. They married in Ireland 
in 1988, returning to New Zealand shortly afterwards. Their three sons were born in 1991, 
1993 and 1995 respectively. In 1997, S took the children to Ireland to spend time with her 
parents. D then visited her there, telling her that the marriage was at an end. While initially 
remaining in Ireland, under pressure from D and the threat of The Hague Convention, S 
returned to New Zealand where she found D had a new partner, with a child born into this 
relationship. S remained the primary carer of the children and returned to Ireland twice with 
them before D, in 1999, applied to the Family Court for a shared custody order. At the same 
time, he sought an order preventing removal of the children from New Zealand. In response, 
S applied for a custody order and for an order allowing her to relocate the children from New 
Zealand to Ireland, and to the support of her family. 
The matter was heard in the Family Court in late 2000. S was seen as “desperately 
unhappy”
943
 if the Court did not allow her to return to Ireland with the children. However, the 
Judge also understood that S would not abandon the children, but would remain living with 
them in New Zealand if the children were not permitted to leave. He therefore made a joint 
custody order, directing the care of the children be shared between the parties on the basis of 
what was roughly a 60:40 split of time in favour of the mother. The Court further ordered 
that the children live in Christchurch and not be removed from New Zealand without the 
leave of the Court, or the written agreement of the parties. The mother appealed to the High 
Court against the order that the children not be removed from New Zealand, returning to 
Ireland for a few weeks without the children. Upon her return to New Zealand, S indicated 
that she was going back to Ireland to live whatever the outcome of the appeal. This new 
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evidence, together with the evidence of the mother’s counsellor that “the decision 
disallowing her to live in Ireland with her children was psychologically damaging to her,”
944
 
resulted in the High Court determining that “the very premise upon which the Family Court 
decision was reached, namely that the boys could have ‘the best of both worlds’ through the 
presence of both parents in Christchurch, no longer obtains.”
945
 Panckhurst J referred to the 
recently released decision of Payne v Payne,
946
 and concluded that:
947
 
I have derived some assistance from a reading of Payne v Payne. It seems that 
a rather more prescriptive approach to cases such as the present is followed in 
England as compared to here. For all that the case does contain a number of 
observations which I think are helpful provided they are not applied in a 
mechanical fashion. 
After reviewing the evidence, Panckhurst J said:
948
 
I have reached the conclusion that the best interests of the boys will be 
promoted if they accompany their mother to Ireland. To my mind there is 
clear evidence that the emotional needs of the boys are best met by [S], and 
that over the next few years at least that need is of paramount importance. … 
In short, I see the detriment and risks involved in a shift to Ireland as justified 
when measured alongside the gain which will flow from the presence of [S] as 
a mother. That, to my mind, is the bottom line. 
D, as self-represented litigant, sought leave to appeal on a question of law, namely that 
Panckhurst J had erred by relying on the Payne decision which conflicted with the decision in 
Stadniczenko v Stadniczenko.
949
 The application was granted on the basis that it was 
prosecuted with due diligence, on the grounds that it raised an issue of increasing general 
importance. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal (Blanchard J dissenting) on the basis that the High 
Court had been materially and wrongly influenced by the Payne decision, by giving too much 
weight to the mother’s decision to return to Ireland and her need to fulfil her role as a mother 
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away from New Zealand.
950
 The Court of Appeal also said that the Payne approach, with its 
greater emphasis on one of the relevant factors to be weighed when considering a relocation 
application, was inconsistent with the no a priori assumption, all-factors and child-centred 
approach required by New Zealand law, and as already established in Stadniczenko v 
Stadniczenko.
951
 As a result of the appeal being allowed, the earlier orders were discharged 
and the matter was remitted back to the Family Court for a rehearing of the original 
applications or for the hearing of fresh applications. Pending further order of the Family 
Court, D and S were given joint custody. The children by now were living in Ireland, but 
were due to travel back to New Zealand for the Christmas holidays 2001/2002. While they 
were in New Zealand, D filed a further application for an order preventing the removal of the 
children from New Zealand
952
 and a joint custody order in his favour whereby the children 
would live in New Zealand with him, with access to their mother in Ireland.  
In the Family Court, Judge Somerville noted that while the children were “relatively 
unscathed,”
953
 D was now “angry, frustrated and bitter” and “firmly of the view that the 
children’s interests would be best served by having input from both parents in New 
Zealand”,
954
 and S was still “deeply affected by the end of the marriage” and “upset at the 
deterioration in their relationship as parents and would like to see it improve.”
955
 D was 
granted joint custody, which appeared to be based on Judge Inglis QC’s principles in W v 
C.
956
 S appealed this decision to the High Court,
957
 on the basis that the Family Court Judge 
had erred in law by being unduly influenced by the need for fairness between the parties, and 
adopting as a starting point the rights and obligations of the parents rather than the best 
interests of the children. She also pointed to the Family Court’s failure to properly consider 
the factors of the sustenance of the children’s relationship with S if they lived in New 
Zealand with D, the youngest child’s wish and need to live with S, the significance of the 
previous primary care by S, the extent to which she had encouraged the children to retain a 
positive view of D and the risk to which the children were being exposed by removing them 
from her care. The High Court decided that they needed to determine the matter to achieve 
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finality as quickly as possible.
958
 The appeal was allowed, S was granted custody which 
included the right to relocate and D was granted access. D sought leave to appeal to the Court 
of Appeal, which was refused.
959
 
8.4 Limits placed on the gender-neutral W v C equality approach
960
 
The second Court of Appeal decision with respect to D v S 
961
 confirmed the second High 
Court’s decision.
962
 That is, that the Family Court was in correct to rely on W v C,
963
 which 
wrongly sought to create an a priori assumption that on separation joint guardianship rights 
were the starting point, and that shared care between the separated parents is the most 
desirable and appropriate discharging of their joint guardianship responsibilities. This 
position was rejected by the High Court and the Court of Appeal as being inconsistent with 
the legal position in New Zealand established by D v S (CA No 1),
964
 that the law requires 
that there can be no a priori assumptions with respect to a welfare and best interests enquiry. 
In the High Court, Chisholm and Fraser JJ said:
965
 
If the concept of equal and shared parental obligations or nurturing rights is 
allowed to represent the starting point for assessment of a proposal to relocate  
… there must be a presumptive or a priori (from what is before) weighting 
against the relocation application because equal and shared parental 
obligations or nurturing rights could only be achieved by preserving the status 
and declining the application. Put another way, one factor (the importance of 
equal and shared parental obligations or nurturing rights) is being isolated and 
given presumptive effect … It seems to us that … the W v C approach cannot 
be reconciled with the D v S principles which emphasises an all-factor child-
centred approach with no room for a priori assumptions or weightings. 
Ironically, if applied to a relocation case the W v C approach must be close to 
the flip side of Payne v Payne and it must follow for that reason alone that it is 
contrary to the relocation principles prevailing in New Zealand. 
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The Court of Appeal was also clear. It said:
966
 
[I]n our view it was not seriously arguable that the High Court was wrong to 
find that the particular passage from W v C was inconsistent with this Court’s 
statement of the proper approach to D v S. … it can no longer be good law to 
use as starting point “the equal and shared legal right to exercise” 
guardianship responsibilities and obligations. It is clearly wrong to say that a 
deviation from that position is justified only by circumstances demonstrating 
that the child’s welfare and interests require it. Rather it is the child’s welfare 
and interests in the future which must be the centre of the inquiry. This must 
be assessed in terms of available options. Here shared parenting was no longer 
an option. 
Judge Inglis subsequently sought, extra-judicially, to clarify the principal message he had 
intended convey by W v C, saying that:
967
 
[J]ust as it is an impermissible a priori assumption that on separation one 
parent will normally assume sole day-to-day care, so it is equally 
impermissible to assume that on separation joint guardianship responsibilities 
will justify each parent assuming shared day-to-day care in substantially equal 
segments of time. 
He accepted that the W v C decision could not be interpreted as suggesting that the 
presumptive starting point in determining care of a child post-separation was the parents’ 
entrenched joint guardianship responsibilities, because such a position could not stand in 
light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in D v S (CA No 1).
968
 That the appropriate starting 
point might be the parents’ status as joint guardians, rather than the welfare of the child as the 
first and paramount consideration, would be an impermissible a priori assumption. He also 
confirmed that presuming that the welfare and best interests of a child of separated parents 
should be met through a shared day-to-day care regime, particularly an equal shared care 
regime, would also be an impermissible a priori assumption.
969
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It is unfortunate that certain passages in W v C failed adequately to articulate 
the necessary distinction between the “rights’ of a guardian and the inherent 
obligations and responsibilities of a guardian … so  leading to the inaccurate 
impression that what was proposed was some new principle that preservation 
as between separated parents of full joint guardianship “rights” instead of 
being the legal “default position” in the absence of any order to the contrary, 
was prima facie in the welfare and best interests of the child. It is, however, 
difficult to understand how recognition of a legal “default position,” with the 
acknowledgment that the welfare and best interests of the child may require its 
adjustment, amounts to an a priori assumption. 
The focus in these considerations was on rights and equality, understood within a 
gender-neutral framework. The challenge for motherhood was that there appeared to 
be no recognition of differences between mothering and fathering, nor of the welfare 
principle as being relationally based, particularly with respect to mother and child.  





 of Blanchard J in D v S (CA No 1)
973
 recognises the emotional 
needs of the children as relevant. The judge considered that at that time in their lives, these 
were best met by their mother, rather than a father. In reviewing the High Court decision, 
Blanchard J considered Panckhurst J was referring, not to mothers generally, but to this 
particular mother, thereby avoiding any breach of section 23(1A) of the Guardianship Act.
974
 
However, he also referred to the Family Court evidence relating to a more general 
contribution of fathers with respect to the issues of resilience and self-reliance. These 
comments highlight the value of fatherhood generally to a child,
975
 and were, arguably, not 
gender-neutral issues but recognitions of the reality of the different, gender-based 
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contributions that mothers and fathers respectively make to the optimum development of 
their children. This judicial suggestion appears to regard these factors as relevant, as child-
centric, and to be appropriately taken into account in a welfare and best interests assessment. 
Implicit, is that such factors are not based in the gender-sameness of liberal feminist theory. 
Accordingly, the Court is faced with complexities in addressing a welfare and best interests 
assessment. The law imposes a requirement of gender-neutrality through section 23(1A) of 
the Guardianship Act,
976
 yet expert evidence and uneasy attempts by the court to recognise 
these realities suggest that such issues may not be gender-neutral.  
The dissenting judgment also suggests that the recognition of the mother’s health and 
happiness, a factor that appears to have been given less weight in relocation decisions since 
the D v S decision, was accorded appropriate weight within the totality of the weighing and 
balancing of all relevant factors by the High Court. It had not been elevated to an 
inappropriate level in the process. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal’s position in D v S, in its 
rejection of Payne, arguably came to be understood to mean a rejection of the mother’s 
health and happiness, as well as the significance of the role of a mother to a child, as relevant 
factors to be properly taken into account in an appropriate way. The dissenting judgment of 
Blanchard J is an example of the judicial efforts being made to recognise motherhood as a 
unique and discrete offering to a child, notwithstanding the gender-neutrality contained in the 
law. The judgment, arguably, also leaves room for the Court to consider the gendered 
qualities of a particular mother (or father) in relation to a child “in his or her particular 
circumstances,”
977
 as consistent with the current law. However, judges remain legislatively 
constrained from including consideration, in a particularised situation, of the more general 
and unique, gender-based contributions with respect to each of motherhood or fatherhood.  
8.6 The link between D v S 
978
 and the development of shared care 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in D v S
979
 was about an international relocation, but it 
became recognised as the most authoritative guidance available in New Zealand with respect 
to the welfare principle, enshrined in section 4 of COCA. It is described by Judge Inglis as:
980
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… the Court’s clear intention to restate the welfare principle as one of general 
application binding on the New Zealand Courts in all cases where there is a 
dispute over a child’s future. 
Judge Inglis saw the effect of the decision as confirmation that a relocation case was no 
different to any other determination that a court was called on to make with respect to a 
child’s future care, and that the welfare principle was to be applied as the first and paramount 
consideration in the same way:
981
 
… with such elements as are added by the issue of relocation being no more 
than elements to be balanced with all others in the wider all-factor child-
centred approach which the welfare principle requires. 
D v S (CA No 1)
982
 records eight factors to be taken into account in correctly approaching 
New Zealand law with respect to a relocation application, and more generally to the 
application of the welfare principle.
983
 These included confirmation that the introduction of 
section 23(1A), now section 4(3) of COCA, was designed to dispel any gender-based 
assumptions as to whose parental care will best serve the welfare of the child, thus restating 
the gender-neutrality required by the law. 
Then COCA was passed, coming into force on 1 July 2005, its architects having been 
influenced by these decisions. The new legislation provided guidelines in the section 5 
principles but gave no one factor statutory priority over any other in the section 4 welfare and 
best interests assessment. The drafting of the new legislation also, arguably, left open for 
further consideration the different theoretical foundations upon which the issue of gender-
neutrality and gender-equality in parenting law should be based, and therefore to be able to 
also consider the importance of early attachment, and the unique role of motherhood with 
respect to such issues as breastfeeding. However, the new legislation included section 4(4)
984
 
as a carryover from section 23(1A) of the Guardianship Act 1968, being the need to make a 
welfare and best interests assessment in a gender-neutral way. Therefore, a genuinely child-
centered approach, able to take into account any relevant factor, remained compromised in its 
continuing inability to recognise the value of gendered care based in the differences between 
mother and fathers.  
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A shift in judicial thinking in the Family Court developed, with increased weight being given 
to the factor of the importance of a child’s relationship with the non-relocating parent 
(usually the father). There also appears to have been decreased weight given to the factor of 
the relocating parent’s (usually the mother’s) emotional health and happiness, all within the 
matrix of a welfare and best interests enquiry.
985
 The result was that relocation was more 
difficult to obtain. The Family Court did not examine whether there were gender-based issues 
relevant to relocation, or to separated shared care. In any event, it was legislatively 
constrained from presumptively considering whether there were differences between mothers 
and fathers relevant to a welfare and best interest enquiry, through s4(3) of COCA.
986
  
Nonetheless, the repeal of the Guardianship Act 1968, and the introduction of COCA did 
signal change. It also created tension between the Family Court and the High Court, as a 
divergence between law and practice began to emerge.  The then Principal Family Court 
Judge Boshier considered that the addition of the section 5 principles in COCA into a 





The weight to be given to the relationships with parents is signaled as being 
greater than the relationships with other family members or of cultural 
considerations. The section states “in particular”, the child should have 
ongoing relationships with both parents. Splitting up a relationship between 
parent and child for a move that would take the child closer to family and 
cultural ties appears to be discouraged. 
Inglis, too, considered that the new legislation brought with it a change in emphasis, but 
acknowledged that his view was not shared by appellate judges Priestley J, nor Panckhust 
J.
989
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The express and clear inclusion in the Care of Children Act of sections 4 and 
in my view sharpens or shifts the Court’s focus to a more individualized view 
than that which existed before. 
In Downing v Stamford,
991
 the tension continued to intensify between the High Court and the 
Family Court as to the correct emphasis required by COCA of the factors relevant to a 
welfare and best interest enquiry with respect to relocation. Priestley J, while he dismissed 
the appeal and confirmed the decision of Judge Callinicos, also said:
992
 
If Judge Callinicos is hinting that the High Court and Court of Appeal 
authorities, which were binding on him, were not adopting the appropriate 
focus or, stating as he does in [31] that the focus “sharpens or shifts” to a 
“more individualised view” thereby suggesting that the focus is indeed 
different, then, quite apart from principles of stare decisis, the Judge was 
wrong. … To the extent that the M B F v S R F dicta may be deflecting the 
Family Court from a correct approach, they are over-ruled. 
Priestley J continued, saying:
993
 
Certainly ss 4 and 5 of the Care of Children Act are more detailed than was s 
23 of the Guardianship Act 1968.  But the focus and the primary inquiry 
remain unchanged. 
The argument was not recognised as having a gender component. It was seen rather to be 
about elevating one of the section 5 principles (that a child should have a continuing 
relationship with both parents) above all other relevant factors in a welfare and best interests 
enquiry, which was not the law. New Zealand’s Principal Family Court Judge in his extra 
judicial 2005 article “Relocation cases: an International View from the Bench,”
994
 relied on to 
support shared care and militate against relocation, said that parents should not relocate if to 
do so would have a detrimental impact on the [child’s] relationship with the other parent.” 
These trends inevitably did support the development of shared care in New Zealand and 
militate against relocation. This included shared care in the face of a mother’s desire to go 
home to the support of the maternal family, seeking to remove herself from what may have 
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been a violent or abusive relationship,
995
 or simply the stress and unhappiness of going it 
alone without family support.
996
 It is arguable that motherhood was compromised by these 
developments, exacerbated by the development of gender–neutral shared care and the 
consequent consideration of relocation, at times, as an infringement upon such development.  
8.7 Relocation, considered as an infringement upon the development of shared care 
Responses of mothers and fathers to the issue of relocation may differ through gender. 
However, because of the imposition of gender neutrality, such responses are not seen in this 
light, and from the point of view of the child, do not then appear to represent their welfare 
and best interests in the fullness intended by the court’s legislative mandate. D v S
997
 was 
interesting in this regard. A Roman Catholic mother, whose life revolved around 
motherhood, in the end conveyed her decision to relocate to Ireland irrespective of the appeal 
court’s decision with respect to her children. The assumption was that although she was 
desperately unhappy in New Zealand, she would stay if her children were here. That way, the 
children could “have the best of both worlds.”
998
 There appeared to be inherent in the Family 
Court’s decision, a reliance on her anticipated mother response that she would not leave her 
children and she would therefore stay. An allied consideration relates to whether judicial 
perceptions exist within a gender-neutral legislative framework of gendered “good” mother 
and “bad” mother responses. That is, mothers are judged according to this measure on 
whether they stay with their children if they are not permitted by the Court to relocate on the 
one hand, or if they go irrespectively on the other.
999
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In New Zealand, it appears that the development of shared care became a priority, attractive 
because it seemed to be able to provide quite simply to a child an equal and fair relationship 
with both parents.
1000
 While the Court would always enable a mother to relocate if she had 
good reason for doing so and balancing the relevant factors in a welfare and best interests 
assessment, it was determined that relocation should be permitted, there were also 
circumstances where an attempt by a mother to relocate with her children was seen as an 
infringement upon shared care being able to develop and militated against it.
1001
 During the 
2000s, an uneasy tension developed between motherhood and the Family Court as a result of 
the informal presumptive weighting that appeared to judicially be given to the value of 
developing a shared care parenting arrangement ahead of recognising a mother’s health and 
happiness within the parenting arrangement, this emphasis impacting upon the diminishing 
success of relocation applications during this period.  
8.8 The corrective provided by the Supreme Court in Kacem v Bashir
1002
 
Subsequently, the series of decisions which culminated in the 2010 Supreme Court decision 
in Kacem v Bashir,
1003
 provided a corrective to the movement in the law after the introduction 
of COCA.
1004
 Correction was provided, not just in respect of the development of an informal 
and elevated weighting of the then section 5(b) of COCA over other relevant factors in a 
welfare and best interests assessment, but also with respect to the extra-judicial comments of 
the then Principal Family Court Judge.
1005
 The Court confirmed that the principle contained 
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in section 5(b) contained an internal weighting within its own provision with respect to a 
child’s relationship with its parents. It was not an external weighting to be applied in relation 
to other section 5 welfare and best interest factors.
1006
 It also provided a corrective to shared 
care being seen by the Family Court as the preferred separated parenting model. These 
movements appeared to be based on an informal and incorrect elevation by the then Principal 
Family Court Judge and some judges within the Family Court of the weight to be given in a 
welfare and best interests assessment to the significance of a child of a relationship with both 
parents through shared care, which in turn made relocation (usually sought by the mother) 
more difficult to achieve. This elevation and weighting was found to be incorrect by the 
Supreme Court because the law continued to require a lack of presumption or a priori 
weighting of any of the relevant factors in a welfare and best interests enquiry.  
8.9 The ebb and flow of relocation statistics 
The Kacem v Bashir
1007
decision resulted in the clarification, and a subsequent legislative re-
ordering, of the section 5 principles in the Care of Children Amendment Act (No 2) 2013.
1008
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bench” (2005) NZFLJ 77 cannot be supported. The Judge considered that the terms of principle (b) indicated 
that parents should not relocate if to do so would have a detrimental impact on the[ child’s] relationship with the 
other parent” (at 79). With respect, most relocations are likely to involve some detrimental impact on the 
relationship with the other parent. The suggested approach would constitute a strong presumption against 
relocation. That is not a right reading of principle (b).” 
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Section 5 Principles relevant to child’s welfare and best interest:  (a) the child’s parents and guardians should 
have the primary responsibility, and should be encouraged to agree to their own arrangements, for the child’s 
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limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious denomination and practice) should be preserved and 
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(a) a child's safety must be protected and, in particular, a child must be protected from all forms of violence 
(as defined in section 3(2) to (5) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995) from all persons, including members of 
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(b) a child's care, development, and upbringing should be primarily the responsibility of his or her parents 
and guardians: 
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The Supreme Court did not consider the deeper, and conflicted, underlying theoretical issues 
to be in tension with each other. However, the statistics with respect to relocation would 
suggest that there have nonetheless been subtle shifts in judicial approach and, therefore, 
relocation outcomes for applicant mothers have again improved.  
An analysis of relocation decisions for the period 1 July 2005 (immediately after the 
commencement of COCA) and 31 December 2006 revealed that of the 51 decisions involving 
relocation applications, 28 were granted and 23 were declined.
1009
 Of the 28 granted, 13 were 
for a relocation within New Zealand while 15 were overseas. From 1 January 2007 to 31 
December 2007, there were 23 decisions. 10 were granted and 13 were declined. Of the 13 
that were declined, 10 were proposed to be within New Zealand, and 3 were proposed to be 
outside New Zealand. For the period 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008, there were 29 
decisions. 17 were granted and 12 were declined. Of the 17 that were granted, 6 were 
domestic and 11 were international. Of the 12 that were declined, 6 were domestic and 6 were 
international.
1010
 Mothers were more usually the applicants. 
These results are consistent with statistics gathered by van Bohemen with respect to 
relocation decisions (30 international applications granted and 35 domestic applications 
granted) between 1 January 2005 and 31 August 2007, where 75 per cent of the international 




Henaghan’s statistics demonstrated that in the 10 years from 1988 to 1998, where there were 
75 relocation cases, the majority (62 per cent) were decided in favour of the custodial and 
relocating parent (usually the mother).
1012
 From 1999 to 2000 there were 33 decisions. 
Sixteen allowed the relocation and 17 did not, being a success rate of 48 per cent. For the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(c) a child's care, development, and upbringing should be facilitated by ongoing consultation and co-
operation between his or her parents, guardians, and any other person having a role in his or her care under a 
parenting or guardianship order: 
(d) a child should have continuity in his or her care, development, and upbringing: 
(e) a child should continue to have a relationship with both of his or her parents, and that a child's 
relationship with his or her family group, whānau, hapū, or iwi should be preserved and strengthened: 
(f) a child's identity (including, without limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious denomination 
and practice) should be preserved and strengthened. 
1009
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 Mark Henaghan, Bronwyn Klippel, Dugald Matheson “Relocation Cases” NZLS CLE Seminar 27, 2000. 
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period 2001 to 2003, the success rate dropped further to 38 per cent.
1013
 These statistics 
confirmed that the rate of successful applications stood at 62 per cent for the ten year period 
1988 to 1998 but from that point on, it progressively declined to 48 per cent in 1999-2000, 
and then to 35 per cent for the period 2005-2007.
1014
  
Henaghan considered that the key factor in refusing relocation at that time was the Court’s 
increasing emphasis on the relationship of the child with the non-moving parent (usually the 
father) and the impact of the interpretation of section 5(b) of COCA.
1015
 This provided to the 
non-relocating parent considerable power. During this period, the value placed on a child’s 
relationship with that parent was considered so important that if they opposed relocation of 
the child sought by the other parent (usually the mother), the basis for the Court’s decision 
provided a better than an odds-on chance that permission for the relocation (usually requested 
by the mother) would be declined.  
According to statistics for 2008-2009, 50 per cent of relocation applications were successful, 
but this dropped to a low of 32 per cent in 2010.
1016
 However, after the decision in Kacem v 
Bashir,
1017
 delivered in late 2010, there appears to have been a marked shift. In 2011, 62 per 
cent of relocation applications were allowed, this statistic being repeated in 2012 at 58 
percent before dropping to 42 per cent in 2103 but rising again to 60 per cent in 2014.
1018
 Of 
the 57 relocation decisions between 2 November 2010 to 19 July 2012, being the period 
immediately following the Kacem v Bashir decision, 65 per cent of relocation applications 
were allowed. 31 of the 57 decisions involved a domestic relocation, 18 (58 per cent) being 
allowed and 13 (42 per cent) being declined. The remaining 26 of the 57 decisions involved 
applications for international relocations. Nineteen (73 per cent) were permitted, while 7 (27 
per cent) were declined.
1019
  
It is noteworthy that within these statistics, significantly more international relocations are 
allowed than domestic relocations.
1020
 There are a number of factors common to successful 
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 The mother is the party seeking to relocate. 
 The mother suffers from depression as a result of having to remain living in New Zealand 
with the child. 
 A wider family support network exists in the country to which relocation is sought. 
 The mother is the primary caregiver to whom the child has a strong attachment. 
 The father is in a position to relocate as well, enabling increased contact to occur in this 
manner. 
 Greater weight is accorded to the child’s views and wishes than in situations where 
relocation is declined. 
There is longstanding recognition that with respect to relocation cases, it is mothers who are 
usually seeking to relocate.
1022
 This is also reflected in the UK, where George identifies in his 
2012 study that 95 per cent of the relocation applications in England that year were brought 
by mothers.
1023
 In New Zealand, prior to Kacem v Bashir,
1024
 judicial determinations more 
frequently declined relocation applications than permitted them. This was difficult for a 
mother who, in light of the increased value placed on the child’s relationship with the non-
relocating parent (usually the father), may have been required to continue with, or support the 
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introduction of, a shared care arrangement with the father. This included circumstances where 
she may have been suffering from depression and/or geographically unable to be supported 
by her wider family. She may also have been required to manage a conflicted parenting 
relationship. Since then, there appears to be an increasing judicial recognition of the reality of 
a mother’s position, such that consideration of the matrix of welfare and best interest factors 
to be determined in a relocation application now appears to be more balanced by inclusion of 
this additional factor, based on the no a priori weight or elevation of relevant factors as 
required by the law. These subtle shifts in judicial emphasis appear to have resulted in greater 
success with respect to relocation applications
1025
 and, arguably, they have resulted in an 
easing of the associated tension that had developed between motherhood and the law. 
Summary 
This chapter has examined the relationship between motherhood and family law through the 
lens of relocation. The analysis of New Zealand relocation decisions confirms that, 
notwithstanding the existence of a legally gender-neutral parenting framework, mothers are 
overwhelmingly the majority of applicants to the Court for permission to enable their 
child(ren) to relocate. Statistics also reflect that over the 20 year period from the mid-1990s 
until 2014, there has been an identifiable fluctuation in the success of such applications. 
There appears to be a connection between the development of a father’s day-to-day care of a 
child in conjunction with the mother through shared care, and the diminished success of 
relocation applications such that, by 2010, approximately two thirds of such applications 
were being declined. Relocation was also, at times, regarded as an infringement upon shared 
care, cutting across the ability to provide to a child relationships with both parents through 
the medium of shared day-to-day care. For motherhood, this limitation upon the value of 
freedom of movement presented additional challenges. The divergence between the 
approaches of England/Wales and New Zealand to the issue of relocation had also reached its 
most extreme point during this time. The corrective provided in New Zealand by the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Kacem v Bashir
1026
 and the subsequent 2013 amendment and re-
ordering of COCA’s section 5 principles have contributed to a swing back in the statistics 
such that by 2014, 68 per cent of relocation applications in this jurisdiction were recorded as 
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being successful (mothers continuing to make up the majority of the applicants), surprisingly 
consistent with the UK’s statistic recorded by George in 2012 of 62 per cent. The pendulum 
between the two jurisdictions, the UK having been regarded as pro-relocation and New 
Zealand having been regarded as anti-relocation, appears now to be settling at a level 
consistent across both jurisdictions. This has meant that in New Zealand, a more favourable 
approach is allowing more mothers to relocate than not.   
The following chapter discusses gatekeeping as a further example of a contemporary legal 
challenge to motherhood and the fluctuating tension in the relationship between motherhood 
and the law. It also explores the constructive possibility of an expanded understanding of 
gatekeeping as a means of enhancing the development of a father’s relationship with a child 
achieved, in part, through recognising and harnessing motherhood’s unique capacity to 







McKinnon’s dominance feminist theory
1027
 suggests the impossibility of a mother’s point of 
view being understood and supported by a state judicial system. That is because in feminist 
theory the state reinforces, even in the name of neutrality, the male point of view since 
patriarchy is the standard upon which the law is founded. Therefore the law sees and treats 
women the way men see and treat women. McKinnon warned that the sameness or difference 
of liberal feminist theory or cultural feminist theory both had maleness as their reference 
point, and therefore masked the reality of gender as a system of social hierarchy, a political 
system of male dominance and female subordination. 
The gendered nature of the issue of gatekeeping, as well as the issues of imprisonment and 
breastfeeding discussed in the following chapters, are arguably examples of motherhood’s 
gendered responses within a legal framework that, in seeking gender equality, is gender-
neutral. These examples demonstrate contemporary family law’s difficulty in addressing 





Gatekeeping is a factor that can facilitate or hinder separated parents’ connections with their 
children and with each other.
1029
 It has been identified as a maternal issue, and also as a 
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complex gendered issue or a gender-neutral issue.
1030
 Close attention has been paid in recent 
years to the ways in which mothers encourage or resist fathers’ involvement in child care and 
family work, that is, gatekeeping in this context is seen as a maternal issue 
1031
 such that it has 
even been referred to as maternal gatekeeping.
1032
 On the other hand, with respect to intact 
families, research has identified a diversity of parenting practices particularly with the rise of 
the dual-income household. Changes in employment patterns have shifted gender 
relationships, and maternal and paternal roles are being negotiated according to complex 
structural and gender influences.
1033
 Hochschild highlights strategies used by couples to avoid 
seeing the obvious discrepancies between their ideal of equality and the practices of their 
everyday life.
1034
 An Irish study identified that traditional practices of time division between 
men and women remain pervasive.
1035
 In 2008, McGinnity and Russell’s findings were that 
“there are still gender differences in the allocation of time to employment and unpaid tasks in 
dual earner couple, with women having on average a higher domestic workload than 
men.”
1036
 Such unequal division of labour in the pre-separation relationship can as a natural 
consequence lead to women being more experienced and therefore seen as superior in issues 
of child care and family management. Doucet sees that “fathers and mothers have a different 
connection to their children and that the one held by the mother is strong, vaster and more 
profound.”
1037
 Austin takes a more gender neutral approach, and reflects upon the bi-
directional and mutual processes that are at play in parental gatekeeping.
1038
 He utilises the 
concept of gatekeeping to frame the analysis in litigation as to how supportive one parent 
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may be of the other and the other’s relationship with the child. This then becomes a key 
determinant in judicial decision making, particularly with respect to relocation.
1039
 
9.2 Definitions of gatekeeping 
Gatekeeping was a term that was originally used in research in a critical sense against 
mothers. In 1999, Allen and Hawkins defined maternal gatekeeping as:
1040
 
… a collection of beliefs and behaviours that ultimately inhibit a collaborative effort 
between men and women in family work by limiting men’s opportunities for learning 
and growing through caring for home and children. 
In 2003 Fagan and Barnett provided a blunter definition, gatekeeping being defined as:
1041
 
… mothers’ preferences and attempts to restrict and exclude fathers from child care 
and involvement with children.  
These views regarded the behaviours and beliefs of mothers as seeking to limit fathers’ 
involvement with their children. Austin described this as restrictive gatekeeping
1042
, while 
Berger, Brown, Joung, Melli and Wimer referred to it as negative control.
1043
 Judge O’Dwyer 
described the consequence for the New Zealand Family Court as a negative focus on mothers, 
who have been seen as using child care as a means of power and control and as reinforcing a 
stereotype, also negative.
1044
 She raised an alternative and preferable perspective to be 
considered, that is, that there could be a recognition of mothers’ abilities to manage 
relationships and to have the capacity to develop strategies that promote fathers’ 
involvement. Her concern was that mothers have not been treated well in the New Zealand 
Family Court and that it was outdated practice to focus solely on mothers, particularly in this 
negative way. The corollary of this is that motherhood, as well as the assessments of the 
welfare and best interests of children, may have been compromised. However, motherhood is 
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also capable of restoration by the court reviewing its approach, choosing to view motherhood 
as a unique, gendered offering in respect of the mother-child relationship, and also by 
motherhood having special skills to be able to assist in the healthy development of the father-
child relationship. 
9.3 Austin et al’s benchbook
1045
 
Current trends, as discussed by Austin, Drozd and Dale, are based in parental gatekeeping 
within a broader, more neutral approach:
1046
 
Parental gatekeeping refers to how parents’ attitudes and actions affect the 
involvement and quality of the relationship between the other parent and child. 
Austin, Fieldstone and Pruett have undertaken additional work in this area, providing a 
formal benchbook for Family Court Judges based on a hypothetical continuum from 
facilitative to restrictive gatekeeping. At one end is restrictive gatekeeping (for protective or 
inhibitory reasons). Examples of such behaviours might be making contact by the other 
parent difficult or limited, conflicted pick-up and drop-off arrangements, not facilitating 
telephone contact, rigidity around the parenting arrangements and speaking negatively about 
the other parent in front of the child. The reasons for these behaviours may be based on such 
issues as unresolved conflict in the adult relationship, a lack of confidence in the parenting 
competence of the other parent, or issues of child support. However, they could also emerge 
from concerns relating to domestic violence in adult relationships, abuse and safety issues 
and a desire to avoid destabilising the child’s attachment through an undermining of the 
mother-child relationship. Austin describes these latter issues as protective gatekeeping
1047
 
for which a conservative approach to contact with the other parent may be appropriate and 
warranted. Nonetheless, it appears that they may be placed at the restrictive end of the 
gatekeeping continuum without demarcation between protective and inhibitory gatekeeping. 
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These protective behaviours are more often demonstrated by the mother and, at this end of 
the spectrum, may cause her to be regarded negatively for engaging in inhibitory behaviours. 
At the other end of the continuum is the facilitative gatekeeping, described by Austin as 
reflected in such behaviours as talking positively about the other parent, assisting in smooth, 
conflict-free changeovers and being flexible with respect to changes to the care arrangements. 
These behaviours are regarded as beneficial to the other parent-child relationship and are 
therefore obviously more desirable. 
The benchbook enables the other parent-child relationship, through the lens of gatekeeping, 
to be assessed and addressed by the court in a principled and forensic way.
1048
 It confirms 
that gatekeeping conflict is normal as post-separation parental roles are renegotiated, the new 
focus being upon how open or restrictive a parent might be to the other parent’s relationship 
with the child in the new parenting arrangements to be implemented. The corollary of this is a 
new focus on the development of strategies that might move a parent from being a restrictive  
to a facilitative gatekeeper. This emphasis recognises that gatekeeping is a dynamic process 
to which both parents contribute, with the attitudes and actions of each parent being 
acknowledged as affecting the quality of the other parent’s relationship with the child. It 
suggests that there should no longer be automatic criticism of a protective parent, or a mother 
who is restrictively gatekeeping. Her reasons for doing so may be important and derive from 
intimate partner violence or other valid concerns yet to be identified. However, Trinder 
considers that to date, most attention has focused on ways in which mothers inhibit fathers’ 




9.4 Trinder’s research  
Trinder’s 2008 study
1050
 explored the processes by which custodial mothers supported or 
inhibited father’s relationships with their children following separation. She identified that 
mothers adopt a range of strategies, from proactive gate-opening to gate-closing. These 
strategies were found to be influential to outcome. The position taken by the mother varied 
according to paternal competence, beliefs about what a child’s welfare requires, and the 
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quality of the parental relationship. Trinder draws on interviews from 54 separated families 
and found that gate work, whether gate opening or gate closing, can be a dynamic 
transactional process rather than a “linear and unidirectional process running from mothers to 
fathers.”
1051
 She refers to gatekeeping as a non-directional concept, implying neither 
facilitative nor inhibitory processes, contrary to the directional and inhibitory understandings 
intended by the 1999 definition of maternal gatekeeping by Allen and Hawkins.
1052
 Trinder 
then introduces the terms “gate-opening” to describe beliefs and behaviours that enhance 
parental involvement and “gate-closing” to describe beliefs and behaviours that inhibit 
parental involvement.
1053
 She also discusses the three disparate strands of research in this 
area. Firstly, are those researchers interested in fathers’ involvement in parenting and who 
focus on how mothers can effectively limit fathers’ involvement through beliefs and 
behaviours that inhibit a collaborative effort between men and women in family work, 
whether in intact or separated families.
1054
 Secondly, are those researchers who have been 
developing the concept of women’s relationship management work which explores maternal 
strategies to manage and promote father-child relationships.
1055
 Thirdly, is the focus on the 
extent to which parents reinforce or undermine each other’s parenting and how that relates to 
a child’s welfare and best interests.
1056
 Trinder seeks to integrate these research strands and, 
drawing on systems theory,
1057
 explores the possible interdependencies and reciprocal 
influences between mothers and fathers that underpin maternal gatekeeping.
1058
 She identifies 
five types of gatekeeping behaviour on a dynamic continuum. Two types of gatekeeping 
behaviour, being proactive gate-opening and passive gatekeeping, were evident and 
consistent in the accounts of both mothers and fathers. The remaining three types of 
gatekeeping behaviour, being contingent gate opening, and justifiable and proactive gate-
closing, were articulated by mothers or fathers, but not both. The main contribution of this 
study was to provide an understanding of the processes by which mothers influence fathers’ 
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involvement. The findings suggest that mothers and fathers exert a continual, bidirectional, 
relational and reciprocal influence on each other, such influence resulting in gatekeeping 
behaviours ranging from inhibitory through to facilitative.  
Thus, these various authors show that the ways in which one parent tries to involve the other 
parent can vary along a continuum from very restrictive at one end to very inclusive, 
proactive or facilitative at the other.
1059
 However, what seems to be emerging is an 
understanding that, irrespective of whether gatekeeping is viewed in a gendered or a gender-




9.5 The New Zealand position 
In New Zealand, Judge O’Dwyer suggests that the judicial focus should be on recognising the 
importance of clear judicial findings with respect to domestic violence within the 
relationship, and upon the “other parent mending their ways” rather than continuing to view 
mothers’ positions negatively and designed to restrict or exclude fathers from involvement 
with their children, as has been the traditional approach.
1061
 The Judge identifies that the use 
of the terminology of “gatekeeping” has rarely been found in the reported decisions of the 
New Zealand Family Court and, when it has been, it has usually been in the context of 
criticism of the mother for her beliefs, attitudes and attempts to manage contact with the 
father. The Court’s approach in this regard appears more consistent with the original views of 
gatekeeping that focussed negatively upon mothers. The new considerations signalled by 
Judge O’Dwyer seek to introduce a focus upon understanding why a mother may have acted 
in an inhibitory way with respect to contact with the father, associated with the need for clear 
findings to be made in domestic violence situations. Austin, reflecting US trends, describes 
the spectrum of gatekeeping behaviours from inhibitory to facilitative in a gender-neutral 
way. However, Judge O’Dwyer appears to recognise the place of the mother in her 
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considerations. This approach suggests a direction more aligned with Trinder’s mutual but 
gendered approach to gatekeeping, as reflected in her UK research. That is, there are a 
number of different gatekeeping behaviours, some common to both mothers and fathers and 
some indicated by mothers or fathers but not both, all contributing to an understanding of the 
relational and reciprocal influence mothers and fathers have upon each other within their 
parenting relationship. This new focus may herald something of a redemptive approach 
towards motherhood by New Zealand’s Family Court.  
Summary 
Greater recognition is now being given to the positive contribution mothers can make in their 
children’s lives through protective or facilitative gatekeeping. This is based in their ability 
and willingness to manage relationships constructively, identifying in particular the “emotion 
work”
1062
 undertaken by mothers and allowing for the development of strategies based 
around these attributes, to promote fathers’ involvement in their children’s lives. This is in 
contrast to the earlier approach of the Family Court that focused on and viewed maternal 
gatekeeping, including protective gatekeeping, in a negative light as a mechanism of control 
to hinder and obstruct a child’s relationship with the father.
1063
 Thus, while gatekeeping may 
have initially viewed motherhood’s natural attunement to a child’s emotional needs through a 
negative lens, more recent work in this field suggests a positive way forward, with a renewed 
understanding of the contributions that each of motherhood and fatherhood make towards 
their gendered and different, but mutually supportive, parenting roles.  
I now turn to discuss in the next chapter three examples where a mother has been imprisoned 
for contempt for resisting the law’s attempts to impose a contact regime for her child with the 
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father. A refusal by a mother to obey court-ordered contact is a very serious form of 
restrictive gatekeeping, or gate-closing. The law, in seeking to develop a father’s relationship 
with the child in circumstances where the mother is resistant, has on occasion exercised its 
ability to imprison, ensuring the mother’s subordination to the power of the law and seeking 
her obedience to its orders. The following chapter considers motherhood’s relationship with 







Throughout history, there have been ebbs and flows in the continuum that represents 
motherhood’s relationship with the law. The imposition of terms of imprisonment for a 
mother’s disobedience of the law in relation to court orders about her child’s care 
arrangements could be regarded as a low point in both historic and contemporary times. 
In this chapter, the tension between motherhood and the law is explored through three 
specific contemporary case examples, where imprisonment is judicially imposed in the face 
of disobedience with respect to legally imposed contact arrangements with the father. The 
law understandably seeks obedience to its framework with the likelihood of penalties being 
imposed when court orders are flouted or disobeyed. This helps to ensure respect for a robust 
judicial system within a healthy democracy. At the same time, within the separated parenting 
arena, it is an extreme response to a complex, gendered issue.  
In each of the cases discussed, the mother was imprisoned as punishment for her 
insubordination to the law in relation to the contact issue. The conduct of each mother was at 
times extreme, undesirable, reprehensible, and her litigation stance in one case was described 
as “outrageous in many areas.”
1064
 However, there appears to have been little consideration 
given to the underlying drivers for each mother’s intense resistance of the law as it related to 
her child, the reasons for her restrictive gatekeeping and the complex, gendered dynamics 
between the parents. There is little follow-up research available to assess the risk to the 
mother-child relationship or to the child itself, arising out of these judicial interventions. 
Judicial power was exercised as a means of enforcing a mother’s compliance with the law for 
the purpose of developing a contemporaneous father-child relationship through a legally 
imposed contact regime. The law also appears to have been applied to seek as a priority, 
within the context of a welfare and best interests assessment, the development of a father-
child relationship through utilisation of power to introduce and enforce a contact regime, 
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notwithstanding the mother’s perception of the legitimacy of her resistance to it and her 
reasons for doing so. 
10.1 The story of Elizabeth Morgan, Eric Foretich, and their daughter Hilary 
This story begins in the US in the 1980s during the shift from the tender years doctrine, 
where a young child was regarded as being best in the care of the mother, towards post-
separation shared parenting.
1065
 The discovery of child sexual abuse and the almost 
immediate backlash against such allegations were also emerging.
1066
 Research into this issue 
was in its ascendancy, focussing on Freud’s theories and intra-familial abuse.
1067
 The topic of 
child sex abuse, once unmentionable, was becoming “something of a national obsession.”
1068
 
There was an increase in reports of child sex abuse, feminist concerns were mounting and 
there were publicised allegations of sex abuse practices within day care centres.
1069
 In one of 
the subsequent Morgan v Foretich decisions, the Court recorded that: “Figures from 1976 to 
1983 reflect an 852 per cent increase in the number of child sexual abuse cases reported. 
However, in two-thirds of child abuse cases, the incident is never even reported. Even when 
the incident is reported, prosecution is difficult and convictions are few.”
1070
  
10.1.1   The US social and legal context into which Hilary was born 
The 1980s in the US was therefore a potent social and legal milieu, with the heightened 
awareness of the issue of child sex abuse, the rise of the feminist movement, and shared care 
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parenting arrangements being increasingly favoured by a court that relied on judicial 
discretion to determine what a child’s best interest might be. Allegations of child sex abuse 
increased to approximately 30 per cent in complex custody cases,
1071
 with some experts 
suggesting that a number of fathers were being falsely accused by mothers.
1072
 It was against 
this background that Elizabeth Morgan voiced the allegation that Hilary was being sexually 
abused by her father. 
Elizabeth Morgan and Eric Foretich were both highly educated and accomplished, he an oral 
surgeon and she a cosmetic surgeon. He was older and had been married before, with a young 
child. They had a whirlwind romance and were married in Haiti in 1981, when Elizabeth was 
already pregnant with Hilary.
1073
 Dr Morgan and her mother (who was at the time separated 
from her father) moved into Dr Foretich’s home in Virginia. Some months later, shortly 
before Hilary’s birth, Dr Morgan moved out and the relationship was over. 
Hilary was born in August 1982 and the litigation with respect to her care arrangements 
began soon after. In the District of Columbia, where the parties then lived, case law in the 
early 1980s still favoured a maternal preference with respect to young children, although by 
then not strongly so. The leading case at the time was Coles v Coles.
1074
 There, the Court 
found that both parents would be suitable custodians of their four-year-old child and made an 
order granting custody to the father. The mother appealed, arguing that to overcome the 
maternal preference, the mother would need to be found unfit. That is, there was effectively 
an informal presumption in favour of the mother which would need to be displaced. 
However, the appellate court held that a finding that a child’s best interests were served by 
placement with the father overcame the maternal preference; in addition, the scope of an 
appeal was limited to whether the judge at first instance had wrongly exercised his discretion 
and that could not be said to be the case. Other appellate case law had also developed, 
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expressly disapproving of joint physical custody orders as not consistent with a child’s need 
for stability.
1075
 At the same time, in Hamel v Hamel,
1076
 the Court made it clear that denial to 
a parent of contact to his or her child in the care of the other parent “is a drastic action … 
justified only in extreme cases.”
1077
  
10.1.2   The parents’ custody dispute 
Against this background, both Elizabeth Morgan and Dr Foretich sought custody. The law 
was no longer protective of the mother-child relationship. Liberal feminist theory had 
introduced the idea of formal equality, or sameness.
1078
 The expectation that fathers should 
participate in child care and mothers should take up employment outside the home had gained 
traction. Therefore, baby Hilary faced being required by the law to be parented by a mother 
and father who had separated before she was born, and in the context of a limited inter-
parental relationship with insufficient opportunity to develop mutual confidence and trust in 
each other. While Elizabeth Morgan was awarded custody, the Court at the same time 
directed overnight contact with Dr Foretich, which commenced when Hilary was 10 months 
old.
1079
 Dr Morgan expressed concerns from the outset about the nature of the contact, 
writing that “I am utterly convinced that when a little child is taken from its loving mother, 
even for visitation, it may lose its natural protector and its security. Men are all very well, but 
nature didn’t make men for rearing little children.”
1080
 She was reported as observing Hilary 
reacting badly to the overnight stays, screaming and suffering from nightmares, and 




10.1.3   Had Hilary been sexually abused? 
Hilary’s maternal grandfather was apparently the first to suggest that Hilary may be the 
subject of sexual abuse, she having returned home as a baby with red thighs after an 
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overnight visit with her father.
1082
 These suspicions were initially rejected by Elizabeth 
Morgan but by 1985, when Hilary was about two and a half years old, Elizabeth reported that 
Hilary had begun to make sexually explicit and inappropriate comments. She was also 
continuing to cry upon return from her father. Elizabeth Morgan considered that Foretich may 
be sexually abusing Hilary and that his contact should cease.
1083
 Hilary was assessed by a 
number of experts, including a psychiatrist who concluded that Hilary’s anger was a response 
to the tension between her parents.  Some of the other experts considered that some form of 
abuse had taken place, while others did not. The matter was heard before Judge Dixon in 
November 1985. At this hearing, the judge found that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that sexual abuse had taken place and ordered that unsupervised contact should 
continue.  
In July 1986, there was a second hearing at which the social worker who had investigated the 
case gave evidence that Hilary was too young to be a reliable witness but that the evidence 
suggested she may have been abused. The social worker talked to Hilary’s older half-sister, 
who was also making statements suggesting that she too had been sexually abused by Dr 
Foretich. The social worker labelled this allegation as “founded”, meaning that it warranted 
further investigation. Dr Foretich vehemently denied the allegations, voluntarily taking and 
passing two lie detector tests. Elizabeth Morgan remained concerned about Hilary’s 
emotional presentation, which she considered was deteriorating with the unsupervised contact 
having to continue. She took Hilary to a psychologist specialising in child sex abuse, who 
met regularly with Hilary and advised that she considered it was one of the clearest cases of 
sexual abuse she had encountered. She recommended that Hilary stop the contact with her 
father as she had suicidal tendencies, post-traumatic stress disorder and was developing 
multiple personalities.
1084
 Elizabeth Morgan followed this advice in February 1986 and 
withheld Hilary from contact, whereupon Dr Foretich filed proceedings to have Dr Morgan 
held in contempt of court, and to change the custody arrangements to him. Elizabeth Morgan 
responded with an application to suspend the contact.
1085
 A guardian ad litem was appointed 
for Hilary. On her behalf, he opposed a continuation of the unsupervised visits on the basis 
that the child’s emotional and mental health was at risk, and sought an assessment of Hilary 
and her parents with respect to the child sex abuse allegations. This was supported by 
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Elizabeth Morgan and opposed by Dr Foretich. The requests were denied. A closed hearing 
took place in July 1986; Elizabeth Morgan refused to obey the order. The judge did not 
accept her actions were justified and indicated he would hold her in contempt if she did not 
comply by 19 July 1986. She again refused and a contempt order was made in August 1986. 
The order was stayed pending appeal. Judge Dixon again ordered unsupervised contact take 
place during this period, Dr Morgan again refused and Judge Dixon again found her to be in 
contempt. She was imprisoned for two days in February 1987, and upon her release she 
allowed Hilary to begin visiting again. The judge gradually extended the contact so that by 
April 1987, Hilary was spending weekends in her father’s care.
1086
 The appeal against the 
contempt order was unsuccessful, the appellate court finding that the lower court’s findings 
with respect to the sexual abuse allegations were not “clearly erroneous.”
1087
 Dr Morgan filed 
proceedings against Dr Foretich and his parents for damages, claiming they had all 
participated in the abuse scenario,
1088
 and Dr Foretich filed in defamation. 
In August 1987, the judge found the evidence of child sex abuse against Hilary neither 
proved nor disproved the allegations against Dr Foretich. The facts were, according to Judge 
Dixon, “in equipoise”.
1089
 That is, there was a 50 per cent likelihood Hilary had been abused 
and 50 per cent chance she had not.
1090
  
10.1.4   The mother’s continued opposition to court-directed father-contact 
After hearing the issue of whether Hilary had been sexually abused by her father, with no 
findings being made either one way or the other, Judge Dixon then directed a two week 
unsupervised visit by Hilary with her father. Dr Morgan appealed, but by now she believed 
that Judge Dixon would never find in her favour and would continue to exercise his judicial 
power against her. However, while the judge had confiscated her passport and the deeds to 
her house, her parents were willing to hide Hilary to avoid unsupervised contact taking place. 
Her mother, Antonia, born in England to an upper class British family, had a Master’s degree 
in Classics from Oxford and another Master’s degree in education from the University of 
London. She also spoke six languages (and after her time in New Zealand this included 
Māori), and could write fluently in Latin and Greek. Dr Morgan’s father, William, was born 
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in New York to an Italian immigrant family, changing his name from Mitrano to Morgan to 
avoid anti-Italian prejudice. He was a Psychology graduate from Yale and worked in the 
Office of Strategic Services during World War II, testing and training spies. He also 
parachuted into occupied France to organise guerrilla attacks against the Germans, and fought 
the Japanese in China.
1091
 They met and married in Britain during the war, returning to the 
US where they established a private psychology practice for counselling children, and had 
their family. They had separated, but reconciled for the purposes of hiding Hilary. Carbone 
describes how William, with his war training, knew just what to do.
1092
  
Dr Morgan believed that Hilary may be directed by the Court to be uplifted prior to the 
scheduled contact with her father. William therefore moved Hilary with her babysitter to 
Virginia a week before the contact was due. Carbone records Dr Morgan’s descriptions of 
going to visit, realising she was being followed and pulling off the road into the car park of a 
country tavern when police came running at her, guns drawn. She describes driving off 
quickly with her lights off, pulling off the road into bushes and waiting in the dark as the cars 
went past looking for her, and then returning. She then went on to visit her father and 
daughter. However, she was concerned that she may end up facing further charges if the 
guardian ad litem was not able to verify Hilary was alive, though hidden. A meeting was 
therefore arranged at a diner in Virginia.  She describes how William “armed himself to the 
teeth”, wearing a vest with guns visible. Dr Morgan protested, but William told her that he 
did not believe the Washington DC police would try to take Hilary if it risked a gun battle in 
a public diner outside of their jurisdiction. When William returned with Hilary to his home in 
Virginia, he saw the police surveillance stationed outside. He therefore “orchestrated 
‘confusion and drama’ to create an opportunity to spirit Hilary away.”
1093
 Dr Morgan has 
described how for the next two days, William and his look-alike brother brought trucks to the 
house, loading and unloading them several times throughout the day, and leaving with them 
sometimes together and sometimes separately. Then William had a taxi company send a cab 
to the house every hour for the next few days, sometimes coming to the front of the house 
and sometimes to the rear. On one of these occasions, he and Hilary slipped into a cab at the 
back of the house, ducking down as they were driven to the airport where they met up with 
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Antonia and flew to the Bahamas, on their own passports. The taxis continued to come and 
go at the house for another day, and when that stopped the police searched the house. 
William’s brother had remained there, and let them in to find William Morgan and Hilary no 
longer present.  
Elizabeth Morgan is reported to have said “I thought my father was crazy. But it worked.”
1094
 
She did not know where they had gone; only her older brother, handling the finances, had this 
information. 
10.1.5   The mother found to be in contempt of court and imprisoned  
Contact by Hilary with her father fell due and did not occur, and Dr Morgan was unable to 
disclose Hilary’s whereabouts. Judge Dixon therefore found her in contempt of law and 
imprisoned her in a Washington DC prison, effective immediately, being 28 August 1987. He 
also ordered that the $200,000 bond she had previously provided be forfeited at the rate of 
$5000 per day.
1095
 Dr Morgan appealed; it took a year to hear the appeal at which time Hilary 
was still in hiding and she was still in prison. 
In 1988, the appeal court determined that the judge had erred in excluding out-of-court 
statements that Hilary had made to her mother and two psychologists, as well as evidence 
about Hilary’s older half-sister about whom allegations of sexual abuse by Dr Foretich had 
also been made. However, with respect to the contempt issue it said that: “Civil contempt 
could become meaningless if a lawful defence could rest on the ground that a party took a 
different view, however reasonable, of the potential harm in compliance” and accordingly 
“the defier acts at his or her peril in so doing.”
1096
 
Dr Morgan sought a writ of certiorari
1097
 from the Supreme Court. This was declined and she 
remained in prison, steadfast that she could not reveal Hilary’s whereabouts. 
Shortly prior to her imprisonment, Dr Morgan had become engaged to Paul Michel, an 
attorney who was subsequently appointed to judicial office.
1098
 While he took no part in the 
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 he did assist her in appointing a new attorney who crafted a more politically savvy 
defence, portraying her as having been the victim of an unfair process and imprisoned after a 
‘secret’ trial because the record of the proceedings were sealed. Her legal team also argued 
that Judge Dixon had developed personal animosity towards her and should be recused on the 




In September 1988, Dr Morgan then filed a writ of habeas corpus for her release, arguing that 
her incarceration had now become punitive rather than remedial and she was therefore being 
held for criminal rather than civil contempt, without having the appropriate procedural 
safeguards in place required by the constitution.
1101
 Judge Dixon rejected her claim, saying 
that she may now have to start seriously considering the orders and “[i]n that sense, the 
coercion has just begun.”
1102
 This was appealed. There was a series of hearings with respect 
to the habeas corpus application, based on the argument that imprisonment for contempt had 
moved from remedial to punitive. Judge Dixon agreed that “[i]t is unlikely that continued 
incarceration will cause Dr Morgan to deliver the child directly to Dr Foretich at any time 
within the foreseeable future if for no other reason than Dr Morgan’s personal pride.”
1103
 He 
offered an alternative, that is, that Hilary be handed over to a child welfare agency, and on the 
basis that Elizabeth Morgan might accept this considered that the continued imprisonment 
therefore should be regarded as still having a remedial purpose. This was appealed, the 
appellate court finding in favour of Dr Morgan that there was insufficient evidence to support 
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10.1.6   The role of the media 
Meantime, the media coverage was increasing. The Friends of Elizabeth Morgan (FOEM) 
was formed, holding candlelight vigils outside the prison, picketing in front of the 
Washington DC Court and undertaking a national campaign on her behalf. The US News and 
World Report ran an article on Dr Morgan and carried her picture on its front cover.
1105
 The 
Washington Post wrote an article commenting that the judge had “ignored evidence he didn’t 
want to hear, then tossed the key away on a mother trying to protect her child”
1106
 and 
another publication suggested that “the Morgan case typifies Dixon’s reputation as a stern 
disciplinarian and tough sentencer who is unsympathetic to women’s issues.”
1107
 There were 
a number of other articles sympathetic to Morgan’s position.
1108
 A few publications wrote 
articles from Foretich’s perspective.
1109
 However, the support was essentially for Morgan, as 
a mother, against the power of the law. Christian evangelical groups joined in, including 
Charles Colson of “Prison Fellowship Ministries” and James Dobson of “Focus on the 
Family”, who interviewed Dr Morgan from prison. Politicians took up her cause and in the 
end, a bill designed to free her was introduced into the Senate.
1110
 In response to the pressure, 
Foretich had a letter published in the Washington Post in which he offered to support 
Morgan’s release from prison and drop his requirements that her parental rights be 
terminated, if Dr Morgan would produce Hilary when she would be placed in a foster home. 
Then he proposed a psychological assessment take place to determine whether he should give 
up contact and to determine whether Dr Morgan should have custody. His other requirement 
was that Morgan not publish any further articles, books or authorise the making of a movie 
about the case.
1111
 In another, subsequent, interview Foretich went on to say that the experts 
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1106
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1111
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doctor who said that both girls had vaginal scarring was a fraud. He further claimed that his 
second   wife had brainwashed his older daughter, and that Dr Morgan had abused Hilary.
1112
 
10.1.7 A political solution 
In September 1989, the US Congress unanimously passed legislation to free Elizabeth 
Morgan. The effect of The District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation 
Act 1989 was to limit the amount of time to twelve months that a person could be imprisoned 
on civil contempt charges for failure to comply with a court order in a custody case. She was 
released after having spent more than two years in prison.  
Shortly afterwards, Dr Foretich discovered that Hilary and her grandparents were living in 
Christchurch. He flew to New Zealand. Dr Morgan’s passport was released to her so she was 
also able to travel to New Zealand.  
10.1.8   The role of the New Zealand Family Court  
Meanwhile, William and Antonia sought assistance from the New Zealand Family Court. An 
interim custody order was made in their favour, with a direction that Dr Foretich not see 
Hilary (who was now known as Ellen) until it could be determined that such contact would 
not be psychologically harmful to her. Counsel for Child was appointed.
1113
 Although the US 
was a party to the Hague Convention, it had no application as New Zealand had not yet 
acceded to it.
1114
 A further Family Court hearing resulted in a final custody order being made 
in favour of Dr Morgan, with no contact to Dr Foretich as it was understood that for Ellen 
whether the allegations of sex abuse against her were true or not, she believed they were true 
such that any contact with her father would disrupt her emotional stability. Dr Foretich did 
not further contest the outcome. Ellen and Elizabeth remained living in Christchurch. Ellen 
attended Selwyn House School for eight years and her mother commenced doctoral studies in 
psychology. Dr Morgan’s husband Paul Michel visited several times a year but, in the end, 
their marriage did not survive. By the mid-1990s, Dr Morgan recognised that to work she 
needed to return to the US. However, Judge Dixon’s contact order in favour of Dr Foretich 
was still in force.  
                                                          
1112
 See Carbone and Harris, above note 1066 at 14. 
1113
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Congress, for a second time, came to her aid enacting legislation that removed the 
Washington DC courts of their jurisdiction over Ellen’s custody or contact arrangements. The 
legislative provision, as a rider to the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies 
Appropriation Act 1997, provided a limited window for any child 13 or over to have the right 
to choose whether or not to visit with a noncustodial parent. Ellen, then 13, wrote to Congress 
saying that she believed her father had sexually abused her and that she did not want any kind 
of contact with him.
1115
 Dr Foretich challenged the constitutionality of the legislative 
provision, saying that it was a bill of attainder, that is, legislation that targets an individual for 
punishment. In 2003, the Courts of Appeal for the District of Columbia agreed with him,
1116
 




10.1.9   The consequences for mother and child 
After she and her mother returned to the US, Ellen engaged for a period in self destructive 
behaviour, later saying “I was so angry with people, and I wanted to punish them. I didn’t 
know how to take it out on other people, so I took it out on myself.”
1118
 She describes having 
profoundly missed her mother during the time she was in prison
1119
 but also that “my 
grandparents went out of their way to give me a semblance of normality and regularity,”
1120
 
notwithstanding her grandfather’s sense of wartime adventure. “He told me ‘We’re going to 
take you across enemy lines.’”
1121
 With acknowledgment to her singing teacher from her 
Christchurch school days, and having changed her name to Elena Mitrano (her grandfather’s 
Italian surname), Elena is now a successful singer songwriter in Los Angeles, where she and 
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10.1.10   Review and summary 
In retrospect, the Morgan case could be regarded as highlighting the intractable custody case. 
However, it also reflects the difficulties that arise when child care arrangements, based in an 
acknowledgment of differences between gender, the role of motherhood is protected,
1123
 and 
where “old, tested, gendered rules that permitted predictable, inexpensive decisions to be 
made without protracted litigation,”
1124
 shift towards a foundation that seeks to ignore 
differences between motherhood and fatherhood in the name of equality, as this paves the 
way for continuing involvement of both parents in a child’s life in the name and manner of 
gender neutrality. The consequence may also be to throw a mother into a power struggle with 
the law as she seeks to protect her child through extremely restrictive gatekeeping 
behaviours. If there are allegations of domestic violence or, as in the Morgan case, child sex 
abuse, it would appear that the court has a responsibility to seek to make findings wherever 
possible. When a court concludes the evidence is in “equipoise”, that is, the allegations are 
neither proven nor disproven, there is no way of resolving the dispute satisfactorily. There is 
also no way of determining whether there may have been a protective legitimacy in the 
mother’s inhibitory gatekeeping response.  
It is also possible that Dr Morgan, in continuing to resist the court’s orders, may have led to 
the court’s eventual response being a transfer of care to Dr Foretich.
1125
 This was the outcome 
in the second case example to be discussed, that of the Skelton series of decisions out of the 
Hamilton Family Court. As in the Morgan situation, familial support was also a feature. 
Played out over about a decade, a mother pitted herself against the law in increasingly 
extreme ways, seeking to avoid the development of the child’s relationship with the father, to 
the point where she lost the care of her child altogether to the father.  
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10.2 The story of Kay Skelton, Christopher Jones and their son Jayden  
The proceedings in relation to Kay Skelton (the mother), Christopher Jones (the father), and 
Jayden Headley (the child) began in 2001 in the Family Court in Hamilton. They were in 
relation to custody and access matters between Mrs Skelton and Mr Jones, with regard to 
Jayden, then just a few months old. Mrs Skelton had always had the primary care of Jayden 
and was reluctant to allow contact by Jayden with Mr Jones or for a contact regime to be 
developed, which the Family Court was keen should occur. She was supported in her 
reluctance by the maternal family. Matters remained before the Court, with contact to Mr 
Jones being developed and extended by court order notwithstanding Mrs Skelton’s 
unhappiness about this. She breached the orders on a number of occasions and, by 2006, a 
two day hearing was scheduled seeking to address this. One outcome that had been signalled 
by the court was that in response to such breaches, a change of Jayden’s care arrangements 
from his mother to his father could be directed.  
On the morning of the hearing, Mrs Skelton applied to have the proceedings struck out on the 
basis of the results of a home DNA kit which purported to indicate that Jayden Headley was 
not Mr Jones’ biological child, but was rather the child of Mrs Skelton’s husband, Brett 
Skelton. The Court did not strike the proceedings out, but instead ordered an independent 
DNA test which established that Mr Jones was indeed Jayden’s biological father and the 
home test kit was not accurate. On 22 June 2006, the Family Court then made an interim 
parenting order in favour of Mr Jones, transferring Jayden’s care to him. By August 2006, 
Mrs Skelton and her father had taken matters into their own hands, removing Jayden from his 
father’s care and from Hamilton. Jayden and his grandfather lived remotely at an unidentified 
address in Northland for five months, while Mrs Skelton was imprisoned in October 2006 for 
defiance of a writ of habeus corpus made by the High Court on the father’s application, 
seeking the return of Jayden to his care. Jayden was returned to Hamilton in January 2007 by 
his grandfather, and his mother was released from prison. Justice Heath in Jones v Skelton 
(No 3)
1126
 said, upon releasing Mrs Skelton from prison as a result of Jayden being returned, 
that: 
It is a shame that things had to get to this stage. The Courts must ensure that the 
integrity of orders it makes are upheld. That is the reason why it was necessary for 
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you to serve so long in prison. This community cannot countenance decisions by 
individuals to ignore the law.  
Steps were then taken by the Principal Family Court Judge to release the otherwise restricted 
Family Court decisions into the public domain as being in the public interest, to justify the 
stance it had taken in relation to the mother’s conduct and seeking to quash any misguided 
sympathy for the mother’s position. The mother sought an injunction from the High Court 
against the Family Court seeking to prevent further publications, and it was acknowledged 
that she, as a party, ought to have been given notice of the intention by the Court to carry out 
publication of decisions that involved her, the High Court directing that the Family Court not 
publish anything further in relation to these matters until further order of the High Court.
1127
 
Then, in November 2008, the mother and maternal grandfather faced charges of abduction as 
a result of events in 2006.
1128
 They had no previous convictions, Mr Headley in particular 
being described by the sentencing judge as having lead “an exemplary and hard-working 
life.”
1129
 They were sentenced to home detention, in part to ensure that Jayden was protected 
from any sense of his own guilt and responsibility for what had happened to his mother and 
grandfather.
1130
 Mrs Skelton was subsequently, in 2010, also charged with perjury in relation 
to the evidence she gave in the Family Court with respect to the home DNA testing process 
and the evidence that Mr Jones was not Jayden’s father,
1131
 and was sentenced to two years 
and eight months imprisonment. There were unsuccessful appeals by Mrs Skelton and Mr 
Headley against their abduction convictions,
1132
 and there were also unsuccessful appeals 
against Mrs Skelton’s sentence for her conviction for perjury.
1133
 The effect upon Jayden of a 
loss of his relationship with his mother is not clear, but the victim impact statement provided 
to the High Court on his behalf by Lawyer for Child at the mother’s sentencing for abduction 
suggested that he engaged in avoidance strategies, pretending that the events had not taken 
place and choosing not to repeat or discuss them.
1134
  
Tapp asks whether parents might be encouraged to let go of litigation if they were assisted to 
understand the values of the family justice system by a judge who showed respect for their 
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context and perceptions, and further, that respect for and compliance with court orders by 
parties is more likely “if parties feel they have been heard, respected as people and their 
perspectives understood.”
1135
 These comments are appropriately framed in a gender neutral 
way. However, McKinnon’s dominance feminist theory would suggest that gender neutrality 
in these situations is an impossibility, as the state judicial system reinforces the male point of 
view upon which it is founded. Nonetheless, a male point of view can still show 
understanding, empathy and respect for the female point of view, as demonstrated by the 
judicial conduct modelled by Priestley J in the decisions of PJM v Family Court at 
Waitakere,
1136
 the Applications by the Hanover family,
1137
 and Joshua v Love,
1138
 echoing the 
emergence of the original welfare principle as being relationally founded.
1139
 The mother’s 
own conduct, as well a lack of respect and understanding for the mother’s position and the 
negative perceptions of her held by the Court, may have contributed to this unhappy sequence 
of events.  
In the third example to be discussed, that of JMC v AJHB, McKinnon’s dominance theory 
and the apparent impossibility of a mother’s position being understood and supported by the 
judicial system, is explored. This mother, defiant, affected by poverty and against a 
background of domestic violence, is pitted against the power of the law seeking to have her 
child develop, facilitated by her, a relationship with the father. There also appears to be an 
irreconcilable tension between the poor regard by the law of the mother’s obstructive 
behaviours, with her belief in the protective legitimacy of her actions. 
10.3 The JMC v AJHB 
1140
 decisions 
Heard before Judge Coyle in the Dunedin Family Court, this series of decisions track 
applications to the Court by the father over a three year period from December 2009 until 
September 2012, seeking punishment of the mother for breaches of his guardianship rights, 
breach of his supervised contact, and seeking to extend his contact.  
                                                          
1135
 Pauline Tapp , above note 1028. 
1136
 PJM v Family Court at Waitakere HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-3306 9 September 2011 per Priestley J. 
1137
 Applications by the Hanover Family HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-7415, 18 August 2011 per Priestley J. 
1138
 Joshua v Love HC New Plymouth CIV-2010-443-443, 21 October 2010 per Priestley J. 
1139
 See Chapter Three with respect to the development out of the UK of the original welfare principle, seeking 
to protect the mother-child relationship within a social context of ownership, power and control by the husband 
and father. 
1140
 JMC v AJHB FAM 2008-012-55, 21 December 2009 and 19 February 2010; JMC v AJHB FAM 2008-012-
55, 10 June 2010; JMC v AJH-B FAM 2008-012-55, 10 November 2010; JMC v AJH-B [2012] NZFC 2711, 5 
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10.3.1   The mother had initially sought the Court’s protection 
There had been earlier Family Court involvement which had commenced in early 2008 with 
an application by the mother for a protection order against the father and for a parenting order 
in respect of the child born in July 2007. The child had always been in her care. The mother 
appeared to have been seeking from the Family Court protection from domestic violence, and 
the security of confirmation of her existing day-to-day care of the child. The protection 
matter proceeded to a defended hearing, where it was found that domestic violence had 
occurred through the father punching the mother in the mouth and the side of the head for an 
unspecified time while she was pregnant with the child.
1141
 Fortnightly supervised contact to 
the father was then reserved utilising Barnados facilities and judicial comment was made 
about the mother not wanting the father to see the child (then 10 months old). The supervised 
contact did not occur, the mother and child having shifted from Dunedin to Christchurch.  
10.3.2   The Court focuses on the father’s contact  
The father filed an application against the mother for admonishment.
1142
 On 22 September 
2009, the mother accepted admonishment and consented to a variation to the order providing 
supervised contact to the father by the end of October 2009 with Barnados in Dunedin, in 
Christchurch with Barnados in December 2009 and prior to Easter 2010 in Dunedin, again 
utilising Barnados.  
The reason the mother did not attend the October 2009 contact arrangement in Dunedin is not 
clear, although later decisions suggest the mother’s lack of finance to afford the travel, and 
that she was a beneficiary. However, it was the cause of a further application for 
admonishment filed by the father which was addressed on 21 December 2009. At the same 
time, the mother had pending before the Court an application to suspend the father’s contact. 
She indicated to the Judge that she did not intend complying with the existing contact order 
until her application to suspend had been addressed. She was advised “bluntly”
1143
 that if she 
did not comply she would be found in contempt of court, which could result in her being 
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placed in custody. She therefore capitulated with contact taking place in December 2009, 
January 2010 and February 2010.   
The Judge made further orders extending the father’s contact on 19 February 2010 to one 
weekend per month and directed that the child not be moved again, this time from the Timaru 
area. Medical information was to be provided, the mother was to pay $60 towards the father’s 
transport costs for supervised contact in Timaru and the mother was to bring the child to 
Dunedin to enable supervised contact to also occur there. The mother did not pay the $60 and 
did not bring the child to Dunedin for supervised contact. She was also criticised for not 
engaging with the s133 report writer, who had been directed by the Court to carry out a 
psychological assessment with respect to the child.  
10.3.3   Escalation of the conflict between the mother and the Court 
The judge then discovered that the mother had shifted from Timaru to Fairlie (a distance of 
approximately 50 kilometres). This contravened his direction that her place of residence not 
be outside the Timaru area until further order of the court, or by the written agreement of the 
father. A contempt hearing was therefore scheduled by the judge on his own initiative on 8 
June 2010, at which he said that what needed to be brought home to the mother was that there 
are real and serious consequences for flagrant breaches of court orders.
1144
 He further said 
that “additionally, I have reached the view that the short term pain suffered by O in not seeing 
his mother for a period is outweighed by the longer term benefits of being able to continue to 
develop a relationship with his father.”
1145
 The judge went on to find the mother in contempt 
of court and sentenced her to imprisonment for 14 days.
1146
  
There continued to be relational, geographical and financial constraints. There had been 
domestic violence in the relationship; therefore any contact needed to be supervised, at least 
initially, to ensure the child would be safe in the father’s care. Neither party was in 
employment, neither had much by way of financial resource and they did not live in the same 
town. The mother was a domestic violence victim at the hand of the father and did not want 
there to be any further contact with him by her or the child. That there be no face-to-face 
contact for a period in this situation, does not appear to have been considered by the Court as 
one outcome that could be considered in all the circumstances; the mother’s view was rather 
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described as “devoid of reality.”
1147
 The mother was also described by the judge as 
“obstinate.”
1148
 He further considered that she “continues to want to remain in control and 




10.3.4  Pressure on the mother 
Upon the father’s application, the mother consented to a discharge of the protection order that 
had been in place against him. The reasons for her consenting do not appear to have been 
recorded
1150
 but, by November 2010, the judge said that there had been an underestimation of 
the obstinacy of the mother and, after parenting orders, admonishment of the mother and 
contempt findings against her for which she had been imprisoned, the judge considered the 
time had come to place the child under the guardianship of the Court to ensure that contact 
with the father could be developed. Accordingly, while the protection order against the father 
was discharged, the child was placed under the guardianship of the Court with Child Youth 
and Family Services (CYFS) appointed the Court’s agent to ensure the child was transported 
between Timaru and Dunedin and to ensure that the contact plan that the judge was 
developing would take place. In June 2011, the matter came back before the court at the 
request of Lawyer for Child because the agent had reported further breaches of the judge’s 
directions. The judge in response said “I will not tolerate any breaches of this Court’s orders. 




Against this background, a consent position was then worked out between the parties, with 
the assistance of their lawyers. The judge, professing surprise that this could have occurred, 
discharged the order placing the child under the guardianship of the Family Court and made a 
parenting order by consent on 12 October 2011. This provided for continuation of the day-to-
day care by the mother and fortnightly weekend contact (unsupervised) by the father subject 
to certain conditions, including requiring him to keep the child away from one Ms W, arising 
out of the mother’s concerns with respect to drugs, alcohol and domestic violence in Ms W’s 
home.
1152
 The mother appeared to have been re-empowered and, of her own volition, was 
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reported also to be communicating with the father, and facilitating further contact beyond that 
of the parenting order.  
10.3.5 The mother seeks the support of the Court but the tensions appear irreconcilable 
By late October 2011, the mother had become aware that the father was not respecting the 
condition that she had required, and was taking the child to Ms W’s home. The mother also 
became aware of a notification having been made to CYFS that the father had assaulted one 
of Ms W’s children. The mother, as a result, unilaterally suspended the father’s contact and 
indicated to him that it would need to be sorted out in court.
1153
 The Court raised issues 
around the father’s credibility, but also criticised the mother for not facilitating a resumption 
of the father’s contact when it became apparent he was not going to be criminally charged 
and CYFS were going to be taking no further steps after investigations were completed.   
The father had, in March 2012, filed a without notice application for a warrant and seeking 
further admonishment of the mother for her suspension of the contact order with a formal 
variation from the Court to do so. The matter was heard in April 2012. There was a 
breakdown in the execution of the warrant the judge had issued, described by him as 
appearing “to have been a monumental failure in communication and I am incredulous as to 
why the police did not simply execute the warrant … [b]ut by the same token, I am equally 
incredulous that Ms H-B, in the knowledge that the court had issued a warrant and thus had, 
in effect, approved contact resuming, did not herself comply with the order.”
1154
 The judge 
then considered the application by the father for further admonishment of the mother for 
breaching the parenting order by her informal suspension of contact. He indicated that he 
gleaned that the father was willing and available to care for the child and, while the 
application before the Court was for admonishment, if he was to consider a contempt 
application he had the ability in that context to vary the parenting order and place the child in 
the care of the father.
1155
  
The judge was urged by counsel for the mother to take a step back from issues of 
admonishment and/or contempt, and to give the mother the opportunity to comply with the 
order, which she indicated she would do subject to being satisfied that the father would not 
allow the child to come into further contact with Ms W and therefore that her child would be 
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 The judge, however, was not prepared to do this as he considered she had made these 
sorts of overtures in the past but, in his view, when the scrutiny of the Court was not upon 
her, she tended to revert to obstructive and resistant behaviours. Therefore, on the basis of his 
finding of further contempt and in considering that the child could be cared for by the 
mother’s partner, the judge sentenced her to a further term of imprisonment, this time for six 
weeks. He said this was because the integrity of the Court needed to be upheld and “to ensure 
that O can have the relationship with his father that he should be having in the future … the 
Court’s response needs to be stern.”
1157
  
Upon the mother’s release from imprisonment, she filed an application to vary the parenting 
order, seeking that the father’s contact be supervised. Her application was struck out by 
Principal Family Court Judge Boshier, who said that orders made by the Family Court must 
be complied with.
1158
 The mother sought assistance from her local Member of Parliament, 
concerned that her view of the father and the appropriateness of unsupervised contact 
arrangements were not being properly assessed by the Court, and that she was being made to 
enforce contact when the child did not want it and was physically resistant. Contact did not 
occur on the scheduled weekend in July 2012 because the child threw a tantrum and the 
mother left it to the father to handle. The father declined to take up the contact, considered he 
was entitled to contact the following weekend and, when that did not occur, made a further 
application for a warrant to ensure contact occurred the next time. The warrant was issued. 
The mother was upset and angry at the father that the police had become involved again, and 
when the police arrived to uplift the child for contact, she advised them that the child was 
unwell. Nonetheless, the warrant was executed.  
The mother subsequently provided a doctor’s report to the Court, where the child’s 
unwellness was described as a runny nose and a mild wheeze consistent with a viral 
exacerbation of his asthma. However, the Court considered that indications of the child’s 
unwellness at the time of contact, being based on the mother’s self-reporting, was unreliable. 
Additionally, it was the view of the policeman involved in the execution of the warrant that 
the mother was prone to coming up with excuses as to why contact should not occur, and the 
father considered the child was fine when he was delivered to him.
1159
 Subsequently, the 
mother enlisted the help of her mother at contact changeovers so there would be no contact 
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by her with the father, which apparently did assist. However, the Court considered that the 
mother was “incapable in any way of supporting O’s relationship with his father.”
1160
 
10.3.6   The power of the Court  
Judge Coyle made it clear that he had relied heavily in his decisions thus far upon the then 
section 5(b) of COCA in giving great weight to the preservation and strengthening of the 
child’s relationship with the father. That he was now being asked to transfer the care of the 
child to the father as the correct response to the father’s further application for admonishment 
and his own determinations with respect to the issue of contempt, meant that he was obliged 
to also address the then section 5(d) of the Act. That is, that continuity of care should be 
recognised as desirable when assessing a child’s welfare and best interests.
1161
 The judge, 
however, determined that the risk to the child in being removed from his mother’s care was 
outweighed by the risk of leaving him there when the mother did not support the 
development of the child’s relationship with the father. The judge considered this was akin to 
psychological abuse and therefore a safety issue pursuant to the then section 5(e) of COCA.  
The judge also made a notification of his own motion to CYFS with respect to the mother’s 
care of her other children, and directed that Lawyer for Child file an application to place 
these children also under the guardianship of the Family Court, as had previously been the 
case for O. Then, while he considered that the low level of contact the father had had with the 
child to date meant that there would be a need for monitoring and support of O in the care of 
the father, he nonetheless placed O in the interim day-to-day care of the father and directed 
that O have no contact with the mother in the interim.
1162
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Eventually, and with subsequent involvement and assistance from CYFS, the other children 
were returned to the mother’s care with support being provided to her, and a shared care 
arrangement for O was entered into between the mother and the father. There was then a 
further complaint with respect to the father’s inappropriate use of discipline against the child, 
which resulted in another CYFS intervention and a police investigation. It is apparently now 
the position that the father no longer cares for the child in a shared care arrangement, (the 
care having reverted to the mother), and the father does not, by choice, have any contact with 
the child nor is apparently seeking to.  
10.4 Further cases of mothers versus the power of the law 
Judge Coyle also found two other mothers in contempt for breach of court orders and 
considered committal in DJP v KDF,
1163
 and also in GCF v FMC.
1164
 Both involved a 
mother’s unilateral relocation of a child in her primary care, where the father, while a natural 
guardian, had a limited relationship with his child prior to the move. Both cases were 
accordingly with respect to a breach of the father’s guardianship rights pursuant to section 44 
of COCA.  
In the first decision, the mother had relocated two and half hours away from Cromwell, 
where the parties had been living. The judge ordered the mother’s return to Cromwell within 
24 hours, directing a contempt hearing if she failed to do so and also indicating that if the 
child was not returned, he would make an interim parenting order placing the child in the 
day-to-day care of the father.  
In the second decision, the mother relocated with her child 45 minutes out of Dunedin where 
the parties had both been previously residing, in breach of a Family Court order made two 
years earlier that the child reside in Dunedin. Upon hearing the father’s without notice 
application, the judge ordered the mother to return the child to Dunedin. The mother did not 
do so, and when the matter came back before the Court a month later for review, the judge 
advised that she had to comply and set the matter down for a contempt hearing.  
At the contempt hearing, Judge Coyle determined that the mother was in contempt and 
considered whether she should be imprisoned. He then determined that as the mother was 
genuinely remorseful, that she did not have the financial resources to return immediately to 
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Dunedin as directed, that imprisonment would not be in the child’s best interests as the 
mother had always been the child’s primary carer and that the father was in any event not 
immediately available to care for the child, she would be directed to return the child to 
Dunedin over the next few weeks. He also authorised a release of his judgment to Work and 
Income New Zealand (WINZ) so they could assist the mother financially. However, if the 
child was not so returned, the day-to-day care would be placed with the father.  
Then, in PJM v Family Court at Waitakere,
1165
 the parents of a nine year old girl had been 
engaged in a dispute over her contact since she was 15 months old. A protection had been 
made against the father on the mother’s application, and the father was subsequently 
convicted for its breach. The parenting relationship was described as “seriously 
dysfunctional.”
1166
 In the end, the mother applied to the High Court for a judicial review of 
two Family Court decisions relating to a section 60 hearing process
1167
 and the reappointment 
of Lawyer for Child for the purposes of the judicial review, alleging, among other things, a 
breach of natural justice and predetermination. The father had also applied for a warrant to 
enforce contact and had filed an appeal against the Family Court’s refusal to discharge the 
protection order.  
Tapp describes how the system’s framing of the relevant issues as being about correct 
procedure “increasingly distanced the matter from what was relevant and real to the parents, 
creating a disjunct between their reality and that of the system, making it increasingly 
unlikely that the matter could be resolved.”
1168
 Framing the issues in this way also points to 
the strength, power and black letter resolution intended to be found in the law.  
It was Justice Priestley in the High Court, in this case, who “consciously stopped the merry-
go-round.”
1169
 He was described as connecting with the parents and showing respect for them 
as people. In naming their feelings, he was able to acknowledge to the mother that he 
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understood her view that her consent had not been given to an unsupervised contact order 
being made, her safety concerns for her child and the importance to her sense of justice that 
she be heard.
1170
 As a result, he was able to introduce a process that authoritatively, yet 
sensitively, managed the conflict and increased the father’s contact to the child “without 
resort to heavy-handed measures such as warrants and imprisonment for contempt, 
guardianship of the Court etc.”
1171
 
10.5    The relationship between imprisonment for contempt and inhibitory gatekeeping 
There is a tension between the need for a legal system whose orders are respected, and the 
appropriateness of the imposition by the courts of such dire consequences as imprisonment 
for breaches of such orders. The cases discussed in this chapter point to a link between a 
mother’s belief in the legitimacy of her actions in withholding a child from court-directed 
father contact, and protective, inhibitory gatekeeping. The law, in nonetheless regarding such 
actions as contempt resulting in imprisonment, is not an appropriate response where there has 
been no finding, or consideration of such findings, with respect to the mother’s reasons for 
withholding contact. In the Skelton series of decisions, while the mother was punished for her 
disobedience of court orders and for her dishonesty to the court in relation to the home DNA 
testing kit issue, there does not appear to have been a close analysis of her reasons for seeking 
to withhold contact in the first place. In the JMC v AJHB situation, the proceedings had 
commenced with domestic violence allegations by the mother against the father with a 
protection order having been made. This order was subsequently discharged, the domestic 
violence findings thereafter appearing to be effectively ignored. In the Morgan-Foretich case, 
the evidence was “in equipoise” (that is, after hearing the evidence the court could not 
determine whether the safety issue – in that case, whether Hilary had been sexually abused by 
her father - is proven, or not). This is of concern. A lack of symmetry and necessary 
connection between a mother’s imprisonment for contempt, and her behaviour in breaching a 
court order requiring father-contact to occur as being obstructively, inhibitory gatekeeping, 
that is, without a protective cause, is also of concern. It is recommended that the Court 
engage in a closer examination, and be prepared to make findings, of a mother’s reasons for 
withholding contact and engaging in inhibitory gatekeeping behaviours. Only then can the 
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Court determine whether such inhibitory gatekeeping is protective, for which imprisonment 
should never be the outcome, or obstructive, for which imprisonment for contempt may 
continue to be considered an appropriate consequence. 
10.6 A holistic approach 
Tapp discusses the use of contempt by Family Court judges, and in particular the JMC v AHB 
series of decisions, not so much to highlight the utilisation of power within a patriarchal 
system as found in McKinnon’s dominance feminist theory, but to more gently suggest that 
imprisonment for contempt is also rarely likely to be compatible with a child’s immediate 
welfare, and is also unlikely to resolve the personal, relational and contextual issues which 
resulted in breaches of court orders in the first place.
1172
 She points to consideration of the 




Once again, the overwhelming weight of the responses to the consultation was that 
enforcement of contact orders by proceedings for committal leading to fines and 
imprisonment is not only a crude way of enforcing contact orders: it is also 
ineffective. Whatever the intellectual force of the argument that it is in a child’s 
interest to enforce a contact order because the order for contact was made on the basis 
that it was in the child’s interest to have contact, the simple facts remain that it is very 
difficult to see how it can ever be to the benefit of children for their primary carer to 
be sent to prison. 
Tapp also reminds us that the law is not the whole story when seeking to resolve family 
relational issues where children are involved.
1174
 She suggests that the number of parenting 
disputes where there is repeat litigation and the parties take up increasingly entrenched 
positions “might be reduced by pre-court processes designed to recognise, respond to and 
manage the personal, relationship, family, social, cultural and economic context of the 
dispute.”
1175
 This is particularly given the view of the Ministry of Justice that the court 
system should not have a role in resolving the intractable family dispute which comes before 
it, saying “[C]ourt procedures are designed to determine facts and enforce law. A court 
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setting is not well suited to resolving non-legal, personal and emotional issues as well as legal 
ones.”
1176
 Tapp however, considers that in the absence of “a properly resourced, multi-
disciplinary triage system designed to ensure that all personal and other contextual issues 
triggering the dispute are dealt with out of the court system, a court dealing with a family 




Tapp also highlights an urgent need for legislative amendment with respect to section 44 of 
COCA to provide for specific enforcement remedies with respect to breaches of guardianship 
consultation or decision-making, thereby avoiding such draconian demonstrations of power 
against a parent, usually a mother, by imprisoning her when it is highly questionable if such a 
response is ever in the welfare and best interests of her child. She additionally points to the 
disjunct between a focus on the system to establish the legal rights of parties, the concept of 
the welfare of the child, and the perception of the parties as to what was important to each of 
them and their families,
1178
 and explores how the system’s framing of the problem can lead to 
the law taking on a life of its own. Recognising that there may be, in these circumstances, an 
underlying theoretical foundation based in dominance feminist theory, the issues can then 
take on a damaging potency, particularly for children.  
Judge O’Dwyer, too, has reviewed the treatment some mothers have been receiving at the 
hands of the New Zealand Family Court, pointing to the need for there to be a better 
understanding and further research with respect to maternal gatekeeping.
1179
 She describes 
mothers’ reasons for restrictive gatekeeping as often being linked to a fear of abuse, this 
reality not being adequately recognised, yet illustrative of the importance of clear judicial 
findings with respect to violence in the parenting relationship. She concludes that because 
protective or facilitative gatekeeping has not been adequately recognised, in conjunction with 
an insufficient analysis of both parents, mothers in such circumstances may not have been 
served well by the Family Court. She proposes that steps need to be taken to research, 
understand and address the perceptions, attitudes and behaviours underlying the dispute, and 
for clear findings to be made in cases of domestic violence. The issues should then be 
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reframed with a child-centric approach. She saw more care being needed in crafting parenting 
plans to meet actual needs, and she further identified relocation issues as being helpful 
opportunities to assess each parent’s ability to promote the other to the child, rather than 




The situations described in this chapter point to challenges for both motherhood and the law. 
It is possible that the reality and effect of relationship and gender in parenting matters could 
be better recognised through more sophisticated judicial understandings of the mutual gender 
dynamics at play within the concept of gatekeeping. The application of these more nuanced 
understandings could mean that such draconian responses by the law including imprisonment 
for breach of a parenting order, could be ameliorated. At the same time, respect for and 
adherence to the law is an important feature of a healthy legal system.  
The following chapter explores a further lens through which the relationship between 
motherhood and the law may be examined, that of the breastfeeding mother within a 
separated parenting context. 
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Breastfeeding is an example of one of the challenges faced by motherhood in New Zealand in 
its relationship to contemporary family law. Such challenge has broad application across all 
forms of separated parenting. This is because separated parenting laws in New Zealand are 
based upon gender neutrality when parenting is not gender neutral and breastfeeding, being a 
gendered role, is uniquely motherhood’s domain. The difficulties for the law created by the 
application of the welfare and best interests principle not being able to take into account the 
gender of the parent and, in particular, the breastfeeding mother, are highlighted in relation to 
this issue. The tensions and differing judicial approaches are further discussed in this chapter.  
11.1 Breastfeeding as a public policy issue 
A mother breastfeeding her baby is regarded by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as a 
relationship of critical importance to the health and wellbeing of both mother and child. 
WHO and UNICEF together say:
1181
  
Breastfeeding is an unequalled way of providing ideal food for the healthy growth and 
development of infants; it is also an integral part of the reproductive process with 
important implications for the health of mothers. As a global health recommendation, 
infants should be exclusively breastfed for the first six months of life to achieve 
optimal growth, development and health. Thereafter, to meet their evolving nutritional 
requirements, infants should receive nutritionally adequate and safe complementary 
foods while breastfeeding continues for up to two years of age or beyond.
1182
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New Zealand’s health care policies are consistent with this international approach, supporting 
and encouraging breastfeeding by mothers.
1183
 The Ministry of Health’s 2008 Background 
Report “Protecting, Supporting and Promoting Breastfeeding in New Zealand” confirms the 
adoption of a national health policy endorsing solely breastfeeding for the first six months of 
a baby’s life, and also beyond that after the introduction of solid food. It refers with approval 
to WHO as supporting breastfeeding into the second year of life. In discussing legislative 
support for such policies, it suggests considering the protection of breastfeeding in custody 
decisions as an innovative legislative measure that could be introduced.
1184
 Both the 
Children’s Commissioner and the Family Court are listed as key governmental stakeholders 
with respect to the encouragement and protection of breastfeeding.
1185
 The report quotes from 
a 2005 Human Rights Commission report, The Right to Breastfeed, in response to questions 
about breastfeeding at work, and calls for stronger protection of breastfeeding mothers and 
babies in New Zealand. It records the report as noting that “although there is no specific law 
in New Zealand on the right to breastfeed apart from anti-discrimination measures, the right 
is given meaning in a variety of ways through measures to respect, protect and promote the 
right to breastfeed.”
1186
 It also points to one of the barriers to the support and protection of 
breastfeeding for mother and child as being a partner belief that artificial feeding will 
enhance the opportunities for the father to bond with the child.
1187
  
11.2 Tension between public policy and New Zealand’s family law 
The denial by the law of a unique and gendered aspect of a parent-child relationship, one that 
can only arise through breastfeeding by a mother towards her child, would seem to place the 
law in tension with the clear policy direction. This is in circumstances where it should be 
expected that legislation be consistent with, and reflective of, policy.  
As a result, New Zealand Family Court decisions addressing the issue of breastfeeding are 
mixed, as judges grapple with the issue. In SAQ v LRER
1188
 Judge Ellis described events 
where the father manipulated the mother and retained the children in his care as “an 
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unscheduled interruption in the children’s natural development with their mother and the 
progression in their developmental move away from an infant attachment to her and towards 
a more independent life with their father”.
1189
 He went on to say:
 1190
  
That is a perfectly natural progression in any child’s life, commencing from the most 
intimate attachment with the mother and the womb, through the processes of 
fundamental, maternal bonding and breastfeeding and then toddling towards dad and 
beginning to explore the world outside with him. These are perfectly natural processes 
which need, for the best interests of the children, to be achieved, to be supported, 
nurtured and carefully managed by the parents. 
Although section 4(3) of COCA appears to preclude him from doing so, the judge was 
commenting that there are gender differences that should be recognised between mother and 
father roles and functions. Notwithstanding that the children had been in the care of the 
father, the judge went on to say: “I do not describe this as a very finely balanced judgment. I 
am clear in my view, that there must be a parenting order in favour of the mother and I do 
make that order now”.
1191
 
The uniquely gendered nature of breastfeeding by a mother was addressed squarely by the 
same judge in the 2012 decision of LJJ v RAF,
1192
 where the father’s position was that the 
welfare and best interests of a not quite two-year-old child would be served by an equal time 
shared care arrangement. The judge prefaced his comments by saying: “Lest it be thought, as 
it is in some quarters, that the Family Court has a preference for women or mothers, I 
emphasise again that the law makes it clear there is to be no presumption or preference on the 
basis of gender”.
1193
 He then went on to say:
1194
 
It is a fact that the child was breastfed. That is not a matter of presumption or of 
preference. It is simply a biological fact; some children are, some children are not. 
The benefits of breastfeeding are certainly well known in the literature and the 
evidence most commonly heard in this Court is that it is generally regarded as 
beneficial for children that breastfeeding should continue for at least the first three 
months and up to the first six months of a child’s life. There is no hard-and-fast rule, 
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but that is a common approach, and I accept on the evidence that I have heard that it is 
an approach that was followed here. I am told that the mother’s feeding of the child 
was not without difficulty and that early breastfeeding was supplemented by bottle; 
that is not uncommon. Why do I comment on this at all? Because very obviously there 
is a naturally strong biological attachment formed between infant and feeding mother 
in that early stage. This is not a discrimination against fathers, or if it is, it was 
designed by a power greater than this Court. 
He further commented that it was also well understood that a child at this age will frequently 
show signs of separation anxiety if they are separated from the person with whom they have 
the most stable and close attachment, and that “the parents may not have appreciated that 
what they were telling me was altogether familiar and describes … the behaviour of an infant 
who is insecure and anxious about being parted from his mother”.
1195
 The judge went on to 
direct a one home care model for the child, with the mother. He then directed contact with the 
father, to whom the child was acknowledged to have a close attachment, three times a week 
for up to three hours at a time. 
These decisions reflect cultural feminist theory
1196
 and a central understanding of gender 
difference with respect to parenting. They therefore affirm, respect and support breastfeeding 
by a mother towards her child and take this gender-specific aspect of a mother-child 
relationship into account in the care arrangements between the parents.  
11.3 Family Court decisions which do not recognise gender difference  
Other Family Court decisions, however, involve judicial attitudes derived from liberal 
feminist theory,
1197
 that is, that in a pursuing equality between the parents, there should be no 




 was a case about a nearly five month old baby who was breastfed on demand by 
the mother, which entailed at that time feeding approximately every one and half hours. The 
father was seeking to commence, through contact, his own care of the baby, which he 
regarded as his right. The mother opposed the introduction of such contact, seeking 
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uninterrupted stability to care for the child in this early period without pressure from the 
father. The baby was breastfed and the mother wanted to continue to breastfeed, as she had 
done with her other four children. Evidence was provided for the mother by a trained midwife 
that “during breastfeeding the attachment between mother and baby is strengthened and 
significant brain development occurs”.
1199
 Judge Coyle, in response, said: “That may or may 
not be correct but in the absence of any literature, any peer-reviewed research or any medical 
evidence I cannot give that statement any more weight than simply the personal view of [the 
midwife]”.
1200
 The midwife had also offered evidence that “it is widely accepted that 
breastfeeding results in significant health benefits for babies and mothers. Formula does not 
provide the same health benefits”.
1201
 In response to this, Judge Coyle said:
1202
 
Again, there is no evidence to back up those assertions … It seems to me to be no 
more than a wide-ranging statement which may indicate a particular bias on the part 
of [the midwife]. Indeed the Court is aware of significant debate as to whether 
breastfeeding in fact provides better health benefits for children than formula, and that 
opinion is squarely divided on the issue. 
The judge went on to determine by way of interlocutory hearing that the evidence of the 
midwife as to these matters could not be considered as the evidence of an expert witness, as 
she had clearly stated in her affidavit that she was giving evidence in support of the mother 
and was therefore not neutral, and further that “the fact she is qualified as a midwife does not 
make her an expert in midwifery”.
1203
 Therefore, he considered any opinions she expressed as 
“simply her personal opinions and those then become an issue of weight for me.”
1204
 He 
struck out those paragraphs of the midwife’s affidavit evidence which he regarded as simply 
her opinion, and then proceeded to hear the matter without the evidence of the midwife as to 
her view of the value of breastfeeding to mother and child. In his final judgment, he 
acknowledged that the mother was breastfeeding and wanted to continue to do so, and 
confirmed that he had had his attention drawn to WHO’s support for breastfeeding and 
Article 24(2)(d) of UNCROC that the state shall support access to education by parents and 
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 Above note 1198.This discussion is in relation to the oral judgment of His Honour Judge Coyle with respect 
to an application by counsel for father to strike out the affidavit of the midwife, being a witness for the mother. 
Paragraph 12 of the midwife’s application refers. 
1200
 Above note 1198 at para [12]. 
1201
 Above note 1198 at para 14 of the affidavit of midwife, referred to in para [12] of the oral judgment of 
Judge Coyle. 
1202
 Above note 1198 at paras [12]-[13]. 
1203
 Above note 1198 at para [6]. 
1204
 Above note 1198 at para [10]. 
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children of the advantages of breastfeeding. However, he said “to argue … that Article 24 
supports the use of breastfeeding, in my view elevates that article to a level which is not 
consistent with what is in fact stated in Article 24(2)(b)”.
1205
 He further recorded that the 
mother’s “desire to maintain breastfeeding is laudable but must be subservient to the welfare 
and best interests of A”,
1206
 that is, breastfeeding must not be a barrier to contact between A 
and her father and that “if there is not a willingness by Mrs H to work with Mr T to ensure 
that A is able to be breastfed when she is in her father’s care, then bottle-feeding will be the 
only option and if Mrs H continues in her view that she refuses to express breast milk then 
Mr T has no option but to use formula”.
1207
 The judge also considered that the mother was 
“using the breastfeeding issue to keep Mr T at arm’s length”.
1208
 
Echoes of a similar approach can be found in Thomsen v O’Leary,
1209
 a 2013 decision of 
Judge Walsh declining the mother’s application to relocate the parties’ twenty-month-old 
child from Timaru to Thames. The child was breastfed and it was the mother’s position that 
she wanted the child to self-wean. Judge Walsh said:
1210
  
… further, I question if perhaps this is a strategy designed to control the nature and 
quality of the father’s contact with Travis to thwart overnight contact. 
He went on to say:
1211
 
Travis has undoubtedly benefitted from breastfeeding. I recommend, however, that 
the mother after having come to terms with my decision could perhaps consider 
bringing forward Travis’s weaning, and Travis could be transitioned into overnight 
stays in his father’s care. 
It is arguable that the basis for the judicial encouragement to curtail the breastfeeding was 
that overnight stays with the father could then be developed. If breastfeeding was not a 
continuing issue, there would then be no impediment to the achieving of equality between the 
parents, any gendered difference no longer needing to be acknowledged or overcome.  
                                                          
1205
 Above note 1198 at para [19]. 
1206
 Above note 1198 at para [26]. 
1207
 Above note 1198 at para [31]; earlier in his decision, Judge Coyle recorded that “A being breastfed is 
extremely important from Mrs H’s perspective. I record that in her evidence she has refused to express breast 
milk for the purpose of facilitating Mr T’s care of A but instead indicated a willingness to breastfeed A while 
she is in her father’s care.” Para [26]. 
1208
 Above note 1198 at para [27]. 
1209
 Thomsen v O’Leary [2013] NZFC 5373 per Walsh J. 
1210
 Above note 1198 para [97]. 
1211
 Above note 1198 at paras [114] and [115]. 
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The MT v AK and Thomsen v O’Leary decisions
1212
 also appear to frame breastfeeding as a 
utility. Such an approach assists in neutralising its naturally gendered nature. However, it also 
then appears to diminish the significance and value of the intimate relationship between 
mother and child which the welfare principle was originally designed to protect, and which 
breastfeeding secures.
1213
 It also arguably challenges the human dignity of a breastfeeding 
mother in proposing such a utilitarian approach, where the mother’s breasts should be 
available within a separated parenting context. For example, in C v W,
1214
 to enable and 
prioritise the development of a separated shared care arrangement for an infant between the 
mother and the father, the child remained in the home with the parents taking turns to vacate. 
Because the child was being breastfed, the mother would regularly visit to feed the child 
when in the father’s care. Then in MT v AK,
1215
 while the judge said that he hoped “that once 
orders are made, Mrs H and Mr T will work together to discuss … how [A] can continue to 
be breastfed while in her father’s care …”, he also chided the mother if she refused to express 
breast milk that the father could then bottle-feed to the child while in his care through his 
court-directed contact, such contact requiring the child to be away from the mother when 
breastfeeding would ordinarily have occurred.
1216
 
11.4 The tension between breastfeeding as a gendered issue, and welfare and best 
interests as a non-gendered principle 
Breastfeeding remains a welfare and best interests issue,
1217
 yet is determined by the sex of 
the parent. As a result, section 4(3) of COCA would appear to be in an inappropriate tension 
with this fact of nature. At times, breastfeeding is seen to be supported by the Family Court 
as an important aspect of motherhood and significant to the development of the intimacy of 
the mother-child relationship, as the decisions by Judge Ellis demonstrate. At other times, the 
Family Court does not support breastfeeding to this extent, and the contested nature of the 
issue is evident. The Court may regard it as a utility, whereby the mother makes herself 
available to both the father and child during his care time to enable breastfeeding to continue, 
                                                          
1212
 MT v AK CRI-2009-012-000413 22 September 2009 per Coyle J; Thomsen v O’Leary [2013] NZFC 5375 
per Walsh J. 
1213
 See Chapter Six with respect to the discussion of the welfare and best interests principle as a relationship-
based concept. See also Jonathan Herring “The Welfare Principle and the Children Act: presumably it’s about 
Welfare” Journal of Social Science & Family Law, 2014. 
1214
 C v W (2005) 24 FRNZ 872, [2005] NZFLR 953. 
1215
 MT v AK above note 1212 at para [31]. 
1216
 Above note 1212 at para [31]. 
1217
 MT v AK, above note 1212 at para [26], Judge Coyle said “Central to this case is the issue of breastfeeding. 
The fact that A is breastfed is a relevant matter which I need to consider as well as the s5 principles”. 
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or the mother may be judicially encouraged to wean the child to enable contact with the 
father to more easily take place.  
The courts, in supporting breastfeeding on some occasions but not others, also appears to be 
in tension with New Zealand’s health care policies to support, encourage and facilitate 
breastfeeding. If breastfeeding is accepted as a matter of gender and is in a child’s welfare 
and best interests, a further issue to therefore be addressed is whether breastfeeding should be 
proactively protected, encouraged and facilitated by the courts in determining separated 
parenting arrangements. The pursuit of equality through recognition of the differences 
between men and women, can accommodate the value to a child of a breastfeeding mother 
without diminishing the equal value of a father who cannot breastfeed. However, this does 
not sit comfortably with section 4(3) of COCA. That is because it is a provision which 
requires that the gender of the parent not be taken into account in determining a welfare and 
best interests matter. Therefore, while the existence of breastfeeding may be recognised as a 
relevant factor in a welfare and best interests enquiry for a particular child, it appears that it 
cannot be recognised more broadly as a self-evident gender difference that should be taken 
into account in determining the best care arrangements for a child in a pro-active, 
provisioning manner. As a result, there appears to be an inherent tension within the welfare 
principle itself created by the presence of section 4(3) within the legislation. 
Summary 
Breastfeeding, as an example of gendered care provided by motherhood to a very young 
child, is not easily accommodated within the gender-neutral legislation of COCA. Judges 
have addressed the tension between breastfeeding and separated parenting, including the 
development of overnight shared care, in different ways. Some have recognised its reality and 
the importance of the intimacy of the mother-child relationship being developed through 
breastfeeding; others have addressed breastfeeding as a utility, arguably diminishing the 
value of motherhood in the process. Still others have suggested that a mother may use 
continued breastfeeding to negatively gateway a child’s relationship with the other parent, 
usually the father, which should be resisted. 
Restoring dignity to the participants in contested court matters, and re-integrating the purpose 
and process of family law with the people involved, may re-humanise motherhood and 
fatherhood, and thereby provide increased protection to a child of both relationships. It may 
also address the disconnect that appears to have occurred in some of these circumstances, 
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where the law appears to have taken on a life of its own. These matters are further discussed 
in the following and final chapter. In exploring various themes with respect to motherhood 
that have emerged in the preceding chapters, a redemptive approach is also explored. This 
would enable motherhood, equal to and complementary of yet not in competition with 
fatherhood, to be recognised as a respected, dignified and centrally-placed component, along 




Discussion and Conclusions 
Introduction 
This thesis has canvassed many aspects of motherhood, commencing with such foundational 
issues as the theological underpinnings of motherhood, the complex relationship between 
male and female, reproduction theory, and the very source of life.
1218
 These underlying issues 
have contributed to the contestable nature of motherhood, in tension with other ideas and 
ideals as they have unfolded throughout the centuries, from Roman times through to modern-
day life. Tracing social and legal history, it is evident that motherhood has experienced the 
extremes of both prominence and protection, and anonymity and a lack of recognition. A 
number of key themes have emerged from my enquiry, which are explored in the following 
discussion.   
12.1 Discussion 
12.1.1   The context for motherhood 
Historically, marriage was the preferred context for motherhood, and, informed in the 
Western world by Christian doctrines, was formative to the development of the roles of 
mother and father, and the acceptance of the one by the other.
1219
  
There were also consequences and stigma for motherhood outside marriage, that is, giving 
birth ‘illegitimately’. However, the impact on motherhood of illegitimacy faded into 
insignificance as legal reforms removed the concept from the law. The bastard child, that is, a 
nullius filus (a child of no-one),
1220
 gained the same legal status as any other child. 
Subsequently, the introduction of welfare benefits financially enabled sole and separated 
mothers to keep and raise their children. They also contributed to the loss of stigma of 
motherhood outside of marriage. As a result, there were a diminishing number of mothers 
                                                          
1218
 The biblical teaching that human sexuality is linked with the statement found in Genesis 1:26-27 that 
humans are created in the image and likeness of God, male and female, is discussed by theologian Karl Barth in 
Ray S. Anderson Empowering Ministry With Theological Praxis (InterVarsity Press, 2001) at 272. He links 
human sexual differentiation at the biological level, and therefore the differentiation between motherhood and 
fatherhood, with the divine image of God including both male and female.  
1219
 See Chapter Two. 
1220
 See Chapter Two, paras 2.9 and 2.10. 
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giving their babies up for adoption.
1221
 The scope for, and context of, motherhood was 
therefore enhanced by these developments. On the other hand, new challenges arose as the 
protections previously provided to motherhood by the development of the welfare principle 
through the patriarchy of a society that did not recognise gender as equal, were removed in 
the name of gender equality.
1222
  
12.1.2   Prominence and protection; anonymity and a lack of recognition 
Tracing social and legal history, it is evident that motherhood has experienced the extremes 
of both prominence and protection, and a lack of recognition.
1223





century England, founded originally on the patria potestas of Roman law, who had the power 
of life and death over his children, his wife and his slaves, continued to reflect the supreme 
social and legal authority of husbands and fathers. Wives and mothers had no authority, 
requiring the ‘coverture’ of their husbands to be able to be meaningful and respected 
participants in society.
1224
 At the same time, during this period, there was also an uncontested 
acceptance of the natural order with respect to motherhood and the intimacy of the mother-
child relationship, notwithstanding the extreme inequality between gender that continued to 
exist socially and legally.
1225
 It was not until gender equality emerged in the law through the 
work of the second wave feminist movement during the second half of the 20
th
 century that 
motherhood, ironically, entered a period of anonymity and lack of recognition.  
12.1.3   Motherhood – a gendered or a gender-neutral concept? 
As history unfolded, a transformation of motherhood took place within the law, from a 
female biological imperative, and a gendered theological and social institution, to the more 
neutral concept of parenting, within or without marriage.
1226
  
While motherhood figured centrally in her work, the late Sara Ruddick in her 1989 book, 
“Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace,”
1227
 did not specifically define mothering as 
a gendered activity, considering only that the work of motherhood shaped the parent as much 
as the child and gave rise to unique cognitive capacities and values of both mother and child. 
                                                          
1221
 See Chapter Two para 2.10 and f/n 160.  
1222
 See Chapter Three, particularly paras 3.12, 3.19 and 3.20, and Chapter Four para 4.1. 
1223
 See Chapter Two. 
1224
 Blackstone, above note 96. 
1225
 See Chapter Two. 
1226
 See Chapters Two and Three, and Chapter Four para 4.1 culminating in the current gender neutral parenting 
legislation found in New Zealand’s Care of Children Act 2004. 
1227
 Sara Ruddick, above note 618; see also discussion in Chapter Five. 
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She considered that doing the activities of motherhood shaped thinking unique to a mother. 
This may have been a careful recognition of feminism’s problem with essentialism.
1228
 It is 
also consistent with current developments in the field of neuroscience that would suggest that 
there are, notwithstanding social and legal movements towards gender neutrality in parenting 
function as reflected in the law,
1229
 certain biological aspects to the female brain that may 
more naturally provide to a female mother a capacity for warm, emotionally attuned 
nurturing, particularly towards her very young child.
1230
 Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
suggest that, despite the social and legal developments over the last 150 years, resulting in the 
current legal position where parenting laws are now couched in gender neutral terms,
1231
 
motherhood may, nonetheless, remain an essentialist and gendered concept. 
12.1.4   An uneasy tension   
It is evident that while motherhood is understood to be foundational and important to human 
relationships, rather than supported by the law, it seems to have, over time, existed in an 
uneasy tension with it.
1232
 
The welfare principle, a cornerstone of family law, is a central example of such tension. 





 century England, it was a legal transplant into New Zealand’s younger, more egalitarian 
society; a society which focused early in its history on reforms designed to achieve gender 
equality.
1233
 Fairness to the mother, not the pursuit of equality between mothers and fathers, 
appears to have been the driving value in the creation of the original UK-based welfare 
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 See Chapter Five with respect to the issue of maternal essentialism. 
1229
 See Chapters Two, Three and Four as they traverse the social and legal history of motherhood from a 
gendered to a gender neutral concept. 
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1231
 See Chapter Four para 4.1 with respect to New Zealand’s Care of Children Act 2004. 
1232
 See Chapter Three; see also, for example, Dr Colin James in “Winners and Losers: The Father Factor in 
Australian Custody Law”, above note 571, in describing the consequences of the 1995 child custody legislation 
in Australia, pointing, at 25, to the incongruity of “the concluding reform in the century of family law 
return[ing] to men some of the privileges they had enjoyed in the nineteenth century under father-right prior to 
the liberal reforms”, and concluding that, as a result, “the welfare principle … was reinvented once more, but 
without considering the child’s interests and despite the rhetoric of equality and justice.” 
1233
 New Zealand is regarded as having been at the forefront of gender equality reforms, being the first nation to 
recognise women’s suffrage by passing legislation in 1893 providing women with the right to vote and achieved 
through the work of Kate Sheppard and others, supported by Julius Vogel but not by Richard Seddon. Also in 
1893, Elizabeth Yates became Mayor of Onehunga, the first time such a position had been held by a woman 
anywhere in the British Empire. Full women’s suffrage in the UK, supported by the work of the Pankhursts and 
others, was not achieved until 1928 (although from 1918, women over 30 and meeting certain property owning 
requirements were granted the right to vote from that date). This was against UK background legislation passed 




 In New Zealand, the key influence with respect to the transplanted principle 
appears to have been the evolution of gender equality. This was not immediately evident, as 
New Zealand followed the English welfare principle and precedents for a long time.
1235
 The 
1980 legislative introduction of gender-neutrality and ‘no fault’ divorce into New Zealand 
parenting laws,
1236
 together with New Zealand society’s broader, long-held beliefs and values 
as a young, pioneering colony
1237
 and the effect of different aspects of feminist theory, 
seeking gender equality by either denying (liberal feminist theory) or embracing (cultural 
feminist theory) gender difference,
1238
 eventually signalled a divergence between New 
Zealand and the UK as to the meaning and effect of the welfare principle.
1239
 Such influences 
had considerable impact upon how motherhood came to be perceived by, and, arguably, to be 
completely left out of, New Zealand’s current parenting laws.
1240
 
Thus, the effect of the transplant of the welfare principle ultimately resulted in a divergence 
of approach and application between the UK and New Zealand, which began to emerge in the 
1970s. While both jurisdictions experienced fathers’ rights movements and political pressure 
to legislatively introduce equal time shared care with respect to separated parenting, the UK 
appeared to continue to recognise, to a greater extent than New Zealand, the difference 
between motherhood and fatherhood in the law.
1241
 In the 1970s in both the UK and New 
Zealand, legal interpretation of the welfare principle subtly shifted to neutrality and deliberate 
indeterminancy, on the basis that society changes over time. At the same time, it was 
reframed as a preference for the ‘status quo’ or the principle of ‘continuity of care’. However, 
as mothers continued to do most of the caring,
1242
 these changes did not, initially, harm or 
undermine motherhood. Such shifts occurred, in part, as a result of the rise of the influence of 
the social sciences in legal decision-making. This included Goldstein, Freud and Solnit’s 
concept of the ‘psychological parent’
1243
 and the use by the social sciences of a different 
language, such as ‘continuity of care’. Therefore, motherhood as an expressed concept was, 
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 See above note 930 with respect to fairness, rather than equality, as a continuing foundational and central 
value in UK jurisprudence, while the emphasis in New Zealand appears to rest on equality first (out of which the 
implication is that fairness can be achieved).  
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 See Chapters Two and Three. 
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 See Chapter Two, para 2.8, and notes 837 and 838.  
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 See Cameron, Robson and Belich above note 319. 
1238
 See Chapter Five paras, 5.2 and 5.3. 
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the issue of relocation during the 2000s. 
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 See the neutrally framed parenting laws contained in New Zealand’s Care of Children Act 2004. 
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 See Chapter Seven, para 7.2 and Chapter Three. 
1242
 See Chapter Four para 4.6. 
1243
 See Chapter Three paras 3.15 and 3.16. 
 290 
as a result, largely retired from the law; arguably an unintended consequence of seeking to 
follow best practice. The leading UK decision of J v C
1244
 with respect to these issues was 
applied by the New Zealand Courts, as they continued to follow English precedent. While not 
necessarily intended, the effect was that it obviated any need to refer specifically to 
motherhood, consistent with the movement towards gender equality based in liberal feminist 
theory. This shift in the interpretation of the meaning of the welfare principle occurred at a 
time when there were continuing and complex gender tensions.
1245
 The removal of reference 
by the law to the ‘tender years’ doctrine in the UK  and the ‘mother principle’ in New 
Zealand
1246
 was, ironically, consistent with the outcomes sought both by fathers and liberal 
feminists but, arguably, based on different drivers. The emergence of a gender bias against 
mothers over this period became evident, and this was particularly the case in New 
Zealand.
1247
 The welfare principle’s protection of motherhood morphed into a challenge to 
the uniqueness of motherhood, through fathers’ rights being rebadged as an issue of a child’s 
welfare.
1248
 The fathers utilised, in this pursuit, the gender-neutral nature of the welfare 
principle, as well as the formal equality sought by liberal feminist theory, which diminished 
the unique contribution of motherhood to parenting. The attractiveness of liberal feminist 
theory, seeking to achieve gender equality by denying any gender difference, was picked up 
by the law. This can be seen through the passage in 1980 of New Zealand’s s23(1A) of the 
Guardianship Amendment Act,
1249
 the then Minister of Justice being very clear as to the 
Bill’s purpose, saying “ If any lingering trace of the so-called mother principle does in fact 
survive, it will be eradicated by the proposed new subsection (1A) of section 23, inserted by 
clause 8 of the Bill.”
1250
 Now in the form of s4(3) of COCA, it appears to have become a 
legislative tool by which motherhood has been significantly challenged over the last 30-40 
years. Motherhood as a concept in law has been replaced by the concept of parenthood. 
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 J v C, above note 355. 
1245
 See Chapter Five; see also Germaine Greer The Female Eunuch, above note 603. 
1246
 See Chapter Three, para 3.20. 
1247
 See Chapter Seven, para 7.2 and the discussion of the story of the development of shared care separated 
parenting in New Zealand, together with Chapter Eight and the examination of relocation in New Zealand as 
compared to the UK. 
1248
 See notes 80, 724, and 854. 
1249
 S23(1A) of the Guardianship Amendment Act, above note 837, 838. 
1250
 See Chapter Four. 
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12.1.5   Linking motherhood with the feminist movement 
The link between the fortunes and regard for motherhood by the law, and the struggle for 
gender equality can also be observed through three waves of feminism.
1251
 The first wave, 
which was focused around the suffrage movement, resulted in New Zealand being the first 
country to grant women the right to vote. This occurred in 1893,
1252
 at a time when New 
Zealand society was establishing itself as egalitarian, with the principle of gender equality 
being established early in its developing nationhood. In the UK, there was less willingness to 
allow this. As a result, the political activism of the suffrage movement was assuaged, in part, 
by Parliamentary recognition of fairness to mothers and children upon parental separation, by 
the development of the welfare principle. It was understood to mean that young children were 
better off with their mothers, and was a mechanism designed to protect the mother-child 
relationship within the context of a prevalent and continuing gender inequality. To prevent 
husbands and fathers from exercising their supreme authority in law, the welfare principle 
was rendered gender-neutral. The gender-neutrality created by a principle to be applied in an 
area of law that was quite clearly not gender-neutral appears to have been regarded in the UK 
as something of a fiction. Even in contemporary English family law, unlike New Zealand, the 
significance of biological motherhood continues to be acknowledged, notwithstanding the 
tension created by the continuing pursuit of gender equality. In Re G,
1253
 for example, one 
partner within a lesbian relationship gave birth to two children, on each occasion utilising 
donor sperm. The relationship between the two women broke down, and as a result of 
continuing tension and the actions of the biological mother in unilaterally seeking to relocate 
the children contrary to a shared residence order with her former female partner, lower court 
orders were made reversing the care arrangements such that the former female partner and 
non-biological mother was granted the primary care, contrary to the previous orders and care 
that had been taking place. The rationale was that the biological mother could not be relied 
upon to support her children’s relationship with her former partner. However, even though 
such an order was made, there can be detected in the Court of Appeal some judicial 
discomfort at this step, Hallet LJ saying: 
I am very concerned at the prospect of removing these children from the primary care of 
their only identifiable biological parent ... Mindful as I am of the changing social and 
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 See Chapter Five. 
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 The Electoral Act 1893, assented to on 18 September 1893, gave all women in New Zealand the right to 
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 In Re G (children) [2006] UKHL 43. 
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legal climate, on the facts of this case, I would attach greater significance perhaps than 
some to the biological link between the appellant and her children. 
The decision was appealed to the House of Lords by the biological mother. The House of 
Lords concluded that the majority in the Court of Appeal had not given sufficient weight to 
the place of the biological mother and allowed the appeal, reversing the shared residence 
order and reinstating the original care arrangements. The House of Lords considered that the 
natural mother should still be regarded as special and unique, notwithstanding current law 
addressing separated parenting matters on the basis of such gender neutral principles as 
‘continuity of care’. Baroness Hale of Richmond said in the judgement:
1254
 
While this may be partly for reasons of certainty and convenience, it also recognises a 
deeper truth: that the process of carrying a child and giving him birth (which may well 
be followed by breast-feeding for some months) brings with it, in the vast majority of 
cases, a very special relationship between mother and child, a relationship which is 




Of course, in the great majority of cases, the natural mother combines all three. She is 
the genetic, gestational and psychological parent. Her contribution to the welfare of 
the child is unique. 
Her Ladyship made an important re-statement within contemporary family law of this 
fundamental issue. That is, while parents (whether a biological mother and father, a 
biological mother and a psychological mother, a biological father and psychological father, or 
additional and further combinations) should now be regarded by the law as equal, their 
equality does not mean they are the same. The natural mother is still understood as making a 
unique contribution to the welfare of her child, perhaps advantaged by the initial and 
formative relational work which takes place in utero. This application of cultural feminist 
theory (namely, that the pursuit of gender equality is required to embrace gender difference) 
in UK family law is not found to the same extent in New Zealand. This may be because, 
while there have been significant advances for women in areas such as suffrage, equal rights, 
employment opportunities, and social recognition, the first and second wave feminist 
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 In Re G, above note 1253 at para [34]. 
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 In Re G, above note 1253 at para [36]. 
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movements contributed to tensions and confusion for motherhood within the law, particularly 
with respect to post-separation parenting. In New Zealand, unlike the UK, gender difference 
in parenting law evolved into a position of its lack of recognition, influenced by liberal 
feminist theory (namely, that the pursuit of gender equality requires the denial of gender 
difference). This occurred over time, New Zealand initially receiving UK law that had 
imposed gender-neutrality, not to deny gender difference but to enable the law to overcome 
the supreme power of the father over the mother. The ultimate effect within the New Zealand 
context was a gender-neutral law that also denied gender difference. 
However, the connection between the female body and the creation of life through the birth 
process establishes a gender difference between men and women that is difficult to refute. 
Known as the maternal essence, it is understood to comprise the biological essence of 
reproductive functioning, the psychological essence of female emotional drivers and 
cognitive abilities, and the social essence of mothering.
1256
 Liberal feminism was, arguably, 
not successful in seeking to ignore this reality by requiring the law to accept gender-neutrality 
in its pursuit of gender equality. It may therefore have contributed to the difficulties faced by 
motherhood, being diminished by a law no longer able to dignify her unique contribution. 
This evolutionary, probably unintentional, process of the law left behind some important 
things about motherhood and maternal essentialism, which should be recovered if they can. 
12.1.6   The severance of maternity from motherhood 
Further complexities in the relationship between motherhood and the law have emerged with 
respect to the relationship between, and severance of, maternity and post-birth legal 
recognition and responsibility of motherhood. Such division had developed in civil 
jurisdictions such as France, but in the common law systems of the UK and New Zealand, 
legal recognition and responsibility of motherhood (apart from adoption) continues to flow 
unbroken from parturition.
1257
 Technological developments with respect to human assisted 
reproduction and surrogacy now require the law to address an increasing lack of symmetry 
between the gestational mother, the mother who provides the genetic material and the post-
birth role of motherhood.
1258
 Diduck and Kaganas suggest that the law might consider the 
need to legally expand upon the present priority afforded to the gestational mother, to 
accommodate within post-birth care arrangements the reality of a genetic mother, a 
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gestational mother and a care mother, given these new technological possibilities.
1259
 
However, care should be taken in such considerations not to under-value the importance of 
the gestational mother (including a surrogate mother), by reducing or removing the present 
legal recognition of the mother who gives birth in favour of the commissioning genetic 
mother. The essential qualities of motherhood should continue to be recognised in the order 
that they happen. That is, the initial mother-child relationship forged by the gestational 
mother reflects a foundational and unique relational intimacy, taking place in an environment 
of nurture, care and dependence within the mother’s body. This should be recognised for its 
relational primacy between mother and child and should not necessarily end at the point of 
birth. The mother who may have supplied the genetic material but is unable to develop her 
own pre-birth mother-child relationship is in an uncertain legal position, in a similar way to 
that of an adoptive mother. However, strengthening a genetic mother’s legal rights at the 
expense of a surrogate or gestational mother may fail to adequately protect the intimate 
mother-child relationship that already exists through parturition. Both the 
gestational/surrogate mother and the genetic/post-birth mother may develop a mother-child 
relationship which exhibit important qualities, but they are not the same and, ideally, both 
should be recognised and protected for the child.  The central emphasis should be on the 
nature and protection of the mother-child relationships, reflecting a mutuality that is the 
defining hallmark of relationships. There is a continuing need for adoption reform with 
respect to the original artificial fiction created by a denial of the natural (and therefore 
gestational) mother, as created in New Zealand by the Adoption Act 1955. This is consistent 
with the need for the symmetry and recognition in the law as a result of these new and 
additional forms of motherhood. Adoption law reform could include recovery and protection 




It is also of note that a gendered role of motherhood continues to be identified from a Māori 
perspective within the cultural context of whāngai,
1261
 notwithstanding New Zealand broadly 
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 Above note 1257, Chapter Four at para 4.5. 
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Reform; A Discussion Paper, October 1999. 
1261
 See above note 87 with respect to a discussion of the practice of whāngai, or Māori customary adoption. 
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having moved away from a recognition of gender-based motherhood and fatherhood, in 
favour of more neutrally framed parenting.
1262
  
12.1.7   Attachment and the ‘psychological parent’ 
Other legal developments have impacted not only on motherhood, but also on the mother-
child relationship. These include contemporary law’s conflicted relationship with early 
theories of attachment, as researched by John Bowlby in the 1940s and contained in his 
originating works of Attachment, Separation and Loss.
1263
 This conflict is based in the more 
recent social science debates with respect to the significance and need for protection of a 
child’s primary attachment, usually the mother, as opposed to attachment theory which holds 
that a child can and should form multiple attachments at the same time, that is, with both 
mother and father (and potentially others) contemporaneously.
1264
 The development, in the 
1970s, of the ‘psychological parent’ through the work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit,
1265
 
created further challenges for motherhood, the legal significance and value of the natural 
mother no longer being prioritised or articulated within the language of the social sciences 
exploring these concepts.  
At the same time, as recent scientific research has enabled the growth of surrogacy across 
international borders and enabled the sharing of genetic material beyond one mother in the 
creation of a child, it has also provided increased scientific understanding with respect to 
neurology. Different brain composition and function are being identified in each of the brains 
of the female/mother and male/father.
1266
 These suggest differences between motherhood and 
fatherhood that may not be simply the consequence of societal expectations and social 
construction, and that men and women in their roles as parents do indeed deal with things 
differently. Such developments also suggest that there may be a scientific basis to revisit the 
significance and understanding of attachment theory.
1267
 Such theory, in the Bowlby 
tradition,
1268
 did not distinguish between attachment based on gestational motherhood 
(including the breastfeeding mother) or attachment based on the physical care of a child 
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provided through post-birth motherhood. Mothers, in the majority of cases, provided both in 
an uninterrupted way, along with the third component of the maternal essence, that of the 
psychological parent.
1269
 However, the implications for the contemporary issue of surrogacy, 
with a division of the role and function of motherhood now possible between a surrogate, a 
provider of genetic material and a post-birth care-giver, need to be considered in relation to 
attachment theory. It is suggested that recognition and protection should be given to the 
surrogate mother, as, according to the theory of primary attachment, the initial mother-child 
relationship established during gestation is the first and primary attachment. If secure and 
protected, it should then enable a child to form secure, healthy multiple attachments 
thereafter, including with the post-birth care-giving mother (who may also be the genetically 
related mother). However, proponents of multiple attachment theory might suggest that 
protection of the surrogate mother-child attachment is not necessary, as a child is capable of 
forming healthy, multiple post-birth attachments at the same time. What is not clear is 
whether to enable such healthy, multiple post-birth attachments, protection also needs to be 
given to the pre-birth mother attachment where that is a separate relationship from the post–
birth, mother-child relationship. 
12.1.8   Politics and power 
There have been, throughout the last 150 years, political, policy, legislative and legally-
focused interpretative impacts upon motherhood. Prominent were the responses to the 
suffragette demands that women be granted the right to vote, resulting in the emergence in 
the UK of the welfare principle. As a result of the politics of the fathers’ movements in New 
Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom,
1270
 a shift, during the 1970s, took place towards 
interpretation of the welfare principle, not as being based on protection of an intimate 
relationship, and in particular the mother-child relationship, but instead as a principle based 
in rights, (that is, a focus on the rights of parents, and in particular fathers’ rights, rather than 
concepts of relationship), that can change with time and expectations of society.
1271
 New 
Zealand and Australia appeared to move faster than the UK in response to, and in the 
direction of, the demands of rights ahead of relationships as the premise central to the 
application of the welfare principle. A reconsideration of the central significance of 
relationship to the meaning of the welfare principle may therefore be warranted. 
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12.1.9   The rise of shared care separated parenting 
The gender-neutrality and a rights-based approach to the welfare principle embraced within 
family law, particularly in New Zealand, provided a platform to support the development of 
shared care parenting arrangements which challenged the more traditionally understood role 
of motherhood but, at the same time, did not appear to recognise the reality of the greater 
share of child-care work still being undertaken by mothers.
1272
 This tension was further 
exacerbated by such gendered issues as gatekeeping and breastfeeding, which were difficult 
to accommodate within a gender-neutral framework. Gatekeeping (now refined and referred 
to by Trinder as gate-opening or gate-closing) reflected a generally negative view of mothers’ 
approaches to the issue of father-contact in a separated parenting context, and the differences 
between, and reasons for, protective and inhibitory gate-closing have not yet been teased out. 
The nature and intimacy of the mother-child relationship no longer appear to enjoy the 
protection of the law through the welfare principle as it once did. While a rights-based 
approach to the welfare principle, and the development of children’s rights generally, are 
important, there is a compelling argument, according to Herring, to re-visit the welfare 
principle as a relationship-based concept, even within a rights-based paradigm. This means 
that people are understood as relational, connected and interdependent. Their lives not 
defined by the clamour and clashes of individual rights, but rather as the working through of 
the give and take of relationships.
1273
 The welfare of the child is, accordingly, not then 
viewed through a lens where a child is atomised and individual, but is rather considered 
within a wider network of relationships where each has influence and effect on the other and 
no participant can be viewed in isolation. The mother-child relationship is, arguably, 
foundational, central and pivotal to such an approach. In New Zealand, the inclusion in the 
law of an encouragement towards gender-neutrality created by s4(3) of COCA adds to these 
complexities. The issues do not appear to be easily reconcilable.  
12.1.10   Relocation  
Between the UK and New Zealand, the application of the welfare principle had, by the 1980s, 
become particularly divergent with respect to the issue of relocation.
1274
 The recognition of a 
mother’s health and happiness within the welfare principle’s post-separation context 
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assessment was found in the UK decision of Payne v Payne.
1275
 In New Zealand, however, 
through D v S,
1276
 the Payne approach was specifically discounted, given the ‘no a priori 
assumptions’ approach to the welfare principle required by New Zealand law. In distancing 
itself from this factor, the New Zealand courts appeared, during the 2000s, to then elevate the 
power of the father, particularly in the relocation situation, preferring the mother to remain 
geographically close and for her to participate in a shared care arrangement. This may have 
been against her better judgment for the child, the parenting relationship may have been 
conflicted, and, as a result, the mother’s own life may have been put on hold.
1277
 The 
uncertainty about relocation outcomes created difficulties, particularly for mothers. At times, 
seeking relocation may have been regarded as an infringement upon shared care. At other 
times, a mother’s desire to return to the support of her family (and her health and happiness) 
as a consequence of a relationship breakdown has resulted in a successful relocation outcome, 
with the courts recognising the mother’s position and permitting her application. Outcomes 
fluctuated; however, there is little doubt that a judicial approach to relocation which elevated 
the importance of the issue of a child developing a more meaningful relationship with the 
father through shared day-today care, presented significant challenges for motherhood. This 
is because if a mother is to adopt a child-centric view of relocation, the value of the father-
child relationship has to be a central consideration. Arguably, this does not mean that the call 
to mothers is to approach relocation from a sacrificial point of view to enable the father-child 
relationship to flourish at her cost. The issue is more nuanced than this. The court may find 
that relocation should occur as being in a child’s welfare and best interests in some 
circumstances, notwithstanding that this requires a child’s geographical shift away from the 
father. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Kacem v Bashir
1278
 introduced greater balance 
into relocation considerations, and the most recent statistics suggest that a mother’s 
application to relocate is now usually more successful than not.
1279
 The ability for a mother to 
keep a child’s relationship with the father alive, notwithstanding physical distance, is a 
relevant consideration as to whether a relocation should be permitted. Thus, a deeper judicial 
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understanding of the concept of gatekeeping would support these deliberations, bringing with 
it the potential for the law to better align motherhood’s desire to support the father-child 
relationship with her view and reasons for safe and appropriate gate-opening or gate-closing 
and her ability to facilitate the development of the father-child relationship, irrespective of 
location.  
12 1.11   The voice of the mother 
The voice of the mother has waxed and waned over various eras. For example, in patriarchal, 
Victorian England where the mother had no public, legal rights in relation to either herself or 
her child, she was still regarded in the private, domestic sphere of the home as having 
considerable authority, arising out of an understanding of Christian marriage and an 
acceptance of the different spheres, roles and functions between motherhood and fatherhood. 
This was notwithstanding a continuing patriarchy and lack of equality between the 
genders.
1280
 Throughout the first half of the 20
th
 century, and as equality between men and 
women was legislated through the suffrage, mothers continued to have a voice and a secure, 
respected place within the home.
1281
 However, through the second wave feminist theories of 
the 1970s,
1282
 the 1980s introduction of gender neutrality and gender neutral language into 
New Zealand’s parenting laws,
1283
 changed understandings of the application of the welfare 
principle
1284
 and as the fathers’ rights movements throughout the 1980s and 1990s gained 
political currency,
1285
 the voice of the mother was muted and came to be regarded with 
suspicion.  
Mothers’ concerns about the effect of shared care arrangements on their children, particularly 
in high conflict or parental domestic violence situations, have at times been interpreted as 
gatekeeping or alienation.
1286
 The actions of mothers, including seeking to relocate, perhaps 
to obtain family support and/or to reduce the adult conflict through geographic distance, have 
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 On some occasions, mothers 
may have been deserving of such labels; however, on other occasions, they may have been 
acting in ways that they believed were legitimately protective of their children. 
One small 2010 New Zealand study concluded that “when mothers attempt to raise their 
concerns about their children’s wellbeing in the family law process, they are not heard as 
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The voice of the mother appeared to have become regarded by the law, not as a protective 
warning to the welfare of the child arising out of a uniquely gendered role and perspective 
but, rather, as a negative, anti-father and obstructive opposition to imposition by the law of 
separated shared care parenting.
1293
 It is therefore unsurprising that, at times, mothers’ 
attempts to resist court orders designed to develop and strengthen the father-child 
relationship, were met by a stern judicial response and resulted in her imprisonment for a 
breach of such orders.
1294
 Sometimes, these were in situations of parental conflict and alleged 
domestic violence, where the law could be regarded as a blunt instrument, continuing to seek 
to maintain respect and adherence to court orders as a public good. There have also been 
exercises by the law of the imposition of its power to its fullest extent, enforcing obedience to 
its determinations about what it considered best for the child in circumstances where a mother 
may have strongly disagreed with such assessment.
1295
 This contemporary low point for 
motherhood can be distinguished from the historical low point experienced by mothers in 
patriarchal, Victorian England when both mother and child were regarded as owned by the 
father, and there was no gender or parenting equality. The current situation presents an 
apparently irreconcilable tension. Parenting equality is now accepted and is commendable, 
yet the position of motherhood appears to have been compromised in the process. The need 
for integrity of, and obedience to, the law is important, but there also appears, at times, to be 
a lack of respect for a mother in speaking out about or disregarding care arrangements she 
does not agree with, and a lack of understanding of her belief in the moral legitimacy of her 
extreme actions in disobeying the law. Recovery of an ability by the law to hear and 
compassionately understand the mother’s voice would be helpful.
1296
 In conjunction with 
this, a closer examination of the effects of domestic violence, adult conflict and aspects of a 
mother’s gatekeeping behaviours in these circumstances, seen as positively protective rather 
than negatively obstructive, would also be desirable. 
12.1.12   The effect of subtle shifts in the law, not wholesale change 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 corrective in Kacem v Bashir
1297
 has re-focused New Zealand’s 
Family Court decision-making, according to the ‘no a priori assumptions’ approach as to 
what is in a child’s welfare and best interests. That is, the development of a father’s 
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relationship with the child, while important, was not to be given priority nor treated as an 
informal presumption, as that was not the law. However, the attractiveness, simplicity and 
apparent fairness of shared care between mothers and fathers as a separated parenting model 
meant that it continued to be supported.
1298
 This presented continuing challenges for 
motherhood, left to bargain in the shadow of the law.
1299
  
Within the social science field, Smyth et al. have identified that even subtle legislative 
encouragement towards shared care is risky, and they do not promote legislating for shared 
care. They recognise, instead, that other things matter more than dividing time between 
mothers and fathers within a separated shared care regime, with the implication appearing to 
include recognition and identification of differences between motherhood and fatherhood.
1300
 
They also considered that positive outcomes for children in shared care arrangements are 
more to do with the sort of families who choose this arrangement (that is, parents who are not 
in conflict and who respect the different contribution that each of the mother and father 
provide) than the imposition of such arrangements by the law in conflicted and resistant 
parenting relationships. That is, shared care is workable for some families but not for others. 
The effect upon motherhood by these family law developments has been significant, 
particularly with respect to such specific issues as shared care, relocation, gatekeeping and 
breastfeeding.
1301
 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the value, and voice, of motherhood 
appears to have been compromised and diminished by these movements in contemporary 
family law.  
12.1.13   Motherhood remains a contestable concept 
The clear implication from the drawing together of all these threads, is that motherhood has 
faced significant challenges throughout history in her relationship with the law, and continues 
to do so. In contemporary times, the law has sought to provide in a child focused manner, a 
meaningful relationship for a child with both their mother and father. Mothers have therefore 
needed to accommodate the reality and practicalities of sharing day-to-day care with fathers. 
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The role of the mother has become contestable as fathers have taken up a greater share of 
what was previously considered ‘mother-work’. Mothers have responded, within a gender-
neutral legal context, to such gendered issues as shared care, relocation, gatekeeping and 
breastfeeding. Some responses, particularly when extreme and in breach of court orders, have 
been viewed as contempt, and in some circumstances have led to imprisonment. The voice of 
the mother has, at times, become muted, if not silenced, and the concerns expressed by 
mothers for their young children when overnight contact has been introduced and concerning 
behaviour in the child emerged have also, at times, been negatively framed and viewed as 
obstructive with respect to legal processes seeking to develop a child’s relationship with the 
father. This is not to argue that a mother is always ‘right’; at times, it is clear that she is not. 
Rather, it is to highlight the complex issues and tensions that have arisen between 
motherhood and the law over time. It also points to a need to understand and accommodate, 
within a contemporary family law context, a continuing gendered relationship between 
motherhood and fatherhood, and to value the contribution they each make to the raising of 
their child within modern society. Motherhood’s more protective parenting approach, and her 
ability to be relationally and emotionally attuned to her child (including her understanding 
and capacity to support the development of the father’s relationship with their child) may, at 
times, stand in tension with fatherhood’s encouragement towards greater risk-taking and 
development of the child’s increased self-reliance and resilience capacity, but both are unique 
and important contributions to the upbringing of a child.
1302
 
12.1.14   The relationship between motherhood and fatherhood  
In most parenting situations, a mother matters very much to a child, but so does the father. In 
relation to their child, they do their best parenting work in a holistic and unified manner, 
respecting the different contributions
1303
 each make, even if they are separated. It may 
therefore be time to return to first principles with respect to the relationship between 
fatherhood and motherhood.
1304
 Doucet’s ‘borderwork’ between mothering and fathering,
1305
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points to fathers taking on the day-to-day care of children and reconfiguring fathering and 
masculinity in a manner that may have caused fatherhood to take ground from motherhood in 
an unintended way. A first principles approach could enable motherhood to resume again a 
greater responsibility for the physical care of her very young child, being supported in her 
breastfeeding and being able to provide the warm, emotional attunement and nurture that is 
naturally her offering. The father could be encouraged to take up again a greater protective 
role and function towards the mother as she undertakes this initial mothering role and, rather 
than seeking to compete, be willing to receive her support in the development of his own 
relationship with the child. Without diminishing the unique value of fatherhood, it is perhaps 
therefore time to focus again on the unique value of, and respect for, motherhood. McMahon 
has suggested that motherhood could be seen in terms of moral transformation and reform, 
offering a redemptive view of the role and value of motherhood in relation to children, 
fathering and indeed the whole of society.
1306
 
12.1.15   A redemptive approach 
A redemptive approach by the law towards mothers and motherhood is not a new idea. 
Tapp
1307
 promotes a more holistic, respectful approach, based in a judicial demonstration of 
understanding and sensitivity towards the relational humanity on display in many of the 
situations the Court is required to address within family law, as it exercises its judicial power 
and function.  
New Zealand’s Judge Mary O’Dwyer also signalled the possibility of a redemptive approach 
by reframing a judicial understanding of gatekeeping.
1308
 Rather than gatekeeping being a 
concept to enable the court to criticise a mother’s beliefs, concerns and views about her child 
as negative or obstructive, it could rather be viewed as a concept that enables motherhood to 
make a unique and positive contribution to the management of a separated father’s contact 
with his child. That she might be encouraged and not discouraged, that she might be viewed 
by the court positively and not negatively, and that she might be understood as possessing 
unique gendered skills able to undertake important ‘emotion work’ in the management of a 
child’s relationship not only with her but also the father, could provide a platform for a 
recovery of the respect and dignity of motherhood. It could also provide for a recognition of 
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its value and role, as distinct from fatherhood.
1309
 This new approach to gatekeeping by the 
Family Court could lead to a more holistic understanding being developed, including one 
where mothers may have a pivotal role in the facilitation of the father-child relationship. 
Mothers’ views should be sought and listened to. They should not be ignored or regarded 
with suspicion or as untrustworthy, unless there is good reason to do so after an examination 
of the circumstances.  
The Family Court and family law practitioners should also be encouraged to firmly apply the 
requirements of the ‘no a priori assumptions’ approach with respect to a welfare and best 
interests assessment pursuant to section 4(1) of COCA, as set out by the Court of Appeal in D 
v S,
1310
 and confirmed by the Supreme Court in Kacem v Bashir.
1311
 This should assist in 
redressing any further extension of an informal presumption that development of a child’s 
relationship with the father should be prioritised ahead of other welfare and best interest 
factors (including maintaining the quality of a child’s relationship with the mother) which 
had begun to uneasily creep into New Zealand family law and had the potential to 
compromise motherhood, and which Kacem v Bashir
1312
 sought to address. 
Adoption of the Herring approach
1313
 within New Zealand family law of the central, 
relational aspect of the welfare principle could also be considered, notwithstanding the 
increasing complexity and focus on gender-neutrality and rights within contemporary family 
law. Herring also considers that the parenting relationship, as well as the parent-child 
relationship, should be one of inherent and deep cooperation; one parent’s role makes no 
sense unless in relationship with the other. Similarly, our value lies not in intellectual 
connection but in our caring relationships where attributes such as joy, kindness, touch and 
care may be found. He says that being loved is the most important thing of our lives, it is 
what makes us a person, it gives our lives meaning and moral value and is something we 
cannot do on our own.
1314
 How this would practically play out within the context of our 
current rights-based parenting law is a challenging consideration. That should, however, not 
be a barrier to pursuing and implementing such an alternative way of thinking about the 
welfare principle and, in particular, the mother-child relationship.  
                                                          
1309
 See the discussion of the recognition of the differences between motherhood and fatherhood, above note 
1297. 
1310
 D v S above note 27. 
1311
 Kacem v Bashir, above note 40. 
1312
 Above note 1311. 
1313
 Jonathan Herring, above note 63 and 1213; Chapter Six, para 6.2. 
1314
 See Jonathan Herring, de Carle lecture series “The Law and the Relational Self” 21 April 2016, University 
of Otago, http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/podcasts (searched 29 May 2016). 
 306 
Should family law, with respect to motherhood and its role in determining a child’s welfare 
and best interests, reflect the principles of legal positivism, with motherhood rendered a state 
of gender-neutral parentage and a legal construct, designed to and purposed for meeting the 
rights of a child? Alternatively, should it hold to a view that recognises an inner morality to 
the law, with the inherent gendered and relational qualities of motherhood and her intimate 
relationship with her child being recognised and protected? Or is there a more nuanced 
balance somewhere in between? These are important considerations for the law in its future 
regard of the mother-child, surrogate-fetus, genetic mother-child, surrogate-genetic mother, 
father-child and mother-father relationships.
1315
 In addition, such fundamental aspects of our 
relational personhood such as dignity, respect, trust and vulnerability as they relate to 
fatherhood, motherhood and the law
1316
 may also be relevant to the development of a healthy, 
real and holistic approach to separated parenting relationships and the law. This means that 
the law’s response, for example through imprisonment of a mother for contempt and breach 
of the father’s rights,
1317
 could be reconsidered as inconsistent with a relationship-based 
approach to the welfare principle. There could be a focus, instead, on the dignity of the 
parents, compassion being extended and attempts made to protect these significant 
relationships. This may include prioritising the mother-child relationship, depending on the 
age of the child, in a manner not evident within the present rights-based approach to the 
father-child relationship.  
12.1.16   A proposal to repeal section 4(3) of COCA 
New Zealand law attempted to remove any last vestige of ‘the mother principle’ by the 
introduction in 1980 of an amendment to the Guardianship Act 1968.
1318
 Its attempt to 
neutralise parenting gender was carried through to the current legislative provision found in 
section 4(3) of COCA. This subsection says: 
It must not be presumed that the welfare and best interests of a child (of any age) 
require the child to be placed in the day-to-day care of a particular person because of 
that person’s gender. 
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these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The difficulty created by maintaining this legislative provision is that the law, while seeking 
to neutralise gender in the name of equality, has failed to recognise and address the inherent 
and essentially gendered nature and relational qualities of parenthood. In seeking to maintain 
this neutral position, the law has found itself straining to apply the legislation in its current 
form. This can be seen in a number of areas of family law as it relates to separated parenting, 
including shared care, relocation, gatekeeping and breastfeeding.
1319
 The law does not appear 
to have been able to adequately recognise and accommodate gender difference and 
relationship within these areas when seeking to determine a child’s welfare and best interests, 
and has therefore, arguably, contributed to the complexity and conflict for all parties. Not 
only does s4(3) of COCA legislatively constrain the application of the welfare principle as 
having a gendered, relationship-based component, it also constrains recognition of the reality 
of gendered issues in a gendered area of law.  
Accordingly, it is proposed that section 4(3) of COCA could be repealed in the interests of 
recovery of the value, respect and dignity of motherhood, without reducing or impinging 
upon the value, respect and dignity of fatherhood. Indeed, such a step has the potential to add 
to, and enrich the one by the other. Eekelaar calls this the ‘purposive abstention model’,
1320
 
where the law does not offer prescription within family law. In other words, the law is not 
required to prescribe that the role and function of motherhood should be gender-neutralised, 
and therefore should not do so. A recognition of the unique and different roles that each of 
motherhood and fatherhood  may play in the life of a child can then continue to be recognised 
as relevant factors for a particular child in a welfare and best interests assessment, in a 
manner that the law is presently limited in doing because of the existence of this provision. 
12.2 A remodelled judgment 
Assuming the repeal of s4(3) of COCA and a renewed focus on relationships rather than 
rights as central to the welfare principle, I turn again to the judgment of MT v AK,
1321
 a 
decision with respect to the separated parenting arrangements for a five month old breast-fed 
baby (see Appendix I). I have now remodelled the judgment (see Appendix II), based on 
fictional legislation that no longer hinders the gender of the parent from being taken into 
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account in giving consideration to all the factors relevant to the application of a relationship-
based, rather than rights-based, welfare and best interests principle as contained in s4(1) of 
COCA. The key differences found in the remodelled judgment include a recognition of the 
unique strengths that each of mothering and fathering bring to parenting, an increased focus 
on relationships as foundational and central to understanding and applying the welfare and 
best interests principle (with a consequential decreased emphasis on rights), and the need to 
protect and dignify the intimacy and value of the breastfeeding relationship between mother 
and child. 
12.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, a redemptive approach by the law could enable recognition again that ‘mothers 
are special’
1322
 without this being a challenge to, or in competition, with fathers. It could also 
allow for a renewed emphasis on Smart’s ‘morality of caring’.
1323
 That is, there could be a 
rebalancing from the overemphasis on “‘psy professions’ who focus on children’s welfare 
and fathers’ rights, while a mother’s interests are lost”,
1324
 to a renewed focus on what 
mothers and fathers each ‘do’ for their children, rather than what their respective rights might 
be. Smart suggests the day-to-day care of a child, that is, the ‘doing’ of parenthood, should be 
given more weight than the law presently provides. This is the work, at present often 
undertaken in a greater way by mothers than fathers notwithstanding care being shared,
1325
 
which in reality could be better recognised if the law was able to better accommodate 
differences in parenting function through gender, by a repeal of s4(3) of COCA.  
The law, as it stands, also appears to give a greater weight to rights, and particularly the rights 
of fathers to contact and/or to develop shared care, and perhaps does not therefore provide a 
balanced approach to the issue. It also continues to give, in surrogacy situations, rights to the 
gestational mother without automatically recognising either the biological or post-birth 
mother (recognising that these can now be three different people). That advances in science 
and technology have enabled these developments, as well as providing increased 
understanding about the differences between the male and female brains in the context of 
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parenthood, creates an impetus for the law to keep up and change where necessary, 
recognising that the resultant ‘doing’ of motherhood is increasingly nuanced in both pre- and 
post-parturition situations through such advances in science and technology. These different, 
yet essential, relationships of mother and child may now be separated into component parts 
by the use of technology. However, all require recognition and protection, commencing with 
the surrogate mother who may not be genetically related to the child but who develops an 
intimate mother-child relationship during gestation, nonetheless. This relationship provides 
the foundation for the post-birth mother-child relationship, where there may or may not be a 
genetic connection that was not supported by gestation. Relationships, not rights, should 
therefore be the focus.  
Finally, current, third wave feminism (the reclaiming and personalisation of motherhood as a 
rite of passage, as reflected in the last twenty years) additionally offers the hope of 
acceptance, not denial, of the maternal essence, as women integrate the achievements of 
second wave feminism (the political movement of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s which sought 
to address gender inequality by critiquing the effect of state systems, particularly the law, on 
motherhood as a status and practice), while also clarifying the confusion it created, and going 




A refocusing, as coined by Smart,
1327
 on relationships and the essentials of motherhood, may 
assist in reintroducing respect and a growing understanding by the law of these issues and for 
the morality of both motherhood and fatherhood, in all their likenesses and differences,
1328
 as 
important, discrete issues for a child.  
The nature of motherhood will have ongoing contest and challenge as all aspects of society 
continue to wrestle with such concepts as equality and gender, and advances in technology 
push social and legal limits with respect to issues of conception, surrogacy and the very 
creation of human life. Notwithstanding, recognising and dignifying the unique nature of 
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 See a discussion of third wave feminism in Bridget J Crawford, above note 533; see also Emily Jeremiah 
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motherhood, motherhood’s relationship with fatherhood, and motherhood’s value to society 





MT v AK[Interim parenting orders] 
[2010] NZFLR 613 
 
 
Family Court Dunedin  
FAM-2009-012-413 
 
22 September 2009 
Judge Coyle 
 
Parenting orders -- Interim orders for contact -- Five-month-old baby -- Baby result of sexual 
relationship outside mother's marriage -- Father seeking contact arrangements -- Mother seeking 
to keep contact to minimum -- Mother using breast feeding to minimise contact -- United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts 5, 7(1), 8(1), 14(2), 18(1) and 24 -- Care of Children 
Act 2004, ss 4, 5 and 6. 
 
A was born in May 2009. Her mother was Mrs H and her father was Mr T. Mr and Mrs H had had 
some difficulties in their marriage. While on a break, Mrs H had a sexual relationship with Mr T. 
She immediately fell pregnant and after some thought decided to carry through with the pregnancy. 
During her pregnancy, Mr and Mrs H attended relationship counselling and as a consequence they 
decided to resume their marriage relationship and remain together. A had been embraced by Mr H 
as his own and was part of the H family. Mr and Mrs H had four other daughters in their family and 
A had now become their fifth child. 
Prior to A's birth, Mr T decided that he wanted to be an involved father and to be an active 
participant in A's life. Mrs H, on the face of it, was reluctant to allow Mr T to have any more than 
minimal contact at this point and she perceived Mr T's desire to have contact as "bullying 
behaviour" which she maintained acted as a constant reminder of past mistakes which added 
pressure to the H's marriage. 
The issue for the Court, therefore, was what contact with her father was appropriate and in A's best 
interests and welfare so as to preserve and strengthen her relationship with both the H and the T 
families. 
 
Held (making interim parenting orders) 
1 There was a clear intention expressed by Parliament that there was more than a mono-cultural 
view of family contained in s 5 of the Care of Children Act. A had a family/family group in the H 
house. She also had a family/family group on her father's side of the family. Thus, in terms of the 
principles in s 5 of the Act, both those relationships had to be preserved and strengthened 
throughout her life (see [8]). 
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2 Mr T's proposal for contact with A was unrealistic given her age and her stage of development in 
life. She needed stability and security and her contact with her father should increase as she got 
older and as she developed cognitively. Conversely, the contact proposed by Mrs H was not 
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enough. Her desire to maintain breastfeeding was laudable but had to be subservient to the welfare 
and best interests of A. In the absence of evidence of clear risk to A, breastfeeding should not 
operate as a barrier to contact between A and her father (see  [30], [31]). 
 
Application 
The applicant father applied for parenting orders seeking day-to-day contact with the child A, who 
was five months of age. 
 
I Stewart and A Klinkert for the applicant. 
 
R Brown for the respondent. 
 




[1] A was born on 1 May 2009. She is therefore nearly five months old. Her mother is Mrs H and 
her father Mr T. 
[2] Mr and Mrs H had had some difficulties in their marriage. While on a break, Mrs H had a sexual 
relationship with Mr T. She immediately fell pregnant and after some thought decided to carry 
through with the pregnancy and on 1 May this year she gave birth to A. 
[3] During her pregnancy, Mr and Mrs H attended relationship counselling and as a consequence 
they decided to resume their marriage relationship and remain together. A has clearly been 
embraced by Mr H as his own and she is very much seen as part of the H family. Mr and Mrs H 
have four other daughters in their family and A has now become their fifth child. 
[4] Prior to A's birth, Mr T decided that he wanted to be an involved father and to be an active 
participant in A's life. Mrs H, on the face of it, is reluctant to allow Mr T to have any more than 
minimal contact at this point and she perceives Mr T's desire to have contact as "bullying 
behaviour" which she says, "acts as a constant reminder of past mistakes which adds an unspoken 
pressure to our marriage". 
[5] The Court is therefore being asked to determine today what contact Mr T is to have with A. 
[6] It is quite clear to me that the adults in this matter see this case as a clash of rights: Mr T's right 
to see and have a relationship with A; and Mrs H's right to raise A in her family free from the stress 
of having to deal with Mr T. 
[7] My focus, however, is not on the rights of the parents at all. Section 4 of the Care of Children 
Act says that the Court's paramount consideration and focus has to be the best interests and welfare 
of A. I must consider A in her particular circumstances and I must implement decisions which are 
appropriate given A's sense of time and her development. I also need, in terms of s 4(5) of the Act, 
to consider the relevant principles in s 5 of the Act. 
[8] The relevant principles that I see as applying to this case are that a child's parents have the 
primary responsibility for the child and should be encouraged to agree on their own arrangements. 
Clearly, on the 
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 evidence, that has been a fraught concept thus far although I am hopeful that in time, once orders 
are made, the parental relationship will improve and Mr T and Mrs H will be able to make 
agreements as to their own arrangements for the care of A. Secondly, A's relationships with her 
family group should be stable and ongoing, and in particular A should have continuing relationships 
with both parents. Relationships between A and members of her family and family group should be 
preserved and strengthened and those members should be encouraged to participate in A's care. 
Lastly, A's identity should be preserved and strengthened. 
[9] My view is that there is a clear intention expressed by Parliament that there is more than a 
mono-cultural view of family contained in s 5 of the Act. That is, A has a family/family group in the 
H house. She also has a family/family group on her father's side of the family. Thus, in terms of the 
principles in s 5 of the Act, both those relationships must be preserved and strengthened throughout 
her life. As I have said in other cases, it is my view that the words "and strengthened" are two of the 
most important words in the Care of Children Act and should not be overlooked. 
[10] Preservation envisages a continuation of relationships whereas "strengthened" envisages a 
building upon and a growing of relationships. Given that I am required to consider, as part of my 
overall discretion in deciding upon what is in the best interests and welfare of A, the principles in s 
5, it is my view that I must, in exercising the discretion today, have the concepts of preservation and 
strengthening foremost in my mind. 
[11] Additonally, those principles in s 5 are entirely consistent with arts 5, 7(1), 8(1), 14(2), and 
18(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which New Zealand is a 
signatory. 
[12] The issue for this Court, therefore, is what contact is appropriate and is in A's best interests and 
welfare with her father Mr T so as to achieve her ability to preserve and strengthen her relationship 
with both the H and the T families. 
[13] A is nearly five months old and she is currently breastfed by her mother. She is of an age where 
she is clearly entirely dependent upon the adults around her to meet all her needs and for her 
support. She is at the genesis of a lifetime of opportunity to develop and strengthen her relationships 
with her parents. She clearly, throughout her life, is going to have many relationships, some of 
which will be brief, and some of which will be enduring, but the most important and enduring will 
be her relationships with Mr and Mrs H, and with Mr T. 
[14] Mr T seeks contact from around 8.30 am to around 5.30 pm on Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday of each week. In cross-examination he acknowledged that that proposal contained in his 
affidavit was not his last word on the matter. The assessment of what I took from his evidence was 
that he wanted more than the current arrangement. At present he is seeing A twice a week for an 
hour to an hour and a half. He had been offered by Mrs H an extension of that to three days a week 
for an hour and a half but Mr T elected to decline that offer as he did not accept that it was in A's 
best interests. 
[15] I took from his evidence that what he wanted in rejecting that increase in contact was the 
opportunity to be involved in A's life. His 
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 concern was that at the times he had been having A in his care, A would rapidly fall asleep and that 
he would spend most of the time watching her sleeping. As endearing as that was to Mr T, he 
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wanted to feed her, to change her, to spend some time playing with her, to bathe her: in short, to be 
involved in aspects of day-to-day parenting of A. 
[16] My assessment of Mr T's evidence and the manner in which he gave his evidence was that he 
brought to his evidence his previous experience with his son, who was also raised in a home where 
his mother and father did not live together. He impressed me as being child-focused, thoughtful and 
considered in the manner and content of his evidence and he repeated in his evidence that, 
regardless of what arrangements are put in place by the Court, if they were not meeting A's needs 
then he would do all he could to alleviate any stress for A. 
[17] I believe Mr T to be genuine in what he has said and I am comforted in that knowledge as it 
will mean that whatever orders I put in place, if for whatever reason they cause anxiety to A, Mr T 
will do all he can to meet A's needs. Clearly Mr T wants to be involved with A more than he is at 
present and that is entirely understandable. 
[18] Mrs H proposes contact on a Monday and Thursday each week and proposes that initially Mr T 
take A away for one and half hours. In her most recent affidavit she deposed that after two to three 
visits Mr T's contact could then progress to a third day each week away from her home, again for 
one and a half hours. However, in cross-examination that period extended to around two months 
and when cross-examined by Mr Medlicott it became clear that Mrs H could not envisage A 
spending up to a day, or indeed overnight, with Mr T until she was at least a year old. 
[19] Mrs H lives a short distance away from Mr T. The time between the households by car, on the 
evidence, varied from around five to 10 minutes to between 10 to 15 minutes. Regardless, it is a 
relatively short distance. 
[20] To date A has been breastfed on demand and is fed around every one and half hours. Mrs H 
wants to continue breastfeeding as she did with her four other daughters. 
[21] Before moving on to the issues that I need to consider, I also want to record that in the 
background there is a realisation by Mr and Mrs H that Mr T is a guardian of A. They wish, it 
would appear, to relocate as Mr H's job may dictate and to have the ability to do so at whim. 
However, it is clear they now realise they cannot move A without there being consultation with Mr 
T as a joint and equal guardian. I want to express my disquiet that, on the evidence to date, there has 
been only a cursory effort to involve Mr T in guardianship issues affecting A. I was concerned, for 
instance, to hear that Mr T does not know the basics such as A's routine or her stages of 
development. In part, I acknowledge that that is symptomatic of the difficulties in the relationship 
between Mr T and Mrs H in that it appears that their communication is non-existent, this despite the 
fact that Mr T to date has been having contact with A at Mrs H's home. However, it seems he is left 
alone and there is very little, if any, communication between A's parents at present. 
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[22] The dysfunction in the guardianship issue can be illustrated by the fact that there is now before 
the Court an application revolving around a dispute about A's name. That application is not the 
focus of this hearing due to a direction made by the registry to that effect. I simply record that I 
struggle with the logic of that decision by the registry as it seems to me that there is no logical 
reason why that issue could not have formed part of this hearing. I had invited the parties to deal 
with the matter pragmatically and for that issue to be incorporated into this hearing but that course 
of action was opposed by Mrs H. Accordingly, that matter will need to be allocated a fixture by the 
registry so that that issue can be resolved. 
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[23] In support of Mrs H's position, her midwife Ms Ladell gave evidence. She had sworn an 
affidavit, large portions of which were struck from the Court record by me following a pretrial 
application by Ms Stewart on Mr T's behalf. Ms Ladell, therefore, gave evidence in relation to the 
remaining portions of her affidavit that I had found to be within the area of her experience and 
expertise. I have to say, however, having heard her evidence, that she could not be classed as an 
expert on the issues to which she deposed evidence. She has only been a midwife for a very short 
period of time and my assessment of her evidence is that she was driven by a pro-breastfeeding 
agenda, which seems to have formed part of her psyche for the last 10 years. I did not find her 
evidence particularly helpful or objective. She did give evidence as to what she saw as risks 
associated with A not continuing to be breastfed and risks in relation to her being bottle-fed. In 
particular she talked of risks to A's health in terms of illness, greater propensity for hospital 
admissions, gastrointestinal infections, risk of asthma, eczema and obesity. However, she was 
unable to give any evidence as to the reality of those risks. Accordingly, her evidence is of little 
assistance as I do not know whether that risk is a one chance in two of A developing those 
symptoms or one chance in 10 billion. It simply was not helpful to the Court at all. 
[24] What she was able to give evidence on was that breastfeeding is optimal in her opinion for the 
first two years of a child's life and for the first six months she believed a child should be fed 
exclusively with breast milk. That is consistent with the view expressed by the World Health 
Organisation in information provided to me by Ms Brown on behalf of Mrs H. In addition, art 24 of 
UNCRC provides at 24(2)(d) that: 
 
State parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that all segments of society, in 
particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are 
supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of 
breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents. 
 
That is, UNCRC supports the State ensuring caregivers of children have access to education as to 
the advantages of breastfeeding, but to argue, as Ms Brown did, that art 24 supports the use of 
breastfeeding, in my view elevates that article to a level which is not consistent with what is in fact 
stated in art 24(2)(d). 
[25] Ms Ladell's evidence, therefore, was of some limited assistance to me but my view is that I 
really cannot put any weight on it 
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 over and above it being her personal opinion in the absence of any clear empirical evidence to back 
up the position she took in her oral evidence. 
[26] Central to this case is the issue of breastfeeding. The fact that A is breastfed is a relevant matter 
which I need to consider as well as the s 5 principles to which I have already referred. A being 
breastfed is extremely important from Mrs H's perspective. I record that in her evidence she has 
refused to express breast milk for the purpose of facilitating Mr T's care of A but instead indicated a 
willingness to breastfeed A while she is in her father's care. 
[27] My assessment of the evidence is that Mrs H is using the breastfeeding issue to keep Mr T at 
arm's length and that that view suits her and Mr H as they attempt to rebuild their marriage. They do 
not want to be reminded of the fact that their family has a child in it who has a different father. But 
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this case is not about Mr and Mrs H and their need to try and keep their family as normal as they 
would like, and to attempt to address the issues surrounding their marriage. 
[28] I found Mrs H on her evidence to be judgemental of Mr T and to be obsessed with her position. 
My assessment of her evidence was that she said what she thought I would want to hear but 
comments in her evidence indicated to me that she would simply prefer that Mr T play as little role 
as possible in A's life. For instance, she made a comment, when asked about Mr T's role as a father, 
that "it is his biological role". I queried Mrs H as to what she meant by that and her evidence on that 
issue was, in my view, equivocal. I can understand the difficulties that Mr and Mrs H face. Life for 
them must at times be difficult as they work through circumstances surrounding why their marriage 
was in difficulty, and the choices that they both made as a consequence of those difficulties. There 
is a sense in which I suspect Mr T's ongoing involvement in their lives on a practical and real level 
constantly reminds them both of a period of difficulty in their marriage and in their lives. 
[29] A should grow up knowing she has two fathers and her reality is the normal reality for many 
children in New Zealand society. The circumstances in which A came into this world should not be 
a source of shame or difference for her, certainly to the extent that Mr and Mrs H appear to believe 
that it is for them. 
[30] Mr T's proposal for contact with A is, in my view, unrealistic given her age and her stage of 
development in life. She needs stability and security and her contact with her father should increase 
as she gets older and as she develops cognitively. The reality is, regardless of the morality of how it 
came to be, that Mrs H is A's primary attachment figure. However, A does also need to develop a 
secure attachment to her father and the issue I need to decide is how that is going to occur so as to 
meet A's needs. I am having to make that decision in the clear absence of any ability of A's parents 
to make that decision themselves. 
[31] Conversely, it is my view that the contact proposed by Mrs H is not enough. Her desire to 
maintain breastfeeding is laudable but must be subservient to the welfare and best interests of A. In 
the absence of evidence of clear risk to A, breastfeeding should not operate as a barrier to contact 
between A and her father. However, I hope that once orders are  
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made, Mrs H and Mr T will work together to discuss A and her needs and how she can continue to 
be breastfed while in her father's care. That may involve Mrs H going to Mr T's home or vice versa, 
but I want to record that if there is not a willingness by Mrs H to work with Mr T to ensure that A is 
able to be breastfed when she is in her father's care, then bottle-feeding will be the only option and 
if Mrs H continues with her view that she refuses to express breast milk then Mr T has no option but 
to use formula. 
[32] Any orders I make also need to recognise that A is young and her needs and her ability to cope 
with longer periods away from her mother will increase as she develops. Her Honour Judge Smith, 
in her Minute of 11 August this year, indicated that any orders should deal with the period between 
the decision of the Court and when A is nine months old. Whilst not bound by her Honour's view, 
upon reflection there seems to be some merit in fixing a point in time as, clearly, the care 
arrangements for A are going to need to be reviewed from time to time as her development and her 
needs change. There is, therefore, in my view, some sense in roughly adhering to the constraints put 
in place by her Honour Judge Smith. 
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[33] Central to these arrangements succeeding, in my view, is Mr and Mrs H appreciating that A is 
in a sense different from their other daughters. For a start, she is not their daughter. She is Mr H's 
stepdaughter. She has two fathers and she needs to be shared with Mr T and his family. 
[34] Having weighed all the evidence and taking into account the principles in ss 4 and 5 of the Act, 
I have reached the view that the best interests of A are going to be served by her having contact 
with her father on three days each week. I also record that A is too young to express any views in 
terms of s 6 of the Act. Accordingly, I make the following interim parenting orders. 
 
Orders and directions 
 
(a)  A is in the day-to-day care of Mr T: 
(i)  every Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday from 10.30 am until 2.00 pm; and 
(ii)  such other additional time as can be agreed between Mr T and Mrs H. 
  
(b)  A is in the day-to-day care of her mother at all other times. 
(c)  Mr T's contact with A is to commence on Tuesday 6 October 2009, being the second 
week of the upcoming school holiday period. Mrs H indicated that there are plans to 
visit her mother's farm in Kurow during the school holidays but I did not take from her 
evidence that she would be away for the full two weeks. 
(d)  The matter is to be reviewed at a mediation conference at the first available date in 
February 2010. Clearly if matters cannot be resolved at a mediation conference then the 
Court will need to convene another hearing. 
(e)  Leave is reserved for Mr Medlicott as A's lawyer to bring the matter back before the 
Court on three days' notice if any 
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 significant welfare issues arise for A between now and the review in February. 
(f)  A's place of residence is not to be outside the Dunedin-Mosgiel area until further order 
of the Court. In making a parenting order, I can attach any conditions I think fit and 
given the acknowledgement by Mrs H that she understands the guardianship 
obligations, I do not see any difficulty in attaching that as a condition at this point. 
[35] Finally, I just want to say to you both as A's parents that I hope that now these orders are made 
you can both put aside the stress which a hearing inevitably causes and you can begin working 
together. My hope would be that in time, and hopefully by the mediation in February, you both and 
together come to an agreed arrangement for Mr T's ongoing contact with A, whether that is a 
continuation of the orders I have made today or whether it is more. If not, the Court will continue to 
make orders, if asked, for A's care arrangements if you both continue to abrogate your responsibility 
to make decisions for A. 




B v C [Interim parenting orders] 
Remodelled [Fictional] Judgment Based on MT v AK 
 
This is a fictional judgment based on the decision of MT v AK [2010] NZFLR 613. It has been 
rewritten from the perspective of a fictional judge who is able to take into account the differences of 
each of motherhood and fatherhood, in circumstances where, at the time it is written, a fictional 
legislative circumstance is presumed to exist; that is, there has been a fictional repeal of s4(3) of 
COCA. Its purpose is to explore whether some of the issues highlighted in this thesis could be 
incorporated and addressed in an alternative manner, using a set of similar, real-life 
circumstances.   
   
A was born in February 2016. Her mother is Mrs C and her biological father is Mr B. Mr and Mrs C 
had had some difficulties in their marriage. While on a break in 2015, Mrs C had a sexual 
relationship with Mr B and fell pregnant with A.  
During her pregnancy, Mr and Mrs C received therapeutic counselling assistance and as a 
consequence they are continuing their marriage relationship. A has been embraced by Mr C as his 
own and is an integral part of the C family. Mr and Mrs C have four other daughters in their family 
and A has now become their fifth child.  
Prior to A's birth, Mr B decided that he wanted to be an involved father and to be an active 
participant in A's life. He considered this to be his right. Mrs C does not agree with the level of 
contact Mr B is seeking, and considers that it risks destabilising the intimacy of the mother-child 
relationship with A, who is still a fully breast-fed baby. Mrs C perceives Mr B's actions in his 
vigorous pursuit through the Family Court of recognition and implementation of his parental rights 
through contact designed to introduce equal time shared care as soon as possible as "bullying 
behaviour," and seeks the Court’s protection during this time of particular vulnerability for her.  
The issues for the Court, therefore, are: 
The protection of the dignity of, and ensuring immediate primacy is afforded to, the mother-child 
breastfeeding relationship between A and Mrs C. 
Ensuring that each of A’s relationships and place within the C family are not destabilised by the 
current proceedings but are preserved and strengthened. 
Encouraging the development of parenting relationships recognising and respecting their differing 
fathering and mothering contributions towards A’s upbringing, as well as developing trust and 
cooperation between each of Mr and Mrs C, their children (including A) and Mr B, as reflecting A’s 
long term welfare and best interests. 
The introduction of mechanisms, based in such trust and respect, to develop an enduring, healthy 
relationship between A and Mr B (and her relationships with Mr B’s wider family) without 
compromise to A’s relationship within the C family and in particular, at the present time, with her 
mother. 
 




1.By the repeal of s4(3) of the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA), I am no longer constrained from 
taking into account, in determining a child’s welfare and best interests, the reality and importance of 
the gendered natures of motherhood and fatherhood in determining parenting arrangements for a 
child. This includes, in particular, the foundational and primary intimacy of the mother-child 
breastfeeding relationship and in these circumstances, the mother-child breastfeeding relationship 
between A and her mother. 
 
2. I seek to apply Article 24(2)(d) of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, ratified by New Zealand on 6 April 1993, requiring the State to ensure parents and children 
are educated and supported in the advantages of breastfeeding and I further seek to align my 
findings and decisions with New Zealand Ministry of Health’s policy that “breast is best.” I 
therefore find that the welfare and best interests significance of a mother’s provision of 
breastfeeding to her child and for preservation and strengthening of that relationship to be a first and 
primary principle, and that such principle is to be applied to the particular relationship between A 
and her mother.  
 
3. I reject the allegation that Mrs C is seeking to breastfeed or is continuing to breastfeed as a device 
to prevent Mr B from developing a relationship with A, and I find that such an approach fails to 
dignify and protect the breastfeeding mother and risks reducing breastfeeding to a utility. 
 
4. Care is required to not destabilise, through these Family Court proceedings and the pressure of 
Mr B’s demands, the primary attachment between A and Mrs C, but to strengthen the primacy of 
the mother-child breastfeeding relationship as a welfare and best interests priority to A at this 
formative time in her life. Mrs C’s introduction and desire to maintain a breastfeeding relationship 
with C is laudable and must be supported. It is central to A’s welfare and best interests, both short 
term and long term, and Mr B’s contact with A must be subservient to this reality. Mr B is not 
excluded; it is his role, along with Mr C, to encourage, support and protect Mrs C in her present 
provision of breastfeeding to A. It will be Mrs C’s role to engage in facilitative gatekeeping 
practices, opening up to Mr B opportunities for a relationship by him with A for the future. 
6. I find Mr B's proposal for contact with A to be unrealistic given A’s age, her stage of 
development in life, and her present dependency on the nurture and secure comfort of her mother. It 
is also disconnected from the reality of the context of relationships within which a welfare and best 
interests assessment for A must be made. 
7. There is a clear intention expressed by Parliament that there is more than a mono-cultural view of 
family contained in s 5 of the Care of Children Act, thereby providing for the provision and 
strengthening to a child of both biological and non-biological mother, father and broader family 
relationships. A is already a participating member of the C family, headed by Mr and Mrs C and 
which includes sibling relationships with four sisters. These relationships need to be preserved and 
strengthened, while at the same time consideration is given to introducing mechanisms that will 
enable A to develop relationships with Mr B and his family in a safe and appropriate way for A 





The applicant Mr B has applied for a parenting order seeking contact with the child A, who is nearly 
five months of age. 
 
JUDGE X: 
[1] A was born on 1 February 2016. She is therefore nearly five months old. Her mother is Mrs C, 
her step-father and Mrs C’s husband is Mr C, and her biological father is Mr B. 
[2] Mr and Mrs C had had some difficulties in their marriage. While on a break, Mrs C had a sexual 
relationship with Mr B. She fell pregnant, after some thought decided to carry through with the 
pregnancy and on 1 February this year she gave birth to A. 
[3] During her pregnancy, Mr and Mrs C attended relationship counselling and as a consequence 
they decided to resume their marriage relationship and remain together. A has clearly been 
embraced by Mr C as his own and she is very much a part of the C family. Mr and Mrs C have four 
other daughters in their family and A has now become their fifth child. 
[4] Prior to A's birth, Mr B decided that he wanted to be an involved father and to be an active 
participant in A's life. Mrs C does not agree with Mr B’s contact proposal, seeking support for 
modest contact only at this time as A is fully breastfed. She does not wish the value of the 
breastfeeding relationship to be destabilised. She perceives Mr B’s actions with respect to his 
pursuing the contact he considers to be his right as "bullying behaviour.” These communications 
also act as a constant reminder of past mistakes which adds an unspoken pressure to their marriage. 
[5] The Court is therefore being asked to determine today what contact Mr T is to have with A. 
[6] It is quite clear to me that Mr B sees this case as a clash of rights: Mr B's right to provide day-to-
day to A in the same manner as Mrs C, in tension with Mrs C's right to raise A in her family free 
from the stress of having to deal with Mr C. 
[7] My focus, however, is not on rights. Section 4 of the Care of Children Act says that the Court's 
paramount consideration and focus has to be the best interests and welfare of A. I must consider A 
in her particular circumstances, within the context of the relationships of which she is a part, and I 
must implement decisions which centrally recognise the context and importance of these 
relationships. Such considerations must also appropriately recognise A's sense of time, her stage of 
development and the essential contributions to such development by each of mothering and 
fathering. I also need, in terms of s 4(5) of the Act, to consider the relevant principles in s 5 of the 
Act. 
[8] The relevant principles that I see as applying to this case are, pursuant to s5(a), that a child’s 
safety, including psychological safety, must be protected. This is the foremost issue. Then, pursuant 
to s5(b), a child's parents are to have the primary responsibility for the upbringing of the child, s5(c) 
a child’s upbringing should be facilitated by cooperation and consultation between her parents, 
guardians and anyone else having a role in the child’s care, s5(d) that a child should have continuity 
of in his or her care and upbringing and s5(e) that a child should continue to have a relationship 
with his or her parents, and that a child’s relationship with his or her family group should be 
preserved and strengthened. Clearly, on the evidence, while Mr and Mrs C are working well 
together, this latter principle of desirability has been a fraught concept with respect to how to 
include Mr B as a parent. I am hopeful that, in time, the key relationships will improve and Mr and 
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Mrs C, with Mr B, will be able to make agreements as to their own arrangements for the care of A. 
Lastly, pursuant s5(f), A's identity should be preserved and strengthened. 
[9] My view is that there is a clear intention expressed by Parliament that there is more than a 
mono-cultural view of family contained in s 5 of the Act. That is, A has a family/family group in the 
C house, and the extended families of each of Mr and Mrs C. She also has a family/family group 
available to her through Mr B. Thus, in terms of the principles in s 5 of the Act, all these 
relationships should be preserved and strengthened throughout her life. As I have said in other 
cases, it is my view that the words "and strengthened" are two of the most important words in the 
Care of Children Act and should not be overlooked. 
[10] Preservation envisages a continuation of relationships whereas "strengthened" envisages a 
building upon and a growing of relationships. Given that I am required to consider the principles of 
s5 as part of my overall discretion in deciding upon what is in the best interests and welfare of A, it 
is my view that I must, in exercising the discretion today, have the concepts of, and tensions created 
between, preservation and strengthening of relationships foremost in my mind. 
[11] Additionally, those principles in s 5 are entirely consistent with arts 5, 7(1), 8(1), 14(2), and 
18(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which New Zealand is a 
signatory. 
[12] A is nearly five months old and she is currently fully breastfed by her mother. She is of an age 
where she is clearly entirely dependent upon the adults around her, particularly her mother, to meet 
all her needs and for her support. Mrs C too, is in a circumstance as a breastfeeding mother, where 
she is more vulnerable than during other periods of her life, and therefore also requires the care and 
support of the adults around her to be able to respond well to the immediacy and intimacy required 
by A’s present, complete dependency upon her. A is at the genesis of a lifetime of opportunity to 
develop and strengthen her relationships with her parents, beginning with her relationship with her 
mother. As her primary relationship, this must be preserved and strengthened. In doing this, A’s 
psychological safety, both in the short and long term, will also be protected. We are informed in this 
regard because of the significant social science work with respect to the issue of attachment that has 
been undertaken over the last seventy-five years, and I am grateful to counsel for drawing my 
attention to the originating work of Bowlby and more recently of the refinements offered by 
Trinder, Smyth, McIntosh, Kelly, Lamb, Warshak and others. Whatever school of social science 
thought is applied, it is now accepted wisdom that a destabilised, disorganised early attachment 
does not bode well for a child’s later psychological well-being. A clearly, throughout her life, is 
going to have many relationships, some of which will be brief, and some of which will be enduring, 
but the most important and enduring will be her relationships with Mr and Mrs C and, hopefully, 
with Mr B, and with her siblings. It is my view that the quality of these relationships very much 
depends at this time on the ability of Mr C and Mr B to presently support and protect Mrs C in her 
development of a secure, nurturing mother-child breastfeeding relationship with A. That Mrs C 
wishes to continue to offer this to A is commendable and needs protecting to them both. 
[13] Mr B seeks contact from around 8.30 am to around 5.30 pm on Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday of each week. In cross-examination he acknowledged that that proposal contained in his 
affidavit was not his last word on the matter. The assessment of what I took from his evidence was 
that he wanted more than the current arrangement and to continue to develop that into equal time 
shared care. At present he is seeing A twice a week for an hour to an hour and a half. He had been 
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offered by Mrs C an extension of that to three days a week for an hour and a half but Mr B elected 
to decline that offer as he did not accept that it was in A's best interests. 
[14] I took from his evidence that what he wanted in rejecting that increase in contact and pressing 
for more as the opportunity to be involved in A's life. His concern was that at the times he had been 
having A in his care, A would rapidly fall asleep and that he would spend most of the time watching 
her sleeping. As endearing as that was to Mr B, he wanted to exercise his right to feed her, to 
change her, to spend some time playing with her, to bathe her: in short, to be involved in aspects of 
day-to-day parenting of A in the same way as Mrs C. 
[15] My assessment of Mr B's evidence and the manner in which he gave his evidence was that he 
brought to his evidence his previous experience with his son, who was also raised in a home where 
his mother and father did not live together. While his evidence appeared to be thoughtful and 
considered, and he repeated that, regardless of what arrangements are put in place by the Court, if 
they were not meeting A's needs then he would do all he could to alleviate any stress for A, I am not 
satisfied that Mr C appreciates that a determination of A’s welfare and best interests is not based in 
his rights as her biological father, but in the quality and network of particular relationships that are 
available and able to be developed in the future for A. I am concerned that there was demonstrated 
little appreciation for the significance of Mrs C’s present breastfeeding relationship with A and that 
she is the only person who can provide this essential start to A. Not only must this not be 
destabilised, but I am also required to look at ways whereby it might be preserved and strengthened. 
Indeed, Mr B’s approach, from prior to A’s birth, has left me concerned about its stressful effect 
upon Mrs C at the very time Mr B should desirably be demonstrating respect for, and protection of, 
Mrs C’s ability to provide and develop a mother-child relationship to A through breastfeeding. This 
unique, gendered relationship between Mrs C and A requires its dignity to be respected and cannot 
be allowed to be reduced merely to the provision of a utility. I am also not satisfied that Mr B 
appreciated that A is being brought up within the C family, and that these relationships should not 
only not be destabilised by his requirements, but they should also should be preserved and 
strengthened.  
[16] That said, Mr B has a great deal to offer A. While Mr C is also developing a fathering 
relationship with A, this is not a fatherhood competition. A’s particular circumstances mean that she 
is fortunate to have available to her the potential for two father relationships. Mr C will be 
providing those daily aspects of fatherhood to A that will promote in her the development of 
resilience, discipline and self-reliance in a way that only the father-child relationship can provide. 
Mr B should look forward to contributing to these developments, along with providing to A those 
other qualities of a healthy father-child relationship such as a sense of adventure, pushing A beyond 
her comfort zone to achieve, and providing praise to her when she succeeds. Mr B will also be 
integral in assisting to secure to A her sense of identity, commencing with her paternal biological 
connection to Mr B and his wider family. He should therefore be encouraged to consider ways he 
can develop his particular father-child relationship with A, which I propose commence with a 
scrapbook for her that chronicles her paternal family history and her place in it. I reiterate, this is 
not a fatherhood competition. It is also not a competition between fatherhood and motherhood. Mrs 
C needs to be able to provide those aspects of emotionally attuned, warm, nurturing care to A, 
commencing with breastfeeding, that only a mother can provide. A needs her to be able to do this 
without interference or pressure from Mr B on the basis that he wants to provide the same things. 
The risk would be that Mrs C’s mothering would then be compromised, and this should not be 
allowed to occur. 
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[17] I ask Mr B and Mrs C, together with Mr C, to step back and look to the long term goal as being 
the development of healthy, respectful relationships between them as the significant adults in A’s 
life, for A’s benefit. I am willing to provide the resources of the Court as far as they are available, to 
support this process. I also require that the brief include education as to the differing, gender-based 
roles of motherhood and fatherhood, and how the fatherhood roles of each of Mr B and Mr C may 
be complementary of each other. I am now able to do this given the repeal of s4(3) of COCA, as I 
am no longer constrained from considering the gender of the parent in determining A’s welfare and 
best interests. Such processes may also at appropriate times include Mr and Mrs C’s four daughters, 
in understanding and developing their relationships with not only A but also their parents, together 
with Mr B and his place in their family as a result of his relationship with A. I regard this 
relationship work seriously, and as being central and pivotal to A’s welfare and best interests. 
[18] It should therefore come as no surprise that I consider the premise of Mr B’s application for a 
parenting order as to contact with A to be misconceived if, as I suspect, it is founded on Mr B’s 
view that this is his right as A’s biological father to expect the Court to make an order today that 
will ultimately result in an equal time shared care arrangement between himself and Mrs C. This is 
an incorrect interpretation of the paramountcy of the welfare and best interests principle contained 
in s4(1) of COCA. I prefer this Court’s approach to be that Mr B, in making this application, is 
rather offering to A and to those with whom she is in existing relationship, that is, her mother Mrs 
C, her father Mr C and her four siblings, the opportunity for a further father-relationship with him 
being developed for A as being in her welfare and best interests. 
[19] It is unfortunate that Mrs C has been required to respond within Mr B’s rights-based paradigm, 
as I suspect this has contributed to her stress at the very time that she ought to have been able to 
expect the protection and support of Mr B and the Court. Nonetheless, she has helpfully given 
consideration as to how contact with Mr B may take place within the current context, and I am 
grateful to her for these considerations. She proposes contact on a Monday and Thursday each week 
and proposes that initially Mr B take A away for one and half hours. In her most recent affidavit she 
deposed that after two to three visits Mr B's contact could then progress to a third day each week 
away from her home, again for one and a half hours. However, in cross-examination seeking to 
elicit from her an agreement to such contact be extended in around two months time to include 
overnights, it was clear that Mrs C was under pressure. She could not envisage A spending up to a 
day, or indeed overnight, with Mr B until she was older. She suggested this be at least a year old. I 
regret Mrs C was placed in this position. A’s relationship with her should not be stressed by 
external demands that are contrary to Mrs C’s views about what A needs, or to A’s needs. At this 
time, Mrs C is the most emotionally attuned to A and her views and opinions about what might be 
best for A need to be heard and respected. Mrs C also needs to be reassured that the Court 
understands that she was under pressure to accede to the agreements being sought from her under 
cross-examination and that at even one year old, A may not be ready for the level of contact, 
particularly overnight contact, that was being sought.  
[20] Mrs C lives a short distance away from Mr B. The time between the households by car, on the 
evidence, varied from around five to 10 minutes to between 10 to 15 minutes. Regardless, it is a 
relatively short distance. To date, A has been breastfed on demand and is fed around every one and 
half hours. Mrs C wants to continue breastfeeding as she did with her four other daughters. 
[21] Before moving on to the matters that I need to consider, I also want to record that in the 
background are guardianship issues which Mr and Mrs C and Mr B need to consider. The law 
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provides that Mr B, along with Mrs C, is a guardian to A. This is irrespective of the circumstances 
surrounding her birth and the role played by Mr C as Mrs C’s husband and father to A. It is 
unfortunate that the legislation does not provide the Court with a greater discretion to enable it to 
take a more nuanced approach to guardianship by recognising the range of circumstances within 
which a child may be raised. I express my disquiet that, for example, Mr B should at the present 
time have guardianship authority while Mr C has none, and that Mr B’s authority is the same as Mrs 
C with the attaching power to withhold his agreement to matters that may significantly affect the 
lives of Mr and Mrs C and their family in circumstances where Mr B presently has only a limited 
role in A’s life. I would prefer that the Court have the authority pursuant to s29 of COCA to be able 
to vary Mr B’s guardianship authority for specific purposes and periods that may better reflect the 
reality and nature of these circumstances. However, this discretion is not available and can only be 
provided by legislative amendment. At present my hands are tied. Accordingly, if Mr and Mrs C 
wish to relocate as Mr C's job may dictate, they cannot presently by law do so without prior 
consultation with, and agreement from, Mr B as a joint and equal guardian with Mrs C in respect of 
A. They would otherwise need the assistance of the Court in respect of such matters. It is also not 
surprising that the communication between Mr B and Mrs C is presently non-existent. It may need 
to be this way to ensure the recovery of Mr and Mrs C’s relationship, which is a matter of great 
importance to A’s security and wellbeing, as well as for Mr and Mrs C’s other children. The Court 
ought not disregard the reality and importance of this boundary by imposing unrealistic 
requirements upon Mr and Mrs C at this time, with respect to the involvement of Mr B in their lives. 
[22] The law may also consider there is dysfunction in the guardianship relationship in 
circumstances where a realistic consideration of the issue may conclude that the situation is not, in 
fact, dysfunctional but normative. This is illustrated by the fact that there is now before the Court an 
application by Mr B revolving around a dispute about A's name. That application is not the focus of 
this hearing due to a direction made by the registry to that effect. Accordingly, a further fixture will 
need to be allocated by the registry so that that issue can be resolved at a later date unless the parties 
can reach a prior agreement. I encourage the further exploration of agreement as a result of the 
outcomes from today’s hearing, and take the opportunity to comment that because A is being 
brought up within the C family by Mr and Mrs C, it would be normal to expect that A carry the C 
name, in the same manner as her mother, father and siblings. She may not wish to be singled out 
and made to feel different by imposing a requirement that she carry Mr B’s surname. Accordingly, I 
urge the parties to reconsider the issue of A’s name in light of these matters. Without 
predetermining the issue, if agreement is not reached and I am required to hear the matter, I would 
be interested to hear the position of the parties if A was to remain AC but has B added as an 
additional middle name. The parties’ position on this, as well as the prospect of agreement by Mr B 
to Mr C being made an additional guardian for A to recognise the reality of his role and relationship 
to A, may signal to me the progress being made in centralising, respecting and prioritising to A the 
significant relationships in her life as the means to determine her welfare and best interests, rather 
than focussing on rights, as I suspect may presently be the case. 
[23] Turning again to Mrs C’s breastfeeding relationship with A, in support of Mrs C's position, her 
midwife Ms L gave evidence in relation to matters which I found to be within the area of her 
experience and expertise, notwithstanding only having been a midwife for a short period of time. 
She supported breastfeeding as the most desirable way for a mother to feed her baby, consistent 
with Ministry of Health guidelines and policy. She confirmed that breastfeeding is optimal, in her 
opinion, for the first two years of a child's life and for the first six months she believed a child 
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should be fed exclusively with breast milk. This is consistent with the view expressed by the World 
Health Organisation in information provided to me by Mrs C’s counsel. In addition, art 24 of 
UNCRC provides at 24(2)(d) that: 
 
State parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that all segments of society, in 
particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are 
supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of 
breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents. 
 
That is, UNCRC supports the State ensuring caregivers of children have access to education as to 
the advantages of breastfeeding, This extends, in my view, to support for implementing 
breastfeeding because of such advantages. Ms L also gave evidence as to what she saw as risks 
associated with A not continuing to be breastfed and risks in relation to her being bottle-fed. In 
particular, she talked of risks to A's health in terms of illness, greater propensity for hospital 
admissions, gastrointestinal infections, risk of asthma, eczema and obesity.  
[24] Central to this case is the issue of breastfeeding. The fact that A is breastfed is a relevant and 
weighty matter which I need to consider along with the s 5 principles to which I have already 
referred. That A is being breastfed is extremely important in enhancing optimal relational, social 
and health outcomes for A. If breastfeeding is available to A, it is a relationship that should be 
encouraged and protected, and not put at risk by compromise. It represents a continuation of the 
mother-child relationship that had already developed as a result of gestation when A was formed 
and grew within the intimacy and safety of Mrs C’s body. That this is important should not be 
minimised as being just Mrs C’s perspective. I record that in her evidence she did not agree to 
express breast milk for the purpose of facilitating Mr B's care of A but when pressed, indicated a 
willingness to breastfeed A while she is in her father's care. I again express regret that Mrs B was 
put in this position as a result of this hearing. A mother should not be pressured to express her 
breast milk for another person to feed it to her child when she is willing and able to maintain for 
herself the natural mother function of breastfeeding. This is the situation, but for a request from Mr 
B that he undertake A’s feeding in place of Mrs C, preferably utilising Mrs C’s breast milk to do so. 
I find that this not only fails to dignify the mother-child breastfeeding relationship but also reduces 
breastfeeding to a utility. The Family Court ought not to allow itself to be drawn into making 
directions that fail to protect the mother-child relationship by reflecting such an approach. 
[25] My assessment of the evidence is that, contrary to Mr B’s assertions, Mrs C is not using her 
breastfeeding relationship to keep Mr B at arm's length. The fact is that the gendered nature of the 
role and function of a mother towards her child through breastfeeding means that Mr B cannot 
participate in this. Nor should he. It is a father’s role at this time to protect and enable, not harass, 
the mother as she undertakes this function on behalf of them both in seeking to give A the very best 
start in life. I also find that it is not unreasonable that Mr and Mrs C may wish to keep Mr B at 
arm’s length at this time, as they seek to rebuild their marriage. It is commendable that they are 
seeking to do so. A needs their relationship to be as strong and secure as possible, with the careful 
development of Mr B’s relationship with A, supported by Mr and Mrs C, being overlaid on this 
foundation. 
[26] Nonetheless, A should grow up knowing she has two fathers, and that her reality is not 
uncommon for many children in New Zealand society. There is plenty of time for this. The 
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circumstances in which A came into this world should not be a source of shame or difference for 
her, and it is incumbent upon Mr and Mrs C as well as Mr B, to sensitively manage this situation for 
A. I propose providing the specialist counselling resource available to the Court, to assist the parties 
in this process. 
[27] Mr T's proposal for contact with A is, in my view, unrealistic given her age and her stage of 
development in life. She needs stability and security, with contact with her father carefully 
developed in line with her social, developmental, psychological and cognitive milestones. The 
reality is that Mrs C is A's primary attachment figure. However, A does also need to develop a 
secure attachment to her father and the issue I need to decide is how that is going to occur so as to 
meet A's needs. I am having to make that decision in the absence of the ability of A's parents to 
make that decision themselves. I am, however, able to draw on social science research which 
suggests that the development of A’s attachment with Mr B should be safely and optimally 
developed through short, regular contact of about an hour to an hour and a half several times each 
week, recognising A’s present age, stage of development and the fact that she is being breastfed. It 
would then be expected, as the parenting relationship between Mr B and Mrs C develops over time, 
that contact by A with Mr B would increase; the counselling and FDR mediation processes which I 
am putting in place are to support and encourage the longer-term ability of A’s parents to reach 
flexible, child-centred contact arrangements as she grows older.    
[28] It is also my view that the contact proposed by Mrs C is more reasonable at the present time, 
but also reflects the pressure that I detect has been exerted on her. Her desire to maintain a 
breastfeeding relationship with A is laudable and must be supported. It is central to A’s welfare and 
best interests, both short term and long term, and Mr B’s contact with A must be subservient to this 
reality. Mr B is not excluded; it is his role, along with Mr C, to encourage, support and protect Mrs 
C in her present provision of breastfeeding to A. It will be Mrs C’s role to engage in facilitative 
gatekeeping practices, opening up to Mr B opportunities for relationship by him with A for the 
future, as A becomes less dependent on her and is encouraged and able to develop other healthy, 
secure and significant relationships. I expect and trust her to engage in this process, reflecting her 
desire to provide to A the opportunity for a healthy, secure relationship with Mr B as well as with 
Mr C. 
[29] Having weighed all the evidence, taking into account the principles in ss 4 and 5 of the Act, 
and recording that A is too young to express any views in terms of s 6 of the Act, I accordingly 
make the following interim parenting orders: 
 
Orders and directions 
(a) A is to be in the day-to-day care of her mother Mrs C 
(b) Mr B shall have contact with A, as facilitated by Mr and Mrs C:  
(i)  Every Monday, Thursday and Friday from 10.30 am until 12.00 noon 
and 
(ii) Such other additional times as may be agreed between Mr B and Mrs C. 
(c) I ask the Registrar to refer Mr and Mrs C and Mr B to specialist counselling pursuant 
to s46G of COCA to address strategies to develop healthy, respectful communication 
between them. I also ask that the brief include education as to the differing, gender-
based roles of motherhood and fatherhood, and how the fatherhood roles of each of 
Mr B and Mr C may be complementary of each other. I expect such processes may 
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also at appropriate times include Mr and Mrs C’s four daughters, in understanding 
and developing their relationships with not only A but also their parents, together 
with Mr B and his place in their family as a result of his relationship with A. I 
suggest 15 sessions be allocated. 
(d) Upon completion of specialist counselling, I refer the parties pursuant to s46F(2) of 
COCA to FDR mediation to explore finalising these proceedings with a relational 
focus and by consent. I recommend that in addition to Mrs C and Mr B, Mr C also 
attend. I also flag now my expectation that any final orders able to be made by 
consent as a result of agreements reached at mediation, should also include 
consideration of the issues of A’s name, Mr C being appointed an additional 
guardian to A and the parenting order as to day-to-day care of A being made in 
favour of Mr C in addition to Mrs C. 
(e) I direct a case management review in February 2017 to consider what further steps 
may be required in respect of these proceedings, in the event that any matters remain 
outstanding at that time.  
[30] Finally, I just want to say to Mr and Mrs C and Mr B, as A's parents, that I hope that as a result 
of these interim orders and the guidance that has been offered as to the way forward, you will now 
able to put aside the stress which a hearing inevitably causes. I trust that you will continue to 
develop your complementary mothering and fathering relationships with A and with each other, that 
you will seek professional assistance when you need it to support your shared parenting 
responsibilities, and that you will hopefully not require the future involvement of the Family Court 
again as you engage in the task of raising A between you, mindful and respecting of your respective 
roles and functions. 
 
